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ABSTRACT 
This thesis develops a normative theory for regulating lawyers driven by (1) 
community concern with access to justice, and (2) empirically grounded analysis of the 
legal profession. Clients and community are found to evaluate lawyers according to 
how well they assist citizens attain justice through law. Yet it is foolish to expect 
lawyers' justice to achieve social justice: Law is limited by expense, irrelevance, 
ineffectiveness and co-option by powerful parties. Lawyers cannot be reformed and 
regulated to satisfy community concerns without some broader vision of what social 
and political arrangements should be available for doing justice in democratic societies 
and how lawyers' justice might contribute to them. The thesis therefore iteratively 
cycles between normative political theory and explanatory analysis of law and 
lawyers in order to design improvements to the institutions that guarantee access to 
justice for citizens, and as a result, to the regulation of legal professions to ensure 
lawyers contribute to the practice of justice. 
Part One of the thesis joins the deliberative democratic theory of neo-republicans such 
as Pettit and Sunstein with the law and society tradition of research on the limits and 
possibilities of law. The objective of the mutual adjustment of these two traditions is 
to propose a practical model for improving access to justice which incorporates 
lawyers' justice but goes beyond it. Citizens should have access to (1) face-to-face 
justice in informal settings transacted under the shadow of legal norms, (2) the 
coercive justice of law where informal justice fails, and (3) social and political action 
for collective challenge of structural and cultural injustices which are sidelined by 
individualised justice processes. Each method is an essential dimension of the 
practice of justice in democracy, and each divorced from the others will likely do 
injustice. It is proposed that large institutions should be required to develop access to 
justice policies that implement this model to escape reliance on access to lawyers' 
justice alone. Key failures by lawyers to contribute the justice of law to these access to 
justice institutions are found to occur when they (1) provide clients with bad service, 
(2) assist powerful clients to dominate others, (3) dominate each other in professional 
relationships, and ( 4) crush other forms of justice with the ideology of legal justice. 
If lawyers are to contribute to the democracy of justice, they must themselves be 
subject to it. Part Two proposes a theory for regulating the legal profession by (1) 
renewing lawyers' pre-existing ideology to give them practical access to justice ideals, 
(2) enculturating lawyers against domination via practices of professional community 
and self-regulation, and (3) rendering such self-regulation subject to dynamic review 
111 
and reform (including competition reform) through the institutionalisation of 
community input into democratic deliberation about professional government that is 
backed by state willingness to forge change. The thesis concludes that just as clients 
and community are bound to disappointment if they expect lawyers' justice to deliver 
social justice, so is contemporary normative political theory misguided in its faith in 
the statist promise of lawyers' justice. Democratic justice can be redeemed, according 
to this thesis, by counterpoising the institutionalisation of justice without lawyers 
against the reformed regulation of lawyers' justice. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Doorkeepers to Many Rooms 
I. Lawyers' Justice, Lawyers' Domination 
(i) Failures of Lawyers, Failures of Access to Justice 
Lawyers frequently disappoint expectations that they will faithfully deliver 
affordable, accessible legal justice to clients and community. The ominous 
statement which begins Kafka's famous parable of the futility of modern law-
"Before the law stands a doorkeeper" (Kafka 1992:285)-sums up much of our 
experience with access to legal justice.1 Lawyers block the way, daring us to try 
gaining justice without them. Kafka's villainous doorkeeper with "big sharp 
nose and long, thin, black Tartar beard" (Kafka 1992:285), who fails to grant 
citizens equal and fair access to the justice promised by law, fits well the 
gloomy picture of the legal profession painted by much contemporary socio-
legal scholarship and by many advocates for the reform of the profession's (se.f-) 
regulation. 
The rich and sophisticated gain easy access to "justice" through a legal 
profession only too willing to bend the law to suit the purposes of those who 
can pay (eg McBamet 1994, Mann 1985). Yet lawyers are generally unavailable 
and unaffordable to "downsiders" (Cain 1994)-the poor and the different. 
Even when lawyers are available, they frequently dominate such clients with 
pressure to plead guilty, accept a quick but unfair settlement or abandon their 
full rights of legal process in the interests of expediency ( eg Baldwin & 
McConville 1977, Blumberg 1967, Felstiner 1995, Hattie & McGrath 1986, 
McConville & Mirsky 1990, Parker 1994, Rosenthal 1977). Because lawyers do 
their most careful and creative work for rich clients, the discourses of law 
become increasingly irrelevant, and oppressive, to those who have little access 
to them (Cain 1994, McBamet 1994, Powell 1993). The law reflects the concerns 
of those who use it most, vivid in the technicalities of tax avoidance or 
1 This grim parable forms the climax of Kafka's novel, The Trial which was first 
published in German in 1925: A man 11 from the country" comes seeking the radiant 
justice of law, in the naive belief that it should be" accessible at all times and to 
everyone". The doorkeeper tells him that he cannot be allowed entry "at the moment", 
and that if the man ignores his veto, he will only meet opposition from a series of more 
terrible gatekeepers who guard the inner sanctums of the law. Despite his many bribes 
and wearisome attempts to be admitted, the doorkeeper always refuses to allow the 
man in, until eventually the man has sacrificed everything in attempts to bribe the 
gatekeeper, and dies as the doorkeeper announces that he will now shut the gate which 
was meant only for him. 
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takeovers; and excludes those who use it least, biased against women and 
ethnic minorities in language and content. Far from fighting for justice against 
these tendencies, the profession as a whole seems engaged in a cynical attempt 
to manipulate the exclusionary capacities of lawyers' justice in the attempt to 
further their own market advantage and social status (Abel 1988, 1989a, Larson 
1977). If they are not actively antipathetic to community concerns about justice, 
they are apathetic, showing little concern for the unjust effects of their work. 
The failure of access to legal justice is not just the failure of lawyers; it also 
reflects the bankruptcy of a whole legal system which is so formalised and over-
professionalised that it has little to do with justice at all. Law and society 
research describes a procedural and remote system of legal justice which has 
little meaning to ordinary citizens, is ineffectual in reaching the culture and 
consciousness of everyday life, and is only utilised effectively by the rich and 
powerful. Legalism dominates our understanding of justice, stealing disputes 
from the control of individuals and communities and providing solutions to 
injustices that are at best irrelevant and at worst oppressive (Auerbach 1983, 
Christie 1977, Goldberg et al 1985, MacDonald 1990, Merry 1990, 1993, Merry & 
Milner 1993). Legal norms that might promote justice are completely incapable 
of penetrating and changing everyday cultures and injustices unless supported 
by existing cultural norms, or supplemented with concerted and persuasive 
social and political action (Galanter 1981, Krygier 1996, Rosenberg 1991). Yet 
the coercion of law is an effective tool of injustice in the hands of powerful 
players who are able to subvert it to their own purposes and even dictate its 
content through domination of political and legal processes (Fitzpatrick 1992, 
Galanter 1974, Norrie 1993). Law might be severely limited in the justice it can 
achieve, but that does not mean the alternatives are any better. Socio-legal 
scholars have also questioned non-legal alternatives, such as alternative dispute 
resolution, as entrenching dominations that the procedures of law at least 
attempt to guard against (Abel 1982b, Cain 1985, Nader 1980). 
How can institutions for justice be organised so that access to justice is not 
constrained by access to law nor limited by the rule of lawyers? Do lawyers as 
"gatekeepers" bear any responsibility for remedying the injustices and failures 
of the legal system? Can their regulation and organisation be reformed in such 
a way that it will make any difference to citizens' ability to access justice? Or 
are lawyers' justice and access to justice permanently incompatible? 
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( ii) Reforming the Legal Profession 
Reforms have already substantially changed the legal professions of Australia, 
Canada, the United Kingdom and United States during the 1970s, 1980s and 
1990s (Cownie 1990, Evans & Trebilcock 1982, Freidson 1983, Powell 1985, 
Weisbrot 1993). The legal aid and community legal centre movements from the 
1960s emphasised the responsibility of lawyers to increase access to legal 
services, and to improve the quality of services given to the poor (Chesterman 
1996, Cooper 1983, Garth 1980). Self-regulation has been adjusted by the 
introduction of lay representatives to disciplinary authorities, and independent 
boards and commissioners to oversee regulation (Powell 1986, Mark 1995). The 
dominant normative base for the design of new regulatory institutions for the 
legal profession are found in scholarly critiques of the profession from 
sociologists and economists about the monopolising and status enhancement 
projects of the profession (Abel 1988, 1989a, Weisbrot 1990). Sociological and 
economic critiques of the profession have been strong on motivating 
competition reform and the liberalisation of the market for justice services in 
order to prevent restrictive and self-serving professional practices. Yet they are 
weak on suggesting what positive role lawyers might play in helping citizens 
achieve justice, and in suggesting substantive goals for the regulation of the 
legal profession. As this thesis demonstrates, they fall far short of meeting the 
access to justice aspirations with which clients and community challenge 
lawyers. 
In response to the limitations of the market control critique, some scholars have 
looked for normative ideals for lawyers in traditional elements of legal 
professionalism. While the new champions of legal professionalism are not 
naive about past failures of the profession, they do see the potential for 
immanent self-critique in the ideology of the profession, as well as for positive 
visions of what lawyering might achieve. In a paper on the "redemption of 
professionalism," Gordon and Simon (1992:231) write that "after both the 
weaknesses of the [legal professional] ideal and the bar's faithlessness to it are 
acknowledged there remains a residuum of the professional vision with 
significant normative appeal and, though this is far more speculative, social 
potency". In other work, Gordon has excavated an historical republican ideal of 
lawyering which could motivate better advocacy for the poor and more social 
responsibility in the way the rich are served in contemporary contexts (1985, 
1988, 1990; see also Luban 1988). 
In Beyond Monopoly, Halliday (1987) finds that legal professions have a capacity 
not only to pursue market projects, but also to assist the state in governing more 
3 
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effectively by taking responsibility for rationalising and improving the law; and 
in Lawyers and the Rise of Western Political Liberalism, Halliday and Karpik 
(forthcoming) show how lawyers have historically helped to preserve and 
strengthen the rule of law and the separation of powers and therefore kept 
political liberalism alive. Dingwall and Fenn (1987) also see potential for the 
social contract between profession and state to be revitalised to ensure that the 
profession improves its self-regulation. These approaches attempt to 
rehabilitate traditional functionalist theories of the professions (Durkheim 1992, 
Parsons 1954a, 1954b) by putting them forward as normative ideals rather than 
analytic descriptions (see Freidson 1992). While this work provides some 
positive ideals for lawyers, on the whole it remains too focused on legal culture, 
and not sufficiently cognisant of the wider context of citizens' aspirations for 
justice and the inevitable failure of lawyers to provide it. 
A more promising way to answer the question of whether and how legal 
professionalism can be "redeemed" is to look beyond lawyers and their 
ideology to how lawyers' justice fits into wider social and political conceptions 
of justice. Within this context, the potential, the purposes and the perimeters of 
lawyers' justice can be understood and used to guide the reform of legal 
professionalism and regulation. Part One of this thesis proposes a model of 
justice as the deliberative mechanisms by which citizens decide how to organise 
their lives together and contest actions and decisions that are not made 
according to shared ideals. It also outlines how access to justice-which goes 
beyond access to law and lawyers' justice-might be institutionalised in a 
strong deliberative democracy. Part Two shows how this broad understanding 
of access to justice might revitalise the narrower domain of legal 
professionalism with realistic ideals for the practice of justice, and suggests a 
model for rendering lawyers themselves subject to the justice of deliberative 
democracy. 
This thesis therefore develops a normative theory for the regulation of the legal 
profession by first building a democratic theory of what access to justice ought 
to mean and how it might be institutionalised, and then asking how lawyers 
might contribute to its practice. Rather than treating the design of regulatory 
institutions for the legal profession as a case study in regulatory policy, this 
thesis sees it equally as an application of normative political theory. In place of 
a focus on technical rules and specific structures, it develops a broad-based 
theory of the policies, processes and institutions that ought to inform the 
regulation of legal professions in a variety of places, times and contexts. Instead 
of seeing regulatory issues as narrowly confined to the legal or market 
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structures governing the profession, it looks at the many ways, formal and 
informal, by which we can ensure that lawyers behave according to access to 
justice norms. And rather than concluding with a static model of lawyer 
regulation, it proposes a dynamic theory for regulating the legal profession 
according to the requirements of deliberative democracy-a deliberative 
democracy to which lawyers themselves contribute the justice of law. 
( iii) Methodology: Between Facts and N arms 
As Dunn (1994:222) writes, the failure of the dominant political theories of 
"bourgeois liberal republic" has been failure of the technological capacity for 
institutional design-the "failure to specify an array of institutions and 
practices capable of furnishing its subjects with security of life and capable of 
protecting that array against internal and external threat". Dunn's criticism is 
apposite. This thesis attempts a partial remedy to the problem by suggesting 
some practical details for the reform of legal institutions of a type found to be 
lacking in the leading theories of deliberative democracy of Habermas (1996) 
and Pettit (1997). 
The thesis attempts to remedy the failure of democratic institutional design in 
the domain of lawyers and access to justice through an analysis founded on 
constant dialogue between normative and explanatory theory. Rather than a 
more orthodox social scientific presentation (where a powerful explanatory 
theory of an empirical phenomenon is presented and rounded off with a few 
normative implications) or a political theory (where a strong normative thesis is 
established and then garnished with one or two comments on how it might 
apply in practice), this thesis maintains a contextualised dialogue between the 
normative and the explanatory throughout. The goal is to design a model for 
the regulatory reform of legal professions for access to justice grounded in the 
possible by means of credible explanatory and descriptive analysis. This 
requires a constant shuttling back and forth between the concepts and 
categories of normative and explanatory theory. 
In her empirical sociological work, Vaughan (1992, 1996) utilises a "theory 
elaboration method" for adjusting explanatory concepts developed by reference 
to research in one organisational form (perhaps at a macrolevel) against theories 
developed by reference to another (perhaps a microlevel case study). The 
concepts are then reevaluated in a macrolevel iteration of the analysis, a process 
that could be repeated through many case studies to produce an explanatory 
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theory powerful enough to apply generally.2 This thesis adopts an iterated 
adjustment method which moves between different types of theory (the 
normative and explanatory). In Habermas' . (1996) words, the method adopted 
moves "between facts and norms". It seeks to avoid the pitfalls Habermas 
(1996:42-81) points out with both the "objectivist disenchantment" (1996:43) of 
the sociology of law, and the "sociologically naive" (Bohman 1994:912) 
philosophy of justice, and to produce (at a rather more modest level of 
abstraction than Habermas) a policy-oriented theory of lawyers and their 
regulation for access to justice that is uncompromisingly pragmatic in its 
normativity. 
As this thesis will argue, much political theory falls into the trap of ignoring the 
realities of social life, while much social science fails for want of sufficient 
interest in normative ideals to supply visionary answers to policy problems. As 
Habermas (1996:66) writes: 
The philosophical discourse of justice misses the institutional 
dimension, toward which the sociological discourse on law is 
directed from the outset. Without the view of law as an empirical 
action system, philosophical concepts remain empty. However, 
insofar as the sociology of law insists on an objectivating view 
from the outside, remaining insensitive to the symbolic dimension 
whose meaning is only internally accessible, sociological 
perception falls into the opposite danger of remaining blind. 
The iterated adjustment between facts and norms employed in this thesis seeks 
to overcome these problems and provide a solid basis for the design of models 
for the reform of lawyers and access to justice. It is a tool for answering 
pressing policy and design questions about how to improve the achievement of 
community access to justice, and the place of state regulation, deregulation and 
self-regulation in legal professional government. 
Historically, this research began with the facts that both lawyers' regulation and 
access to justice were urgent issues of law reform throughout the common law 
world, and the intuition that they ought to be related as a matter of institutional 
design. Community and client concerns about lawyers were found to be 
concerns about access to justice, a concern that raised both normative and 
empirical questions of whether access to justice is an important goal, whether it 
is relevant to lawyers and how it might be achieved. The concept of access to 
2 Also see Scheff's (1990:31, 180-181) method of "abduction" which shuttles back and 
forth between observation and imagination, induction and deduction and relates the 
specific to the general, the part to the whole and theory to research. 
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justice was developed and adjusted by reference to democratic theory and 
research on the operation of justice, resulting in a model for the improvement of 
access to justice and a concrete proposal for implementing it through mandated 
self-regulation of the large companies and government bodies that affect our 
everyday lives. 
The application of access to justice ideals to lawyers was further adjusted by 
reference to lawyers' own ideas of what their role ought to be. At the same 
time, the Australian process of regulatory reform to the legal profession was 
studied though interviews with lawyers and reformers using the difference 
discovery method of sampling (to pursue interviewees with new perspectives 
until different perspectives were exhausted). The data were analysed using 
Glaser and Strauss' (1967) constant comparative method to reveal the full range 
of perspectives and experiences reported by interviewees (by comparing each 
new bite of information with the previous ones until no new categories of 
experience were being discovered).3 
In short, the methodology of this thesis can be summarised as: 
(1) the iterated adjustment of normative and explanatory theory; 
(2) a difference discovery method to sample perspectives on regulatory reform 
of the legal profession; 
(3) a constant comparative method to analyse them. 
The Australian case was used as the testing ground for conceptions of lawyers' 
justice and how these might fit with a normative theory. Where there is 
illuminating data in the published literature that complements or qualifies this 
picture from other countries, it is used. The convergences with the Australian 
picture are more striking than the divergences from it, and the model developed 
should apply equally well to other common law countries at least. It was found 
that constructive change could be explained where there was a deliberative 
process of reform, a finding that adds to the normative/ explanatory theory of 
responsive regulation (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992), and justifies a deliberative 
democratic model of regulation for lawyers. 
Thus, the thesis moves from a summary of research on community complaints 
about lawyers, to the normative theory of access to justice in deliberative 
democracy, to empirical research on the regulation and nature of the legal 
profession, and back to questions of deliberative democracy. The result is a 
3 The sampling and analysis methodology are explained in detail in Chapter Seven (pp 
157-160). 
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model able to link both community and lawyerly concerns about access to 
justice with significant insights into what democracy ought to be and what the 
practice of law and justice is. 
IL Plan of the Thesis 
(i) Part One 
Part One of this thesis sets the context for determining the proper place of 
lawyers in a just democracy by proposing an integrative theory for the design of 
access to justice institutions, and indicating what lawyers' justice could be 
expected to contribute to access to justice. 
Chapter Two establishes the nexus between access to justice and the regulation of 
lawyers by showing that clients and community judge the conduct of individual 
lawyers and law firms according to how well they give access to justice. Yet the 
nexus has been broken by disciplinary and regulatory institutions for the legal 
profession which are rarely, if ever, informed by issues of access and justice. 
Clients and community on the one hand, and professional associations and 
practitioners on the other, seem to have radically different ideas about what 
role, if any, access to justice should play in professional regulation, organisation 
and ideals. The remainder of the thesis addresses the challenge that client and 
community complaints raise-of ensuring that the practice of lawyering and the 
goal of citizens' access to justice are married in theory and policy. 
Access to law is a fundamental way of constituting a just democracy by 
affording citizens a means to contest and debate public and private actions, test 
them against accepted social and political ideals and seek to rectify them when 
found wanting. Chapter Three argues that access to justice should mean the 
ability to participate in all the processes by which people can (successfully) 
make claims against individuals and institutions that they ought to be able to 
make in order to advance shared ideas of good social and political relations . 
Such a definition of access to justice opens up a radically wider vision of justice 
than a narrow concern with improving lawyers and the provision of legal 
services to the poor. 
Chapter Four analyses how states and reformers have attempted to guarantee 
access to justice through four waves of reform over the last thirty years: (1) 
legal aid, (2) public interest law, (3) alternative dispute resolution, and ( 4) 
competition policy. Individually and cumulatively these waves have helped, 
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but have been unsuccessful at providing sufficient access to law, or developing 
satisfactory alternatives for justice. Communitarian face-to-face justice and 
social and political action have been seen as disparate alternatives or 
subordinate supplements to legal justice rather than complementary pieces of a 
whole picture of just democracy. An integrated access to justice policy is 
proposed where access to informal and political means of doing justice are 
explicitly seen to be as important as access to law. The relative merits of formal 
and informal justice, of legal and political justice, have been much debated, but 
this model integrates them so that (1) the potential for doing justice without law 
but under the shadow of law is maximised, and (2) individualised justice flows 
into collective action for justice, and collective justice movements shape and 
participate in individual claims for justice (see Figure 4.3, p 93). 
Chapter Five focuses on the problem of legalism's stranglehold on practical 
access to justice institutions and proposes a possible fifth wave of access to 
justice reform which implements the insights of the previous chapter. The fifth 
wave would focus on improving access to justice in the institutions where 
people transact their daily lives-schools, workplaces, shops, government 
departments and families. Such a strategy escapes the reliance of access to 
justice policy-making on formal legalistic processes and lawyers' services, by 
requiring these institutions to develop and refine their own access to justice 
policies which link internal justice processes with external and independent 
oversight. The fifth wave is posited not only as a desirable development, but 
also a feasible one given the impetus of mandated self-regulation and the rubric 
of the new regulatory state (Majone 1994, Hood & Scott 1996). 
(ii) Part Two 
Part Two develops a democratic theory for the regulation of the legal profession 
guided by the need to ensure that the profession takes responsibility for 
assisting citizens as they seek to bring injustices into the light of deliberative 
justice. It proposes a dynamic, deliberative process in which state, community 
and profession each have a legitimate voice, and regulatory strategies of 
professional community, self-regulation, competition and accountability each 
play a role. 
Chapter Six shows that lawyers' traditions of ethical self-regulation already 
provide ideals the profession has used to promote itself as having an access to 
justice role: 1) the liberal advocacy ideal, (2) the gatekeeper ideal, (3) the public 
interest ideal and (4) the ideal of professional community or collegiality. These 
ideals can be reformulated slightly to address the problems of lawyers' conduct 
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identified in Part One and to provide a set of goals according to which the 
contemporary profession can be regulated and organised. The crucial question 
however, is what techniques are required to achieve this. 
Chapter Seven introduces the main regulatory strategies (professional 
community, self-regulation, competition and accountability) that different 
groups claim can be used to reform and regulate the legal profession by 
reference to the 1990s debate over reforming Australian lawyers. Interviews 
with lawyers, reformers and regulators in Australia using the difference 
discovery method show that reforming the regulation of the legal profession 
requires a deliberative process and a regulatory mix that can cope with the 
differences revealed. 
Chapter Eight shows that a deliberative process motivates a mix of trusting and 
distrusting regulatory strategies that are justified by sociological theory and 
empirical evidence about the legal professions of common law countries. It is 
also the most democratic way to regulate the profession to ensure that it realises 
its justice ideals. 
Chapter Nine outlines a normative theory for the design of regulatory 
institutions of the legal profession based on deliberation between profession, 
state and community. It shows that within a deliberative process regulatory 
techniques of professional community, self-regulation, market reform and 
institutions of accountability can complement and balance one another as long 
as improvement of access to justice is the agreed goal of the deliberative 
process. Such a process can work if (1) lawyers are encouraged to discuss and 
revitalise the ideals of their justice tradition among themselves, and to justify 
their position in any community debate according to those ideals, (2) 
community groups that will argue for access to justice concerns are nurtured 
and represented in the regulatory processes of the profession, and (3) 
government regulators and reformers listen to the access to justice concerns of 
the community and the technical expertise of the profession, and communicate 
their willingness to forge change. 
Parts One and Two of this thesis therefore address two separate problems, one 
mainly exogenous to the legal profession, one mainly endogenous: (1) the 
profession's place in the world from the external perspective of access to justice 
and (2) the issue of how to regulate lawyers given the nature of the profession 
and the regulatory techniques available. The normative theory proposed for 
securing access to justice and regulating the profession shuttles repeatedly 
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between its basis in both empirical analysis and political theory. This thesis is 
throughout a work of institutional design, of policy-oriented dialogue between 
the normative and explanatory. 
Chapter Ten concludes the bilateral dialogue by putting the regulation of the 
legal profession and the theory of deliberative democracy together, 
summarising how each can inform the other. The political theory of 
deliberative democracy helps us understand what role lawyers' justice might 
play in achieving just social and political relations and how processes of 
democratic regulation can effectively remedy lawyers' domination. But 
political theory itself is often too focused on lawyers' justice, on formal 
participation in the public political sphere and on the need to remedy abuse of 
public (not private) power to provide a complete conception of what roles 
lawyers should play (and not play) in contributing to justice. 
The detailed study of the legal profession and access to justice institutions in 
this thesis can challenge the idealistic democratic and legal theory of writers like 
Pettit (1997) and Habermas (1996) to grapple with the facts that: 
(1) law and lawyers are integral to achieving justice, yet are very limited in 
what they achieve; 
(2) justice can be done in many rooms and through many means; 
(3) citizens may be able to share in the government of their communities and 
the practice of justice by realistic participation in local and private 
institutions, not just in public deliberation that feeds into central law-making 
processes; 
( 4) the limiting of private power is as important as the limiting of public 
power in any theory of how a just democracy should be organised. 
In Between Facts and Norms, Habermas (1996) makes the most ambitious 
contemporary attempt to develop a realistic theory of how law does and should 
contribute to the constitution of a just deliberative democracy. He seeks to 
show how his (intentionally) unrealistic earlier paradigm of the ideal speech 
situation (Habermas 1987) might be transformed into a practical ideal that can 
be institutionalised through deliberative democracy "in which law mediates 
between normative demands of reason and the empirical facts of power and 
complexity" (Bohman 1994:899). Ironically, his quest for a means to make 
effective the personalised communicative action of the lifeworld leads him into 
a political theory, like much political theory, in which formal law and 
centralised decision-making are too prominent: All decisions and actions, even 
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though they originate in diffuse local lifeworlds, must be funnelled through the 
centralised decision-making structures of state and law if they are to contribute 
to the construction and maintenance of a just democracy. 
There is too much statist politics and too much law in Habermas for it to be a 
practical theory of a just democracy (see also Bohman 1994:920-921). Yet this is 
the stuff of much political theory. By contrast, in another area of scholarly 
endeavour, reformers and researchers advocate the privileging of the 
"lifeworld", of diffuse local and individualised means of face-to-face justice 
without lawyers, as a solution to the limitations of centralised law in doing 
justice. This approach to justice is also flawed. As writers like Abel point out, it 
contains too little law and too little politics to solve fundamental injustices (Abel 
1982b, Cain 1985, Nader 1980). It does not address adequately the permeation 
of structures of domination throughout whole communities (making idyllic 
communal justice impossible). Nor does it have a normative vision of political 
and legal institutions for alleviating that domination. 
This thesis advocates a practical theory of justice which is more than the law 
and politics most traditional theories offer, but also more than the 
communitarian justice of the alternative dispute resolution movement. It is a bi-
directional approach to doing justice in which it is recognised that the 
centralised justice of law and state politics will only ever be directly applied to a 
handful of injustices, while the diffuse and decentralised justice (or injustice) of 
face-to-face relations in families, schools, workplaces, neighbourhoods and 
community organisations will apply to many daily situations. A credible 
architecture of access to justice must be about how what happens in one room 
affects what happens in others. The model developed here gives each form of 
justice a role in conditioning and supplementing the other; the few cases which 
are the subject of formal politics and lawyers' justice create the norms and the 
potential for coercive enforcement that alleviate domination among informal 
and diffuse local means of justice. The space for local and informal justice to 
grow can enable a more practical, democratic architecture of justice where 
voices from the basement are more audible and might have an influence on 
centralised justice. This model opens the doors to many rooms, rendering 
implausible any theory of justice confined to the corridors leading to the 
courtroom. 
This thesis contributes not only to the public policy of regulation of the legal 
profession, but also to the political theory of justice and deliberative democracy 
through critique and renewal of theorists such as Habermas. It suggests a 
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methodological variation for qualitative data collection in the form of a 
difference discovery method. It contributes to the theory of institutional design 
by discussing how in one key domain the normative and the empirical can be 
linked to inform one another. Too much political philosophy is built on 
phenomenologically empty categories quite tangential to explanatory theories 
and empirical evidence. Too much explanatory theory is divorced from crucial 
questions in the political philosophy of the phenomenon. The model of iterated 
adjustment between the normative and explanatory adopted in this thesis is a 
discipline against, on the one hand, choosing categories in the normative theory 
of justice that can never map onto a powerful explanatory theory, and, on the 
other, pursuing explanation devoid of the ability to address crucial normative 
questions. The study of lawyers' justice, lawyers' domination invokes 
fundamental questions about social justice and social domination. Adequate 
answers involve balancing the institutionalisation of justice without lawyers 
with the institutionalisation of justice as a practice of lawyers. Chapter Two 
begins by showing how clients and community raise access to justice concerns 
for lawyers. 
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CHAPTER2 
Judging Lawyers 
I. Introduction 
Although people generally ascribe a high social status to lawyers, they do not 
score them highly on ethics (eg Daniel 1983:118-122). According to the Morgan 
Gallup poll, Australians consistently rate lawyers badly on honesty and ethical 
standards in comparison with other professionals; pharmacists, doctors, 
dentists, bank managers, school teachers, engineers, police officers, university 
academics and accountants (Weisbrot 1990:18). Yale's 1982 review of US, 
Canadian, English and New South Wales (Australia) literature on public 
attitudes towards lawyers in comparison with other occupations found that 
surveys in all four regions consistently revealed negative opinions or 
impressions of lawyers, although US lawyers had the worst reputation (see also 
Galanter 1994). 
What is it that lawyers do so badly that people think they ought to do better? 
Section II of this chapter examines the evidence for what lawyers most 
commonly do wrong from the perspectives of clients and community. Section III 
compares client and community concerns with what professional associations 
and disciplinary authorities regulate and punish, and the problems that lawyers 
themselves identify with their profession. Figure 2.1 (p 41) summarises the 
findings. The data used are existing empirical literature on lawyers' ethical 
breaches and offences, on client complaints, and on public perceptions of 
lawyers as well as supplementary material from my own interviews with 
Australian lawyers reported in Chapter Seven.1 The purpose is not to determine 
the absolute frequency of unsatisfactory conduct, but to inquire into what 
people think is worthy of concern in lawyers' conduct: The facts of community 
complaints about lawyers are a basis for inferring community opinion on what 
the role of lawyers ought to be. 
Clients and community judge lawyers according to whether they provide good 
quality legal services that are accessible to all and whether they play their part 
in upholding the justice system. From the evidence of their complaints, 
members of the general community believe that lawyers' main role ought to be to 
1 The interview methodology and coding of respondents is explained in Chapter 
Seven (pp 157-160). 
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contribute in these ways to "access to justice". In contrast, professional 
associations and disciplinary authorities are more concerned with breaches of 
"professional community" than access to justice, while, ironically, women and 
minorities within the profession, as well as employee and non-city lawyers, 
complain that professional community often excludes them. 
This cleavage in the priority given to access to justice between clients and 
community on the one hand, and the legal profession on the other, is reflected in 
broader debate in the community on reform of the profession and the justice 
system. Reformers of the legal system often see the regulation of the legal 
profession as raising issues "of central importance to access to justice" (Access 
to Justice Advisory Committee 1994:65).2 Community groups agree; the groups 
which banded together in 1995 to produce a Consumer Justice Charter thought 
that the legal profession '' shared responsibility with governments for ensuring 
that the legal system meets the needs of the community" (Consumer Action 
1995:3).3 Yet in public debate the legal profession is reluctant to accept access 
to justice as its responsibility (eg Australian Lawyer 1994, Crennan 1994, Lewis 
1994, Tubbs 1995:14). 
Section IV of this chapter discusses the difference between public and 
profession on the fundamental goals of professional regulation as an 
introduction to the remaining chapters of Part One that examine the normative 
theory of access to justice and its institutionalisation, and discuss whether 
client and community expectations that the profession be oriented towards 
access to justice can form the basis for the regulation and reform of lawyers. 
2 The Australian Access to Justice Advisory Committee quoted here was asked to 
summarise the last decade of access to justice reform proposals in Australia for the 
national government. 
3 The coalition vvas initiated by the Consumers' Federation of Australia but included 
the National Association of Community Legal Centres, the Australian Council of 
Social Services, the Federation of Ethnic Communities Councils, the Australian 
Conservation Foundation and Disabled Peoples' International (Australia). The 
Charter states that, 
i. The training and practices of legal services providers should promote fairness, 
economy, accessibility and timeliness in the delivery of justice. 
ii. Structural reform and regulation of legal services providers should promote 
justice and the interests of the community. This includes ensuring that consumers 
are informed, empowered and protected in their dealings with legal service 
providers and that legal services are affordable. 
iii. Consumers of legal services should receive information and assistance 
necessary to make informed decisions about the conduct of their matter, including 
information about costs, risks, and options. 
iv. The activities of legal professional bodies should promote justice and the 
interests of the community above other interests. (Consumer Action 1995) 
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II. Access to Justice 
The main complaint about lawyers is that they do not adequately provide equal 
access to good quality legal services. The perception is that lawyers will not 
work as hard for poor clients as for rich ones and that they are primarily 
interested in making money. For example, the Australian Commission of 
Inquiry into Poverty surveyed people in three poorer areas of Sydney and found 
a common impression of lawyers as capable of giving good service, but generally 
giving it more to the rich than the poor. A large majority of the sample agreed 
with statements such as: "You can expect to get a fair and sympathetic 
reception in a solicitor's office" (7 4.4 percent) and "Lawyers have a good 
understanding of the problems of the ordinary man [sic]" (67.2 percent). Yet a 
majority also agreed that: "A lawyer will charge all he [sic] can" (60.5 percent); 
"For a price lawyers will use every trick in the books to help their clients" (71.4 
percent); "Lawyers are mainly interested in making money" (70.3 percent); and 
"Lawyers are not champions of the poor" ( 65.6 percent) (Cass & Sackville 
1975:82; see also Legal Access Marketing Group 1985:36).4 It seems likely that 
these perceptions are shared among the populations of common law countries. 
For example, Reasons, Bray and Chappell's (1989) Canadian survey found 
that, while a majority of the general public accepted that lawyers ethical 
standards were very high, they also thought that lawyers charged more than 
they were worth and disagreed that lawyers will work as hard for a poor client 
as for a rich one (see also Moore 1985). 
What are the specific problems of conduct community members identify? 
Clients most commonly complain, either to disciplinary authorities or to 
researchers, about (i) the quality of the service they receive from lawyers and (ii) 
over-charging and over-servicing (see Yale 1982 who reviewed the research in 
Canada, the US, Australia, the United Kingdom and New Zealand).5 The 
evidence of socio-legal researchers suggests that (iii) lawyers provide better 
services for the rich than the poor. The fact that lawyers work better for the rich 
than the poor is in turn the basis for a fourth community concern with 
lawyers-(iv) that they are in the business of distorting justice for the rich. 
4 Tomasic's (1985:101) late 1970s survey of Australian lawyers' attitudes suggests that 
they may share the community's cynicism about their profession. 
5 This is not to say that clients are always dissatisfied with the service they receive 
form lawyers. Indeed surveys usually show that a high percentage are satisfied with 
the service they have received (eg Lafontaine 1985:177). However their complaints 
show what clients are looking for in a lawyer. Thus Curran's survey (1985:109) 
showed that people look for commitment, integrity, competence, and 
fairness/ reasonableness of fee. 
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( i) Quality of Service 
Legal professional culture does not encourage lawyers to see their clients as 
consumers and seek to leave them satisfied with their service. Even some of the 
lawyers interviewed for Chapter Seven recognised this as a general failing of their 
profession: 
Lawyers often feel superior to clients but really it is the other way 
around. They are the ones keeping you fed. (MSS16) 
A lot of lawyers work on the basis: I'm a lawyer and I'll meet my 
expectations. That is back to front. It is a business. You have to be 
consumer-oriented. I've met a lot of professionals who think they 
can just sit in their offices and have the work come to them. That 
goes to their view of the legal system too. They ask how can I 
squeeze this client into the legal system, not how can we change 
things for the client, or present it to the client in a different way. 
(MSMll) 
Barristers in particular are often accused of having an arrogant attitude 
towards both clients and instructing solicitors: 
The barristers need reform rather more than solicitors do. They 
think they are a law to themselves. They will double book 
themselves and then drop you, or ask if they can put your trial on 
hold so they can go and do something else. They don't read the 
things you send them until you come and visit them. They just give 
bad service generally. (FSL7) 
A lawyer's lack of interest in providing high quality service results in negligence, 
incompetence and delay, the issues clients most frequently complain about. 
Thus, the New South Wales Law Reform Commission (1980) analysed 
complaints made to the Law Society and directly to the Commission and found 
delay and negligence the most common causes of dissatisfaction with lawyers, 
along with poor communication and problems with charging. A decade later, 
the Commission looked at client complaints again and found that delay, 
negligence and poor quality work were still at the top of the list, with poor 
communication not far behind (New South Wales Law Reform Commission 
1993:39). The Legal Access Marketing Group Survey sampled people from the 
Sydney metropolitan area and found that "most respondents perceived that the 
legal profession is not prompt enough, do not keep clients well enough 
informed, and assume an air of superiority when dealing with clients" 
(1985:33). Evans' recent study of client perceptions of Victorian solicitors 
found that of the 20 percent who were dissatisfied with their solicitor, the main 
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reasons (in order of frequency) were communication problems, cost, delay and, 
much less frequently, lack of client control (1995:59). 
Weisbrot cites evidence that throughout common law countries there are 
numerous client complaints about delay, incompetence, overcharging and 
discourtesy (Weisbrot 1990:210). Felstiner (1995) summarises American and 
British research on lawyer-client relationships showing people complain that 
lawyers (1) fail to treat clients with respect, (2) do not consider the nature of 
interpersonal relations with clients to be an important part of law practice, (3) 
are motivated more by financial returns than professional values, ( 4) are 
inaccessible and unresponsive, (5) are poor communicators, and (6) are 
indifferent to client feelings. 
Abel's research on England and Wales shows that clients most commonly 
complain about delay, inefficiency, incompetence, negligence, lack of interest, 
courtesy and cost (1988:252). Individual clients feel solicitors are unfriendly 
and aloof, fail to answer calls and create work for themselves. They complain 
of slowness, inefficiency and incompetence, excessive cost, lack of 
consideration and lack of communication. Similarly the Benson Royal 
Commission on Legal Services found that the most frequent client complaints to 
disciplinary agencies were assertions of inefficiency and negligence, and 
secondly, of delay and the cost of providing legal services (Benson 1979, Vol. 
2:301). Their own survey of users of legal services found that those who 
thought they had cause for complaint (but had not complained), were 
concerned that their solicitor took too little interest in the matter, had not 
appeared to have done enough about it, had delayed, made mistakes or 
charged too much (Benson 1979, Vol. 2:254). Jackson's (1993) summary of 
British research on the satisfaction of defendants with the criminal courts 
concluded that defendants felt "let down" by lawyers when they did not give 
them sufficient p~rsonal contact, attention and consultation.6 
In Steele and Nimmer's (1976) sample of US clients, delay and quality of 
service came behind fee problems (see (ii) below) as the second most frequent 
area of complaint. Clients were also concerned about a failure to perform the 
full analytical tasks requested and in lawyers having interests on both sides of 
the case. Abel (1989a:152) argues that most complaints about lawyer's 
conduct in the US concern competence, and Powell (1986:53) reports that the 
6 Indeed Jackson cites studies showing that spending sufficient time with their 
lawyer was an important factor in defendants' perceptions of the procedural fairness 
of the whole criminal process. 
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majority of complaints received by American legal professional disciplinary 
agencies arise from disputes over either the quality or costs of services 
provided. 
( ii) Over-Charging and Over-Servicing 
The amount of fees and the manner in which they are calculated and 
communicated from lawyer to client are the second major cause of complaint 
amongst clients. Problems occur when lawyers fail to explain properly to 
clients the basis of charging (leading to a perception of overcharging), or when 
the basis of charging is actually unfair, or simply too high for some (potential) 
clients to afford. 
In 1980, the New South Wales Law Reform Commission found that aspects of 
billing such as excessive charges, failure to provide details of charges, and the 
imposition of costs in advance were major causes of complaint for clients. Over 
half of Evans' (1995:60) sample of clients in Victoria thought their fees were 
expensive or very expensive, and cost was the second greatest cause of 
dissatisfaction with services received from their solicitor (1995:59). In the US, 
Steele and Nimmer (1976) interviewed 45 clients who thought they had serious 
problems with their lawyer to find out how they perceived their problem.7 The 
most common issue was professional fees. This was partly because clients did 
not understand the value of what they were paying for. They also objected to 
the non-participatory manner in which price was determined, the way the final 
fee ended up much higher than initial estimates, and the fact they could not 
understand why certain items were included on the bill. 
Another form of over-charging is over-servicing. Common examples include 
stringing out a trial to use up a client's money, or assigning two, three or even 
four staff to a job where one would be sufficient. According to one interviewee, 
a large Australian firm was known during the 1980s as the "two nun firm" 
because they always sent (and charged for) two lawyers where one would do. 
Another told a similar story: 
[Large firms] have so many solicitors they don't know what to do 
with them. And the client can afford to pay. For example at a 
conference they will have the partner who's there just to impress the 
client, the guy who's really doing the work and a book carrier. I was 
acting for a cotton farmer who'd really been done over by the bank. 
On our side it was just me and a bright young barrister. On the 
7 These people were found by means of a random sample of the whole community 
rather than through the complaints statistics of a disciplinary authority and only one 
had actually made a formal complaint. So the statistics are not biased in terms of 
what people formally complain about. 
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other side they had a silk, a junior, then the partner, the guy who 
was doing the work and the book carrier. (MSM3) 
The evidence suggests that hourly billing, the predominant method of charging in 
the legal profession, is particularly prone to unfair and deceptive billing 
practices. As an Australian lawyer who had been a partner in a large national 
firm explained, "you are charging in a way that encourages inefficiency, 
fudging" (FJl). It lends itself to dishonesty since the client must trust the law 
firm to record and bill the correct number of hours and to choose which lawyers 
should spend how much of their time on each piece of work. Research in the US 
suggests that dishonest billing practices in relation to hourly rates are quite 
common, such as double billing for time spent travelling for one client and 
reading documentation for another; billing a second client for recycling relevant 
research or document preparation that had previously been done for another 
client; billing extra hours for a particularly clever piece of work; billing for 
dubious expenses; or simply "padding"-billing for hours that have not been 
worked with no attempt at justification (Lerman 1994, MacDonald 1994, 
Marquess 1994, Ross 1996, Selinger 1994, Simon 1994). 
Problems with fees may have structural causes, in addition to the unfair 
practices of individual lawyers and firms. Economists, as we shall see in 
Chapter Eight, argue that lawyers as a whole profession earn monopoly profits 
because many procedures-for example, conveyancing, wills and divorce-do 
not require the special knowledge and the complex skills that lawyers claim 
they have, and charge heavily for, but could be done by others much more 
cheaply or even by clients themselves for free ( eg Simon 1994:629, Trade 
Practices Commission 1993, 1994). 
( iii) Better Services for the Rich than the Poor 
Clients' most frequent complaints are about (i) the quality of service and (ii) the 
charges for services. Sociologists of the professions have traditionally 
explained professionals' over-charging and lack of interest in high quality 
service by reference to professionals' superior power in their relationships with 
clients. As Freidson (1986:174) states, 
In the vast majority of cases of professional work . . . the 
professional's position as gatekeeper of desired resources combines 
with a monopoly of organisationally relevant knowledge about how 
the system works to create a position of interpersonal power that 
few are in a position to challenge. 
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Some extreme examples of how clients or potential clients can be dominated by 
lawyers were given in submissions to the Australian Law Reform Commission's 
study on the equality of women before the law: 
A woman tried to find a solicitor who would agree to defend a case 
in the Family Court. Her husband was applying for access to their 
two small children. Her husband had recently made death threats 
against her and the children and she had a restraining order against 
him. She engaged a total of three solicitors and tried seven more 
before she found a lawyer who would take her case. She succeeded 
in having access denied in the Family Court: 
"On many occasions I was virtually being intimidated into allowing 
access which made me feel guilty and ashamed to stay with my 
initial decision or to say that I wanted to deny access . . . Solicitors 
told me I had the right to ask for denial but whenever it became an 
issue (even before a hearing) I was told it would be impossible, that 
, I should show the judge that I am doing everything to enable the 
father access. I was constantly being trapped into agreeing with 
solicitors. Solicitors informed me that if I did not agree to some 
form of access the judge would decide and I might not be happy 
with this decision ... " (submission quoted by Australian Law 
Reform Commission 1994a:21; see also Seuffert 1996.) 
In relation to both charging and quality of services, richer and institutional 
clients are less at the mercy of their lawyers than poorer individual clients. 
Both the work of Heinz and Laumann (1982) and of Spangler (1986) has shown 
how lawyers for business and for the rich are increasingly being forced to give 
their clients the service the clients want, not just what is convenient for the 
lawyer. (Interview data in Chapter Seven at pp 171-173 will indicate that this is 
true of Australia also.) At the same time as they are demanding better quality 
service, corporate clients are also reining in the bills of their law firms. They are 
starting to demand tenders and estimates of set fees. Some Australian 
companies have said they will not pay more than a certain amount per hour 
(two or three hundred Australian dollars for partners, who were charging up to 
five hundred dollars). 
There has been much empirical research on the extent to which lawyers have the 
power to dominate other clients. Research on middle class clients is ambiguous. 
In the US, Reed (1972) and Hosticka (1979) and, in Australia, Lawrence (1978) 
suggest that lawyers generally manage or control their relationships with 
individual clients. Rosenthal (1977) also found evidence that there were 
breakdowns in the way lawyers deliver services to clients because of 
inappropriate models of lawyer-dominated decision-making. Cain (1983), on 
the other hand, argued that general practice lawyers do not dominate clients but 
faithfully translate clients' objectives into legal reality. Sarat and Felstiner' s 
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(1995) extensive project on the way lawyers and clients related in forty divorce 
cases shows how lawyers negotiate with, persuade and interpret the legal 
system to clients who are dependent on their explanations. But they argue that 
neither the lawyer nor the client is consistently in control of the relationship: 
Both lawyers and clients are sometimes frustrated by feelings of 
powerlessness in dealing with the other ... Often no one may be in 
charge. Interactions between lawyers and clients involve as much 
drift and uncertainty as they do direction and clarity of purpose. It 
may be difficult at any one moment to determine who, if anyone, is 
defining the objectives, determining strategy, or devising tactics. 
(Felstiner & Sarat 1992:1456) 
The evidence does seem clear that it is common for lawyers to dominate low 
status clients. Many studies of the criminal justice system have shown how 
clients are dependent on lawyers who organise and persuade them to fit in with 
the demands of the court system (Baldwin & McConville 1977, Blumberg 1967, 
Ericson & Baranek 1983:76-110, Sudnow 1965). Similar observations have 
been made of lawyers who deal exclusively with low status clients in 
community legal centres or legal services offices (Spangler 1986:144-174, Parker 
1994). The level of service a client receives depends greatly on the 
socioeconomic status of the client: "[T]he relative ease with which ... lawyers 
can tell their clients what to do seems to speak more to the helplessness of the 
clients than to the power of the attorneys" (Spangler 1986:171). 
Relative power and status between lawyer and client may not be the only factor 
causing some clients to receive lesser quality, less cost-effective service: The 
status of the lawyer within the profession, and the lawyer's stock of "social 
capital"(Arnold & Kay 1995) also have an effect. Low status clients are more 
likely to be served by solo practitioners or small firm lawyers, and there is 
considerable evidence that these low status lawyers violate ethical rules more 
often than other lawyers (Carlin 1966, Handler 1967).8 Reasons and Chappell 
(1985, 1986) demonstrate that if a lawyer is engaged in solo practice, 
conveyancing, mortgage transactions or general practice, he or she is more likely 
to be sanctioned by disciplinary authorities. Weisbrot (1990:203-204) also 
cites evidence that solo practitioners are over-represented and large firm 
lawyers under-represented among solicitors against whom complaints are filed. 
8 Both Carlin's and Handler's studies relied on samples of the whole Bar and tested 
offending for themselves without relying on official sanctioning statistics and their 
biases. 
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It may be that rule-making and disciplinary processes are controlled by elites 
who are more likely to label marginal practitioners' behaviour unethical. Arnold 
and Hagan (1992, 1994) tried to establish this statistically in Canada but their 
data were ambiguous. Their 1994 study gives some support for the idea that 
solo practitioner status and professional inexperience influence disciplinary 
decision-making, but legitimate factors such as offence characteristics and 
complaint histories were much more important. Studies such as Carlin's (1966) 
and Handler's (1967) relied on their own surveys of the Bar and tests of 
unethical behaviour rather than official statistics, and Weisbrot' s (1990) 
evidence is of complaint rather than prosecution statistics. Their conclusions 
should not be biased by official sanctioning practices. 9 
A more promising explanation for decreased ethics among low status lawyers is 
Arthurs' (1970) suggestion that solo practitioners are more likely to give 
unethical and unskilled service because they lack the collegial support of those 
in larger firms and are in a more financially precarious situation. Arnold and 
Kay (1995) see this as an issue of differential "social capital". Large firms 
which serve high status clients are rich in formal and informal controls on their 
employees. Lawyers are "embedded within networks of social relations that 
provide ethical obligations, expectations ... , information channels and social 
norms" (Arnold & Kay 1995:339). Their management structures, socialisation 
processes and, recently, quality assurance programs mean that large firm 
lawyers are less likely to serve clients poorly or defraud them, and if they do, 
disciplinary authorities are more likely to delegate responsibility to the firm to 
deal with it.10 
Solo practitioners and small firm lawyers do not enjoy the same social 
embeddedness.11 They are less likely to have access to the network of business 
and management resources and contacts that lawyers in large firms have, and 
will generally have more financially insecure practices because of their lower 
9 However the ethical rules themselves are developed by elites and reflect their 
concerns (see eg Reichstein 1965 discussed at p 32 below). 
lO See also Freidson's (1975) study of informal social control among medical 
practitioners in a group practice setting rich in "social capital". Doctors distinguished 
between the normal and deviant mistakes each other made. Where deviant mistakes 
were made, the offender was talked to and this was effective in influencing a change 
or getting them to resign. However where solo practitioners were concerned the main 
form of control was non-referral which was too ambiguous a signal to be useful in 
correcting the offender. Thus informal professional control worked only in settings 
where individual practitioners were part of a local professional community. 
11 However Landon's research (1985) shows that solo practitioners who practise in a 
closekn.it community may be better advocates for clients because they are embedded in 
the expectations of the community. 
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status clientele. The result is greater temptation to take on more work than they 
can handle, to violate ethical rules in the struggle to survive, and lesser capacity 
to deal with problems internally when they do arise. Arnold and Kay provide 
statistical evidence from one Canadian law society that solo practitioners who 
possess the least social capital receive the majority of complaints of 
professional misconduct. They conclude that "large law firms are better 
equipped than either sole practitioners or small firm lawyers to create and 
reproduce the forms of social capital essential for developing and maintaining 
lawyers' compliance with ethical standards" (Arnold & Kay 1995:340). 
Low status lawyers are also more subject to countervailing pressures from the 
court system or from lack of resources which mean they feel they cannot do 
exactly what their clients want. In a classic paper, Blumberg (1967:19) shows 
how criminal lawyers are subject to the demands of a whole system in which 
their clients must be made to fit: 
Organizational goals and discipline impose a set of demands and 
conditions of practice on the respective professions in the criminal 
court, to which they respond by abandoning their ideological and 
professional commitments to the accused client, in the service of 
these higher claims of the court organization. 
It is practice at the lower end which is more likely to be subject to these 
pressures. Richer clients can afford to pay lawyers who will fight the system. 
Poorer clients get less devoted service from lawyers who are themselves less 
powerful players in bigger games. As Carlin (1966:177) concluded from his 
famous study of the ethics of the New York City bar thirty years ago: 
The best trained, most technically skilled, and ethically most 
responsible lawyers are reserved to the upper reaches of business 
and society. This leaves the least competent, least well-trained, and 
least ethical lawyers to the smaller business concerns and lower-
income individuals. As a result, the most helpless clients who most 
need protection are least likely to get it. 
Yet the devoted service commanded by large firm clients creates its own 
problems. 
(iv) Distorting Justice for Rich Clients 
There is a hint in the perceptions reported at the beginning of this section that 
people not only believe that lawyers charge too much for their services and do 
not necessarily give good service to the poor, but that they are also willing to 
bend the rules in favour of the rich, thus distorting the law. People want 
devoted, cost-effective service from lawyers when they are clients, but they are 
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concerned that service be adequately limited by the imperatives of law and 
justice when the client is someone else, especially someone rich. Post cites a 
poll conducted by the US National Law Journal which found that people thought 
the two most positive things about lawyers were that their "first priority is to 
their clients" and that they "know how to cut through bureaucratic red tape", 
while the three most negative things were that they "file too many unnecessary 
lawsuits", "manipulate the legal system without any concern for right or wrong" 
and were "too interested in making money" (Post 1987:380; see also the 
statements quoted at p 17 above). People blame lawyers for doing for others 
what they praise them for doing for themselves (Lasson 1994:727). The 
perception is that lawyers will only do their best for those who can pay a high 
enough price. 
Not only do people believe lawyers serve the rich better than the poor within 
the limits of the law, but majority agreement with statements such as "For a 
price a lawyer will use every trick in the book to help a client" (Cass & 
Sackville 1975:82) suggest that people think lawyers will do anything for 
someone who pays well enough, regardless of ethical considerations. Large firm 
lawyers who serve high status clientele are particularly susceptible to being 
charged with selling out to big business.12 There are numerous enough examples 
of (ex)-corporate lawyers who see things this way themselves: 
I had spent ten years as a corporate lawyer, firstly with the law firm 
Stephen, Jacques and Stephen, which later became Malleson, 
Stephen, Jacques, and then for five years after that with the Sydney 
law firm Allen, Allen and Hemsley. My practice was almost 
exclusively corporate and commercial law with specialties in finance 
law, mining and trade practices law . . . After ten years as a 
commercial lawyer I'd seen enough of the way the law was able to 
be subverted by powerful forces in society and I felt I needed a 
complete change of direction. I felt that my intellectual skills were 
not being used for the public benefit. I therefore made a personal 
decision that I wanted to leave that form of practice. (Bruce 
Donald speaking about why he became director of the Central 
Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service, Faine 1993:187-188) 
Kenneth Mann's 1985 study of elite white collar crime defence lawyers in the 
US presents a picture of clients who can afford lawyers so wily and well paid 
they can outwit prosecutors and manipulate the criminal justice system to help 
their clients avoid well-grounded prosecutions. In particular, he shows how 
lawyers are able to control the information they receive so as not to actually 
find out about the illegal activities of their clients and thereby conduct a defence 
12 See Smigel (1964:294-295) for a view of large law firm lawyers as "yes-men" or 
''mouthpieces for big business", and also Nelson (1988:236). 
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in good faith. Compare this with the accounts of how defence lawyers for 
ordinary lower class criminals persuade them to fit in with the system and 
accept a "reasonable" plea bargain (Baldwin & McConville 1977, Blumberg 
1967, Sudnow 1965). 
Doreen McBarnet (1994:74) questions the way that lawyers (throughout the 
common law world) have been able to use their skills to help rich clients evade 
taxes: 
Aware that new law does not suit their interests, the owners and 
managers of capital may well lobby against it. But at the same time, 
armies of Wall Street and City lawyers will be working to construct 
devices which can render the law irrelevant anyway. 
In Australia the role of lawyers in tax evasion schemes has been similarly 
questioned. Palmer and Sampford ask to what extent it is acceptable for 
lawyers to knowingly be involved in exploiting loopholes and constructing 
devices that avoid the clear intention of the law by means of legal technicalities 
(Palmer & Sampford 1994:23; see also Solomon 1992:104-105). Levi 
(1988:158-172) shows that widespread tax avoidance and evasion in Australia 
during the 1970s and early 1980s facilitated by accountants and lawyers, and 
encouraged by the Barwick-lead High Court, resulted in a public crisis of 
confidence in the taxation system. Indeed the technicalities of tax law illustrate 
that as lawyers spend more of their time helping achieve the goals of certain 
clients, so the law comes to disproportionately reflect their interests and 
concerns, becoming less effective than it might be for the whole community 
(Cain 1994). Rich clients can afford lawyers who do the work of creating "legal 
techniques, definitions and devices including devices which avoid state 
impositions and obviate other people's legal rights if they impinge on the 
interests of their clients" (McBarnet 1994:83; see also Powell 1993) . 
Tomasic and Bottomley's (1993:88) interviews with lawyers and accountants 
as part of their study of the running of the top 500 Australian companies 
suggested that many professional advisers thought their business clients were 
often unethical, but did not think it was their role to do anything about it. 
Tomasic and Bottomley (1993:185) also found that professional advisers 
including lawyers played their part in the 1980s "decade of greed" in Australia: 
Our study has confirmed the important role played by professional 
advisers in the construction of corporate managerial behaviour. 
Although professional ideologies stress that it is the client who is in 
charge (eg the idea that lawyers ' take' instructions from clients), the 
significant capacity of lawyers, accountants and auditors to shape 
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the patterns of corporate conduct should not be ignored. This may 
occur in positive action-as in suggestions made by a professional 
adviser-or omissions, such as where a failure to detect or advise 
against fraudulent action is interpreted by the corporate client as an 
implied sanctioning of conduct ... the 'decade of greed' was not 
simply the product of a handful of 'corporate cowboys' pursuing 
their individual amoral ambitions. It was the outcome of a complex 
interplay of corporate, governmental and professional structures 
d · 13 an practices ... 
Nelson's study of US large firm lawyers showed they felt they ought to curb 
their clients' unethical, unjust or illegal behaviour, but very rarely acted on that 
belief: "In the reality of practice these lawyers enthusiastically attempt to 
maximize the interests of clients and rarely experience serious disagreements 
with clients over the broader implications of a proposed course of conduct" 
(Nelson 1988:232). 
Although it seems more likely that lawyers will be overcompliant with the 
pressures of client interests where the clients are rich and powerful, the 
temptation may also arise in relation to less glamorous clients (see Parsons 
1954b:371-2, 376-7). In 1966, Carlin (at 73) found that lawyers with low 
status clients reported more frequent pressure from clients than lawyers with 
high status clients. He concluded that where lawyers have an unstable clientele 
or derive the major portion of their income from a large client then they are most 
sensitive to pressure. On reconsidering his work in 1994 in the light of 
contemporary research, Carlin (1994:xvii) thought this had changed: 
The large firms have become more commercial, more business-and 
profit-oriented and very likely less ethical ( evidenced most 
recently by the millions in settlement fees paid by Kaye Scholer and 
Jones Day for their roles in the Lincoln savings-and-loan mess). 
And given the power of the corporate clients and their greater 
concern with self-protection, it is more likely to be third parties who 
suffer from the unethical behaviour of large-firm lawyers, as in the S 
and L cases, rather than the clients ... It appears then that large 
firm lawyers are moving closer to their colleagues at the other end of 
the status ladder in terms of professionalism and ethics, while at 
the same time moving away even further in terms of power and 
wealth.1 4 
13 See also Sykes (1994:557), 
Take any bold rider whose empire collapsed and look at its accounts two years 
before. The picture will be of rising assets and rising profits. A bank which 
presumably should have had access to the bold rider's books will have lent him 
a heap of money. A top accounting firm will have verified his accounts. He 
will boast the services of one of Australia's leading law firms and merchant 
banks ... 
14 Seep 222 for further reference to lawyers' involvement in US savings and loans 
collapses of the 1980s. 
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The most obvious explanation for this kind of undesirable conduct is the 
dependence lawyers feel on their clients and the pressure to keep their business 
by doing whatever they want. Whether or not low status clients can influence 
lawyers to act in their own interests against the public interest, rich and 
institutional clients will have more access to legal services and so will pose a 
greater threat in this regard. Increasing competitive pressures may increase the 
threat, and in large firms the structure of the work place or of particular work 
teams may encourage individual lawyers to keep silent (see Grabosky 1990).15 
The "social capital" of large firms might work to create an atmosphere where 
such good service is expected for the benefit of clients that lawyers are 
discouraged from taking an ethical stand. 
(v) Conclusion 
Client and community complaints about lawyers can be understood as concerns 
with the role lawyers play in helping ( or hindering) access to justice. Clients ( or 
potential clients) are concerned with their own unequal access: Poor service 
means that having access to a lawyer is not always as effective as it might be in 
achieving justice. Charging practices mean that the poor can afford lawyers 
who are less likely to do exactly what they want and are more likely to 
overcharge, give poor service or just act unethically. The market power and 
status of business clients gives them the ability to "regulate" their own lawyers 
forcing costs down and the quality of service up. The embeddedness of high 
status clients' lawyers within the culture and internal control mechanisms of 
large law firms also means that they provide better service. While large firm 
lawyers may be subject to internal structures and quality assurance programs, 
as well as countervailing pressures from clients that prevent them breaching 
trust and serving poorly or unethically, there is no assurance that they will not 
breach the trust of the community in the way they serve their clients.1 6 
Members of the public express concern not only about their own unequal access 
to legal services but also about the effects of unequal access on the legal system 
and on justice. 
Concern with the fact that lawyers work better to achieve the goals of better-
heeled clients is a worry about compromising the justice system as a whole and 
15 Grabosky (1990) has also categorised a number of other reasons lawyers might 
become involved in facilitating clients' breaches of the law without a dishonest intent 
themselves. 
16 The two different types of complaint about lawyers can be mapped onto two 
/✓hemispheres" of the profession (Heinz & Laumann 1982): Lawyers who work for 
individual clients are more likely to dominate their clients with bad service and 
incomprehensible costs. Those who work for organisations are more likely to assist 
their clients to dominate others. 
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the meaning of people's access to it. As Moore (1985:50) shows, people's 
dissatisfaction with the services they have personally received from a lawyer 
correlates with judgments that the legal system as a whole is ineffective and 
unjust. Their complaints about lawyers show that they think lawyers ought to 
contribute to the justice of the legal system. 
III. Professional Concerns 
(i) Lack of Concern for Access to Justice Complaints 
While clients and community are concerned when lawyers fail to provide equal 
access to high quality legal services, disciplinary authorities seem to concern 
themselves with rather different matters. Since the legal profession in Australia 
is still mainly self-regulatory (both complaints handling and ethical rule-making 
are largely in the hands of the profession), disciplinary statistics and 
professional conduct rules reflect what professional associations and the 
governing elite of the profession see as the main things that lawyers do wrong.17 
A large percentage of the complaints that people make about their own lawyers 
never go any further than being scrutinised and dismissed by these authorities. 
Indeed legal professional disciplinary authorities disclaim jurisdiction over 
many of the things that people most frequently complain about (Abel 
198lb:648). Issues of negligence, incompetence, and billing have not been seen 
as disciplinary issues because the client could sue the lawyer in tort or contract 
for a remedy. 
Abel's research in England and Wales showed that the grounds on which 
disciplinary tribunals punished solicitors-violation of accounts regulations, 
misappropriation of client funds, false statements in applying for a practising 
certificate, criminal convictions, acting as a solicitor without holding a current 
practising certificate and failing to account for money-were very different to 
what was complained about. Delay, which was 67 percent of justified 
complaints, was the reason for punishment in only 8 percent of cases. 70 
percent of claims were found either to be unjustified or to concern negligence 
over which the Law Society disclaimed jurisdiction (1988:252). In his research 
on the US, Abel (1989a:152) concludes that "Although the vast majority of 
client complaints involve matters of competence, professional disciplinary 
bodies generally reject charges of incompetence as outside their jurisdiction" 
(see also Powell 1986:53). Weisbrot (1990:210) shows a pattern of numerous 
17 Powell's (1986:53) research suggests that even when disciplinary functions are 
handed over to an independent body the profile of matters sanctioned barely changes. 
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complaints about delay, incompetence, overcharging and discourtesy over all 
common law countries, while "the professional associations themselves focus 
on intraprofessional complaints (such as unfair attraction of business), practice 
by unauthorised persons (in breach of legal monopolies) and financial 
misconduct". 
Thus as discussed in section (ii) below, professional associations and disciplinary 
authorities concentrate on (a) intraprofessional complaints and practice by 
unauthorised persons in their attempt to preserve professional unity and 
monopoly, while (b) the regulation of financial misconduct and trust account fraud 
is emphasised in order to preserve the legitimacy of professional self-regulation. 
Yet these are not necessarily the issues their own members think they should 
focus on. As shown in section (iii), practising lawyers frequently feel excluded 
from professional community due to (a) discrimination or (b) exploitation, and (c) 
are dissatisfied with professional regulation and professional associations they see as 
neither effective nor deserving of legitimacy. 
(ii) Concerns of Professional Associations and Disciplinary 
Authorities 
(a) Preserve Professional Unity and Monopoly 
One way of discerning what legal professional associations do see as important 
is to consider what they make rules about. In 1974 Maley analysed the ethical 
codes of Australian engineers, architects and doctors, and the ethical 
statements and rulings of the Law Society of New South Wales. He found that 
the codes were primarily concerned with, 
the proscription of advertising except in carefully limited and 
controlled ways, injunctions to maintain the established scale of 
professional fees, prohibition of commissions and discounts, 
insistence on remuneration only by fee or salary, prevention of 
soliciting clients, and exhortations to serve the community and 
uphold the dignity and honour of the profession (Maley 1974:393) 
They spent most space on the professional's "obligations to his [sic] colleagues, 
to matters of etiquette between colleagues, and in carrying on his professional 
practice in ways which do not infringe colleague-prerogatives or give him a 
professional (especially an economic) advantage" (Maley 1974:397). The 
policing and enforcing of the obligations was also biased towards these 
concerns. In 1993, the Trade Practices Commission (TPC)18 found that in most 
Australian states and territories significant regulation on the type of advertising 
18 In 1995 the TPC merged with the Prices Surveillance Authority to form the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC.). 
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allowed, prohibitions on ways fees could be charged (eg no contingency fees), 
what a barrister could do, reservation of certain work to licensed legal 
practitioners, and regulation on the structure of legal practices continued to 
make up the bulk of the regulatory rules for the legal profession (TPC 1993:71-
77). According to Wolfram (1978) legal professional codes in the US 
traditionally have also been mainly concerned with the etiquette of how lawyers 
attract business. 
It seems that such rules were designed to prevent overt competition between 
practitioners and preserve the image of a profession oriented towards public 
service not a business aimed at commercial gain (see Fennell 1982). They can 
actually have the effect of preventing ordinary people receiving the information 
they need to make a wise choice about a lawyer. For example, "ambulance 
chasing" or touting is seen as particularly undesirable conduct in the US and in 
England (Abel-Smith & Stevens 1967:196), and has been strictly forbidden in 
Australia. At one stage the Chicago Bar Association even sought 
(unsuccessfully) to be given the power to impose prison sentences on lawyers 
who solicited clients (Abel 1989a:145). Yet Reichstein (1965) argued that 
ambulance chasing is functional in a situation of inadequate legal service 
provision and sharp practices by insurance company assessors. According to 
him, high status lawyers disapproved only because they thought it encouraged a 
bad image of lawyers. 
Professional rules are also used to prohibit innovations in services that might 
make lawyers more accessible, less costly, and perhaps less "professional" in 
image. In the US, breakthrough restrictive practices cases arose when lawyers 
who sought to set up new forms of legal services (that made lawyers more 
affordable) were prosecuted by Bar Associations for breaking professional 
rules.1 9 For example, it took Jacoby and Meyers four years to be cleared of 
charges of breach of legal ethics over their inexpensive shopfront legal clinic 
which offered long opening hours and the use of paralegals to cut costs 
(Coleman 1985:31). Even innovations to provide free legal services for no profit 
are opposed: In Australia professional associations tried to use ethical rules to 
stop legal aid offices being set up by the federal government in 1975 (Tomsen 
19 9 2). 20 This area of legal ethical regulation is now beginning to lose 
importance as rules aimed at preserving a unified image are seen as simply 
19 See Bates v State Bar Association of Arizona 433 US 350 (1977) and Goldfarb v 
Virginia State Bar Association 421 US 773 (1975). 
20 Ex parte Hartstein: re Bannister (1975) ACT Supreme Court, unreported; see Disney 
(1975). See Zander (1968) for a discussion of British ethical rules that prevented 
lawyers working for the poor. 
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maintaining the profession's monopoly. Yet even a 1996 Australian legal ethics 
textbook says that rules of professional courtesy require lawyers never to state 
any opinion on the professional conduct of other lawyers, particularly when 
they are being consulted by a client in relation to a matter that involves a 
complaint about another practitioner-a rule that is surely aimed merely at 
preserving the unified image of the profession (Dal Pont 1996:429). 
A second area of concern for professional associations is pursuing those who 
are practising law without a license. Because their professional monopoly is 
enshrined in law, professional associations have the power to prosecute people 
in court for practising law without a practising certificate. This power is most 
commonly used now to fight conveyancers.21 As Chapters Seven and Eight will 
show, the pursuit of professional monopoly both through the sanctioning of 
unqualified legal service providers and the maintenance of a unified 
professional community has been seen as one of the main projects of the legal 
profession (O'Malley 1983:76). 
(b) Financial Misconduct: Trust Account Fraud 
There is one area of client injury which professional associations and 
disciplinary authorities take particularly seriously-trust account fraud. 
Disciplinary authorities spend a major part of their resources on policing trust 
accounts, carrying out random audits and ensuring that audit certificates are 
filed each year. If what is sanctioned were the main guide, trust account fraud 
I 
and other problems with borrowing and investing client moneys would be the 
biggest problem that lawyers have in Australia, Britain and Canada. For 
example, Weisbrot (1990:204) shows that almost all of the eighty-two solicitors 
struck off between 1968 and 1982 in New South Wales were disciplined for 
committing trust account breaches, a matter which accounted for only 2 percent 
of the complaints to the Law Society.22 Most of the lawyers interviewed for 
Chapter Seven also considered trust account fraud the main form of undesirable 
conduct lawyers take part in. 
21 For example in 1994 Paul Sande, a South Australian conveyancer moved to the Gold 
Coast in Queensland and set up a conveyancing business. In South Australia non-
lawyer conveyancers are allowed, but in Queensland only lawyers are allowed to do 
conveyancing. Sande was charged with seven counts of conveyancing without a 
certificate. He had previously sought a restricted certificate from the Law Society to 
do conveyancing only, but that was not granted since he did not have the 
~alifications to be a solicitor (see Moodie 1994). 
Also reflected in Law Institute of Victoria Professional Standards Department 
Half-Yearly Reports January 1993 to June 1993 and July 1993 to December 1993. 
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Certain lawyers have great opportunities to steal from clients. In the English 
and Australian system, solicitors hold large amounts of money on trust for 
clients in relation to conveyancing transactions, money from deceased estates, 
settlement money from litigation, and money for outgoings that the lawyer will 
pay on the client's behalf. In the English and Australian system, clients also 
leave money with solicitors for investment at higher interest rates than they 
might receive from a bank.23 
There is some evidence that money left with lawyers for a long time such as 
estate money or long term investments is more likely to be embezzled (Garling 
1983). In many cases, this occurs where the solicitor invests the money in his or 
her own private finance company (Wilton 1983:35). In New South Wales, the 
frauds of Kandy and Diamond in 1994 were expected to cost the fidelity fund 
about $30 million dollars, and in both cases the frauds were related to mortgage 
investment practices run by the solicitors (see Justinian 1994:2-3). In Canada, 
Arthurs found that 39 percent of lawyers disbarred for trust account fraud had 
"extra-legal" general investment or land development businesses (1970:248). If 
this is combined with a precarious_ financial situation or a declining practice, 
embezzlement can become very tempting. It is not a problem for barristers since 
they do not keep trust accounts and rarely have access to clients' money. 
Similarly, in the US where lawyers do not have a conveyancing monopoly in 
many states and do not generally invest money for clients, it is a much less 
important issue (Haynes 1983). 
One reason trust account fraud is the most frequently sanctioned offence is that 
it is relatively easily policed and its wrongful nature is not controversial. 
Compared with more subjective complaints of negligence and incompetence, a 
lay person can be sure they have been harmed. Thus, disciplinary authorities 
must act and be seen to act on trust fund problems if their legitimacy is not to 
be questioned. For this reason, in both England and Australia, trust fund and 
other financial improprieties by solicitors were a major reason for introducing 
significant regulation, particularly self-regulation, over solicitors in the first 
place (Abel-Smith & Stevens 1967:188, Kirk 1976:83-105, McQueen 1993:15, 
21). 
23 The money is supposed to be lent by the solicitor to other clients, but problems often 
occur because lawyers lend the money to their own private investment companies with 
or without the client's consent, or forge a mortgage (as if the money had been lent out) 
and use the money for their own purposes. 
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While fraud is clearly of major concern to clients when it occurs, their losses are 
generally covered by fidelity funds and problems are relatively infrequent. In 
contrast to what disciplinary figures suggest, clients are more commonly 
concerned about the quality of the service they receive and the way the bill is 
determined. It is unfortunate that such regulatory resources are concentrated in 
an area which, almost by definition, is likely to be of more concern to richer 
clients (Reasons & Chappell 1986:40). Issues of competence and quality on the 
other hand are more relevant to poor clients, as demonstrated in Section II 
above. 
(iii) Practising Lawyers' Concerns 
While their professional associations are concerned with maintaining 
professional community and the legitimacy of self-regulation, ordinary lawyers 
often notice that professional community and self-regulation neither includes 
nor benefits them. They have concerns about the way they are treated by other 
lawyers, by their firms and by their profession as a whole. They complain of 
discrimination against women and minority groups, about working conditions 
especially in large firms, about their representation in professional associations 
and the burden they bear from finicky trust account rules. 
(a) Discrimination 
The legal profession throughout the common law world remains constituted by 
a socio-economic elite. Recruitment and disciplinary practices have reinforced 
this (see Weisbrot 1990:83-90). Their discriminatory practices mean that some 
lawyers ( and potential lawyers) do not feel part of a unified legal professional 
community at all. As Pue shows, legal professional associations in Canada, 
Britain and the US have been historically "xenophobic, elitist and generally 
aligned with capital interests." They have been guilty of "pervasive racism, 
anti-Semitism and class bias" and their disciplinary powers have often been 
used for the purposes of political suppression (Pue 1995:762-763). King and 
Israel's (1989) research suggests that commercial solicitors' firms in Britain still 
discriminate on the basis of race in their recruitment practices, while the most 
notorious basis for discrimination within the profession is gender. As one 
woman lawyer in a large firm commented, 
In the 5 years I have been in practice women have gone backwards 
not forwards. Firms treat women badly. Most of the firms are run 
by men and the partners are mostly men. In some firms the partners 
are still all men. The discrimination may be subconscious because 
they have an idea of what new partners should be like and that is 
clones of themselves. So an extraordinary woman may catch their 
attention and they think, "Yeah, maybe we could try that." But 
ordinary good women practitioners miss out because they don't fit 
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the preconceived idea, whereas average men become partners ... 
We've given it a fair go of letting women graduates just go through 
and get promoted. But we have had 50 percent women graduates 
for some time and it hasn't happened. They just aren't being 
promoted at the same rate as men. (FSL22) 
Despite massive numerical gains in the profession in all common law countries, 
women are still disadvantaged in terms of career advancement and finding jobs 
with flexibility to manage family care responsibilities (Australian Law Reform 
Commission 1993:68-84, Canadian Bar Association Task Force on Gender 
Equality in the Legal Profession 1993, Dixon & Serron 1995, Epstein 1993, 
Gatfield & Gray 1993, Hagan et al 1991, Hagan & Kay 1995, Nossel & Westfall 
1995, Lentz & Laband 1995, Scutt 1990:30-38, Thornton 1996, Weisbrot 
1990:83-90). In 1991 only 22 legal firms in Australia reported to the Director 
of Affirmative Action (Young 1992:1095), and the Australian Law Reform 
Commission (1993:77) refer to an unpublished study which evidenced minimal 
compliance with affirmative action legislation requirements among law firms in 
Victoria.24 Professional associations are now being asked to play more of a 
role in monitoring and encouraging women's participation in the profession and 
perhaps even to require affirmative action themselves and discipline those who 
do not comply (Australian Law Reform Commission 1993:76, Young 1992). 
Discrimination against women and minorities in the profession not only affects 
lawyers or aspiring lawyers, it also affects the community at large if those we 
have entrusted with the guardianship of law reflect only a limited segment of 
the community (King & Israel 1989). Not only might their lack of participation 
in the legal profession affect the way services are provided to women and 
minorities, it also affects the actual substance of the law. The law tends to 
reflect the limited life experiences of judges and lawyers, no matter how hard 
they try to be just and fair. Naffine has theorised that the law appears as 
"certain, predictable and dispassionately even-handed in its dealings with 
people" (1990:154) only inasmuch as it posits as the subject of law the "man of 
law" who is "a successful market individual who fosters his own interests and 
has an eye to the main chance" (1990:100). As long as the profession itself, 
including judges, approximates that model the law and the way lawyers help 
clients negotiate the law will not change. But "the admission of different, 
dissenting voices, such as those of women [ and minority groups], would ... force 
a Copernican shift in legal thinking" (N affine 1990: 155; for similar ideas see 
Cain 1994, Kerruish 1991). 
24 Only those with 100 employees or more are required to report. 
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This makes participation and equity within the profession an issue of great 
concern to the whole community, not just as a matter of fairness to those who 
are excluded, but also as a matter of ensuring that law and legal services are 
equally available to all. The transformative access to justice potential of 
opening the profession up to plural voices is a question addressed again in 
Chapter Nine (pp 210-211, 229-232). 
(b) Exploitation 
A growing concern amongst ordinary lawyers is with their conditions of 
employment. Far from idyllic unified community, many employee lawyers feel 
exploited by other members of their own profession. 
The whole of private practice is run on the principle of greed. 
People at the bottom are exploited by people at the top and the 
people at the bottom put up with it because they think when they 
get to the top they'll be able to do it themselves ... I've heard 
someone say the whole system runs on fear. You've got to account 
for your time and you're afraid of what will happen if you don't. 
(FSG25) 
It is not only clients who suffer from excessive orientation towards charging to 
make a large profit in some law firms. Employee lawyers are often pressured to 
work long hours to achieve a minimum requirement of billable hours. Yet they 
only earn a fraction of the gross amounts they bill out. According to Ackland 
(1994a) in 1994 employee lawyers in large Australian firms billed on average 
between 4.5 and 6 times their salary. The rest goes in expensive overheads, and 
profits for partners (see Galanter & Palay 1991 for one analysis of this dynamic 
in US firms). It is only recently that professional employees have begun to see 
industrial relations as relevant to law firms (see Anleu 1992:197-198, Spangler 
1986). The Australian Services Union announced late in 1994 that it would be 
targeting solicitors and administrative staff in Victorian law firms (Davis 1994). 
A few months earlier, the Professional Officers Association of New South 
Wales began proceedings for a state award for minimum working conditions for 
legal staff. The pressure for these proceedings came from Women Lawyers' and 
Young Lawyers' associations (Tabakoff 1994b). 
( c) Dissatisfaction with Professional Regulation and Professional Associations 
Finally, individual lawyers and groups of lawyers often feel that they are 
excluded from or victimised by the self-regulatory practices of their professional 
associations. Many of the lawyers interviewed for Chapter Seven felt that 
finicky trust account regulations and Law Society audits overburdened honest 
practitioners while barely contributing to solving serious problems of fraud. 
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They questioned the efficiency and legitimacy of the professional association's 
focus on trust account regulation: 
There are definitely inefficiencies there. Their auditing leaves a lot 
to be desired. The things they come out here and make us jump 
through hoops. But there are people like Kandy who jumped out 
the window with $20 million and Powell in London ripping all the 
money from the Nauruan trust. (MSM3) 
Little [a dissident Victorian solicitor] ... was campaigning against 
the Law Institute as this monstrous bureaucracy that spends so 
much money and we would be better off if we just spent it 
ourselves. To some degree everyone agrees with that. It's like taxes. 
You know you have to pay for a service but it gets to a point when 
all you feel is the payment and the service doesn't seem worth it ... 
The services of the Institute are too costly and at the same time the 
Institute is picky to a fault about how the practice runs ... Technical 
rules can be a drag on the efficiency of firms. So people feel that 
and look for their quid pro quo. Sometimes it's hard to find any 
good things. (FSL14) 
This reflects wider feeling among ordinary lawyers, especially suburban, country 
and small firm practitioners, that their interests are not adequately cared for by 
professional associations which simply look after the interests of the elite. They 
are dissatisfied with the dual roles of professional associations as regulators 
and trade unions, feeling that the latter function is not performed well enough: 
The Law Society is there for the advancement of certain members of 
the profession. They see it as a stepping stone to other things. It 
should be there to advocate for members of the profession. There's 
really a battle going on now over the dual roles of the Law Society. 
It says it is there to protect society in the public interest, but then it 
is also there for the profession's own benefit to advocate for the 
profession. There is a fundamental conflict there . . . The sole 
practitioners have tried to push the Law Society to give up one of 
their roles, perhaps the regulatory role, and to take on the advocate 
role. (MSS16) 
Certain suburban and solo practitioners amongst the interviewees felt they had 
been (unfairly) targeted by the disciplinary self-regulatory mechanisms of the 
profession, and there is certainly evidence that self-regulation has lead to 
practices such as "scapegoating" individual practitioners for failures of the 
whole profession (Daniel 1996).25 
25 However, as Brockman & McEwen (1990:33) point out whenever formal 
disciplinary action is taken against lawyers there is potential for trust and goodwill 
to break down within professional community and particularly between the 
individual lawyers being disciplined and the professional association: 
Self-regulation appears to work best when it is not or does not have to used 
. . . Like the criminal justice system, the disciplinary systems of SROs [self 
regulating organisations] function best when the players are to some extent 
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Such attitudes are also present amongst segments of the profession in England 
and Wales who are dissatisfied with the Law Society's failure to act strongly 
against government reforms (Ames 1996), and also in Canada where Ontario 
lawyers responded to a survey by complaining that their professional 
organisation failed to represent their interests (Mew 1989:229). Reichstein 
(1965:5) suggests that competing and conflicting interest groups will always 
seek to control professional organisations, so that a professional organisation 
controlled by one group will tend to encroach on the liberty of other members.26 
(iv) Canel us ion 
In contrast to the concerns of clients and the community with the failures of 
lawyers to provide access to good quality legal services, disciplinary authorities 
and professional associations have traditionally centred on keeping trust 
accounts under tight regulation and maintaining rules of the profession to 
preserve a unified professional community. The emphasis on professional 
community seems to have been aimed at, firstly, maintaining a 
11professional" 
rather than a 11 commercial" image for lawyers and, secondly, preserving the 
monopoly over legal services in a unified group.27 Such rules may actually be 
counter-productive to improvements in access to justice by stifling innovative 
services and advertising, and preserving the traditional monopoly of lawyers at 
the expense of non-lawyer legal service providers who might be cheaper. 
Although of great significance when it does occur, trust account fraud is not the 
most common problem clients experience and occurs only under specific 
conditions, unlike problems of delay, negligence and incompetence which are far 
more widespread. 
Professional priorities in lawyer regulation not only differ from client and 
community concerns; practising lawyers suggest that the focus on both 
professional community and trust account regulation has been at best 
ineffective, and at worst a sham. They complain of an exclusive profession in 
which women and minorities face discrimination, employee lawyers are 
exploited by their employer-colleagues and professional associations represent 
cooperative. If the law societies play "hard ball" with their own 
members they will be open to criticism from within. 
26 As reported above at p 32, his research showed how an elite of the profession were 
able to define "ambulance chasing" as unethical despite its social utility and 
widespread use by lower status lawyers. See also Freidson (1983) and Gilb (1966:109) 
for evidence of undemocratic and exclusionary practices among US professional 
associations with self-regulatory powers in the past. 
27 Justifications for focusing on professional community will be examined in more 
detail in Chapters Six and Seven. 
39 
Chapter 2 Judging Lawyers 
the interests of elite city lawyers alone. While clients and the community might 
wish for regulatory authorities more intent on making lawyers better at 
providing access to justice, practising lawyers hope for professional 
associations better at doing some of the things they say they do-incorporating 
all kinds of lawyers into an inclusive egalitarian and respectful professional 
community, representing a variety of lawyer interests and ensuring that 
professional regulation with full legitimacy in the eyes of clients and the public 
takes place. They criticise the current regulatory system for failing to tackle the 
outcomes that matter for a justice system, especially rule-book regulation of 
trust accounts being a web which catches the fly and lets the bumblebee break 
through by completely failing to address large scale frauds which open the 
whole profession up to ridicule. 
IV. Access to Justice Versus Professional Concerns 
Clients and community present the challenge of organising and regulating the 
legal profession so that it plays its part in providing access to justice. Figure 
2.1 contrasts their concerns with the legal profession in comparison with those 
evinced by disciplinary authorities, professional associations and practising 
lawyers. 
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Access to Justice Professional Concerns 
Concerns 
Professional 
Clients and Community Associations and 
Disciplinary Authorities 
Practising Lawyers 
• Poor quality service • Breakdown of • Discrimination. 
( delay, incompetence, monopoly. 
• Employment negligence). 
• Individual behaviour exploitation. 
• Over-charging and that breaches unity 
• Irrelevant and over-serv1crng. and etiquette, such as 
burdensome self-competition between 
• Better services for the regulation. lawyers. 
rich than the poor. 
• Non-representative, • Perceptions of self-
• Bending rules for the regulatory illegitimacy non-effective 
highest bidder. (especially when trust professional 
account frauds occur). associations. 
Inequality of access to Nurturing professional community and regulatory 
high quality legal legitimacy. 
services. 
Figure 2.1 Summary of Concerns with Lawyer Conduct 
Does public concern with access to justice mean that the legal profession's 
traditional emphasis on preserving community is not a valid objective for 
professional organisation and regulation? Rules which maintain the 
professional community and solidarity of the profession by restricting 
competition between practitioners, and especially the information clients can 
receive about differences among lawyers, are now contested as obstructing 
access to justice. Yet there is reason to believe that fostering professional 
community will retain importance. While many ordinary lawyers are not 
concerned with the traditional ethics of duty to their colleagues, they would like 
a profession concerned about discrimination, inequality and exploitation 
between lawyers, and professional associations which reflect the range of 
interests among lawyers. Addressing these issues might work to,vards creating 
a genuinely inclusive community of lawyers where difference is accepted and 
respected. This is a matter of justice and fairness within the profession but it 
can also have an effect on client access to legal services. As professional 
community becomes more inclusive of different groups of lawyers, it can also 
become more inclusive of different groups of clients. 
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Fostering professional community may also be useful to clients and the public in 
another way: One of the reasons high status clients get better quality legal 
services than lower status ones is that their lawyers are more likely to be 
embedded in networks rich in "social capital" (see pp 24-25 above). Within 
these communities of colleagues, informal social control works to demand high 
standards of service and sanction low standards. Where a lawyer's 
embeddedness in professional community is low, they are less likely to act 
according to norms of regard for clients. Greater professional community means 
a greater potential for informal control over lawyers, which could be as easily 
aimed at improving access to justice, as restricting it. 
Thus professional community in a legal profession oriented toward access to 
justice may still be of considerable importance. Part Two of the thesis returns to 
this question. Chapter Six will show that the ideology of communal self-
regulation, if not its practice, comprises ideals which do address client and 
community concerns; Chapters Seven and Eight examine the justifications for 
traditional regulatory practices and the competing demands for competition, 
accountability and access to justice reform in more detail; Chapter Nine seeks to 
reconcile them in a theory for the regulation of the legal profession. Before these 
concrete questions of the organisation and regulation of the legal profession can 
be addressed, community concerns demand we have a normative theory about 
what access to justice requires so that we can say what part lawyers ought to 
play and regulate them accordingly. Chapter Three embarks on the search for 
such a theory. 
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Securing Justice 
I. Introduction 
Questions of the regulation and organisation of the legal profession can be and 
often are decided in isolation from questions of access and justice. Yet if client 
and community concerns about the ethics and conduct of lawyers in fact relate 
to the ways in which they hinder access to justice (as Chapter Two argued they 
did), then reforming legal professional regulation begins with considering what 
access to justice ought to entail. We cannot be content with a model for 
regulating the profession which fails to contribute to a wider access to justice 
agenda or helps perpetuate unequal access to justice. Talking about access to 
justice means asking fundamental questions about how social relations are 
ordered and what being a citizen of a good society means, normative questions 
of the socio-political good which extend far beyond law and lawyers. 
Section II of this chapter argues that community concern about access to justice 
should be understood as a concern about the availability of procedures for 
claiming social or individual justice, for securing one's place as a citizen in a 
good society. Law should not be artificially divided from other means of justice 
in the discussion of access to justice. Justice is therefore defined using Rawls' 
concept/ conception distinction (Campbell 1988:3-4) as those arrangements by 
which people can (successfully) make claims against individuals and institutions in 
order to advance accepted ideals of social and political life. 
Section III elaborates this definition of justice using a republican conception of 
justice that is attractive, as later chapters will show, because it opens up a 
theoretical strategy for reconciling the conflicting access to justice concerns of 
citizens and lawyers through deliberation. Pettit' s interpretation of the 
republican tradition (Pettit 1993, 1996, 1997, Braithwaite & Pettit 1990) is used 
to argue that justice should be understood as those arrangements by which 
people can (successfully) make claims against individuals and institutions in 
order to have security against being dominated by others.1 Secure justice of a 
republican type implies practical deliberative democracy in which decisions and 
1 Republicanism is particularly useful for drawing these themes together, and giving 
them a deeper rationale, but the reader need not be convinced by republicanism to 
follow the rest of the thesis. 
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actions are easily contestable on the basis of reasons through procedures 
accepted as fair. 
Section IV uses normative republican theory together with empirical socio-legal 
research to consider what the relationship between access to law and access to 
justice is and should be. It will argue that the most desirable and effective 
means of justice--of securing good social relations-may not be legal processes, 
so much as informal, voluntary and dialogue-based means of "ground-up" 
communal ordering on the one hand, and collective social and political action 
on the other. The coercion of law might be used to achieve justice only as a last 
resort; where law is used it would be as non-coercive as possible in order to 
allow informal and internalised social controls arising from proper deliberation 
to flourish. Thus access to justice will not consist simply in access to law, but 
in a diversity of arrangements and institutions by which accepted social and 
political ideals are securely achieved. This broader than customary reading of 
the term "access to justice" lays the groundwork for understanding the role of 
lawyers as significant but not dominant in the practice of justice. 
II. What is Access to Justice? 
(i) Access to Justice 
The rhetoric of access to justice (and the reform movement associated with it) 
has been effective in bringing the demands of substantive justice to bear on 
discussions about the legal system and on legal services over the last thirty 
years. 2 But the term "access to justice" has not been well defined. It has 
covered a wide variety of issues including the accessibility of court processes 
for resolving disputes over mutual rights and responsibilities, 3 the availability 
of adequate legal representation in a criminal trial (eg Young & Wall 1996), 
access to more informal legal processes such as tribunals ( eg Sainsbury & Genn 
1995), and the availability of legal advice4 and public legal education. The 
2 The access to justice movement is a global movement of legal workers (particularly 
from legal aid offices and community legal centres), government reformers and law and 
society scholars who are concerned with making the legal system more accessible and 
with the fact that legal processes do not necessarily lead to results that are 
individually or socially just. The movement has been comprehensively described in 
the theoretical and empirical work of the Florence Access to Justice project (eg 
Cappelletti & Garth 1978; Garth 1980), and more recently from the British 
~erspective in Zuckerman & Cranston (1995). 
For example, rights to compensation in negligence or mutual rights and 
responsibilities in a contract or after a divorce. 
4 For example, where a contract is being negotiated, or to jump the administrative and 
legal hurdles necessary to fulfil a goal such as registering a business name or company, 
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access to justice movement has advocated more substantive reforms of law and 
legal procedures to ensure that the interests of the poor, minorities and diffuse 
public interests can be taken into account, in addition to promoting a broad 
range of alternative dispute resolution methods and intra-organisational 
complaints handling mechanisms to avert legal processes altogether. 
The reason for this extensive range of concerns is that while the term" access to 
justice" has been used mainly in relation to the legal system, the "justice" to 
which it refers has been taken by reformers to mean much more than legal 
justice. The history of the access to justice movement can be read as a 
progressive struggle to overcome the discrepancy between the claims of 
substantive justice and the formal legal system, as Chapter Four will show.5 The 
term has been useful precisely because it signifies this tension between legal 
justice and substantive justice. Access to legal processes need only be one 
example of access to justice, albeit one of central concern to date in the practice 
and literature of the movement. In this thesis access to justice will be taken to 
mean what it says; the availability of suitable arrangements or processes for 
people to claim justice, not just to use the law. This may be a more expansive 
definition of the term than customary, yet such a broad definition is necessary 
to fully comprehend its spirit and use. It does, however, beg the question of the 
meaning of "justice". 
( ii) Justice 
There are many ways of defining "justice". Selznick (1992:431-432) points out 
that for most people justice "embraces a complex set of interacting variables" 
including "entitlement, justification, equality, impartiality, proportionality, 
reciprocity, rectification, need, desert, and participation", and different 
theorists may emphasise one or the other. But "the idea that justice is a matter 
of people getting what they deserve is perhaps the most common and tenacious 
conception of justice" as Campbell argues (1988:150). Defining justice in this 
way-as giving to each person his or her due-means that the concept of justice 
or to fulfil an ordinary transaction such as transferring property or administering a 
will. 
5 For example Trubek (1990) describes how in the first stage, legal aid was introduced 
to ensure that everyone could have access to formal legal processes through a lawyer. 
In the second stage, the fact that formal legal justice would not be sufficient to achieve 
substantive justice was emphasised; law would have to be made more just by changing 
laws and procedures and allowing group and public interests to be taken into account. 
In the third stage, the sufficiency of "legal justice" was questioned and community-
based alternatives were developed. See also Cappelletti & Garth (1978), and 
Bottomley et al (1994:59-86) for material on the development of access to justice in 
Australia. 
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is settled, but different theorists are free to disagree on what giving each person 
their due means in concrete terms (Campbell 1988:4). It utilises Rawls' 
concept/ conception distinction to get around the problems of clarifying a term 
that is used in such a complex and varied way: 
The concept is then taken to provide the 'meaning' of justice, while 
the conceptions enunciate the evaluative criteria variously deployed 
to determine that certain types of situation[s] are just or unjust. 
Thus the concept of justice may be analysed as a set of principles 
for assessing social and political institutions, while conceptions of 
justice represent differing views on the proper content of these 
principles. (Campbell 1988:3-4) 
Thus Rawls defines the concept of justice as "a proper balance between 
competing claims" in relation to "the appropriate distribution of the benefits 
and burdens of social cooperation" (Campbell 1988:4). In other words, talking 
about justice means talking about the social good, that is, those ideals we ought 
to accept for living together and governing ourselves in communities. A 
conception of justice is the substantive set of principles that actually set out 
what social and political ideals ought to be accepted; "a set of related 
principles for identifying the relevant considerations which determine this 
balance" in Rawls' terms (Campbell 1988:4). Rawls' own criterion of political 
assessment is one conception of justice, but any other normative socio-political 
theory could provide an equally valid conception. 
When we want access to justice, we are concerned, like Rawls, with achieving 
some conception of the social good. But, like Hume (1978:489) who saw in 
justice a conventional device for the regulation of disputes over limited or scarce 
resources, we conceive the justice to which we want access in a procedural way. 
The desire for access to justice is the desire for access to processes aimed at 
achieving some conception of the social good. Thus (the concept of) justice will 
be defined in this thesis as, 
those arrangements by which people can (successfully) make claims 
against individuals and institutions in order to advance shared ideals of 
social and political life.6 
6 Philip Pettit suggested an earlier version of this definition. The question of how a 
community decides on a particular set of social and political ideals will not be 
discussed here although clearly it is important. 
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It will yield different views (conceptions) of the required arrangements depending 
on what ideals are accepted as shared. 
On this approach justice is the means by which people seek to secure the type 
of social and individual relations they think are right, and to rectify them when 
they have gone wrong in particular circumstances. This could involve having the 
means to make a claim in an individual dispute about what is the right way to 
solve it, or seeking to change institutional practices and culture to conform to 
relevant social and political ideals. 
This definition makes for a very broad notion of justice; to see it as tied in this 
way to a criterion of social and political assessment is to see it as being 
concerned with much more than civil dispute resolution or criminal justice. 
Although it clearly includes legal and quasi-legal justice arrangements, the 
definition also embraces even the most informal methods of dispute resolution 
as well as a variety of forms of political participation (including informal 
political participation in social movements) by which people make more general 
claims about the way their societies should be organised and resources 
distributed. Section IV of this chapter and the whole of the following chapter 
(Chapter Four) will discuss the relationship between legal and other forms of 
justice. First, the notion of justice needs to be further clarified. 
III. The Republic of Justice 
(i) Justice as Security Against Domination 
Any normative political philosophy or substantive conception of justice could 
provide the social and political ideals at which justice should be aimed. But 
this thesis will use the republican ideal outlined by Pettit (1993, 1997, 
Braithwaite & Pettit 1990) because, as is shown below, it fits particularly well 
with the emphasis of access to justice rhetoric on procedures for securing 
justice. The normative claims of republican theory also complement the 
empirical evidence on the relationship between law and other means of justice 
discussed in Section IV of this chapter and in Chapter Four; and, they motivate 
the deliberative dialogic regulatory model for rendering the legal profession itself 
just that will be found to be both desirable and practical in Part Two of the 
thesis. 
Recent work on republicanism shows that it has always been primarily 
concerned with ensuring that members of a society have security in their status 
47 
Chapter 3 Securing Justice 
and freedom as citizens (Braithwaite & Pettit 1990, Dunn 1994, Manin 1994, 
Pettit 1993, 1997, Skinner 1984)? 
[F]reedom was conceptualised as the social status enjoyed by 
someone who is not a slave and, more generally, by someone who is 
so protected by the law and culture of his community that he does 
not have to depend for the enjoyment of independent choice on the 
grace or favour or mercy of another ... [Republicanism] emphasised 
that liberty is constituted by the support against interference, and 
the status of being manifestly so supported, which goes with 
citizenship in an appropriately governed society; in a society where 
the rule of law obtains and power is systematically checked. (Pettit 
with Braithwaite 1993:226) 
Skinner (1984), Pettit (1993, 1997) and others have shown that the 
fundamental ideal on which republicanism was implicitly based was a 
particular conception of freedom, 8 which Pettit (1997) calls "freedom as non-
domination". 9 This conception of liberty can be distinguished from the idea of 
freedom as non-interference which is predominant in liberal theory. For 
classical liberals, individuals retain their freedom to the extent that they do not 
actually suffer restraint in their range of choice. In contrast, republicanism 
emphasised security against interference. For republicans a person's freedom is 
diminished to the extent that another agent has the capacity to interfere with 
them without constraint, even that agent does not in fact do so. Republican 
non-domination means the absence of interference not by accident but by 
design, by virtue of being secured against the powerful in "an appropriately 
governed society". 
Thus while Sunstein (1988), for example, defines his version of republicanism 
according to four principles or commitments with which it has been historically 
associated,10 Pettit defines republicanism more foundationally according to 
freedom as non-domination. He shows how traditional republican institutions 
7 As Dunn (1994:209) notes, this does not mean that modem republics have delivered 
much real security to citizens. Indeed, as noted in Chapter One (p 5), Dunn suggests 
that republican political theory has largely failed to design institutions which will 
deliver real security. According to him the modem success of the republican form is 
due mainly to the failures of its rivals to provide a better answer to the problem of 
security (1994:210). For material on the history of republicanism in Australian law 
and society see McKenna (1996) and Williams (1995). 
8 The following discussion will use liberty and freedom interchangeably. 
9 Braithwaite & Pettit (1990) called it dominion . 
lO These are (1) "deliberation in politics made possible by civic virtue"; (2) "the 
equality of political actors, embodied in a desire to eliminate sharp disparities in 
political participation or influence among individuals or social groups"; (3) 
"universalism, exemplified by the notion of a common good"; (4) "citizenship, 
manifesting itself in broadly guaranteed rights of participation" (Sunstein 1988:1541). 
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such as a rule of law, a constitution in which different powers serve to check 
and balance each other, the separation of powers, counter-majoritarian 
entrenchment of certain laws, federalism, deliberative politics, participatory 
citizenship and a regime of civic virtue in which people are disposed to serve 
honestly in public office, are not the foundations of republican theory but are 
significant as means by which liberty is secured.11 Each is a way in which 
citizens are protected against any interference that others might contemplate. 
This republican focus on developing institutions which protect and secure 
people's freedom in society fits well the procedural view of justice outlined 
above in which justice is a critical way of securing a community governed by 
accepted social and political ideals. 
Using a republican conception of social and political ideals and the procedural 
view of justice outlined above, justice can be defined more fully as, 
that set of arrangements that allow people to make claims against other 
individuals and institutions in order to secure their freedom against the 
possibility of domination. 
Justice defined in this way is a central concern of republicanism; ensuring 
adequate arrangements and institutions to allow citizens to make claims about 
(1) how their freedom as non-domination ought to be protected and 
institutionalised in the future, or (2) how they have been dominated in the past 
(and to have the situation rectified; see Pettit with Braithwaite 1993) is the 
main project of republican political theory. 
(ii) Justice as Deliberative Democracy 
Pettit (1997:183-185) writes that in order to secure citizens' freedom, not only 
should government be constrained by checks and balances such as the rule of 
law and separation of powers, but citizens should have the opportunity to 
make their presence felt in public decision-making that offends (by their lights) 
against their interests by ensuring that, 
[A]t every site of decision-making, legislative, administrative and 
judicial, there are procedures in place which identify the 
considerations relevant to the decision, thereby enabling citizens to 
raise the question as to whether they are the appropriate 
considerations to play that role. And ... that there are procedures in 
11 Similarly, popular 
0 republicanism" which is concerned with abolishing 
monarchical power might simply be another institutional way of ensuring freedom as 
non-domination. 
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place which enable citizens to make a judgment on whether the 
relevant considerations actually determined the outcome . . . (Pettit 
1997:188) 
In other words the republican concern with ensuring that people can adequately 
make claims to advance their freedom in society requires that public decisions 
be subject to the contest and debate of deliberative democracy. Indeed the 
creation of a deliberative democracy-a polity where decisions are made on the 
basis of dialogue and public justification accessible to all citizens-is a 
traditional concern of republican theory (Pettit 1997:188-189), particularly of 
US republicanism (Sunstein 1988, 1993). It is also central to a variety of more 
recent political theories including Habermas' discourse theory of law and 
democracy (1996), Dryzek' s discursive democracy (1990), Young's 
communicative democracy (1990, 1993) and a whole literature on active 
participatory citizenship inspired by the ancient Greek ideal of citizenship as 
"part of the integrated life of the city-state" (Boucher & Vincent 1993:89) and 
the classical civic republican tradition (Barber 1984, Oldfield 1990). 
For Pettit this does not require the unrealistic ideal that all public decisions 
originate in collective consent and universally satisfactory resolution of 
differences. He puts forward the more practically feasible ideal of contestatory 
democracy as an instantiation of deliberative democracy in which decisions are 
legitimate if they are open to contestation in forums and through procedures 
that are acceptable to all concerned after they are made (Pettit 1997:183-200). 
This tends to encourage decisions to be made on the basis of publicly 
acceptable reasons and with enough consultation and participation to ensure 
that all the relevant arguments and considerations are on the table; and in the 
second place requires a "republic of reasons" in which decisions that have been 
made are open to debate and justification, and in which citizens have access to 
means of contestation, and forums that adjudicate contestations fairly. 
Deliberative democracy is constituted only by the creation of institutions and 
arrangements through which citizens can assert their interests and ideas in 
response to decisions that have been made ( or in relation to issues that are yet 
to be decided). There must be places in which debate can actually be joined 
and the assurance that justice will be done in the procedural sense outlined 
above, that there be forums where citizens can make claims that advance their 
freedom as non-domination. Traditionally political theorists have emphasised 
achieving this through formal, democratic participation in public political 
decision-making-the vote, the possibility of standing for election, the courts. 
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Feminists and others have re-formed the understanding of participation in 
deliberative fora to include informal political participation in social movements, 
community groups and the institutions of civil society (Lister 1995:8-9). For 
Habermas it means the formal public political sphere must be "porous" to the 
protests and contributions of individual citizens and social movements and not 
restricted to their involvement through elected representatives (Habermas 
1996:359-387); there must be enough participation by a wide enough diversity 
of citizens in a wide enough diversity of communicative styles to ensure all of 
the relevant considerations become part of the deliberation (Bohman 1994:918, 
Young 1993). 
In Pettit's conception, deliberation-the ability to debate and contest 
decisions-is about making sure that the public decisions of legislature, 
executive and judiciary do not dominate citizens. Indeed most political and 
democratic theory concentrates on elaborating the institutions and arrangements 
by which public power is exercised. It is equally important that institutions of 
deliberation exist to ensure that citizens are not dominated by private powers 
(an issue that will be discussed in Chapter Ten, pp 262-263).1 2 As Anne 
Phillips (1991:39) argues "it is absurd to espouse democracy at the level of the 
state when there is subordination in our lives elsewhere". Advocates of 
participatory democracy have usually recognised that at the very least 
workplace democracy goes hand in hand with participation in affairs of state 
(Phillips 1991:39-40). Indeed the legal profession itself is a private power that 
must be subject to the justice of deliberative democracy as Chapters Eight and 
Nine will show. 
In a strong deliberative democracy, citizens are able to use a variety of 
institutions and arrangements to challenge or prevent both private and public 
dominations, to debate whether public and private actions and decisions fit 
with accepted social and political ideals, and if not, how and whether they 
should be rectified. They can use democratic representation in the public 
political sphere, recourse to courts of law, tribunals or internal institutional 
dispute resolution processes. They might engage in informal protest or social 
movement politics. They request justification for actions or decisions within a 
family, workplace or community group and engage in informal dialogue aimed 
at promoting their conception of the good. The very existence and accessibility 
of these arrangements and institutions by which citizens raise their interests and 
12 See Braithwaite (forthcoming) for one attempt to rectify this in the context of 
republican theory. 
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concerns, in which they request justification for decisions, and argue that a 
decision ought to be reversed or the results of an action rectified, constitutes 
justice in the republic.13 
(iii) Access to Republican Justice 
Ensuring that citizens actually have access to all these justice arrangements and 
can take full advantage of them is crucial to having "the wherewithal to operate 
normally and properly in your society", and therefore the enjoyment of freedom 
as non-domination (Pettit 1997:158). To be free in republican terms is to be 
"incorporated as a citizen into the body politic" (Braithwaite & Pettit 1990:59). 
Traditional republicanism recognised that only those with pre-existing 
socioeconomic independence ( often based on property-ownership) could be 
citizens because only they had the resources to take advantage of all the 
arrangements for securing their liberty. This is why the early feminist Mary 
Wollstonecraft focused on the importance of secure rights to property, so that 
women could enjoy the rights and participate in the duties of citizenship free of 
dependence on men for their subsistence (Wollstonecraft 1995:236). 
For this reason republicanism was historically exclusive; its ideal of freedom 
was so demanding that only an elite could attain it. In contemporary societies 
we should be happy to accept neither a lesser ideal nor an elitist conception of 
who is entitled to freedom. It will be crucial to republicanism that all people 
have the means to access or get the benefit of whatever arrangements there are 
for securing their liberty. Otherwise they will not have the benefit of liberty as 
non-domination at all; they will not be citizens. As Haakonssen (1993:572) 
comments on the republicanism of Pettit and Skinner, 
Republican liberty, so formulated, seems to amount to little more 
than the old liberal ideal of equal freedom under law but the 
suggestion does go further. In the republican conception, it is 
suggested, danger of interference is only really absent when each 
individual can obviate such danger. The point of a republic is 
therefore to put each individual in a position where he or she can 
live in resilient, self-asserted freedom. The independence that in 
traditional republics was derived from owning property must in the 
new republic be derived simply from being a person. 
Access to justice is necessary to achieve "resilient self-assertable freedom" and 
must be one of the elements of republican citizenship. If any individual or class 
of individuals lacks the capacity for access to justice then they will not be able 
13 The way the different forms of justice fit together will be discussed in Chapter 
Four. 
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to operate fully as a competent member of society, or at least their citizenship 
status will not be secure. To what institutions might citizens be guaranteed 
access? As we have seen, access to justice rhetoric has emphasised making 
legal and quasi-legal justice institutions accessible to all. How significant is 
access to other procedures and arrangements for securing justice and what 
relationship do they bear to law? 
IV. Law as Justice in a Deliberative Democracy 
( i) Access to Law as Access to Justice 
Access to justice discourse has concentrated on the citizen's use of institutions 
of law as deliberative fora in which private and public dominations can be 
contested and debated. Pettit, along with other republicans, also puts great 
emphasis on the institutions of law. He and Braithwaite claim that the most 
obvious requirement for the promotion of freedom as non-domination is a 
robust system of legal protection: 
What republicans generally say is that [liberty] is exemplified by the 
condition of citizenship in a free society, a condition under which 
each is properly safeguarded by the law against predations of 
others. The regulative interpretation of liberty, the interpretation 
which guides us on what liberty requires, equates freedom not with 
being left alone, but with being given equal protection before a 
suitable law. (Braithwaite & Pettit 1990:57) 
In practice, Gordon (1985) shows that the Federalist lawyers of the early 
American republic saw the law over which they had guardianship as the only 
mechanism capable of integrating the citizens into a just and virtuous republic 
that reconciled commercial and self-interested activity with shared values and 
common purposes: 
That virtue-supplying substance, the lawyers argued, that surrogate 
for traditional communities and hierarchies, was law itself; or, to be 
more precise, was the mainfold [sic] diverse social practices of 
lawyers-law not as a body of rules, but as a powerful autonomous 
culture produced by lawyers and diffused by them ... (Gordon 1985, 
Lecture One:6) 
It is clear that access to law can help make freedom or citizenship status secure 
by (a) helping to achieve remedies for specific instances of domination, (b) 
ensuring that the rich and powerful do not have superior access to law that can 
be used to dominate the powerless, and (c) empowering citizens to function 
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independently and without domination in ordinary affairs of life through access 
to legal information and advice: 
(a) Ability to Make Claims Against Domination: Access to law is one means for 
individuals, groups and the state (which represents the whole community in 
criminal and regulatory law) to make claims to stop, remedy or prevent specific 
instances of domination and to reform dominating practices and social 
arrangements. Even the criminal justice system should provide a means for the 
claims of victims to be recognised when their non-dominated status is denied by 
a criminal act (see Braithwaite & Pettit 1990, Pettit with Braithwaite 1993). 
(b) Equality in Access to Law: Freedom may also be threatened if some classes of 
individuals have more access to law than others. The powerless are at the 
mercy of whoever can buy up the best advice and representation in making their 
claims. If some people are always able to use the law to have their claims 
heard, while others are not, then the law will become skewed by continually 
recognising the claims of those who can afford to use it. It will fail to serve its 
overall purpose of advancing the freedom of all. For example, the courts and 
even the law have become increasingly oriented towards resolving disputes 
between commercial equals who clog the system because they are the ones who 
can pay. Large companies can undermine whole areas of regulation set in place 
to advance liberty as non-domination by settling cases where an unfavourable 
precedent is likely to be set down, using their superior access to the best legal 
advice to fight those cases where they are likely to achieve an interpretation in 
their favour (Galanter 1974). 
( c) Access to Legal Advice and Information: Finally, a person's freedom can be 
threatened not only if they lack equal access to procedures by which they can 
make justice claims, but also if they lack information and knowledge about their 
status and the ways it can be protected. Without such information about rights 
and obligations a citizen may not be able to do basic things like draft a will, fill 
in a tax return, buy and sell goods or transfer land. Nor will they be able to lay 
claim to their rights in everyday situations and as a result will be easily 
exploited by more knowledgeable and powerful people. 
(ii) Limits of Law as Justice 
Yet there are critical limitations on the role that law can play in achieving 
justice. Liberal theory tends to recognise that the advantages of law should 
always be balanced against its disadvantages. Republicanism may seem 
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susceptible to criticism that it places too much emphasis on law. Statements 
like the following might encourage such condemnation: 
Liberalism goes for a quantity-centred conception of liberty, a 
conception to which restraint is the antonym, and sees law as 
instrumentally serving the cause of such liberty: law is itself a form 
of restraint but overall it does more good in this regard than harm. 
Republicanism prefers a security-centred or quality-centred 
conception, a conception opposed to servitude rather than restraint, 
and casts the law in a constitutive role vis-a-vis liberty, not merely 
an instrumental one: the rule of law helps to confer on citizens that 
secure status in which their liberty consists. (Pettit 1993:179) 
Yet an emphasis on law as constitutive of freedom and as specially suited to 
securing justice, does not necessarily preclude recognition of its limitations. One 
can emphasise the centrality of law in securing freedom, at the same time 
advocating the equal importance of other cultural and political processes. 
Republicanism emphasises rich democracy in which citizens' security is founded 
on the existence of a variety of arrangements and institutions, including law, 
that foster deliberation about how to achieve the ideal of freedom as non-
domination. 
Law must be supplemented and handled carefully because it is generally 
coercive to an extent.14 While it is an excellent tool for contesting decisions and 
actions in a reasoned manner (Sunstein 1996), it also generally restricts people's 
range of choice, if not the intensity of the freedom they enjoy (Pettit 1997:24-
25, 104). As Lloyd (1979:26) comments, law as an ideal type consists of two 
elements, authority and force; it is legitimate coercion. While some law is much 
less coercive than other law and some even lacks sanctions, as an ideal type 
"the force of law is and seems always to have been linked with rules which are 
capable of being enforced by coercion; the hangman, the gaoler, the bailiff" 
(Lloyd 1979:35). Law is a critically important method of justice in certain 
situations precisely because it can coerce compliance, but it is more usually 
effective for reasons other than its coerciveness. Indeed, its coerciveness can be 
a major limitation, as will be argued below and again in relation to regulating 
lawyers in Chapters Seven and Eight. 
The liberal conception of liberty as non-interference sees freedom as the absence 
of coercion. Thus law always represents a restraint on freedom, even if it 
promotes a greater freedom (see Pettit 1993:166-169, 1996:595-599, 1997:35-
14 This is not to deny that some law is purely educative, has no sanctions attached 
and is therefore not coercive; yet law is typically coercive to a greater or lesser extent. 
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41). For republicans, by contrast, law is particularly suited to making freedom 
secure. A just law never dominates or makes people unfree: "The rule of law is 
a crucial element in the standard way of bringing liberty into existence; it is not 
just a factor that impacts both negatively and positively on the level of liberty 
people enjoy" (Pettit 1993:167). However law might condition the freedom of 
citizens in the manner that physical limitations do _by restricting people's range 
of choice. 
The coercion of even a just law may still therefore be a disadvantage for 
republicans. The advancing of freedom ultimately means having as wide a 
range of undominated choice as possible, and so it is preferable to avoid the 
making and use of unnecessarily restrictive law (see Pettit 1996:593). If 
possible, an area should not be the subject of the coercion of law at all; it 
should not be the subject of prescription or proscription. If there must be law, 
the less coercive the better, and the way the law is enforced also ought to be as 
non-restricting of freedom as possible. Institutions that discourage the 
unnecessary use or enforcement of law should be fostered, and in any legal 
system enacted laws should serve the cause of freedom better than alternatives. 
In Not Just Deserts, an outline of a republican theory of criminal justice, 
Braithwaite and Pettit (1990) call this "the principle of parsimony". Such a 
principle will be of the utmost importance in the area of criminal justice, clearly 
the most coercive area of legal prohibition, and so often involving radical 
invasions of liberty in its enforcement:15 
The state should use those legislative, enforcement, and sentencing 
options which are minimally interventionist until the evidence is 
clear that more-intrusive [sic] practices are required to increase 
dominion. More than that, the state should actively search for 
alternative ways of promoting dominion to such interventionist 
policies as criminal punishment. (Braithwaite & Pettit 1990:79-80; 
see also at 87, and Pettit 1997:154-155) 
Criminal justice is the most coercive area of law, but the coerciveness of legal 
solutions to questions of justice will always have to be weighed against their 
value in advancing freedom.16 
15 Braithwaite & Pettit (1990:104) go so far as to argue that there ought to be a 
iiresumption against imprisonment in any criminal statute. 
6 In practice there is no reason why this republican approach cannot lead to similar 
outcomes to the liberal balancing approach. 
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In a deliberative democracy, there ought to be available a variety of 
arrangements and institutions of deliberation that check domination. As 
already suggested, the use of law will be just one means of doing justice among 
many that include social and political action in formal and informal arenas, 
requests for dialogue and justification in families, clubs, workplaces and other 
institutional arenas and informal decision-making and dispute resolution fora . 
Indeed it will be preferable to use the most voluntary, dialogic means of 
achieving justice available and this will mean designing law to be as minimally 
coercive as possible, encouraging the proliferation of non-coercive, community-
based methods of social ordering, and designing institutions which encourage 
the use of less coercive means of doing justice before more coercive ones. Thus 
Part Two of this thesis will argue that lawyers ought to be reformed using 
deliberative mechanisms before coercive ones, and that self-regulation should be 
attempted before state regulation. 
An added reason for being parsimonious about legal coercion as a means of 
achieving justice is that coercion may be so easily misdirected. Republican 
theory can idealise law's ability to check domination in other areas without 
being stained by the taint of domination itself. Yet powerful actors will always 
be able to use the coercion of law to dominate others. They may use superior 
legal advice and the ability to manipulate legal technicalities to overpower the 
powerless and frustrate regulation put there to enhance non-domination. They 
may dominate law-making, either in the legislature or the courts, so that the law 
reflects their interests. The mere proliferation of law in and of itself advantages 
powerful organisations because they have a greater ability to hire lawyers to 
bend its technicalities to their own purposes. As Sutton and Wild argue "The 
more formal and complex the body of law becomes, the more it will operate in 
favour of formal, rational, and bureaucratic groups such as corporations. In one 
sense, therefore, law and justice may be fundamentally irreconcilable" (Sutton & 
Wild 1978:195; see also Shils & Rheinstein 1954). 
(iii) The Social Science of Non-Coercive Control 
If political philosophers teach us that ideally it is better to be restrained about 
using the coercion of law so that the range of citizens' freedom can be 
maximised, law and society research has shown that as a matter of fact non-
coercive control can be a more effective means of achieving justice ( eg Galanter 
1981). Law is more just when it "springs from the character and condition of 
the people" and when it is administered with regard for the integrity of social 
practices and people's autonomy (Selznick 1992:469-470; see also Krygier 
1996). Non-coercive social control is likely to be more effective than coercive 
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control in achieving long-term compliance with norms that advance freedom, 
and coercive law is most effective when a last resort.1 7 This theme is most 
clearly developed in the corpus of empirical and policy-oriented work brought 
together by Braithwaite in his research on criminology and business regulation.
18 
Empirical research on criminal deterrence shows that informal sanctions have a 
much greater impact than formal legal sanctions, and that regardless of what 
kind of social control is attempted it is not its formal punitive features that 
make a difference, but its informal moralizing features (Braithwaite 1989:69-
70). So Braithwaite's theory of reintegrative shaming is based on the 
assumption that "moralizing appeals which treat the citizen as someone with 
the responsibility to make the right choice are generally, though not invariably, 
responded to more positively than repressive social controls which deny human 
dignity by treating persons as amoral calculators" (Braithwaite 1989:10). There 
is significant psychological evidence for a "minimal sufficiency principle" that 
the less powerful the technique used to secure compliance, the more likely is 
long term internalisation of a desire to comply. Such internalisation is 
discouraged by the use of rewards and punishments; reasoning and dialogue 
promote it (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992:49-51). 
The same theory explains individual and collective responses of actors to 
business regulation in a variety of arenas (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992, Grabosky 
& Braithwaite 1986): Braithwaite and Makkai's program of research on nursing 
home regulation shows that strategies of trust, reintegrative shaming and praise 
are more effective at increasing business compliance with regulation than the 
application of formal sanctions,19 and Braithwaite (1985) had similar results in 
relation to coal mine safety. There is also much evidence that when regulators 
use coercive strategies to achieve compliance they break down the goodwill and 
motivation of those actors who are willing to be socially responsible; resentment 
and defiance build up, crushing the possibility of voluntary compliance (Ayres 
& Braithwaite 1992:21-27, Bardach & Kagan 1982, Kagan & Scholz 1984). 
Ayres and Braithwaite's (1992:97) theory of "responsive regulation" uses these 
empirical findings to propose that it is better to maximise self-regulatory 
possibilities for business by using less coercive, more dialogic methods of 
17 This last point will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four. 
18 The role of law is never directly discussed in Braithwaite's work but he seems to 
suggest that the coercive nature of legal regulation makes it less effective than 
informal sanctions, community ordering, dialogue and persuasion. 
19 See Braithwaite & Makkai (1991, 1994), Makkai & Braithwaite (1993, 1994a, 
1994b). 
58 
Chapter 3 Securing Justice 
regulation first and more coercive measures only when less coercive means fail 
(a model that will be discussed further in Chapter Four, and will be found to 
have particular application to the regulation of the legal profession in Chapters 
Seven and Eight). 
Brehm and Brehm's (1981) theory of "reactance" provides the most refined 
account of the psychological phenomenon behind these findings. Their evidence 
shows that people will resist attempts at control where their freedom is 
perceived to be under threat. They react against threats to their freedom by 
attempting to exercise precisely the freedom they feel is threatened simply to 
make sure they still have it, regardless of whether they would have otherwise 
been motivated to do so. For example, children grounded by their parents will 
attempt to go out when they might otherwise have been happy to stay home 
and watch television. Reactance will be greater depending on the intensity of 
the threat and how much the particular freedom means to the person. In this 
thesis support for reactance theory and responsive regulation is found in the 
reaction of the Australian legal profession to competition and accountability 
reforms during the 1990s discussed in Chapter Seven. Lawyers, including many 
who were initially opposed to reform, were converted to the desirability of 
reform where a process that respected and sought to persuade them was 
utilised; they reacted with resistance when they felt disrespected and 
discredited. 
Reactance theory is helpful because it links the normative importance of 
freedom (as in Pettit 1997) with the fact that restraints on freedom are 
empirically found to produce different effects to those intended. The 
implication of reactance theory is that more persuasive and even dialogic 
methods of changing the behaviour of social actors are more likely to be 
effective precisely because they respect those actors' freedom more. Where 
someone is treated as able to make their own choices about their behaviour, 
rather than being coerced into some course of action, reactance will not be 
necessary because they will not perceive any threat to their freedom. They will 
therefore be more capable of engaging in rational deliberation about what 
should be done. In those cases where they choose to abuse others' freedom and 
refuse to listen to reasons for compliance, coercion may become necessary. 
Similarly when it comes to achieving broad social change in people's habits and 
attitudes, or in the distribution of resources and power, law is of limited use. 
As Rosenberg (1991) shows in his book on the social reform effect of US 
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Supreme Court decisions, political support for social change, community 
pressure for change and market conditions are all much more important than 
litigation in producing reform, changes in opinions or mobilisation of citizens. 
Rosenberg's data shows that law's coercion is limited by severe constraints on 
how effectively it can be implemented in the real world; compliance can only be 
forced in such a narrow range of circumstances that it is mostly incapable of 
producing diffuse or wide-ranging change. While there was no evidence that 
Supreme Court decisions mobilised the proponents of change, there was, 
however, evidence that the perceived threat of the decisions produced 
resistance and strengthened the opponents of change (Rosenberg 1991:341-
342). The use of law can have a "reactant" effect on social change to improve 
justice. 
More effective means of producing widespread social change involve citizens 
participating more directly in political and economic decision-making, and also 
in civic education and consciousness-raising about rights, responsibilities and 
issues of justice (Braithwaite 1995a, Rosenberg 1991:343). As Engel and 
Munger (1996:48-49) show in their study of the relevance of legal rights to the 
life stories of two disabled women, the norms of law "become active, not 
through litigation, but as part of the routines of everyday life" when they play a 
creative role in the transformation of internal dialogues in which people decide 
how to act for themselves, and in public dialogues in which they decide how to 
organise their workplaces, polities and communities. 
This is not to advocate the replacement of the rule of law. It is to say the rule of 
law is meaningless without voluntary, community and political involvement in 
achieving social and political ideals. Community involvement in problems of 
crime may be centred around the shaming and restoration to community of 
individuals, such as in restorative justice conferences (Braithwaite & Mugford 
1994), or around social movements that create a culture of disapproval of 
crimes (Braithwaite 1995a). In Braithwaite' s theory of business regulation, the 
non-coercive control of social movement politics and of restorative justice 
conferences is structured into the "first port of call" strategy of tripartite 
regulatory comm.unitarianism where business, regulatory agencies and public 
interest groups engage in cooperative multi-party regulation (Ayres & 
Braithwaite 1992:81-100). Such dialogic regulation is more likely than 
deterrence and incapacitation to encourage "a commitment to the rightness of 
the law and to the unthinkableness of breaking the law" (1992:81). If possible 
the use of law should be avoided; if not it should be designed and used as 
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educationally and non-coercively as possible; and coercion should only be used 
to achieve compliance in the last resort. These conclusions will apply equally to 
other areas of law as to criminal justice and public regulation since the feature 
of law which makes parsimony desirable is its coercive nature.20 
(iv) Law in a Deliberative Democracy 
Normative theory and empirical research both converge on the idea that while 
recourse to law can be one means of instituting deliberation and doing justice, it 
is severely limited in what it can achieve. As this chapter has shown, other 
arrangements and institutions for constituting deliberative democracy-such as 
informal means of dispute resolution, social movement politics, formal political 
action and dialogic, moralising and persuasive means of social control-will 
often be preferable. 
Social science research which gives prominence to community ordering equates 
well with the traditional republican emphasis on active citizenship and civic 
virtue. The characteristic concern of republican political theory with 
deliberative participation in public life shows that the coercion of law is not 
enough to achieve justice without social and political action. The prominence 
republicans give to civic virtue, the disposition among citizens to follow 
routines, and take initiatives that tend towards the maximisation of freedom as 
non-domination in society (see Pettit 1997:241-251) means that we can and 
should often rely on "protective civic culture" (Pettit 1993:167) before using law 
to secure freedom. Indeed law should not undermine a protective civic culture. 
Firstly, in the regulation of public officials, sanctions which rely on positive and 
negative regard should be chosen in preference to more coercive ones (Pettit 
1997:219-230); this is consistent with the republican tradition's emphasis on 
incentives of shame and honour in public office. More coercive sanctions will be 
necessary to cope with occasional knavery. Secondly, in relation to inhibiting 
would-be dominators in the society at large, civic virtue makes it possible for 
people to be controlled by laws (Pettit 1997:246-251). Its presence means that 
most people comply spontaneously because of sanctions of positive and 
negative regard. The reliable detection of offences and identification of 
offenders is often possible only where there is an actively virtuous citizenry and 
20 Even in civil justice, where law is invoked there is still always the possibility of 
such coercive means of enforcement as sequestration of property, garnishee of wages 
and ultimately imprisonment for contempt of court. Chapter Four examines in more 
detail what applying the lessons from the sociology of non-coercive control might 
mean for civil dispute resolution. 
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a culture of civic virtue which calls new sanctions into play as necessary to 
promote freedom as non-domination.21 
The existence and nurture of other means of justice apart from law act not only 
as alternatives to law's coercion but also as restraints on law's domination. 
Characteristically republican concerns with rule of law and separation of power 
constraints ensure that law is internally structured in such a way that it 
provides minimal opportunities to be subverted (Pettit 1997:230-231). The 
substance of the law may also contain principles designed to shore up its own 
integrity. For example it might provide procedures for public interest groups to 
step in when diffuse interests are likely to be under threat in particular cases 
(Trubek & Trubek 1981). But the best checks on law's capacity to be used as a 
tool of domination will be external, and will rely on the existence of a strong 
civic culture and deliberative politics of justice. The existence of a culture that 
does justice spontaneously as a result of the types of communitarian and social 
movement alternatives to law mentioned above renders citizens more likely to 
follow the spirit of the law voluntarily; it becomes mostly unthinkable to use 
law to dominate others. When someone does the unthinkable, a strong civic 
culture means that there are alternative ways of doing justice available. The 
law itself may require the powerful to encourage a culture of justice by taking 
action that will undermine their own ability to subvert the law. Chapter Five will 
propose that organisations be required not only obey to the law for themselves, 
but to develop plans for proactively doing justice to those they are in a position 
to dominate even before law is invoked. 
Making people's ability to participate in law as equal as possible means that 
people can check each other's ability to use and abuse the law. Yet equalising 
resources in that way may simply mean that everybody seeks to check each 
other's use of law by attempting to undermine the law for themselves. Such a 
strategy will escalate to a "war of all against all" if there is not a supporting 
civic culture in which people are encouraged to comply with the spirit of the law 
voluntarily and not use the law to dominate others. It will be particularly 
important to inculcate the culture of justice in one particular group if people are 
to be prevented from using law to dominate others. This group is those whose 
job it is to help others use the law-the legal profession. If lawyers, and others 
who help people access the law are willing to help clients use and subvert the 
law however they wish, then the law can easily be subverted. But if they 
21 See Pettit & Gatens (1995) for further discussion of these points as applied to the 
women's movement. 
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challenge those who will inevitably seek to use law to undermine freedom as 
non-domination, then the law will be safer. The legal profession, in other 
words, ought to be there to help people access the law when they need it, but it 
will be crucial that the profession also sees itself as part of a culture of justice 
which encompasses much more than the law. These themes will be the subjects 
of later chapters. 
V. Conclusion 
This chapter was concerned with inquiring into the meaning of access to justice 
as the basis for understanding the normative goals for the regulation of the legal 
profession. Firstly, it argued that concern about access to justice evidences a 
concern with procedures for justice, with arrangements by which citizens can 
make claims that advance shared ideals of how social and political relations 
ought to be, and to rectify them when they go wrong. Thus the concept of 
justice was defined as; 
those arrangements by which people can (successfully) make claims 
against individuals and institutions in order to advance shared ideals of 
social and political life. 
Secondly, this chapter showed that republican political theory provides one 
particularly attractive conception for filling out the procedural definition of 
justice. The main project of republican theory, at least according to Pettit's 
(1997) reading of the tradition, is to elaborate the arrangements and institutions 
by which citizens can secure themselves from public or private domination in 
society. Republican political theory thus motivates a concern with developing a 
deliberative democracy sustained by participatory citizenship in which citizens 
can utilise a variety of means to contest and debate public and private actions, 
to test them against the ideal of freedom as non-domination and to rectify them 
when they are found wanting. Thus justice was defined in a republican way as; 
that set of arrangements that allow people to make claims against other 
individuals and institutions in order to secure their freedom against the 
possibility of domination. 
In the republic of justice citizens have secure freedom because of their access to 
a variety of deliberative procedures in which they can make claims that 
advance their freedom as non-domination. 
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Finally, the chapter argued that while the institutions of law are clearly central 
to the practice of justice, law is limited both in its effectiveness and in its 
desirability as a means of securing justice because of its coercive tendencies, 
and its amenability to subversion by powerful interests. Indeed community-
based methods of social ordering will usually be more effective at securing 
freedom than law. Both theory and evidence show that coercive legal sanctions 
should only be used as a last resort, law should be designed and enforced as 
non-coercively as possible and, most importantly, a variety of other means of 
doing justice including alternative dispute resolution, participation in social 
movement politics, democratic representation and civic education for the 
respect of rights must proliferate. 
In practice there are a number of problems with implementing this theory to 
improve justice: Firstly, lawyers have historically been able to dominate access 
to justice discourse with the formalism and coercion of law. The access to 
justice movement itself has found it difficult to look beyond law in its attempts 
to improve justice. Secondly, critics of non-coercive social control show how 
dangerous it is to depend on community-based ordering to achieve justice. As 
Galanter (1981:170) points out, such communitarian alternatives are "not 
always the expression of harmonious egalitarianism. Indigenous law .. . [may 
be] based on relations of domination; protections that are available in public 
forums are absent". De-emphasising law may mean taking away the only 
resource the powerless have for achieving justice, if domination is pervasive in a 
culture. Similarly, the politics of democratic representation and social 
movements do not necessarily include all the voices that ought to be included in 
justice deliberation. Without rights entrenched through the coercion of law, 
domination within supposedly dialogic processes is all too easy. Chapters Four 
and Five use socio-legal research to consider how we might successfully 
institutionalise a set of justice procedures which give law and lawyers a 
significant but not dominating place in the deliberative republic. Law and 
lawyers should not be at the periphery of a republic of justice; the challenge is 
how to make them central without subjugating people's justice to lawyers' 
justice. 
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Institutionalising Justice: 
Four Waves of Access Reform 
I. Introduction 
If access to justice is a constitutive element of (deliberative) democracy in 
theory, as Chapter Three argued, then the institutionalisation of access to justice 
arrangements will be a crucial question of policy in practice. As Chapter Two 
suggested, people see the legal profession as a major access to justice 
institution. As a result, much access to justice policy relies either directly or 
indirectly on reorganising institutions of legal professionalism and legal service 
delivery. Yet Chapter Three showed that access to justice institutions which rely 
solely on law will be inadequate both in theory and practice. This chapter turns 
from the discussion of political theory to consideration of the means and 
institutions available for ensuring that citizens do have access to justice and 
how they can best be utilised. 
Section II examines four waves of reform championed by the access to justice 
movement over the last thirty years. Each emphasised the value of different 
institutional means for delivering access to justice-institutions of the state, 
market, communities and social movements. Section III argues that they have 
failed to satisfy access to justice demand because they have not sufficiently 
integrated the use of formal and informal justice, nor has sufficient weight been 
given to achieving justice through social change. How can a practical policy for 
access to justice that institutionalises the goals of deliberative democracy be 
realised, one wherein citizens can utilise a variety of means to contest and 
debate public and private actions against standards of freedom and ideal 
social relations? Section IV proposes that access to justice policy comprehend 
the complex relationship between legal, informal and social movement means of 
securing good social relations by strategically and carefully integrating legal and 
informal justice institutions and placing them in social and political context. 
The legal profession might be an important provider of access to justice, but 
access to justice policy should embrace much more than lawyers' justice. 
Indeed, as the rest of the thesis will argue, lawyers' justice must be subject to 
the wider democratic justice agendas proposed in this chapter. Before moving 
to that task in Part Two, Chapter Five will illustrate in a concrete way how 
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access to justice that is not dominated by lawyers' justice might be 
implemented. 
II. Four Waves of Reform 
Between the mid-1960s and early 1980s1 access to justice researchers 
chronicled three waves of access to justice reform focusing in t~rn on (1) legal 
aid, (2) public interest law and (3) informal justice (Trubek 1990, Cappelletti & 
Garth 1978).2 By the 1980s, the rhetoric of access to justice had lost much of 
its salience among scholarly researchers while the demand for justice was as 
insatiable as ever. The core ideal was transmogrified, perhaps cynically, into a 
fourth wave of competition policy reform of legal service provision. 
These four waves may not exhaust the methods available for improving access 
to justice, nor do they necessarily represent an historically accurate picture of 
the order in which reforms have occurred in all Western countries. But they do 
form a useful heuristic of the ways in which reformers and government have 
sought to overcome the discretion of charity by assigning responsibility to 
institutions of either the state (wave one), social movement politics (wave two), 
face-to-face community (wave three), or the market (wave four) in attempts to 
make access to justice secure. Moreover, in at least some parts of the world, 
this has been the order in which the different waves have momentarily 
dominated the access to justice reform stage. 
( i) Wave One: Legal Aid 
The first wave of access to justice reform focused on increasing the availability 
of formal legal means of access to justice by increasing access to lawyers' 
services. The introduction, and in some cases reform, of legal aid emphasised 
the state's responsibility for delivering access to justice (Cappelletti & Garth 
1978:22-24, Hauhart 1989). Legal aid reform emphasises the state's 
responsibility in ensuring everyone has access to justice as a basic prerogative of 
citizenship. The state's responsibility to provide an effective, efficient and 
1 Before the 1970s the predominant method of improving access to justice was charity 
which relied on individual lawyers voluntarily assisting the "deserving" poor 
(Fleming & Regan 1995:24, Rowley 1992:4, Tomsen 1992:309). 
2 Cappelletti & Garth (1978) was written as the third wave was emerging. See also 
Sarat (1986:532-533). See Bottomley et al (1994:59-86) for similar material on the 
development of access to justice in Australia. See Fleming (1996) for a critique of the 
four wave analysis of access to justice reforms. 
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accessible court system has been recognised since Magna Carta.3 Wave One 
added responsibility for ensuring adequate legal representation.4 Thus in 
Australia, the Whitlam government set up federal legal aid offices in the 1970s 
which were handed over to the states a few years later (Garth 1980:105-117, 
Tomsen 1992, Weisbrot 1990:239-247). In some countries legal aid was 
provided by staff lawyers employed by the state in legal aid offices. In others 
the state subsidised the hire of private lawyers at reduced fees, and in recent 
years legal aid authorities have experimented with franchising and block 
contracting (see Pleasence et al 1996). In many countries including Australia, a 
mixed model was used.5 
Legal aid made the arrangements for traditional legal justice available to more 
people. In England and Wales, and the Netherlands, up to 70 or 80 percent of 
the population were eligible for legal aid in the 1970s (Regan & Fleming 
1994:185, Smith 1996:4, Zander 1981:36).6 Yet it only marginally changed the 
way legal services were provided and the way the legal system worked. 
Research on publicly funded legal services agencies continually shows that 
despite hopes (and fears) about their radicalism, they are generally just as 
conservative and potentially dominating in the way they serve clients as 
ordinary law firms (Etheridge 1973, Kidder 1976, Mentor 1996, Parker 1994, 
Scheingold 1994, Spangler 1986).7 The significance of legal aid is therefore 
limited by the effectiveness of law and of traditional court processes in 
delivering the justice to which people seek access. It can do little to change law 
and legal processes where they do not work well, nor to challenge abuse and 
exploitation outside the court system. 
3 Magna Carta of 1215 was about the crown's responsibility to provide a forum for 
hearing disputes which was accessible (ie in a fixed place, not travelling around with 
the King), effective ( only justices and sheriffs learned in the law should be 
appointed) and efficient Gustice would not be delayed or denied) (McKechnie 1914, 
Stringham 1966). 
4 The difficulty of adequately using the courts without a lawyer was legally 
recognised in the Australian case of Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292. The 
High Court of Australia recognised that representation by counsel is essential to a fair 
trial in serious criminal matters. The judges in Dietrich held that they could not find 
there was a right for an accused to be provided with counsel at public expense, but 
they did hold a court should order a stay where someone was unrepresented and this 
would result in an unfair trial. 
5 For descriptions of legal aid in other countries see Cappelletti & Garth (1978), 
Cooper (1983), Garth (1980), Pleasence et al (1996), Young & Wall (1996). 
6 Although they may have had to pay a contribution towards their legal expenses, 
particularly if they gained an award or settlement of damages. 
7 Indeed as Chapter Two (pp 21-25) showed, poor clients such as those who use legal 
aid services are more likely to be dominated by lawyers. 
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Legal aid is also restricted by its expense. Since the 1970s the criteria for 
receiving legal aid have become increasingly narrow (Law Council of Australia 
1994b, Regan 1996, Regan & Fleming 1994). In the Netherlands 60 percent of 
the population are still eligible for some legal aid assistance (Blankenburg 
1994:805), but the figure has declined to well under half in Britain (Smith 
1996:4). In Australia the means test ensures that only those close to or below 
the poverty line are eligible for assistance (Access to Justice Advisory 
Committee 1994:225-257), and around 70 percent of those who are approved 
for legal aid already receive Commonwealth social security benefits (Legal Aid 
& Family Services 1994, 1995), suggesting that aid is only available to the very 
poorest sector of society. The merits test (a determination of how likely the 
applicant's legal action is to succeed) and matter test (a determination of 
whether the issue falls into a priority area for funding) have become particularly 
restrictive.8 Criminal matters are priorities while it is increasingly difficult to 
get legal aid for family and civil matters (Regan & Fleming 1994),9 an outcome 
that disadvantages women who are much less likely to apply for legal aid in 
criminal matters than in family matters (Australian Law Reform Commission 
1994b )_lO In 1993 the New South Wales Legal Aid Commission indicated that it 
would cease funding civil and family disputes altogether and support only 
criminal cases. The decision was only reversed after prolonged lobbying 
(Germov 1995:163). In most countries it seems that criminal cases swallow 
most of the funding for public legal services,11 followed by family cases, 
housing matters, and consumer and finance matters in that order (Garth 
1980:151-156, Legal Aid & Family Services 1995:12-13, Regan 1996, Rowley 
1992:263). 
The entire Australian legal aid budget is still less than 5 percent of the gross 
income of the legal services industry, and only 6 percent of total public 
spending on the civil and criminal justice system (National Legal Aid Advisory 
8 The Law Council of Australia (1994b: Appendix A) showed that in Australia many 
more applicants are being denied legal aid under the merits and matter guidelines 
than before while less were being refused under the means test. 
9 Indeed following the Dietrich decision (footnote 4 above) Legal Aid Commissions 
around Australia pointed out that they were not given enough funds even to provide 
legal aid in all the criminal cases where a fair trial would require it. 
lO Australian legal aid statistics show that many more men than women apply for 
criminal legal aid and that applications for criminal legal aid are more likely to be 
successful (Legal Aid & Family Services 1994, 1995). 
11 These figures are complicated by the fact that in some countries criminal legal 
services are offered by different bodies to those which offer civil and family services. 
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Committee 1990:43, 185).12 Imagine how expensive legal aid would be if the 
state took seriously its responsibility to provide funding and/ or lawyers for all 
citizens to assert their rights in the courts and to have access to legal advice and 
information relating to day-to-day affairs such as making wills and buying 
property. The legal aid approach to delivering access to justice is unaffordable 
because it aims to make formal legal justice available in wider and wider 
circumstances thereby riding the tiger of costly legal professional fees (Germov 
1995:162). It increases demand by promising more than it can deliver. Indeed 
the legal profession exacerbated this problem in countries like Australia by 
initially resisting the establishment of legal aid offices, fearing fee regulation and 
loss of autonomy, and then compromising on a system where much of the legal 
aid budget is spent on paying private practitioners on a fee-for-service basis 
rather than more efficiently on staff lawyers, para-legals and social workers 
(Tomsen 1992, Weisbrot 1990:239-247).13 
(ii) Wave Two: Public Interest Law 
The second wave of access to justice reform, public interest law, addressed 
legal aid's limitations by seeking to change the law, court procedures and the 
nature of legal practice so that access to legal justice might become more 
meaningful. It attempted to combat the bias law develops in favour of the rich 
and the organised because they are better and more regularly represented in 
legal processes (Galanter 1974), by emphasising group participation in the law 
and the organisation of under-organised interests. It also sought to solve the 
expensive problem of funding individuals' access to formal legal processes by 
aggregating claims and emphasising diffuse, group and public interests. The 
object was often "to change the law or to restructure governmental agencies, 
rather than to win benefits for specific litigants" (Selznick 1992:466). 
This meant radical changes in procedural rules of standing, fairness and legal 
representation, especially in the US (Cappelletti 1978:35-36). The class action 
initiated by a public interest law firm or a consumer group became the 
paradigmatic Wave Two means of achieving justice. Procedural changes lead to 
substantive changes and vice versa so that new areas of law and new rights 
began to emerge. Some lawyers also developed new and creative forms of 
practice. They recognised that in order to achieve substantive justice they 
needed to act not only in the courts but also in informal settings, such as 
12 In 1993-1994, legal aid services were provided to 2.3 percent of the Australian 
population and in many cases this may have been only a one-off advice interview 
(Regan 1996:89). 
13 In Australia about two thirds of the public funds for legal aid goes to the private 
profession (Weisbrot 1990:243). 
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bureaucracies and administrative agencies, and in legislatures and the political 
arena, and to use forms of advocacy other than litigation: "Much of what these 
new lawyers did looked as much like politics as law" (Trubek 1990:116-117). 
Public interest law relies on social movement politics to achieve justice through 
law. The women's, environmental and consumer movements each used law and 
legal processes to achieve their goals in certain circumstances (see Abel 1985, 
Handler 1980). A prominent example in Australia was the Mabo litigation 
which established indigenous land rights and led to federal native title 
legislation (Sharp 1996). Such battles depended upon the support of 
sympathetic and devoted lawyers although they were initiated by wider groups. 
The weight of the public interest law wave was carried by movements that 
arose within the legal profession itself; community legal centres and public 
interest law movements (Trubek & Trubek 1981:133).14 
The public interest law movement focused on changing the traditional 
arrangements of legal justice so that people could be collectively, and not just 
individually, empowered to have their voices heard in and through the legal 
system. However, it was limited by its focus on achieving change through the 
reform of legal justice. Public interest lawyers were still legalistic even when 
acting in non-legal arenas: They politicised law only by legalising politics 
(Trubek 1990:118). Public interest law never escaped legalism enough to live up 
to its radical political promise. Yet it gestured towards the importance of the 
political use of law and of supplementing law with politics in the attempt to 
remedy structural and group injustices. 
(iii) Wave Three: Informal Justice 
The third wave drew attention to alternatives to legal justice. A range of 
institutions and practices were developed in an attempt to provide access to 
justice, not just law. These included introduction of less formal courts and 
tribunals (such as small claims courts), court-based mediation and arbitration 
(in family and commercial matters), and private alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR) and community justice centres. Initiatives also included using lay 
persons and para-professionals both on the bench and in the bar, and 
modifying substantive law to avoid disputes or to facilitate their resolution. 
Process was to be adapted and related to different types of disputes (Dezalay 
1993): Some disputes have to be solved quickly, while others can be negotiated 
over a long period of time, parties in a long-term relationship need a different 
14 In Australia see Basten et al (1985), Bell (1985), Chesterman (1996) for examples. 
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style of dispute resolution to those who barely know each other, and disputes 
between parties who differ greatly in power require a different approach to 
disputes between equals. In criminal justice, the movement for restorative 
justice advocated family group or community accountability conferences as 
dialogic alternatives to the repression of court and prison (Braithwaite 1989, 
1995b, Braithwaite & Mugford 1994). 
The informal justice movement covers an heterogenous terrain; there were those 
who embraced it purely for practical reasons There were many who saw "in 
ADR the germs of a radical transformation of ideas about law and justice" 
(Trubek 1990:121), one which emphasised institutions of face-to-face 
community for delivering justice.15 Since law is at best a limited means of 
achieving justice, people sought alternative ways of achieving justice even in 
situations which were traditionally seen as primarily legal problems. Trubek 
(1990:122) describes the community-based ideology behind their approach: 
While some who championed ADR had rather modest goals in mind, 
others saw in the movement for alternative forums possibilities for 
greater community, new sources of law, and a different understanding of 
self-empowerment. For these radical voices, what was wrong with 
traditional civil procedure was not just its monetary costs, but the fact 
that it presumed that the enforcement of legally defined rights was both 
necessary and sufficient to ensure self-empowerment. These radical ADR 
proponents sought procedures that would both employ and develop 
community norms and values, allow the development of normative 
agreement through open dialogue, and be sensitive to the importance of 
social relationships in the maintenance and enhancement of the self. 
Thus the third wave encourages practices which rely on communal ordering as 
an alternative to professionalised legal justice. 
The informal justice movement, however, could not deliver what it promised 
(Goldberg et al 1985:485-501).16 ADR options were slow in gaining popularity 
and were not publicly funded. Informal justice was severely criticised for not 
protecting people's rights, and for privatising justice so that domination was 
perpetuated rather than opened up to the scrutiny of public legal justice. It was 
also criticised for being private and individual and thus failing to address 
aggregate and widespread problems especially consumer problems where class 
actions are helpful. In contrast to public interest law which emphasised using 
15 Some simply want more efficient ways to solve major business disputes, while 
others aim to divert minor cases from civil courts and others advocate a radical 
approach to both criminal and civil cases. 
16 These criticisms are discussed in Section III below. 
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law to achieve social change, informal justice was criticised for reinforcing 
"prevailing relations of power and authority by defusing conflict" (Bottomley et 
al 1994:86). Where institutions of informal justice were successfully 
implemented, they frequently became as rigid and technical as formal justice as 
time passed and especially as lawyers colonised them (Auerbach 1983, Merry 
1993). 17 
(iv) Wave Four: Competition Policy 
Much of the access to justice literature stops in the 1980s when the rhetoric of 
"access to justice" seemed to lose its power until its recent revival, in Australia 
and Britain at least, in the 1990s. Although not necessarily labelled as such, the 
access to justice ideal was still pursued in a fourth wave of reform to the legal 
system through the 1980s and into the 1990s. This wave advocated the 
implementation of competition policy in order to allocate access to justice 
resources, whether formal or informal, as efficiently as possible through market 
institutions. 
The focus was on reforming the legal services market which had been organised 
in a particularly anti-competitive way. This wave fitted the general priority 
given to micro-economic reform during that period.18 The legal profession was 
inculpated for monopolising the market for legal services and loading it with 
restrictive practices. Lack of efficiency in the legal services market was seen as 
a significant cause of the cost of justice. A literature on how to improve was 
developed (Slayton & Trebilcock 1978, Evans & Trebilcock 1982, Albon & 
Lindsay 1984), leading eventually to both government and profession initiated 
reforms in the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia. 19 In the US 
competition reform to the legal profession occurred somewhat earlier and more 
through private activism and the courts than threatened government reforms 
(Powell 1985). Globally the liberalisation of the legal services market is likely to 
remain important as international agreements such as the World Trade 
Organisation's General Agreement on Trade in Services are implemented (see 
Kakabadse 1996; see also Self 1985). 
Improving the efficiency of the legal services market was expected to render 
traditional services more affordable, and also to encourage a proliferation of 
new means of providing legal services including non-lawyer legal service 
17 See Chapter Five (pp 103-106) for a more detailed discussion of this problem. 
18 In Australia, see the Hilmer Report (Hilmer et al 1993) which discusses market 
reform to the legal service market in the context of wide ranging competition reform. 
See also Pusey (1991). For Britain see Perkin (1989:472-519). 
l9 See Chapter Seven at pp 160-162. 
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provision, franchising, group legal service plans, legal insurance, partnerships 
with non-lawyers, advertising, price competition and contingency fees. During 
the 1980s such liberalisation in the legal services market did occur in the 
commercial sector due to the operation of market forces. Companies forced 
their lawyers to be more competitive and used accountants and business 
advisers where before they might have used lawyers.20 
There is also some evidence that the introduction of competition reforms to the 
legal profession improved ordinary consumers' access to justice.21 In Australia, 
the TPC found that conveyancing fees tended to be lower in jurisdictions where 
non-lawyers were allowed to compete with lawyers (1992:14) and that once 
advertising restrictions were relaxed in New South Wales advertised fees were 
much lower than previous scale fees (1992:28). In England, Domberger and 
Sherr (1989) found that the Government's 1984 announcement that licensed 
conveyancers would be able to compete with lawyers was enough to cause 
substantial drops in conveyancing prices and some apparent increase in client 
satisfaction levels.22 A later English survey (Love et al 1992) found firms that 
advertised tended to have lower fees, the presence of licensed conveyancers in 
an area depressed fees, and that increased levels of advertising amongst some 
firms in an area reduced the fees of all firms in the area. 
In the US, advertising restrictions on lawyers began to be lifted after the 1977 
case of Bates & O'Steen v State Bar of Arizona. 23 Minimum fee schedules were 
struck down as restraint of trade in the 1975 case of Goldfarb v Virginia State 
Bar,24 and group legal service plans have been allowed since the late 1960s 
(Powell 1985:287-288, Serron 1992:63).25 As Serron (1992:63-64) writes, 
The impact of these decisions has been notable. Direct mail companies 
offer prepaid legal plans through credit card companies, direct sales, and 
telemarketing, which creates a stable client base for participating 
attorneys. Unions negotiate the provision of a full-time legal services 
20 See Chapter Seven at pp 171-173. 
21 Much of this evidence concerns the effects of competition on the price and quality of 
conveyancing and other routine services, rather than litigation which is the most 
expansive and inaccessible aspect of the law. 
22 Advertising restrictions were lifted in 1985, but licensed conveyancers were not 
allowed to enter the field until 1987 by which time conveyancing prices were already 
much more competitive. Paterson et al (1988) produced similar results for the same 
time period and found that 45 percent of their sample of law firms began advertising 
after 1984 because of the perceived need to be more competitive. 
23 433 US 350. See Cox (1989) for a description and analysis of the case. 
24 421 us 733. 
25 Powell (1985:288) reports that by 1979 there were already some 2500 group legal 
service plans in operation in the US covering 3.75 million people. 
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unit as part of a fringe benefits package. National legal services firms 
open storefront offices in a variety of cities and use television advertising 
to market services. Local for-profit legal clinics with several branch 
locations in a metropolitan area advertise in Yellow Pages, on buses, and 
m newspapers. 
The economic research on whether these changes have benefited US consumers 
is sparse, but there is evidence that the removal of advertising restrictions has 
led to lower prices at least for standardised less complex legal services (see Cox 
1989, Schroeter et al 1987).26 Muris and McChesney (1979) compared the Los 
Angeles Jacoby and Meyers legal clinic with traditional firms in the area and 
found that the clinic's prices were lower and quality of service higher. They 
conclude that advertising allowed the clinic a high enough volume of work to 
efficiently use specialisation, paralegals and systems management to reduce 
costs and improve quality. 
Competition policy is not inconsistent with the other three waves of access to 
justice reform and can actually support them. By liberalising the market for 
legal services and for dispute resolution it opens up options of informal justice 
and public interest law which were not always possible while traditional 
lawyers' justice monopolised access to justice. For example, business was able 
to take advantage of the alternatives to legal justice developed in the third 
wave of access to justice reform by forcing the liberalisation of the legal service 
market. As Singer (1994:55) says, 
What began in the 1970s as a movement to settle interpersonal conflicts, 
racial tensions, and what the legal establishment considered "minor" 
disputes was quickly seized on by important parts of corporate America as 
a way of keeping business conflicts out of court. To a large extent ... 
corporate interest in ADR constitutes a consumer movement at the upper 
end of the legal market. 
Breaking these monopolies and allowing a range of access to justice strategies to 
proliferate is not only economically more efficient but necessary since, as will be 
argued below, access to justice will only ever be substantially improved by 
means of a comprehensive strategy that incorporates the insights of the other 
three waves. 
It is naive to expect the market in justice ever to be organised so efficiently that 
the majority will be able to afford the services they need. Market solutions may 
26 Cox (1989) reviewed all the literature on the effects of the liberalisation of 
advertising restrictions up to that time. He concluded that increased advertising 
lowered prices but its effect on quality was uncertain. 
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well achieve significant improvements for middle class people with some money 
to spend on legal services as well as increases in the speed of access to justice 
for commercial litigants, where substantial enough changes are made. Market 
reforms might also make a difference in prospective litigation where the 
outcome is likely to be a substantial payment out of which legal fees could later 
be taken. Yet even at their leanest, legal fees will never be so cheap that 
everyone can afford them. Those without discretionary resources will be 
excluded from the market and therefore from participation in the legal system. 
(v) Interlocking Strategies for Access to Justice 
The four waves can be read to each emphasise the value of a different 
institutional method of delivering access to justice. The first wave concentrated 
on helping people enforce their traditional legal rights adequately in the courts. 
Its strategy was to provide more state-employed lawyers in an attempt to 
expand the scope of formal legal services. The second wave was concerned with 
using social movement politics to change the law, court procedures and 
ultimately society so that this access would be more meaningful. It advocated 
the employment of more lawyers by institutions of civil society to reform formal 
legal institutions. The third wave established that much justice is and should be 
achieved at less formal levels. Mediators replace lawyers in fora for disputing 
that replace formal legal adjudication; informal community-based dispute 
resolution was proffered as the alternative to legal justice. The fourth wave took 
efficiency to be a proxy for access, encouraging competition in order to allocate 
access to justice resources, whether formal or informal, through the market. 
Each is a poor attempt at reform on its own. Yet weaving together the four 
basic ideas that access to justice researchers and policy-makers have developed 
over the last thirty years might achieve some modest improvements in access to 
justice. Indeed the cumulative impact of the four waves has already been non-
trivial. Institutions of the state (Wave One), civil society (Waves Two and 
Three) and the market (Wave Four) might be able to mutually support one 
another in providing at least a minimal level of the justice that is essential to 
democratic citizenship.27 Thus a competitive market will be more effective if 
the state is able to use regulation to ensure it stays competitive.28 Where the 
market works well and alternatives to law and legal processes are free to 
27 For an example of how the different spheres can support each other in access to 
justice, see the Blankenburg (1994) case study below, at pp 93-95. 
28 Thomas (1992) notes that the British Thatcher government had to be strongly pro-
state in its policies, including its policies in relation to the legal profession in order to 
be strongly pro-market because the state had to act to achieve the sort of market it 
wanted. 
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develop and proliferate, governments are more likely to be able to afford to take 
responsibility for providing a basic level of support for those who cannot afford 
to buy justice on the market when basic rights are at issue. Where a vital 
community sector is providing the impetus for reform through lawyers' groups 
such as community legal centres, the access to justice movement and the 
consumer movement, then both markets and states are more likely to stay 
responsive to community access to justice needs, and communitarian 
alternatives to legal justice are more likely to be developed. 
Obversely, a reform that focuses on only one wave, for example ADR can 
deflect policy-makers from seeing the need for other waves of reform, for 
example public interest law. Thus critics of ADR see proponents of face-to-
face justice as failing to consider the necessity for group and political action to 
achieve justice through strategies such as public interest law (Abel 1981a, 
1982b, Nader 1980), and therefore their reforms decrease rather than increase 
justice. Integrating at least the four waves described above is the remedy to 
symbolic change under the rubric of one wave which acts as a band-aid to 
enfeeble political prospects for radical surgery under the rubric of another. 
Where the state fulfils its responsibility to support the infrastructure of legal 
and communitarian justice, where the institutions of community are vigorous in 
their attempts to improve legal justice and provide face-to-face justice and 
where the market works efficiently enough for many to be able to buy their 
access, then there is some hope that access to justice will genuinely expand. Yet 
despite all these efforts, the four waves have barely been ripples on an ocean of 
potential for justice. 
III. Legal Justice and its Alternatives 
(i) Searching for an Alternative to Legal Justice 
Chapter Three showed that in a well balanced deliberative democracy, law is 
and should be only one means available to do justice. It showed that empirical 
sociological and psychological research converges with normative political 
theory in suggesting that non-coercive and informal alternatives based on 
dialogue and persuasion are likely to be more effective than coercive law in 
achieving long term compliance with norms that advance justice, and that 
coercive law is most effective when it is in reserve as a last resort (Ayres & 
Braithwaite 1992, Bardach & Kagan 1982, Braithwaite 1989, Kagan & Scholz 
1984, Sherman 1993). Indeed we will never have sufficient legal aid, a lean and 
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competitive enough legal services market, nor a public-spirited enough legal 
profession, to do all our justice through law. 
It is also true that people prefer to use lawyers and formal legal processes as a 
last resort in their attempts to achieve justice. In her ethnographic study of the 
way working class Americans used lower courts and mediation, Sally Engle 
Merry (1990:172) found that going to court was "a desperate move when all 
else seems to have failed". She suggests that ordinary Americans are not 
litigation-mad, using court reluctantly when informal social controls fail and 
they need to escape the tyranny of local communities where husbands and 
boyfriends dominate women, and whites dominate ethnic minorities. They 
preferred to achieve justice by informal, dialogic or noncoercive means, but were 
ready and willing to exercise their rights to use court if necessary. Similarly in 
Britain, the National Consumer Council (1995) found that of 1000 people who 
had been involved in a civil dispute in the previous three years,29 over one half 
thought they would prefer to resolve any future dispute through mediation 
rather than through formal arbitration or a full trial.30 Most were dissatisfied 
with the legal system and only 8 percent thought they would like to use the legal 
system to resolve any future dispute.31 Yet, like Merry's respondents, despite 
their dissatisfaction, most (59 percent) were prepared to use the legal system if 
other methods did not work. 
This dissatisfaction with law has been reflected in the thinking of the access to 
justice movement. Underlying the four waves heuristic of access to justice 
reform is the story of a struggle to overcome reliance on expensive, formal 
legalistic procedures and to develop alternative arrangements: The four waves 
moved from improvements in access to formal legal justice (legal aid) to using 
innovative political ways to achieve more substantive justice (public interest 
law) and abandoning law altogether in an attempt to achieve justice through 
informal community-based means (ADR). The final wave left it to the market 
to decide what method was the most efficient means of delivering justice in 
each situation (competition policy). The greatest hope of many access to justice 
researchers and reformers has been in the potential of informal alternatives to 
29 They gave eleven categories (in order of frequency): damage to a vehicle, divorce, 
medical negligence / accident/ injury, unpaid debt, faulty goods, dispute with a 
government agency, quarrel with a neighbour, problem at work, faulty service, 
custody/ access, tenancy, will or estate, repossession of a home. 
30 80 percent had used either a lawyer or a citizens advice bureau to help them 
resolve their dispute. 
31 The percentage was higher for those who had actually used a full trial in their 
previous dispute, around 20 percent. 
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legal justice to radically improve access to justice by nurturing a civic culture of 
justice and avoid over-reliance on legalism. 
(ii) The Attractions of Informal Justice 
The first virtue of informal alternatives to traditional formal legal justice is their 
(presumed) inexpensiveness. Formal justice cannot be extended to everyone 
because of its great cost. Informal justice promises to be cheaper and quicker by 
abandoning technicalities, cumbersome procedure and expensive professionals. 
But the attractions of informal justice run deeper than economic expedience. 
Merry and Milner (1993:3) fantasise a 
popular justice ... that is locally controlled, non professional, and 
procedurally informal and that envisages a renewed community and 
decisions made according to community norms ... an alternative to the 
violence and coercion of state law. 
Advocacy of informal justice is based on the belief that finding ways of 
resolving disputes which institutionalise community norms is more meaningful, 
more democratic and ultimately more empowering for individuals than legal 
justice. Lawyers and court processes "steal" disputes from the community in 
which they have arisen and impose alien meanings on them, risking results that 
have little significance to the disputants (Christie 1977:4, Teubner 1987:8); 
"legal centralism" impairs awareness of the private orderings already extant in 
the communities of which we are members (Galanter 1981). Early proponents 
of ADR were inspired by anthropological research into village-based means of 
mediation (Harrington & Merry 1988:717). Others idealised a past small town 
North America which rejected legalized dispute settlement and emphasised 
communitarian justice based on "mutual access, responsibility, and trust" 
(Auerbach 1983:4). 
ADR fora aim not only at building up community norms and ordering, but also 
at restoring and repairing individual relationships in contrast with formal 
processes which abandon hope of continuing functional relationships. The 
vision of informal justice idealises an equitable process based on trust where 
people communicate freely, understand each other, settle differences and 
perhaps even change their behaviour rather than have a judgment (usually 
financial damages) imposed on them in an adversarial setting. A boss 
apologises for his harassing behaviour, and his victim forgives him and receives 
whatever compensation fits her circumstances best; monetary damages, a public 
acknowledgment of wrongdoing, an overdue promotion. 
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(iii) The Dangers of Informal Justice 
Despite its attractions, informal justice is frequently rejected as a second rate 
alternative to legal justice. Most people want to retain the option of taking their 
grievance to the highest court available if they wish, especially when informal 
justice fails, as it frequently does: "They want the leverage of state power to 
obtain the redress they believe is theirs by right, not a compromise that purports 
to restore a social peace that never existed" (Abel 1982a:8, see also Goldberg et 
al 1985:486). This is why novelist Helen Garner's (1995) account of a real-life 
Melbourne University sexual harassment case was controversial: She implied 
that it was unfair of two young women to press criminal charges against their 
college master for two comparatively minor incidents of alleged harassment 
when they could have asserted their rights with him straight away or at least 
used mediation within the college to solve their problems. Garner failed to 
adequately recognise that the powerless often need to enforce their rights 
against the powerful in a way that consensual community-based dispute 
resolution does not deliver. Many feminists reacted to her argument for 
informal justice by showing how it detracted from hard-fought rights to take 
legal action against sexual discrimination.32 They pointed to all the cases 
where women cannot assert their rights or will get nowhere by doing so, and 
also argued that one of the reasons this matter had to go to court was that the 
University's internal procedures for dealing with sexual harassment were 
completely inadequate (see Parker 1996). 
While supporters see informal justice as a means for disputants to resolve their 
disputes to meet their own needs and in accord with their own cultures and 
values, critics argue that it is just as likely to perpetuate the domination and 
oppression of everyday social life as the positive cultural values and meanings 
of disputants and their communities (Abel 1981a, Fitzgerald 1985, McEwen 
1987). In many contexts informal justice may not protect people's rights as well 
as formal justice can. A woman may be at greater risk of being dominated by 
her husband or employer in mediation over divorce arrangements or an 
harassment claim than where the procedural safeguards of court and the 
presence of lawyers go some way towards putting right the structural 
inequalities of the everyday world. 33 
32 Gamer also made other arguments against which feminists reacted, especially 
that the young women were acting as victims when they should have recognised their 
own potential power in the situation. 
33 That is, assuming the woman does have adequate legal representation. 
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Informal justice can also support structural inequality by siphoning poorer, less 
powerful potential litigants away from the formal justice system leaving the 
courts more accessible to the wealthy. It is a system of "second class justice" 
reserved for the poor, the black and women (Cain 1985). Critics point out that 
the virtues of informality are often asserted on behalf of disadvantaged groups, 
but the members of those groups themselves always seem willing to use formal 
justice if the funding is available (Auerbach 1983:127). The individualistic 
nature of informal justice tends to mean that patterns of social inequalities are 
not noticed: "It thus distracts attention from, and challenges to, the status 
quo" (Fitzgerald 1985:641; see also Abel 1981a, 1982a, 1982b, Nader 1980). It 
defuses conflict that might otherwise have lead towards the transformation of 
social inequalities. Finally, institutions of informal justice may actually extend 
state control into areas of life which were previously not legalised by taking 
clients away from "truly grass-root, community infrastructures" and 
encouraging them to use institutions of informal justice supported and 
controlled by the state (Fitzgerald 1985:641; see also Pavlich 1996). 
Overall, then, informal justice works towards creating a culture of justice very 
imperfectly. It often has as many features of coercive formal law as of informal 
community ordering. It frequently disadvantages the weak and powerless by 
strengthening and perpetuating the social inequalities of the real world. And it 
is often imposed by a state interested in saving costs, rather than evolved by 
grass-roots community groups.34 Yet there is still something to be said for the 
argument that formal professionalised legal j1ustice is not enough. As Abel 
himself admits, at the end of a long critique of the informal justice movement, 
It is advocated by reformers and embraced by disputants precisely because 
it expresses values that deservedly elicit broad allegiance: the 
preference for harmony over conflict, for mechanisms that offer equal 
access to the many rather than unequal privilege to the few, that operate 
quickly and cheaply, that permit all citizens to participate in decision 
making rather than limiting authority to "professionalsrr, that are 
familiar rather than esoteric, and that strive for and achieve 
substantive justice rather than frustrating it in the name of form. (Abel 
1982b:310) 
34 These are all contingent defects. It is possible to create institutions of informal 
justice that coopt state power rather than the reverse (Dinnen 1996),, and that attract 
attention to social inequalities rather than distract attention rrom them 
(Braithwaite 1995c, Braithwaite & Daly 1994). See Section IV below. 
80 
Chapter 4 Institutionalising Justice 
(iv) The Failure of Formal and Informal Justice 
One of Abel's strongest critiques of informal justice is that it privatises, 
individualises and neutralises conflict, stymying opportunities for it to be used 
creatively to achieve social change: 
Informal institutions control by disorganising grievants, trivialising 
grievances, frustrating collective responses. Their very creation 
proclaims the message that social problems can be resolved by fiddling 
with the control apparatus once more, that it is unnecessary to question 
basic structures. (Abel 1982a:6-7; see also Abel 1981a, 1982b) 
The traditional individualised processes of formal legal justice can equally be 
criticised for ignoring the existence of basic cleavages in society and failing to 
deal with fundamental structural conflict. Both formal and informal disputing 
are very limited means of addressing structural problems and inequalities that 
cause injustice. 
Political action is put forward as the only alternative to law which addresses 
the failure of both formal legal and informal communitarian strategies to achieve 
social change and distributive justice. Whether it is active participation in 
institutions of representative democracy or in social movements, political action 
can change the way things are structured, how people think and the rights and 
obligations that can be claimed through the processes of formal and informal 
justice. The public interest law movement sought to address this problem. Yet 
on the whole, access to justice discourse has failed to comprehend the fact that 
access to justice means not only access to fora in which individual claims to 
rectify social wrongs can be addressed, but access to means by which 
individuals and groups can make claims to change widespread and structural 
features of social relations. As Chapter Three argued, justice is more than access 
to the means to enforce certain rights once they have been established; it also 
means access to the means to participate in legal, political and social life in 
ways that are aimed at changing law, rights, social relationships and structures. 
(v) The Failure of Access to Justice Reform 
The story of access to justice reform is the story of an unfulfilled movement 
towards improving the accessibility of law and of nurturing alternatives to law 
in doing justice. In theory deliberative democracy requires the variety of means 
of justice to be available that the four waves represent, as Chapter Three 
showed. Yet in practice each wave has failed, as we have seen, to live up to its 
particular promise, and they have cumulatively failed either to transform access 
to law or to develop satisfactory alternatives. Thus both formal and informal 
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justice seem desirable yet unsatisfactory means of achieving justice in individual 
cases. And both are weak at taking into account structural inequality or 
achieving the changes in social structure that are essential to securing justice. It 
is not sufficient to simply cumulate a variety of justice options, something more 
is required if they are to work together in deliberative democracy. 
IV. Integrating Legal Justice and its Alternatives 
(i) A Culture of Justice? 
The best solution that reformers and theorists have offered to the dilemma of 
choosing between formal and informal justice is to encourage the proliferation of 
both so that every potential claimant has a choice and every dispute can find 
its most appropriate forum (eg Edelman 1984). Yet this could mean continually 
expanding the dispute resolution system so that there are more and more 
avenues for people to pursue their complaints and grievances,35 leading to more 
and more disputes being brought forward for resolution, more lawyers and more 
funds spent on justice, while injustice continues to be done as often as justice in 
a plethora of fora. Structural social inequality would remain unaddressed by 
access to justice initiatives and the accessibility of dispute resolution could 
conceivably worsen social relations (Felstiner et al 1980-81, Lieberman 1981). 
Ultimately the aim of either formal or informal justice should not be to increase 
disputing but to facilitate a culture in which less disputing is necessary because 
justice is less frequently denied, a culture where claims to justice are dealt with 
as speedily and well as possible. The informal justice movement appeals to our 
desire for informal ordering, community norms and social relations where justice 
is evident as a matter of course. Yet the institutions of ADR do not of 
themselves achieve the type of protective civic culture where justice is 
instinctive and not forced. Similarly law is only effective at eliciting 
commitment to doing justice where it is embedded in cultural practices and 
informal norms that already support it. As Krygier (1996:18-19) shows in the 
context of post-communist Eastern Europe, law must mesh with practices of 
everyday life if there is to be a civic culture of justice; 
people must care about what the law says-the rules themselves must be 
taken seriously, and the institutions must come to matter. They must enter 
into the psychological economy of everyday life-to bear both on 
35 Goldberg et al (1985:6) show that providing more accessible means of dispute 
resolution can result in more disputes being brought to fora to resolve and therefore 
more clogs on the whole system. 
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calculations of likely official responses and on those many circumstances 
in which one's actions are very unlikely to come to any officials' attention 
at all. They must mesh with, rather than contradict or be irrelevant to 
the "intuitive law" of which Petra0yci wrote, in terms of which people 
think about and organize their everyday lives . . . the wider social 
efficacy of official law requires that it enter into the normative structures 
which nourish, guide, inform, and coordinate the actions of good men, and 
women, too; people who do not merely comply resentfully when they feel 
they might otherwise be punished, but who comply happily (enough) 
even when they are confident they will not be. 
We have much evidence that law and informal norms do interpenetrate and 
constitute each other. Informal ordering occurs even in the most formal 
institutions of justice and formal ordering affects the most informal (see 
Galanter 1981). Henry's research (1983) on employee discipline in a number of 
companies showed that, regardless of the formal structure of their internal 
disciplinary procedures, formal state law and informal relations of private 
justice were inextricably inter-related in each of a variety of organisations (see 
also Newman 1987). Fitzpatrick (1984) uses the concept of "integral plurality" 
to describe the way that law is constituted in relations of support and 
opposition with other semi-autonomous social fields, including community 
mediation (1988). Falk Moore (1978) identified a wide range of semi-
autonomous social fields capable of generating rules and winning compliance, 
and emphasises continuities between state law and law or quasi-law generated 
by group structures of society. Selznick (1992:468) writes of the sociological 
doctrine of legal pluralism according to which, "The vitality of a social order 
comes from below, that is, from the necessities of cooperation in everyday life." 
Galanter (half mocking) describes the way that those who do social research on 
law repeatedly discover that "law in modern society is plural rather than 
monolithic ... and that the national (public, official) legal system is often a 
secondary rather than a primary locus of regulation" (1981:164). 
Each of these scholars shows that law and informal forms of ordering 
interpenetrate. Yet formal and informal ordering can do more than 
haphazardly interpenetrate; they may check each other's disadvantages and 
ultimately work together towards encouraging a culture that does more justice 
than injustice. When formal law facilitates and oversees indigenous ordering, 
there is potential for it to increase the latter's ability to do justice. Galanter 
(1981), writing from the legal pluralist perspective, shows how bargaining and 
regulatory endowments flow from the court into a world of uneven indigenous 
orderings. Krygier (1996) shows how formal institutions of law can help 
support the establishment of civil society and trust in post-communist societies. 
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For both Krygier and Galanter, and for others (eg Mnookin & Kornhauser 1979), 
formal justice can oversee and improve processes of indigenous ordering and 
informal justice. From the other side, formal justice can also be enriched and 
strengthened when it is complemented by informal justice because it is more 
likely to be complied with on a day-by-day basis. There is some evidence then, 
that the interpenetration and integration of formal and informal justice might 
improve each other and therefore strengthen the delivery of justice by both 
formal and informal means. This will only occur if they are integrated in such a 
way that they build each other up in any particular situation. 
( ii) A Pyramid of Access to Justice Strategies 
Formal and informal means of justice could be integrated by organising them 
into a hierarchy prioritised according to time. In any particular dispute there 
are usually a variety of means or settings available for achieving justice. In 
Figure 4.1, they are split into three broad categories on a pyramid, ranging in 
formality with the most formal at the top and the most informal at the bottom. 
Empirically, a dispute generally starts at the bottom and only moves up the 
options represented by the levels of the pyramid if it is not resolved and the 
parties have the motivation and resources to do so.3 6 Normatively, the 
availability of a comprehensive range of justice options arranged in such a 
pyramid can increase access and justice overall. 
Each level itself contains a variety of possibilities and overlaps with the next 
level. The first and most common level is the justice done according to 
uindigenous ordering" (Galanter 1981), the ways of doing justice that 
spontaneously arise within everyday institutions and settings. People are 
always doing justice (and injustice) among themselves in their families and 
workplaces and within public and private organisations. Justice according to 
indigenous ordering occurs where a person asserts their rights when they are in 
danger of being trampled within a relationship, and they are treated justly 
without need of recourse to any other person or body. Spontaneous grievance 
processes such as the way a parent does justice between feuding children or an 
employer between subordinates are also examples of justice according to 
indigenous ordering. 
36 In their famous article on the emergence of disputes Felstiner et al (1980-81) begin 
even earlier in the process of emergence of disputes by pointing out that a dispute does 
not even arise until someone perceives an injurious experience, names it as such, blames 
someone else for it and makes a claim for a remedy. Many potential disputes never 
become claims even in the most informal fora. 
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Figure 4.1 A Pyramid of Access to Justice Options 
At the tip of the pyramid is formal legal justice to which only a few cases ever 
go. Even where the parties have actually invoked court procedures, most civil 
disputes settle by negotiation, and most criminal matters are dealt with by 
guilty plea, the equivalent of civil settlement, even though they could go to trial 
(Anleu & Mack 1995, Astor & Chinkin 1992:25-30, Riekert 1990).37 In the 
middle are a variety of more institutionalised methods of dispute resolution 
which fall short of formal legal proceedings, but are layered on top of 
spontaneous cultural means of resolving disputes and grievances. These are the 
institutions of "informal justice" which are advocated as alternatives to the 
formal legal system. They fall on the boundary between formal state law and 
indigenous ordering (Merry 1993:35). They range from neighbourhood ADR to 
court based mediation and arbitration, from using a consumer complaints 
mechanism provided by a particular company to using the Department of 
Social Security's appeals process up to the Social Security Appeals Tribunal. 
This simple model is both a descriptive foundation for an explanation of how 
disputing works empirically,38 and a normative foundation for a model of how 
it ought to work to best deliver access to justice. In both cases, the model 
represents a dynamic model of justice. Empirically, indigenous ordering 
37 However settlements may often be unsatisfactory or unjust. 
38 See Hawkins (1984) for a descriptive analysis of the enforcement of environmental 
regulation in Britain that tends to support the theory, as well as the references in 
Chapter Three at pp 58-59. 
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temporally precedes informal justice and formal legal justice more than vice 
versa. But reversals happen: For example, sometimes having moved up to 
litigation, a dispute may then move back to negotiation at the semi-formal level 
of arbitration. Normatively, as is argued below, it is better to try indigenous 
ordering before informal justice and informal justice before formal legal justice 
more often than the reverse. However it will not be uncommon to deliberate 
under the ordering presumption of the pyramid and quickly decide to go 
straight to formal legal justice-a court injunction is needed now to provide the 
strongest protection possible against an unjust action that might threaten a 
human life. The pyramid is a preference ordering against rushing to formal legal 
justice before testing the presumption that indigenous ordering and informal 
justice are best tried first, maximising access without compromising justice. 
(iii) Formal and Informal Justice in the Commercial Sector 
A good example of where there is already evidence that such a pyramid model 
works well to deliver access to justice is in commercial contracting where a 
range of middle level alternatives to legal justice are already available, formal 
legal justice is also strong, and so is the "indigenous" culture of dispute 
resolution. 
Formal justice is strong in the commercial sector because the state provides the 
necessary legal infrastructure and because business people can afford to use it. 
In recent years state-provided justice for commercial litigants has been 
considerably streamlined: For example, due to user pressures, Australian 
courts now use case flow management in commercial matters to encourage 
settlement and speedier decisions (Cairns 1992:428-448). In the US an array of 
in-court settlement devices have been developed (Singer 1994:56-57). The 
substance of the law is also generally more responsive to the needs of the 
business community than to other groups. 
At the most informal level, a business culture of informal dispute resolution is 
strong and expanding: Because commercial players "have a high stake in 
reducing the conflict costs in everyday transactions" they will prefer internal 
settlement to external dispute resolution and leave court processes as a last 
resort (Blankenburg 1994:806). They are motivated to resolve conflicts between 
themselves because of the desire to cultivate ongoing business relationships and 
are accustomed to doing so. Good legal advisers have always concentrated on 
negotiating solutions rather than fighting to the death in court, and managers are 
increasingly motivated to avoid the expense of litigation if possible (Singer 
1994:56). Macaulay's classic 1963 study of the way business people used and 
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did not use contracts shows the importance of informal negotiation and the 
limited role of law and legal sanctions in adjusting contracts and solving 
disputes. The common desire to avoid recourse to law was expressed by a 
purchasing agent, 
if something comes up, you get the other man on the telephone and 
deal with the problem. You don't read legalistic contract clauses at 
each other if you ever want to do business again. One doesn't run 
to lawyers if he wants to stay in business because one must behave 
decently. (Macaulay 1963:61; see also Clegg 1975:126-151) 
Both sides in any dispute know that threatening to use law and lawyers will 
cause deterioration in their relationship because, as one businessman explained, 
when one side threatens to bring a breach of contract suit the other feels that 
they are being "treated like a criminal" and will therefore fight back (Macaulay 
1963:65). Mackie's (1989:169-209) more recent study of the use of lawyers 
within corporations tells a similar story of corporate reluctance to resort to the 
use of law and lawyers in resolving problems. 
The informal culture of dispute resolution is semi-formalised in the longstanding 
practice of incorporating arbitration clauses into commercial contracts (Riekert 
1990:31-32). Recently the demand for middle level alternatives to litigation has 
increased so that private ADR options are proliferating. Riekert (1990) 
describes a variety of options available in Australia including mediation, 
conciliation, and mini-trials as well as arbitration, and Mackie (1989:209) also 
describes an "emerging system of 'community-based justice' within the business 
sector" in Britain and Australia. In some areas companies are choosing to 
contract in advance for a pyramid of dispute resolution options where things go 
wrong (Singer 1994:80). Most ADR in Australia is taking place in the 
construction/ civil engineering industry where standard form contracts have 
provided for mediation and arbitration for years (Riekert 1990:36). 
This pyramid of dispute resolution works reasonably well to achieve inter-firm 
justice in disputes in the commercial sector because dispute resolution 
mechanisms at all three levels are strong and easily accessible. Firms can 
generally afford to go to the apex of legal process if necessary to protect their 
rights. They can also make credible threats to invoke legal process so that they 
bargain "under the shadow of the law" in informal negotiations and ADR fora. 
Riekert (1990:35) reports that over 80 percent of commercial litigation initiated 
in Australian courts is resolved before formal trial, suggesting that the threat of 
court can catalyse more informal means of dispute resolution. There is a strong 
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culture of informal dispute resolution in place which supports indigenous and 
middle level means of justice. Strong demand for ADR fora has been met by the 
creation of a host of options ranging in formality from mediation to arbitration 
to mini-trials. The success of pyramids of dispute resolution strategies in the 
commercial sector suggests that integrating formal and informal justice could be 
a more general solution to access to justice problems. 
(iv) The Advantages of Integration 
Ayres and Braithwaite's (1992) theory for using both formal and informal 
means of regulation in the more limited context of business regulation suggests 
that the careful integration of formal and informal justice can maximise 
cooperative solutions to injustices and the voluntary doing of justice without 
sacrificing the use of coercive sanctions in cases of recalcitrance. Their theory 
revolves around the idea that regulatory agencies should use a range of 
strategies in response to the actions of those they regulate. Their pyramid is a 
principled way of linking coercive or legal means of regulation with persuasive 
trust-based means of regulation (see Figure 4.2). It is a schematic representation 
of the idea that instead of using their most drastic regulatory strategies first, 
regulators should trade on the goodwill of those they are regulating, encouraging 
them to comply voluntarily. Their presumption is that more coercive strategies 
should only be used when less coercive ones have failed. When coercive 
strategies achieve their goal, the regulator should revert to a trusting demeanour: 
"Compliance is optimised by regulation that is contingently cooperative, tough 
and forgiving" (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992:51). The background threat of 
coercive strategies in this strategy maximises the effectiveness of trusting, 
cooperative measures, but means that regulators do not have to rely on trust 
and negotiation when distrust and formal sanctions are more appropriate. 
Prioritising informal means of regulation in time ensures that cooperative 
measures are used more frequently without compromising the possibility of 
using more formal measures where necessary. Chapter Three (pp 58-59) showed 
that a series of empirical studies support the feasibility of their theory, and as 
Chapter Seven will demonstrate, the regulatory reform of the Australian legal 
profession also fits the theory. 
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Figure 4.2 An Enforcement Pyramid for Business Regulation 
(from Ayres & Braithwaite 1992:35) 
It is the argument of this chapter that Ayres and Braithwaite' s model is timid in 
restricting its relevance to state regulation of business. The same model should 
also provide an explanatory and normative foundation for solving the general 
problem of doing justice in democratic societies. It is not only state regulators 
who generally do and ought to follow the presumptions of the pyramid-it is 
also mothers, lovers, bosses, creditors, unions, and generals struggling for justice 
in child rearing, relationships, employee management, finance, industrial 
relations, international trade and warfare. Where the formal legal act is as 
elevated as a declaration of war39 or initiation of a formal trade dispute under 
the GATT, or as mundane as sexual harassment litigation, the model describes 
the disputing preferences of most actors and, because all of these actors ought 
to be concerned to be just, the presumptions of the pyramid have a normative 
relevance that ought to bear on their decision-making. 
Doing justice deliberatively according to the pyramid has obvious economic 
advantages. At the tip are the most expensive strategies while those at the 
bottom are the most frugal. Encouraging people to utilise less expensive 
39 See Braithwaite (1991) here. 
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strategies for achieving justice first means that the resources of formal justice 
processes can be more efficiently allocated to those who really need them to 
assert their citizenship. Taking this principle seriously might mean arranging 
things so that rich litigants cannot clog the courts with litigation designed purely 
as tactics in bigger corporate battles (Tomasic 1990) perhaps by channelling 
those who are rich enough into a truly user-pays system of formal justice and 
keeping state resources for those who cannot afford the full price of formal 
adjudication, or by requiring them to use a variety of alternatives to law before 
invoking court processes. It also means that where it is more important to 
people that a problem is resolved quickly than resolved right, they can opt for 
informal justice. Where it is more important that it be resolved right than 
resolved quickly, they can keep moving up the pyramid until all avenues of 
checking that the outcome is right have been exhausted. 
Using economic arguments to justify the imposition of an access to justice 
strategy in which people are discouraged (perhaps even disabled) from using 
the resources of law to make their claims until they have exhausted informal 
alternatives is itself unjust. It is open to the criticism that ordinary people will 
be forced to lesser (informal) justice in the interests of economic expedience, 
while the rich will still be able to buy full access to the law. The careful 
integration of formal and informal justice need not deny people formal justice 
where they require it. It does suggest that keeping access to formal justice 
available as a second (or third resort) can make less formal justice work better 
in the first instance, and ensures the availability of a remedy if and when it 
fails. Putting formal justice in the background means that more cooperative, 
communal means of achieving justice are given a better chance to work at first 
without compromising access to formal justice where necessary. The more 
middle level options there are, the more opportunities there are to resolve 
disputes without the disadvantages of a formal process. Ensuring that people 
can always escalate to formal justice means that their rights are more likely to be 
protected earlier, more cheaply and with less emotional pain, and that if they 
are not, they will get relief. 
Doing justice according to the pyramid finally addresses the ADR movement's 
concern about the "maintenance and enhancement of the self" (Trubek 
1990:122). Emotional pain is too often neglected in both economic and 
lawyerly analyses of justice. Yet as the ADR movement indicated, a 
fundamental fact about injustice is that it hurts and a fundamental fact about 
justice that satisfies consumers is that it heals. So much so that there is virtue 
' 
in crossing over empirical and normative claims of the theory: Empirically 
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injustice hurts, therefore normatively justice should heal. Restorative justice 
theory, research and praxis shows that justice needs many ante-rooms before 
one reaches the courtroom if it is to be given a chance to heal (Cragg 1992, 
Calaway & Hudson 1990, Marshall 1985, Messmer & Otto 1992, Van Ness 
1986). The pyramid leaves plenty of space for healing, just as it leaves a 
prudent space for the judge's hammer. 
(v) Checking Injustice 
Integrating formal and informal justice can make each more efficacious not only 
because it improves their efficiency but because it checks some of the 
dominations and injustices involved in each. The danger with processes based 
on communal ordering and shared meanings and experiences is that they are 
susceptible to perpetuating the oppressions of community: 
Community, after all, is itself morally ambiguous: We do not want to 
support the old boy networks that cement elite communities, the informal 
black listing that the entertainment industry used against radicals, or 
the racial, religious, and gender segregation perpetuated by private 
clubs. (Abel 1982a:12) 
External legal norms can increase the value of informal orderings for access to 
justice by checking the tyranny of the majority. Law and formal legal processes, 
at their best, are designed to protect people's rights and safeguard due process. 
Legal justice provides an external set of norms against which to judge the justice 
provided by its alternatives, especially the way they protect people's rights . 
When formal justice is layered over other forms of justice then it is not only an 
alternative to them, but also a regulator of them. We have already seen that 
Sally Engle Merry (1990) found that working class Americans used courts for 
just this purpose, to escape the tyrannies of community. 
The solution to the tyranny of the majority comes at its own cost. While 
recourse to formal legal processes might help solve the tyranny of majority in 
community, it exposes citizens to the risk of tyranny by formalistic and 
professional procedures. The danger of formal legal processes is that they are 
often dominated by professionals and unresponsive to the values and norms of 
others. It expands institutions of the law into "supervision and governance of 
[the] intimate world of neighbourhood and family" (Merry 1990:182). As 
Merry (1990:181) notes, 
To return to court again is to offer the court the opportunity to shape the 
problem in its discourses, to name it, and to point towards its solution. As 
the average person returns to court with new demands, he strengthens the 
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power of the law over his life, both its direct coercive power and its 
ideological domination, its capacity to interpret and make sense of his 
problems. The use of the law challenges existing social hierarchies, but 
the discourses of the courthouse continue to constrain and restrict the way 
these problems are understood. Plaintiffs rebel against the social order, 
but their complaints are held within a framework established by the 
law, by traditions of social relationships, and by the language of therapy 
and help. 
Even where informal or democratised means of justice are successfully 
introduced they can easily be colonised and stultified by lawyers.40 Reforms 
based on integrating formal and informal justice will only be successful if the 
relationship between legal justice and more communal processes of justice is 
such that they both check the dominations involved in the other. Integrating 
formal and informal justice means not only that formal justice can be an 
alternative and regulator of informal justice, but that informal justice can be 
used to persistently critique professional models of justice and challenge it to 
become more collaborative, personal and based in community norms and 
power: 
Popular justice subverts state law by constructing a cultural space-an 
alternative justice that is more responsive to community desires-even if 
this alternative is phrased within the language and structure of state 
law itself. It creates an oppositional discourse within state law that 
insists on the possibility of managing conflict without violence and 
asserts a model of community ordering. By constructing a vision of an 
alternative justice, it confronts the legal system with a persistent 
critique. (Merry & Milner 1993:9) 
Informal justice options that utilise communal relations can enrich legal justice 
by checking the domination of unaccountable professional judgment but ought 
not oust its concern with due process and the protection of people's rights: In 
restorative justice conferences being trialed by colleagues at the Australian 
National University in Canberra, mothers do sometimes tackle the police on 
abuses such as excessive use of force against their children.41 Ideally the 
pyramid of access to justice strategies would look something like Figure 4.3 
where formal law goes down the pyramid to facilitate and oversee informal 
justice so that problems of oppression and domination are weeded out. But 
indigenous ordering goes up the pyramid so that people are developing for 
themselves an increasing number of options to meaningfully resolve their own 
40 This problem will be addressed in Chapter Five. 
41 Fieldwork notes from the Reintegrative Shaming Experiment, Australian 
National University, Canberra, conducted by Heather Strang, Larry Sherman and 
John Braithwaite. 
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disputes. Such mutual interpenetration sets the conditions for a comprehensive 
culture of access to justice in which legal and other strategies are able to 
contribute. 
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Figure 4.3 The Checking of Injustice in a Pyramid of Access to Justice Options 
Most justice and injustice that already occurs does so at the most informal 
level. Therefore the aim of this strategy is to create incentives for people to do 
justice at the lowest level possible at the same time as their sensibilities are 
sharpened by the need to protect rights through improving formal legal justice. 
As informal justice is made more accountable to public justice the base of the 
pyramid gets larger because people prefer to settle matters lower down (see p 
77 above) when they find that matters can be settled in a way that protects 
their rights at that level. Such institutions of dispute resolution will maximise 
the effect of law in encouraging voluntary aversion to injustice, and will provide 
means and techniques to restore justice quickly at the most informal level. 
Formal justice remains (or rather becomes) available whenever necessary. Thus 
integrating formal and informal justice challenges the "intellectual cliche that 
communal relations deteriorate with the increase of formal, impersonal and 
technical social regulations" (Galanter 1981:166). In an integrated pyramid of 
access to justice options, communal relations of justice are enhanced by formal 
justice and vice versa. 
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(vi) Integrated Access to Justice Strategies: An Example 
Workable access to justice reform would thus use state, market and community 
based initiatives not just as complementary justice alternatives but as an 
integrated range of formal and informal strategies for access to justice. 
Blankenburg's (1994) comparative study of litigation rates in the Netherlands 
and a neighbouring region in West Germany shows how this might work in 
practice. 
The German state of Northrhine-Westphalia has litigation rates from thirteen to 
twenty times higher than the Netherlands, according to Blankenburg's analysis, 
but no significant difference in adversariness and other relevant aspects of 
culture or in the number of potentially litigious social relationships. Legal aid is 
much more widely available in the Netherlands than in West Germany, as are 
legal advisers. So formal justice is stronger in the Netherlands, but at the same 
time, according to Blankenburg, there are many more alternatives to litigation, 
pre-court conflict institutions and also alternatives to formal legal services 
(since there is no lawyers' monopoly). So there are a variety of ways of both 
avoiding conflicts in the first place and of resolving them without court, 
explaining the Netherlands' much lower litigation rates. Nevertheless since legal 
aid is available to approximately 60 percent of households the courts are free to 
hear important cases. As Blankenburg (1994:806) explains, this means more 
people get access to justice overall: 
In a number of conflict constellations where the law protects the 
socially weaker parties against the more powerful ones (like 
consumer protection, tenants rights, and employment protection), 
"alternative" institutions attract a high number of cases that would 
not find a forum in a more litigious culture. At the same time that 
they effectively filter out recurrent routine cases, thus relieving the 
court dockets, the infrastructure of legal aid nevertheless offers an 
opportunity for strategic test litigation. 
In Blankenburg' s example, institutions of state, market and civil society each 
contribute to establishing the pyramid of options that give people access to 
justice. A strong state provides substantial legal aid and therefore supports the 
availability of formal justice but also legitimates a variety of less formal means 
of dispute resolution. The fact that anyone is entitled to give legal advice and 
to represent people in the lower courts and that fees are not strictly controlled 
means that there is a strong market in legal services which makes formal justice 
more affordable and encourages a variety of means of delivering justice services. 
Strong institutions of civil society support a variety of informal and semi-formal 
means of justice: For example, Blankenburg (1994:801) argues that better 
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funded and more active Dutch consumer organisations set up complaints 
boards which handle a higher caseload than those set up by the comparatively 
weaker German consumer organisations. Thus institutions of state, market and 
civil society are beginning to set up a pyramid of options that increase 
individuals' ability to use procedures to achieve justice where they have claims 
against particular individuals or institutions. But what of the need to have 
access to procedures by which people can change more fundamental and 
structural injustices? 
(vii) Achieving Justice where Structural Inequality Reigns 
If both formal and informal justice fail to deal comprehensively with structural 
inequality, then a strategy that integrates them is not likely to do much better. 
Pyramids of access to justice strategies, however, need not be completely 
useless at dealing with structural inequalities or achieving social change. In the 
case of both formal and informal justice, significant gains can be made when 
procedures are changed to empower communities and groups to take part, and 
to take account of patterns of domination and oppression. The public interest 
law movement was an attempt to deal with precisely this sort of criticism of 
formal justice. It attempts to change legal procedures to allow group interests 
to be represented and to allow consideration of arguments that take account of 
the political and social contexts of actions. The courts can also be the locus of 
liberating conflict in certain circumstances (Abel 1981a:251). For example, a 
decision that a compa11-y is liable for sexual harassment by one of its employees 
may encourage it ( and other firms) to put in place programs and policies aimed 
at discouraging such behaviour occurring in the future, and providing grievance 
mechanisms if it does occur, thus improving the lot of women in the firm. A 
decision granting a particular indigenous group land rights might force the 
government to enact legislation giving more general indigenous land rights, and 
start a public debate in which indigenous claims to justice are taken (at least a 
little) more seriously than before.42 
Just as there are ways of empowering groups to take part in formal justice 
processes instead of simply pitting powerless individuals against powerful 
organised interests, there are ways of organising groups to even up the power 
inequalities in institutions of informal justice. There is no reason why Abel's 
(1982b:288-289) criticism of informal justice fora should always apply: 
42 But see Rosenberg (1991) who argues that such decisions rarely achieve the social 
change enthusiasts claim for them. 
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Although neighbourhood institutions constantly speak about community, 
what they actually require (and reproduce) is a collection of isolated 
individuals . . . Informalism appropriates the socialist ideal of 
collectivity but robs it of its content. The individual grievant must 
appear alone before the informal institution, deprived of the support of 
such natural allies as family, friends, work mates, even neighbours. 
Community accountability conferencing in criminal justice (Braithwaite & 
Mugford 1994) is one attempt to tum institutions of informal justice into fora 
where individuals are empowered through the presence and support of their 
most trusted friends to confront and receive an apology and compensation from 
those who have wronged them, even when the offender is much more powerful 
than themselves: "It is a meeting of two communities of care, both of which 
contain men and women, children and adults, the cool and the uncool, the 
organised (like the Aboriginal Community Council) and the unorganized" 
(Braithwaite 1995c:7, See also 1995b:198). A similar strategy could be used in 
other areas where dyadic ADR has been the norm, such as divorce and custody 
disputes. Giving responsibility to organised community and interest groups, 
such as consumer or feminist NGOs to monitor informal dispute resolution fora, 
such as industry consumer complaint schemes, divorce mediation centres, and 
even complaints mechanisms for the legal profession (as Chapters Eight and 
Nine will suggest) can also help ensure that patterns of exploitation and 
oppression are noticed and dealt with.43 
Neither the processes of informal nor formal justice can go far towards 
achieving justice by themselves if they are not embedded in a context in which 
groups and individuals are striving for social change using processes of 
representative democracy and social movement politics external to the law. 
Conversely, the potential for change when political and restorative justice are 
intertwined is great: 
But if the assertion of authority to resolve disputes and control behaviour 
has the potential to contribute to the creation of a countervailing power 
that can oppose both state and capital, it can do so only as part of a broad 
social movement ... Such a movement is essential to informal institutions 
in two ways: First, it alone can create the community base that allows 
informal institutions to function by giving people incentives to resolve 
conflicts rather than sever relations and by conferring authority to 
43 In the case of community accountability conferences, this could mean state funding 
of advocacy groups to receive copies of all conference agreements, watching for 
agreements that are oppressive or worse than a court would have done by one of the 
parties, watching for structural injustices for which there are large classes of 
additional victims whom the advocates should apprise of their access to a remedy 
Gust as in the mediated case) This is actually a potentially more efficient way of 
publicising access to remedies than the haphazard publicity of the court. 
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examine behaviour, intervene in conflict, and enforce decisions. Second, 
legal institutions can gain broad significance only if they are integrated 
in the pursuit of social, economic, and political objectives. Informalism, 
thus, is not an end in itself, but it can be a very important means in the 
struggle for justice. (Abel 1982a:12-13) 
The lesson of Chapter Three was that in addition to formal legal means and 
informal face-to-face means of achieving justice, the politics of social 
movements and active citizenship are necessary to achieve the sort of social 
change that justice requires. A culture of civic justice involves more than face-
to-face community in informal justice fora. Access to justice for women, 
aborigines or gays mainly involves working outside either the legal system or 
ADR fora to change people's conceptions of what is right and to redistribute 
power, wealth or status. But it will also be important for these groups to know 
that they can effectively utilise the legal system and ADR fora as groups and 
individuals when strategic to achieve their goals. Often the outcomes of 
political and social struggles will be rights which themselves become 
institutionalised in legal processes and eventually in pyramids of formal and 
informal options of enforcement. . When women fought for equal pay in 
Australia, the result was not only changed consciousnesses and changed 
practices, it was also changed laws and changed industrial awards (Burgmann 
1993:98-100).44 
The pyramid model outlined above is a way of imagining how formal law can 
relate to communitarian processes in dispute resolution. It must be embedded 
within a politics where different groups put their ideas about the social good 
onto the agenda and there are processes by which it is decided how they should 
be able to enforce their rights. Political action is about putting new things on the 
agenda, creating new rights and obligations that people can enforce and 
changing the old ones to make them accord more with our vision of citizenship 
and the social good. The political must thus be continually acting on all levels 
of the pyramid to change both the rights and the processes it institutionalises 
and to make them conform more closely to the demands of good social 
relations. 
44 But also note Burgmann's (1993:98) description of the way the women activists in 
the Equal Pay Case hearings of 1969 felt disenfranchised by the formality of the legal 
process that was dominated by men contrasted with their involvement in the social 
movement politics of public protest. 
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V. Conclusion 
Improvements in access to justice can only be made if we free access to justice 
policy-making from legalistic over-reliance on the processes of law. This does 
not mean severing issues of justice from law, but seeking out the potential for 
interdependence between legal and non-legal means of justice. Formal, informal 
and middle-level means of individual justice must each be interlocked and 
placed within a broader context of political action and group representation. 
The aim is a culture which maximises both the doing of justice spontaneously 
and informally under the shadow of the law, and the accessibility of legal and 
semi-legal remedies when injustice is done. 
This chapter has argued that layering formal and informal injustice means that 
both have a chance to check the disadvantages and injustices of the other. 
Prioritising informal justice in time encourages the development of communal 
means of resolving problems. It can avoid the escalation of conflict and 
imposition of alien values which frequently occur in court. It can free up formal 
law for important disputes and develop new models for empowering 
individuals and communities in justice processes which might eventually be 
applied to law. The ready availability of more formal justice when informal 
justice fails, means that people are more likely to do justice earlier to avoid the 
sanctions of more formal processes. The value of the four waves of access to 
justice reform has been in showing the importance of institutions of state, 
market and civil society in building up the range of strategies necessary to 
improve access to justice. A fifth wave of access to justice reform could do 
better at developing and integrating the variety of initiatives that are necessary. 
We saw that in the commercial sector a sufficient range of alternatives has 
almost spontaneously developed for inter-firm disputes. This is only because 
two conditions are fulfilled in that sector. Firstly, firms can afford to go to the 
apex when they need to protect their rights and can make credible threats to 
invoke it so that they really do bargain "under the shadow of the law". The 
market for legal services works well since businesses can generally afford to buy 
the level of services they need, whether court justice or private dispute 
resolution, and the state supports this by making such expenses tax deductible. 
Governments ensure that courts are reasonably well equipped to hear and 
decide business disputes quickly and fairly. Furthermore, there is already a 
strong business culture in place which provides the basis for informal and 
middle level means of justice. The pyramid strategy works best between equals 
who can bargain and negotiate freely at the most informal level and who are 
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motivated to get on not only because of the threat of court, but because they 
want a continuing relationship. 
These two conditions are not necessarily met in the areas where improving 
access to justice is most crucial. They are not likely to be satisfied when an 
individual cries injustice against the large company where they work or 
government department on whom they depend for benefits: Access to justice 
reform must concentrate on proactively ensuring that an integrated range of 
justice options are available even to those who cannot afford to buy legal justice 
on the market or are liable to being dominated by those more powerful than 
themselves. People most frequently experience injustice within the institutional 
loci of their everyday lives, the organisations where they work, shop and spend 
their leisure time, the government bodies which make important decisions on 
their behalf, and family groups where men can dominate women, adults can 
dominate children and the able can dominate the old and disabled. Building up 
integrated sets of access to justice options for individuals and groups within 
these powerful institutional structures ought to be the priority of any fifth wave 
of access reform. Such a fifth wave will be the topic of Chapter Five. 
A more tricky problem is ensuring that in practice legal and indigenous 
regulation do check each other's dominations rather than multiplying them. It is 
possible to have pyramids in which the injustice of each level fails to check the 
injustice of the other. For example McConville and Mirsky's research in New 
York City criminal courts showed that reliance on guilty pleas by public 
defenders meant that courts could not adequately fulfil their function of 
protecting people's procedural rights and checking informal police culture. The 
domination of police at the level of arrest affected the way court cases were 
decided: 
Our research shows that guilty pleas in New York City are a part of a 
vertical process: What will happen later at the court stage influences 
what happens earlier at the police stage. Routine processing in court, 
through guilty pleas, reinforces the actions and expectations of the police 
and defendants, thereby encouraging sweeps, dragnets and other non-
individuated arrests. This integral feedback loop, in which facts are of 
little consequence and in which witnesses are not called at either 
hearings or trials (and the propriety of policing and the reliability of 
police evidence are untested), institutionalizes domination. (McConville 
& Mirsky 1995:229) 
The ideal is for formal law to go down the pyramid to facilitate and oversee 
informal justice so that problems of oppression and domination are weeded 
out; and for indigenous ordering to go up the pyramid so that people are 
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developing for themselves an increasing number of options to meaningfully 
resolve their own disputes. Whether this occurs will depend on the way 
institutions of formal and informal justice are designed, interlocked and 
regulated. But the "institution" which could have the greatest effect on the 
success or otherwise of any access to justice pyramid is the legal profession. 
Lawyers may either help or hinder the flow of formal and informal justice 
between the layers of the pyramid depending on their attitudes and 
organisation. Each of the four waves of access to reform has historically relied 
heavily on reforming and reorganising the legal profession to achieve its goals.
45 
Claimants will usually believe that in each of their individual cases the services 
of a high quality lawyer are the best way to secure justice. Yet overall access to 
justice reform that is feasible and desirable means nurturing ways of providing 
access to justice that do not ride on the back of professional fees and 
adversarialism, and encourage a culture in which justice is done at the cheapest, 
most informal level. 
Explicitly seeing justice as something that can be secured through informal, 
cultural and political processes, as well as legal ones, makes it more achievable 
and more desirable. In this context access to justice reform conceived purely as 
reform to lawyers' justice is not sufficient. At the same time it will be crucial to 
ensure that lawyers are reformed and regulated to be suited to a world in which 
justice is a cultural and political practice, not just a legal one. This will be the 
agenda of Part Two of the thesis. 
45Tois claim will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
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Speaking Justice to Power: 
A Fifth Wave? 
I. Introduction 
The access to justice strategy set out in Chapter Four asks us to reimagine access 
to justice as something other than a professional system controlled and rationed 
by lawyers and judges (with a few alternatives tacked on). Chapter Four 
concluded that if access to justice is to be significantly improved, a priority is to 
ensure that justice is being done in everyday transactions and interactions and 
that legal and alternative individual dispute resolution options are placed 
within a context of community and political action. The focus of a fifth wave 
of access to justice reform should therefore lie in creating and improving 
everyday justice practices, rather than relying solely on elaborating professional 
systems of justice that are only ever utilised by the rich and the desperate. This 
chapter sketches an idea for a fifth wave access to justice policy reform which 
attempts to do just that. 
People experience domination in the places where they spend their daily lives in 
the presence of more powerful others-families, schools, workplaces, shops, 
government departments and community organisations. Because commonplace 
dominations make up most injustice, it is in these institutional loci that citizens 
will frequently experience injustice (or be enriched by justice). As Galanter 
(1981:161-162) writes, 
Just as health is not found primarily in hospitals or knowledge in 
schools, so justice is not primarily to be found in official justice-
dispensing institutions. Ultimately, access to justice is not just a 
matter of bringing cases to a font of official justice, but of enhancing 
the justice quality of the relations and transactions in which people 
are engaged. People experience justice (and injustice) not only (or 
usually) in forums sponsored by the state, but also at the primary 
institutional locations of their activity-home, neighbourhood, 
workplace, business setting and so on-(including a variety of 
specialized remedial settings embedded in these locations). 
Many of the places where injustice occurs will be powerful organisations with 
the capacity and money to ensure that customers, employees, shareholders and 
other citizens within their domains have access to the justice options discussed 
in the previous chapter. This chapter argues that it is therefore strategic to 
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conceive the next wave of access to justice reform (the fifth wave) as requiring 
these organisations to create, implement and finance for themselves responsive 
access to justice policies for those affected by their power; local access to 
justice plans for dominations that are predominantly local ( or "glocal" in the 
case of a global corporation that dominates a galaxy of local sites). 
Because wave five would require organisations above a certain size to create 
and pay for a significant proportion of citizens' access to justice, governments 
could focus resources on improving (waves one to four) access to justice in 
relation to less centralised, smaller (but very powerful) institutions such as 
families, small business, private housing markets and community groups. 
Therefore this chapter advocates enforced self-regulated access to justice for 
large organisations, by requiring them to develop access to justice plans for 
those under their influence, combined with education for voluntary 
improvement of justice within small organisations including families. When 
injustice from small organisations like families properly becomes a matter of 
public concern, enforced self-regulatory strategies may become relevant here 
too. 1 Because voluntary self-regulation provides less robust guarantees of 
access to justice than enforced self-regulation, public resources dedicated to 
waves one to four access to justice (legal aid, public interest law, ADR and 
competition policy) should be concentrated on access to justice in small 
organisation like families. Enforced self-regulation in large organisations 
enables this shift to occur by freeing public access to justice resources from the 
need to meet demands incurred in large organisations. 
Such a policy does not ride the tiger of legal professional fees and culture. 
Rather it requires organisations and the citizens affected by them to decide for 
themselves how to build pyramids of access to justice options using alternative 
grievance mechanisms where appropriate, and law and lawyers only where 
necessary. Such a policy heads off the threat of the permeation of legal culture 
down the pyramid to a broad vision for access to justice. Section II shows why 
a strategy that escapes the problem of legalistic domination of access to justice 
is necessary. Section III outlines incipient manifestations of the access to justice 
policy idea for large organisations and argues that organisations should be 
required to develop comprehensive and systematic access to justice policies. 
Section IV sets out how organisations might be required and persuaded to 
1 For example when a minor commits an offence the state might require family 
conferencing, an enforced self-regulatory strategy. See Braithwaite & Daly (1994), 
and Braithwaite & Pettit (1990) for a discussion of when an action properly becomes a 
matter for the intervention of the state by criminal law. 
102 
Chapter 5 Speaking Justice to Power 
comply with such a regime as a matter of enforcement and self-interest. Section 
V shows how legal culture and communal ordering might each be important in 
constituting organisational practices that do justice rather than injustice. 
II. Breaking the Legal Stranglehold on Access to Justice Policy 
Chapters Three and Four have shown that access to justice encompasses much 
more than law and that indeed law usually is and ought to be a last resort for 
citizens who wish to secure just social relations. Yet legalism has frequently 
dominated the access to justice reform agenda: Macdonald's (1990:290) 
critique of access to justice scholarship argues that society's concerns have 
moved "from justice to law (or more precisely, from complex justice to legal 
justice); and ... from substance to access (again, more precisely, from the 
outcomes of institutional processes to the potential for their invocation)" . 
Geerts (1980:219) shows that lawyers are guilty of perpetrating two 
exaggerations of the significance of law which affect both policy-making and 
citizens' desires: On the one hand they overestimate the "social engineering" 
function of law, its ability to achieve beneficial social change, while on the other, 
they overaccentuate the importance of access to law as an end in itself. 
Concerns at the ascendancy of legalism in practical justice discourse and policy 
making echo the Weberian apprehension at the rise of technical rationality at 
the expense of other forms of social action (Shils & Rheinstein 1954), the 
warning of Habermas (1987:361-373) that communicative action may be easily 
supplanted by legal norms ("juridification"), Luhmann's (1985) concern that 
the rationality of the legal system may destroy other patterns of social ordering 
(see also Teubner 1987), and popular misgivings about increasing "legalisation" 
(Galanter 1992), and over-lawyering (especially in the US, see Galanter 1994). 
Chapter Four argued that the history of access to justice reform could be seen as 
an attempt to break away from legalism in institutions of justice delivery (p 
77).2 But in practice it was generally an unsuccessful manoeuvre. Indeed the 
movement itself was largely initiated by lawyers and legal academics. At each 
stage legalism and lawyering have dominated. 
2 The first three waves moved from improvements in access to formal legal justice 
(legal aid) to using innovative political ways to achieve more substantive justice 
(public interest law) and finally abandoning law altogether in an attempt to achieve 
justice through informal community-based means (alternative dispute resolution). 
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The legal aid model relied on organising and regulating lawyers as a public utility 
employed by the state to provide services to citizens (Leubsdorf 1982:1035). 
As a result it has been so expensive as to provide only a tiny minority of 
citizens with a narrow range of legal services (see pp 66-69 above). 
The public interest law movement was an attempt to use innovative legal 
techniques and politics to achieve more substantive justice for under-
represented groups and individuals. Because it depended on lawyers acting 
conscientiously to help reform the legal system, give free services, and become 
involved in community action (Leubsdorf 1982:1048), it remained entrenched in 
legalism (Trubek 1990). While there was progress in (unsystematically) taking 
on more structural injustices, only injustices of such structurally aggregated 
character as could be accommodated within the formal legal paradigm of the 
class action could ride wave two. It did not necessarily provide remedies for 
the fragmented, diffuse injustices arising from local dominations (see pp 69-70 
above). 
The free market model has the potential to free up alternative forms of justice 
service delivery, although in practice it has concentrated on reform of the legal 
profession, dismantling lawyers' monopolies and restrictive practices 
(Leubsdorf 1982:1026). Chapters Seven and Eight will argue that this is a 
limited strategy even for the smaller task of orienting lawyers more towards 
access to justice. It can make legal justice cheaper for those who can afford to 
pay, but wave three does nothing for those who cannot afford to pay at all. 
They had already learned to "lump" injustice before wave three arrived and 
continue to do so (see pp 72-75 above). 
The ADR movement was the most promising attempt to break the legalistic 
stranglehold on access to justice policy. It focused on encouraging the 
proliferation of non-legal resolution services. Lawyers often colonised the 
alternatives that reformers developed, however, dragging them back into legal 
culture and professionalism. Moreover institutions of informal or popular 
justice frequently mimic state law in their attempts to gain acceptance (Merry & 
Milner 1993:5). Empirical work in the law and society and law and 
anthropology traditions repeatedly shows how vulnerable the institutions of 
informal justice are to the colonisation of law and legal professionalism (see 
Abel 1982b, Auerbach 1983, Galanter 1981, Merry 1993, Naffine & Wundersitz 
1991). Reforms that initially sought to eliminate lavvyers by creating informal 
alternatives to law such as commercial arbitration, workers' compensation 
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boards, small claims tribunals, and juvenile courts have frequently been taken 
over by judges and lawyers and absorbed into dominant legal categories. 
Lawyers and judges easily assume the administration of institutions of informal 
justice, bringing with them the discourse of formal law and their codes of 
professionalism (Merry 1993:60). Such is the potency of the imperialism of 
legal discourse that even occasional appearances by lawyers "may lead an 
informal tribunal to restructure its proceedings, perhaps bringing them more in 
line with lawyer expectations" (Lempert & Monsma 1988:137). Lempert and 
Monsma concluded from their study of a public housing eviction board in 
Hawaii that lawyers appearing sporadically before the board often proceeded 
in a legalistic way, attempting to transform hearings into more court-like 
encounters. 3 The existence of a credible threat of appeal to institutions of 
formal justice also increased legalism: "Without making great changes in the 
way eviction hearings were held, the Authority acted to bring its eviction 
process more closely in accord with the requirements of formal law" (1988:178). 
Thus ADR and informal justice practitioners learn to secure immunity from 
formal legal appeal by mimicking the processes of the formal system.4 
Chapter Two showed that the main criticism community and clients make of 
lawyers is that they do not do enough justice. The history of access to justice 
reform suggests that lawyers simultaneously over-promote law. Lawyers' 
justice flows down the pyramid with such force that other means of justice are 
inundated, while law itself does not deliver what it promises. We do not really 
"want a world in which there is perfect penetration of norms downward 
through the pyramid so that all disputes are resolved by application of the 
authoritative norms propounded by the courts" (Galanter 1981:151). Reforms 
that begin and end with legal services perpetuate the problem of too much law 
and not enough justice. The argument of Chapter Four was that in order to 
3 Lempert & Monsma (1988:158-159) imply that lawyers who did appear before the 
board seemed to have unreasonably high expectations about procedural safeguards. 
4 See also Merry & Milner' s (1993) edited collection on the operation and history of 
the San Francisco Community Boards which shows how popular justice is both co-
opted by state law and resists co-optation. As Merry (1993:61-62) writes in her piece 
in the collection, 
The fact that SFCB did not create new forms of neighbourhood ordering in San 
Francisco is not surprising. This reproduction of power relation occurs, I think, 
because popular justice rarely grows out of a base of power outside the state or 
the dominant classes. It is usually more closely tied to state law than to 
indigenous ordering. Anarchic popular justice is the most direct political 
challenge to existing power relations and is usually quickly quashed. Popular 
justice that grows out of indigenous ordering, the communitarian and anarchic 
traditions, has a greater possibility of challenging the hegemony of language 
and form exerted by state law. 
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expand access to justice out of its narrow professionalistic vision, alternatives 
must be encouraged and institutionalised, and formal justice allowed to play its 
supporting role. Tinkering with the apex of the pyramid without a focus on 
developing a variety of justice options in the places where people need them 
most is not enough. 
III. Speaking Justice to Institutionalised Power 
An important criticism of communitarian ADR as a movement is that it has 
relied too much on encouraging neighbourhood informal justice, when many of 
the most common and serious injustices occur in workplaces, market exchanges 
and government-citizen relationships. It is often within institutions rather than 
local geographical communities that it is most urgent that there be 
organisational cultures that do justice, semi-formal processes for justice and the 
option of going to formal justice if necessary. In pre-industrial societies where 
politics, work, education, religion and child-rearing were all geographically 
localised, neighbourhood-based informal justice was of great significance. In the 
contemporary world the main arena of justice is in non-neighbourly networks of 
institutions that enmesh us wherever we go. It is here that improving "grass-
roots" justice options can make a significant difference. Governments and 
companies are already recognising this is an important issue in a variety of 
discrete areas such as discrimination in employment and environmental justice. 
Specific initiatives in these areas ought to be broadened and systematised into a 
more comprehensive strategy in which organisations are required to have their 
own access to justice policies or plans. The aim is to speak justice to the power 
that these organisations already exercise in dealing with (or failing to deal with) 
many local dominations. 
(i) Indigenous Access to Justice within Organisations 
There are many informal and semi-formal ways in which institutions routinely 
do justice and injustice to citizens, incipient manifestations of access to justice 
plans that ought to be broadened and improved. Even an organisation that has 
never developed an explicit policy about the justice of its processes still has 
policies that deal justly or unjustly with citizens' justice claims. ADR and 
informal justice processes are already very significant in most institutions as a 
result of indigenous orderings and market pressures. Examples include 
shareholder grievance mechanisms, consumer complaints procedures, 
management strategies for dealing with employee complaints of exploitation, 
discrimination or harassment, policies for dealing with debtors and creditors, 
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practices for firing staff and methods of consulting with and taking account of 
community interests in institutional decisions such as where to locate a new 
factory or office. 
Many commercial institutions now have consumer complaint schemes (TARP 
1995b),5 as well as grievance mechanisms for employees in areas such as sexual 
harassment and discrimination (Conte 1994, Edelman et al 1993, Ronalds 
1991). Industry complaints schemes have also become numerous. A prominent 
example in Australia is the Banking Ombudsman who uses mediation and ADR 
to solve consumers' problems with banks. The Ombudsman is independent of 
the main retailing banks, yet financed by them, and answers to a council of 
three bankers, three consumer representatives and an independent chair 
(Weerasoria & Wallace 1994). 
Changes in industrial relations law making it difficult to terminate someone's 
employment without giving them natural justice, and sexual harassment 
decisions have lead to the introduction of new management procedures and 
justice schemes in many companies. In the US Edelman et al (1993:512) found 
that institutional employers were motivated to have internal dispute resolution 
mechanisms to deal with equal employment opportunity and affirmative action 
issues in order to keep them out of external state agencies and the formal legal 
system. 
(ii) State Regulated Access to Justice in Organisations 
The introduction of self-regulatory complaint and dispute resolution schemes at 
either an institutional or industry level is sometimes a spontaneous reaction to 
market forces and customer and employee complaints. It may also occur as a 
result of state action. Much justice reform in recent years has been oriented 
towards encouraging and improving the quality of informal and semi-formal 
complaints and dispute resolution schemes within government departments and 
industry, as it is recognised that they are less expensive, and that companies 
can often be persuaded to pay for complaints schemes as an expense of doing 
business (Goldring et al 1993, Attorney General's Department 1995).6 The 
deregulation of state utilities in many countries has occurred only under the 
legislative condition that adequate schemes for consumer complaints and 
5 Sixty-five percent of TARP's (1995b:4) sample of Australian companies had a 
department or an individual responsible for handling consumer enquiries and 
complaints. 
6 Goldring et al (1993:416-422) describe a variety of dispute settlement procedures for 
consumer complaints. The former Australian Prime Minister's recent Justice Statement 
(Attorney General's Department 1995:23) was "geared towards the resolution of 
disputes before there is a need to pursue the formal avenue of litigation." 
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feedback be developed or maintained (Hood & Scott 1996). Thus in Australia 
when the telecommunications industry was liberalised, an industry ombudsman 
scheme was also introduced (TPC 1995b:22). "Regulatory crime" laws, such as 
trading standard and consumer protection statutes frequently encourage self-
regulation by providing businesses with a defence to offences if they can show 
they exercised "due diligence" by having in place management and quality 
assurance systems aimed at ensuring compliance with the standards (Scott 
1995). 
As internal complaints and grievance processes become common, governments 
and industry have become concerned to assure or regulate their quality. For 
example, the previous Australian government began to consult with industry 
and consumer groups in order to set minimum standards for customer dispute 
schemes which would cover independence and impartiality, accessibility, 
efficiency and effectiveness, openness and accountability, timeliness, consumer 
participation, data collection and reporting (Attorney General's Department 
1995:145). 7 Standards Australia have produced a standard by which 
complaints schemes can be accredited. 8 Standards which might provide a 
model for internal justice policies are also being developed for effective 
compliance programs in areas such as trade practices (Brown & Kandel 1995:7-
29, Harvard Law Review 1996:1789, TPC 1995a:27-30).9 Under the British 
7 They also sought to protect the name "ombudsman" since there has been an increase 
in "ombudsman" schemes that may not live up to the standards of the original 
ombudsman schemes (Attorney General's Department 1995:146). 
8 Standards Australia, Australian Standard Complaints Handling, AS 4269-1995. 
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC, formerly the TPC) 
have also concerned themselves with helping companies understand the standards 
which should be applied to internal complaints handling schemes. See TPC 
(1995b:18) for one list of elements for an effective internal complaints handling 
process; committed management, fairness, accessibility, adequate, properly-resourced 
staff, appropriate remedies, feedback, review. 
9 For example the US Sentencing Commission's Sentencing Guidelines for 
organisations look to at least the following factors in determining whether a 
compliance program is "effective"; high level management responsibility for 
compliance, written polices and procedures promoting compliance, programs and 
publications to educate employees about these policies and procedures, an auditing 
system to detect illegal conduct and allow employees to report violations, reasonable 
steps taken by management to prevent further violations if illegal conduct is 
discovered, consistent enforcement and disciplinary sanctions against wrongdoers, 
avoiding delegating authority to persons with a propensity to engage in illegal 
conduct (Brown & Kandel 1995:7-29, Harvard Law Review 1996:1789). 
The ACCC (TPC 1995a:27-30) suggests that effective compliance programs might 
involve; training and advice, commitment at all levels of the organisation, adequate 
resources for compliance, a senior manager with responsibility and direct access to the 
CEO or audit committee of the board, compliance policies clearly stated and targeted, 
being well publicised, formal reporting relationships, action plans for when problems 
reported, record keeping, complaints handling system established, inclusion of agents 
and sub-contractors as well as employees, monitoring against performance standards, 
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government's 1991 Citizens' Charter, a complaints task force has been 
established to advise public bodies on the best methods for dealing with 
grievances (Birkinshaw 1994:40). 
Majone (1994) has characterised the rise of such developments as the rise of a 
"new regulatory state". Instead of a state providing telecommunications or job 
placement for the unemployed, it specifies the outcomes it wants from either 
private or public providers of those services and then regulates to secure those 
outcomes. Increasingly, as the telecommunications ombudsman instantiates, 
one of the outcomes specified by the new regulatory state is access to justice. 
The fifth wave of access to justice proposed in this chapter therefore has its 
incipient manifestations in the new regulatory state. Indeed the fifth wave is 
very much attuned to the ethos of reinventing government so that the state gives 
priority to steering rather than rowing (Osborne & Gaebler 1992). The fifth 
wave is, therefore, a practical not a romantic strategy for a world that refuses 
to accept totally unregulated market or Weberian bureaucratic control of its 
problems. Indeed it is so practical that there are already many incipient 
manifestations of it, as shown by TARP's (1995b:4) research which suggests 
that well over 50% of Australian companies have a department or institution 
responsible for handling consumer complaints. 
(iii) Models of Enforced Self-Regulation in Organisations 
Strategies of "enforced self-regulation" (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992:101), such as 
the access to justice policy regime proposed in this chapter, are increasingly 
used to ensure that institutions take responsibility for the ways their activities 
can affect others both inside and outside their own organisations. In a variety 
of areas the state requires corporations and other powerful organisations to 
audit their own activities, to consider what effects their power might have on 
others, and to develop policies to remedy those effects. They are usually made 
accountable by being required to report the results of their deliberations to the 
government and to the community at large.IO 
regular review for effective outcomes, liaison with enforcement authorities and 
compliance organisations, continuous improvement philosophy, systematic 
identification and management of risks. 
lO NGOs are also using this strategy in attempts to improve corporate conduct. For 
example, Consumers International have developed the Consumer Charter for Global 
Business which transnational corporations are being asked to sign if they can 
demonstrate that their operations comply with its standards of ethics, competition, 
marketing practices, product standards and consumer information. Signing the charter 
also means compiling a bi-annual report on the corporation's activities and compliance 
with the standards which can be made available to members of Consumers 
International (ACT Consumer Affairs Bureau 1996). 
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Corporations are now finding it desirable to initiate their own compliance 
audits before outside regulators do it for them. Sigler and Murphy (1988) 
describe compliance programs that American corporations use to help them 
negotiate antitrust, environmental law, equal employment opportunity and 
occupational health and safety.11 They report that, 
For America's larger corporations, it is commonplace to find 
substantial legal departments among whose purposes are to assure 
that the business can continue its activities without running afoul of 
the law. Beyond merely consulting with lawyers, most of these 
companies have more active efforts to ensure that their personnel 
understand the legal risks and the rules that apply. (Sigler & 
Murphy 1988:55) 
Environmental regulation already requires corporations to take responsibility 
for the effects of their activities on the environment by preparing environmental 
impact statements about the consequences of proposed developments. There is 
a trend towards expecting corporations to environmentally "audit" all their 
activities, not just new developments (eg International Auditing Practices 
Committee 1995). No fewer than fifty International Organisation for 
Standardisation (ISO) committees are presently working on an international 
environmental management standard which would require companies to set 
objectives for continuous improvement in environmental stewardship and then 
to audit independently to ensure that each year's performance is better than the 
previous year's (Cascio 1994). 12 Fischer and Schot's (1993:5) international 
research on industrial firms suggests that "somewhere in the mid-1980s firms 
changed from fighting or resistantly adapting to external pressures to embracing 
them and incorporating environmental considerations into their policies in a 
more rigorous way". 
Equal employment opportunity (EEO) and affirmative action (AA) regimes 
require companies, government departments, and universities to consider 
whether women (and sometimes other minorities) are discriminated against 
within their organisations and in their employment practices, and to develop 
corporate plans for improving their position (V. Braithwaite 1993). A similar 
regime of enforced self-regulation is becoming common for occupational health 
11 Sigler & Murphy (1988:57) argue that compliance strategies are most advanced in 
relation to anti-trust which they say is directly related to the severity of antitrust 
laws and the government's practice in enforcing them. See Fisse (1989) for a discussion 
of trade practices compliance programs in Australia. 
12 It seems that unlike the situation with European environmental management 
standards, ISO continuous improvement will not be on environmental outcomes, but 
continuous improvement in environmental management (Gunningham 1996). 
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and safety (Rees 1988, Smith et al 1993). Rees found some evidence that self-
regulation based on labour-management cooperation facilitated by the 
regulatory agency was more effective than command and control regulation 
judged by accident rates and the evaluations of the leading participants. 
Sheikh (1996; see also Dierkes 1985) discusses the concept of requ1nng 
companies to conduct "social audits" in the growing number of fields in which 
the law and the community recognise corporate social responsibilities. Social 
audits evaluate the corporation's performance in its social environment in areas 
such as employee welfare, occupational health and safety, responsibilities to 
shareholders and creditors, consumers and clients, and also "a company's 
social performance on matters such as environmental pollution, waste, 
misleading advertisements, unsafe consumer products and product quality" 
(Sheikh 1996:193). Sheikh's own survey of British companies showed that well 
over half had already begun to regularly audit more than one area of social 
activity (Sheikh 1996:194). 
(iv) Improving Indigenous Access to Justice within Organisations 
Market forces, spontaneous social ordering and piecemeal government reforms 
do not create sufficiently comprehensive, effective or equitable access to justice 
strategies within the institutions where we live our lives. A fifth wave of access 
to justice reform might focus on ensuring that informal justice options and 
indigenous orderings exist in large organisations, and that those already in place 
are of sufficient quality and are sufficiently integrated with more formal justice 
options to do justice rather than injustice. Instead of introducing complaints 
and dispute resolution schemes piecemeal, a fifth wave of reform might ask 
institutions to deliberate upon all the ways in which they do or should attempt 
to do justice to citizens. 
Enforced self-regulatory activities in the domains of the environment, 
occupational health and safety and affirmative action provide partial models 
for public and private organisations to comprehensively audit the ways they 
provide access to justice for customers, employees, shareholders, creditors and 
others, and then to improve them. The access to justice policy regime would 
require them to critically examine these private orderings, discuss them with 
stakeholders, and consider whether they do justice or injustice and where they 
have gaps. It would incorporate schemes of the types described above into 
explicit and comprehensive access to justice pyramids. It would give 
institutions responsibility for the effects of their own power by insisting that 
they audit their own justice practices and develop policies with their 
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stakeholders about how they will ensure access to justice for all (whether 
customers, creditors, employees, students or anyone else) who may suffer 
domination within their institutional network. 
Thus a corporation or government department might introduce consumer 
complaints schemes, natural justice for employees in danger of losing their jobs, 
grievance processes for employees who experience discrimination or harassment 
and for debtors who feel they are being aggressively hounded for their debts. It 
might join an independent industry ombudsman scheme to which a grievant 
could appeal if their grievance was not resolved internally in a satisfactory 
way. It might even decide to pay for legal advice or representation for citizens 
who were unhappy with the justice meted out in informal and semi-formal 
forum.s. 
This proposal would solve the problems of relying on lawyers' charity or 
subsidising lawyers' fees to enhance justice in crucial places. Rather it relies on 
effectively mobilising the resources of the organisations in which domination 
occurs to deal with the problems they help to create. If one turns to lawyers for 
access to justice strategies, responses are frequently limited to after-the-fact 
remedies. If one turns to those who hold organisational power, one can prevent 
injustice. While the lawyer can get compensation for citizens who suffer from a 
polluted river, the manager can engineer the production process to minimise or 
eliminate waste.13 
IV. Why Embrace the Access to Justice Policy Regime? 
Perhaps this sounds romantic. Why should cost-conscious executives fund 
comprehensive enhancements to their private justice systems, and why should 
the public entrust a significant amount of the provision of access to justice for 
citizens to large and already (dangerously) powerful organisations? Three 
reasons shall be considered below. Firstly, it may be rational for executives of 
large organisations to adopt access to justice policies because flexible access to 
justice regimes that are private can deliver competitive advantage for just 
organisations over unjust ones. By virtue of their justice they can keep 
customers, hold and motivate quality employees, enjoy a capacity to restructure 
in response to changes in the competitive environment with minimum friction 
and keep at bay greens, consumerists, unionists, EEO, privacy and disabled 
13 Moreover he or she is likely to be able to do this at negative cost much of the time 
given that production processes that generate a lot of waste are probably inefficient 
(Porter & van der Linde 1995). See Section IV below. 
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activists, and others who can threaten their legitimacy. Secondly, organisations 
might comply with an access to justice policy requirement imposed by the state 
in a process which allows them to do justice in their own way. Finally, an 
advantage of the proposed access to justice policy regime for the public is that 
if large organisations provide a significant amount of access to justice then 
public resources can be moved to areas where they are really necessary, and 
models can be developed for improving the culture of justice in smaller 
organisations. Part V of this chapter considers how to ensure that these private 
justice systems are in fact just, and do not simply extend the arbitrary power of 
already powerful organisations. 
(i) Advantages of Access to Justice Policies for Organisations 
The development of corporate access to justice policies could improve business 
for competitive corporations. The efficiency of such schemes means that 
although they will require a significant devotion of resources and administrative 
expense to implement, and may be costly, they can be cost neutral overall, or 
even save money in the long term. 
Harvard Business School professor, Michael Porter (1990:652) sees well 
publicised consumer complaints systems as a stimulus to improvement in 
business practices leading to better productivity and profitability. Laura Nader 
argues that effective consumer complaints schemes can be the basis for an 
information loop that improves products and services (Nader 1979:1018). An 
Australian study of consumer complaint behaviour conducted for American 
Express and the Society of Consumer Affairs in Business (TARP 1995a, 1995b) 
shows that effective corporate complaint handling practices can produce 
significant marketing advantages. The study found that where consumers were 
satisfied or more than satisfied with the way their complaints were handled 
they were much more likely to repurchase than if they did not complain, or were 
dissatisfied or merely "mollified" by the way their complaint was handled. 
Indeed where consumer complaint handling exceeded consumer expectations, 
the consumer was almost as likely to re-purchase as if there had never been a 
problem (TARP 1995a:18). 
Similarly the implementation of anti-discrimination measures such as AA and 
EEO regimes may increase the efficient utilisation of under-used labour 
resources. An organisation that refuses to promote its best women because they 
are women is investing its human capital foolishly. Occupational health and 
safety regimes can reduce costs by reducing problems and accidents that shut 
down production (Cunningham 1984:320). This accomplishment is vividly 
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illustrated in coal mines where productivity and safety are positively correlated 
(Braithwaite 1985:169). The evidence is compelling that "pollution often 
reveals flaws in the product design or production process"; processes that 
produce wastes harmful to the environment are generally also inefficient so that 
improving environmental performance is often cost neutral (Porter & van der 
Linde 1995:122). Porter and van der Linde (1995) see this as an instantiation 
of a general principle that business now accepts-that innovation can improve 
quality while lowering cost. 
Institutional access to justice policies could also engender higher productivity 
from workers who appreciate being treated more justly, and higher satisfaction 
from customers/ employees/ students who prefer to get justice within an 
everyday setting rather than having to go to an external forum. This is 
consistent with Fisse and Braithwaite's (1993) argument that corporations 
ought to be responsible initially for doing justice to corporate criminals within 
their own organisations. Their evidence suggests that in some cases employees 
felt that they received a fairer deal from employers' corporate justice systems 
(that handle a massive volume of informal adjudication of criminal allegations 
such as employee theft) than from the state. They compare this with a 
literature "showing more generally that citizens who experience informal 
justice-court-annexed arbitration, plea bargaining and mediation-are more 
likely to come away with a perception that they have been treated fairly than 
are citizens who have been dealt with by a court" (1993:170; see also Lind & 
Tyler 1988). This in itself may improve competitiveness and efficiency since 
employees and others who feel they are treated fairly by their employer may 
also be more cooperative with company ( or government) efforts to restructure. 14 
Finally, the institutions themselves will have something to gain by having their 
own policies that allow them to do justice before they are challenged more 
formally. They will spend less down-time fighting with customers, workers and 
creditors and be more trusted by government who will therefore resort less often 
to direct regulation of the firm. They can decide for themselves how to structure 
their management and transactions to ensure justice rather than having someone 
else impose inconvenient schemes or requirements on them. Managers are also 
more likely to come up with creative ways of providing access to justice that are 
good for business and fit in with corporate culture than governments are ( see 
14 As Leibfried & Rieger (1995) point out, contrary to expectations large welfare 
states are generally more successful in the global market than other states because the 
safety net they provide means that businesses can more easily restructure in line with 
competitive pressures with more cooperation from workers who know they will be 
provided for. 
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Fisse & Braithwaite 1993:197). This sort of responsiveness to core values of 
society positions business firms in an advantageous market position while also 
satisfying government by anticipating some of its demands (Sigler & Murphy 
1988:53). In sum, they can win by playing ball well with the "new regulatory 
state" (Hood & Scott 1996, Majone 1994). 
( ii) A Regime that Promotes Compliance 
A regime which gives organisations the responsibility for doing justice to those 
under them and for doing it in their own way can successfully engender 
compliance and changes in corporate cultures, policies and processes to 
produce more justice. Lawyers and philosophers are disinclined to think of the 
challenge of justice as a challenge of management creativity. The idea of 
institutional access to justice plans is to nurture and harness management 
creativity to encourage the discovery of a plurality of approaches to increasing 
justice within institutions and industries. Just as Porter and van der Linde 
(1995:120) argue that "properly designed environmental standards can trigger 
innovations that lower the total cost of a product or improve its value", so the 
access to justice policy regime should be aimed at improving access to justice 
through liberating organisational innovations. As Harris (1993) concludes from 
her review of Australian consumer complaint and dispute schemes, 15 self-
regulatory schemes tend to have higher compliance levels because they are more 
consensual. The whole purpose could be easily defeated by having formal 
schemes introduced precipitately from on high. 
Taking a dialogic approach to introducing legislation requiring access to justice 
plans would encourage management creativity. The Australian affirmative 
action regime is a useful model in this respect. It was introduced by means of a 
pilot program involving twenty-eight private sector companies and three higher 
education institutions which volunteered to implement affirmative action 
programs. Extensive consultation occurred both before and after the pilot 
program. The variety of companies participating in the pilot program meant 
that a plurality of approaches and courses of action were developed. Later all 
private sector organisations with over one hundred employees and all higher 
education institutions were required to report on their development and 
implementation of affirmative action programs (V. Braithwaite 1993, Ronalds 
1991). Valerie Braithwaite's (1992:i) study of the implementation of 
affirmative action regulation in Australia concluded that the way it was 
15 She included industry association schemes, government consumer affairs bureaus 
and internal institutional schemes. 
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introduced and its enforced self-regulatory approach were keys to what success 
it had: 
In general, the business community saw compliance with the 
affirmative action legislation as part of being a good corporate 
citizen. They regarded the legislation as reasonable in that it was 
not particularly intrusive, it was effective in raising awareness and 
making employment practices fairer, it was not difficult to 
implement, and offered favourable outcomes for business. 
In the first instance the objective might be simply to create the capacity for 
quality access to justice policies to be introduced in a wide range of 
organisations. The aim would be to develop and test a range of models for how 
organisations can go about having an access to justice policy. As in the 
Australian affirmative action regime, some lead organisations could volunteer to 
develop models of access to justice. 16 The state could be a moral exemplar by 
volunteering one of its own Departments, and some private companies which 
are attracted to showing leadership might also volunteer. Since organisations 
like American Express are already leaders in developing access to justice 
policies in a number of areas such as consumer complaints schemes and 
employee natural justice (TARP 1995b), the development of models for 
comprehensive access to justice policies would be a matter of building on things 
that are already happening, rather than doing something entirely new. 
Managers and consultants would later be able to draw on the expertise 
developed and documented by exemplary program research. 
Ultimately however there must be a structure of incentives if a large number of 
organisations are to introduce such policies. In the second stage, regulation 
similar to the affirmative action regime might be introduced requiring all 
organisations above a certain size to develop and submit their own access to 
justice policies.17 Rewards and sanctions can encourage institutions to take 
seriously the need to develop and submit their access to justice reports. In the 
affirmative action case, the strict deadline for reports and the fact that 
16 See Eveline (1994) for a study of one Western Australian mining company that 
volunteered to implement affirmative action ahead of time. 
17 Size could be defined by number of employees, as in the affirmative action regime, 
or by size of budget. The affirmative action regulation requires companies to (1) issue 
an equal employment opportunity policy statement to all employees, (2) assign 
responsibility for affirmative action to a senior officer, (3) consult with trade unions, 
(4) consult with employees particularly women, (5) the collect statistics to observe 
gender by job classification breakdown, (6) review personnel policies and practices, (7) 
set forward estimates and objectives, (8) the monitoring and evaluation of the program 
(see V. Braithwaite 1992:1). Progress on these eight steps must be reported in a 
document sent to the Affirmative Action Agency each year. 
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companies would be named in Parliament if they did not submit a report was 
of some use (V. Braithwaite 1992:89). In 1992 a further sanction was added; 
companies would be ineligible for government contracts if named in parliament. 
This process of increasing the seriousness of the sanctions available for non-
compliance over time is useful where it might take organisations years to adapt 
and become committed to a completely new type of regulatory regime. 
Although the results of the affirmative action regime have so far been limited 
(Burton 1991), by 1992 it had been successful in getting 95% of organisations 
required to do so to submit a report (Affirmative Action Agency 1992:1) and 
had achieved modest gains in actually getting companies to implement 
affirmative programs (V. Braithwaite 1993). 
A more relevant sanction for failure to implement an effective access to justice 
policy might be the award of exemplary damages against organisations where 
an injustice occurs that should have been prevented by a suitable policy. 
Governments and courts are already willing to use awards of costs to 
discourage a party causing unnecessary cost and delay (eg Attorney General's 
Department 1995:34). Extra damages might be awarded in a court action 
arising out of a matter that the court thinks should have been dealt with 
internally by the losing organisation. The extra damages might compensate the 
plaintiff for the fact that they have had to spend more time and money getting 
the matter resolved by going to court than if it had been dealt with internally in 
the first place, and will also be an incentive for plaintiffs to make institutions 
accountable in court for the way they do justice. If it were felt that letting 
plaintiffs keep the excess would give them a windfall benefit, the excess could 
be assigned to legal aid or to some other access to justice funding. 
The US Sentencing Commission recommended a similar scheme which was 
implemented by Congress for using decreased fines to encourage corporations to 
voluntarily put in place compliance programs to help them avoid committing 
offences (Gruner 1994:444, 817-894). A base fine is adjusted according to a 
corporation's "culpability score" in relation to a particular violation: 
Each corporation starts with five points on its culpability score. 
Judges can add points for aggravating factors ... Similarly, judges 
can subtract points for mitigating factors, such as if the organisation 
has in place an II effective" compliance program; accepts 
responsibility for the crime; cooperates with the investigation; or 
voluntarily reports the offense. Depending on the final score, the 
actual fine may range from as little as one-twentieth to as much as 
four times the base fine. Additionally, if a convicted organization 
with fifty or more employees does not have an effective compliance 
program in place the Guidelines require that the organization be 
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placed on probation until it implements such a program. (Harvard 
Law Review 1996:1785-1786) 
By mid-1995 208 organisations had been sentenced under the guidelines. Only 
one was found by the court to have an effective compliance program, and only 
three others bothered to claim that they had such a program. Fourteen percent 
were ordered to implement compliance programs and sixty-one percent were 
placed on probation (Harvard Law Review 1996:1786-7). Yet there is evidence 
that the Guidelines have had some of the effects desired; a survey of 300 US 
businesses found that almost forty-five percent added vigour to their 
compliance programs because of the guidelines and another twenty percent 
added compliance programs (Harvard Law Review 1996:1787). However, only 
about forty percent used audits (Harvard Law Review 1996:1788). 
Similarly in Britain the existence of a self-regulatory system for avoiding risk 
can be a defence to offences of strict liability in consumer protection and 
trading standard cases (Scott 1995). 18 In some Australian trade practices 
cases courts have seen the existence of a compliance program as a mitigating 
factor in the assessment of penalties (see TPC 1995a:8-9). In Trade Practices 
Commission v TNT Australia Pty Ltd, 19 Justice Burchett thought that a most 
important factor in mitigation would be "Whether the company has a corporate 
culture conducive to compliance with the Act, as evidenced by educational 
programs and disciplinary or other corrective measures in response to an 
acknowledged contravention" (at 40 169). 
Conversely, courts have been scathing where there is evidence of a half-hearted 
attempt to introduce a compliance program but no evidence of management 
commitment to a compliance culture. In Trade Practices Commission v CSR 
Limited20 Justice French observed that it seemed that CSR had taken legal 
advice mainly so that it could find out how to abuse its market power without 
technically contravening trade practices legislation. He increased their penalty: 
There was little convincing evidence of a corporate culture seriously 
committed to the need to comply with the requirement of the Act. 
The compliance program as indicated by the evidence appeared 
desultory and in need of reinforcement. No indication of any 
corrective measures or revitalisation of that program was offered. 
The corporate culture was, I think, reflected in CSR's dealings with 
the Commission and the conduct of this litigation. (at 52 155) 
18 Tesco v Nattrass (1972] AC 153. 
19 (1995) ATPR 1141-375. 
20 (1991) ATPR 1{41-076. 
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The most draconian option is to make it an offence to fail to have an access to 
justice plan, ultimately punishable by corporate capital punishment-
withdrawal of the firm's license or charter. As draconian as this sounds, 
enforcement action up to license revocation can already be taken in relation to a 
variety of types of business (including professions such as the legal profession): 
Some US states effectively do this with access to justice for nursing home 
residents. Unless nursing homes come up with effective plans for improving 
access of residents to rights such as freedom of movement and choice of 
treatment, enforcement action up to license revocation can be taken (Fogg 
1994:<j[200). 
( iii) Improving Access to Justice in Other Domains 
(a) Focusing Public Access to Justice Resources on Priority Areas: 
Part of the access to justice problem has been that access to justice resources 
have been under pressure from so many directions that it has been difficult for 
them to deliver everything. This is especially true of state legal aid resources. 
The proposed fifth wave puts much of the onus for providing access to justice 
in relation to institutional power on the institutions involved, so that the state 
can prioritise the areas which really need state access to justice resources. This 
includes the state responsibility to continue to support the infrastructure of 
formal justice, but it will be especially important in targeting the access to 
justice problems of those who suffer domination in non-institutional settings. 
The most important neglected problem is how to improve justice for women and 
children within the family, the smallest, yet most ubiquitously powerful unit in 
post-industrial societies. 
While much can be accomplished through access to justice plans for greater 
equality for women who work for or are victimised by large organisations, these 
are not the only, or perhaps even the primary sites for unjust treatment of 
women (and children). The problems within families especially of women and 
children ought to be a priority for state access to justice spending, a priority 
which will be more achievable if institutions are made responsible for their own 
access to justice needs. At the apex of the pyramid this would mean improving 
the availability of legal aid for formal justice for matters that concern women 
and children (the priority given to criminal matters in legal aid creates a bias in 
favour of adult male recipients, seep 68 above) and continuing to improve the 
way the law and formal processes treat women and children. It might also 
mean improving funding for women's and children's legal services which take 
important test and other cases and lobby for improvements in law and court 
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procedures. At the base it should involve seeing funding for women's and 
youth refuges, crisis centres, and counselling services as a priority, and in the 
middle it would involve continuing to work for better quality mediation schemes 
in family law matters. 
(b) Modelling Effect: 
"Fifth wave" access to justice reform can also have a beneficial effect on 
institutional domains other than large organisations through modelling, even if 
they are not under legislative obligations to develop access to justice policies. 
Small businesses, neighbourhoods, community groups and families would 
benefit from the improved capacity for and knowledge of access to justice 
schemes developed in larger organisations, and schemes developed by larger 
organisations would inevitably become available to citizens in a variety of other 
arenas as well. For example industry-wide consumer complaint schemes 
developed by larger organisations as their legislative duty would also be 
available to the customers of smaller businesses. Smaller businesses often 
naturally follow the lead of larger businesses, suggesting that internal access to 
justice policies developed and found to be successful in large organisations 
might eventually be adopted as standard in smaller organisations as well. 
Indeed smaller businesses are often dependent on larger organisations as 
suppliers, distributors or customers so that an access to justice regime which 
required or encouraged large institutions to ensure that the businesses with 
which it dealt also had access to justice policies may massively increase access 
to justice.21 
Apart from the direct effects that the development of access to justice policies 
in large organisations might have on small organisations, the development of 
capacity and know-how in relation to grass-roots justice schemes would also 
have a positive effect in a variety of areas. For example developing 
benchmarks and quality indicators for intra-organisational access to justice 
policies in large organisations could also be adapted for use in evaluating and 
accrediting ADR schemes developed by community groups. Social movements 
which develop and advocate ADR strategies within organisations can use the 
same know-how in developing neighbourhood and family alternative justice 
processes; the consumer movement and unions will be as relevant in finding 
solutions to problems with small businesses as with larger companies. The time 
might come when lawyers realised that in the era of the new regulatory state it 
is time to facilitate modelling explicitly by establishing an ISO committee to 
21 This approach is taken in quality assurance schemes where to assure its own 
quality a company must also ensure that its suppliers are also quality-certified. 
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commence work towards an international access to justice voluntary standard 
grounded in the philosophy of continuous improvement and publicly reported 
audit of outcomes. 
Effective restorative justice programs in schools teach all students how to claim 
and how to do justice in ways that might be translated into myriad families, 
community groups, workplaces and commercial organisation, small and large, 
when the students leave school. Indeed education for doing justice informally, 
and education about legal norms, rights and responsibilities for all are linchpins 
of successfully improving the access to justice culture of a society. It is often 
said that there could be more civics education and more law in the curriculum; a 
conclusion of the research in this thesis is that perhaps there should be more 
law and more informal justice education in the curriculum for the masses while 
there should be less law and more justice in law students' curriculum so that 
access to justice becomes the domain of the people, not just of the profession. 
One way to ensure that the justice lessons learnt in large organisations like 
companies, government departments and schools begin to be translated into 
other smaller institutions like families, clubs and small business might be to 
develop educational materials targeted at these groups teaching and 
encouraging them to deal with their own justice problems internally. 
22 
IV. Ensuring the Quality of Organisational Cultures of Justice 
(i) Dangers of Institutional Access to Justice Strategies 
There are dangers in allowing institutions to be solely responsible for access to 
justice arrangements for those over whom they exercise power. Those 
arrangements may not provide access to justice at all, or the "justice" they 
provide may replicate patterns of domination and oppression already 
established in the culture of the organisation. Indeed access to justice options 
offered by institutions may often magnify the problems of informal justice 
discussed in the previous chapter (pp 78-80) because of the inbuilt and obvious 
inequality between the grievant and the institution within which they make their 
claim. Laura Nader (1979:1006) summarises a number of studies of complaints 
made to organisational complaints schemes and concludes, 
Instead of providing easy access to swift relief, many of the 
programs obstruct the complainants' path with complex procedures 
and repeated delays. Some fail to disclose to the complainant the 
22 See Nelsen (1996) for an example of the sorts of materials that might assist 
families to do justice. 
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steps necessary in order to process a grievance; some department 
stores even hide their customer-service offices from view. 
Intermediary organisations are often understaffed, underfinanced 
and overworked, and the resulting backlogs and inefficiencies can 
discourage consumers from pressing their complaints. There is 
evidence that some organisations deliberately dissuade individuals 
from pursuing relief. In sum, complaint-processing methods often 
make it so difficult for complainants to persist that they are likely 
to "lump it," and even likely to avoid raising claims in the future. 
Edelman et al (1993) show that internal complaint handlers reconstruct 
employees' civil rights complaints as depoliticised management concerns, that 
their complaints handling procedures lack fundamental due process protections 
and are unconcerned with issues of party inequality and with elaborating 
standards of discrimination. Finkle and Cohen (1993:113) show that American 
laws which induce manufacturers to provide ADR for consumers can be 
criticised for favouring manufacturers and not being well supervised by 
governments. A policy of decentring legalism and encouraging institutions to 
develop their own access to justice strategies could be dangerous if it means 
that the indigenous ordering of management perpetuates domination and 
oppression up the pyramid. The aim of a fifth wave of access to justice reform 
must therefore be not just to create more private justice options, but to check 
domination in those that already exist. 
As Finkle and Cohen (1993:113) show in their research on Better Business 
Bureaus in North America, "It is possible to design a process which is paid for 
by sellers and that appears to be even-handed". The development of 
standards and best practice for access to justice schemes from the bottom up 
by those who are actually implementing them can improve their quality, as can 
external supervision by independent complaints handlers, courts, lawyers and 
representatives of social movements. These complementary sets of standards 
can constitute pyramids of access options which do justice. The aim, as 
outlined in Chapter Four, is that as legal norms go down the pyramid, and 
communal and indigenous orderings go up, justice becomes part of everyday 
transactions and relationships within organisations.23 
(ii) Developing Standards from Best Practice 
Quality standards for access to justice policies based on best practice would 
nurture and take advantage of organisational creativity in developing justice 
schemes, thus strengthening the upward flow of indigenous institutional 
orderings that do justice rather than injustice. Accreditation or quality 
23 As was represented in Figure 4.3, p 93. 
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assurance schemes might be introduced, and independent audits imposed as a 
regulator of the quality of access to justice policies. Each year organisations 
might be required to publish their access to justice plans including the objectives 
at which they are aimed, performance indicators and audit results.
24 
The development of non-legal professionalisms will be an important support for 
the development of high quality internal justice processes. Both V. Braithwaite 
(1992) and Edelman et al (1993:501) show that the effectiveness of internal 
procedures for AA and EEO depend on the commitments and role of the 
professionals responsible for them with the organisations and particularly 
within management. Valerie Braithwaite's (1992:94) data showed particularly 
that the involvement of AA officers in networks of support was an important 
factor in their effectiveness in changing corporate cultures. Similarly as 
occupational health and safety and environmental auditing became 
professionalised, standards improved because the people in the organisations 
had another source of knowledge and support outside their employer 
institution. Thus Rees (1988:228) highlights the importance of a professional 
safety movement in improving occupational health and safety regulation and 
compliance within organisations: 
Guided by a distinct body of professional commitments, ideas and 
aspirations-Safety Management-Safety Department officials 
converted the workers' compensation system into a safety 
management tool, not only to highlight job site accident costs, but 
more importantly, to facilitate consideration of occupational safety 
as a significant factor of production. 
In Australia the Society of Consumer Affairs Professionals in Business was set 
up to provide professional culture, support and knowledge for people 
employed by organisations to handle consumer complaints. The Regulatory 
Affairs Professionals Society in the pharmaceutical industry with 4000 
members worldwide is another example of such an organisation. In Europe 
private sector ombudsmen have met and drawn up their own criteria of the 
standards which a body must attain before it should be entitled to use the term 
"Ombudsman" (Birds 1994:106).25 The object of developing such non-legal 
professionalisms is to replicate with access to justice professionalism what is 
being accomplished with EEO professionalism in Australia-a professionalism 
where both lawyerly and non-lawyerly voices (such as human resource 
24 Performance indicators might include things like the results of surveys of 
complainant satisfaction. 
25 Since this is a purely voluntary association, not all officers called "ombudsman" 
actually comply with these standards. 
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management voices) are prominent, and contributing to the development of 
innovative access to justice programs. 
(iii) External Oversight of Internal Access to Justice 
A crucial aspect of an effective internal access to justice mechanism will be that 
the organisation provides access to an external mechanism, and ultimately law, 
if claimants do not feel that justice has been done internally so that external, 
especially legal, norms will condition institutional justice. Since internal 
institutional justice schemes can be criticised for being inherently biased in 
favour of the powerful organisation that operates them, it will be no use 
introducing internal justice schemes if they are cut off from pyramids of access 
to justice strategies, which reach up to the apex of formal ( external) justice. 
In the first instance it might be necessary for institutions to ensure that citizens 
can go to an independent informal tribunal, ombudsman or industry complaints 
scheme. Membership of an association that provides tribunals or an 
ombudsman may be an access to justice requirement. For example in Australia 
all three telecommunications carriers, Telstra, Optus and Vodafone, are 
required as a condition of their license to participate in the Telecommunications 
Industry Ombudsman scheme and to fund the scheme proportionately to the 
number of complaints made against them, decisions up to $10 000 being 
automatically binding on the service provider (TPC 1995b:22). Thus 
telecommunications consumers are guaranteed access to a pyramid of justice 
options, especially with the existence of the Consumer Telecommunications 
Network and Telstra-specific Telstra Consumer Committee funded by industry. 
Ultimately institutional access to justice must be subject to the justice of law. 
Courts will naturally exercise oversight over the adequacy of internal justice 
arrangements if people have sufficient opportunities to go to formal justice 
when they are not satisfied with private justice. Even Laura Nader (1979:1020) 
recognises that keeping channels of access to formal justice available can make 
non-judicial internal organisational justice alternatives work better: 
Courts should be available, especially in cases in which the parties 
have unequal power; parties with relatively equal power are more 
likely to resolve disputes without the aid of the judiciary. Access to 
court for parties of unequal power could itself shape opportunities for 
satisfactory settlement without the exercise of legal authority. Even now, 
settlements of claims that could have been resolved legally almost 
universally reflect the level of awards available in small claims 
court. Expanding judicial relief for minor claims could lead to better 
nonjudicial solutions. (emphasis added) 
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Therefore it remains essential that people can go outside the organisation to 
formal means of justice and it will also become important that internal access to 
justice policies comply with benchmarks from external law, that they be 
transparent to the state, the legal profession and citizens by being subject to 
public reporting of justice processes and outcomes. In sexual harassment cases, 
courts are willing to look at internal corporate policies to judge whether they 
contain adequate processes for identifying and dealing with problems (Conte 
1994:349-351, Ronalds 1991:144). There is no reason why courts could not 
show a similar interest in examining access to justice policies more generally. In 
order to facilitate this, an element of institutional access to justice policies might 
be that the institution provide finances to assist dissatisfied grievants access 
legal advice and the court system. 26 
Finally, a criticism of internal access to justice schemes (as with informal justice 
generally) is that they individualise and depoliticise conflict and claims. For 
example Edelman et al (1993:528) found that internal discrimination 
complaints schemes for employees were "primarily geared toward repairing and 
improving management techniques and relations between employees and their 
supervisors". The definition of complaints as individual management 
problems, 
... privatises and depoliticises the public right to equal employment 
opportunity. Individual complaints are rarely linked to public rights 
and ideals, and the complaint resolution process does not involve 
public recognition of those rights or public articulation of a standard 
to which other employees may appeal. Thus, each employee must 
renegotiate the meaning of discrimination. Further, IDR [internal 
dispute resolution] is unlikely to have the general deterrent effect 
that precedent and publicised lawsuits have on at least some 
employers. (Edelman et al 1993:530) 
Chapter Four argued that informal justice need not privatise disputes unduly if it 
is placed within a context of concern for and awareness of more structural 
issues. A quality standard for internal schemes and a responsibility of external 
overseers might be looking for patterns in complaints, identifying structures or 
practices causing them and doing something about them (Nader 1979:1007). In 
many areas there will be the potential for internal or external groups to have an 
interest in the way justice is meted out. A union, a women's network, an 
environmental group, telecommunications consumer group or council for civil 
liberties may be involved in helping to develop access to justice policies, in 
26 Howells (1994:65) has made a similar suggestion that credit institutions which 
benefit from the work of financial advisors ought to subsidise their debtors' access to 
these services. 
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overseeing the way they are provided and advocating that structural issues be 
dealt with. Effective and justice internal access to justice schemes will give 
these groups a voice. 
(iv) The Interaction of Lawyers' Justice and Indigenous Institutional 
Justice 
Critics worry that management's internal justice and self-regulatory industry 
schemes will not adequately protect people's rights or provide sufficient due 
process safeguards. Legal culture is desirable precisely because law and formal 
legal processes are good at providing an external set of norms against which to 
judge the way that internal grievance processes protect people's rights. Since 
lawyers are the carriers of this tradition, they might be constructively involved 
in the implementation of access to justice policies within organisations.27 This 
would help draw the benefit of law down the pyramid from the apex of formal 
justice to enhance informal internal processes. 
In order to preserve the value of informal internal orderings for access to justice, 
however, we must be careful that penetration does not become domination. 
Since professionalised justice still has a monopoly of legitimacy, and lawyers 
have successfully claimed a non-accountable status over large areas of their 
work, informal justice can easily be captured or co-opted by groups of legal 
professionals. As Fisse and Braithwaite (1993:175-176) warn, 
If the law becomes excessively interventionist in proceduralising 
private justice systems, it creates a hazardous mismatch between 
the design of private justice and the patterns of particular corporate 
cultures: it jeopardises that very contextual responsiveness that 
attracts disputants to informal justice. 
If external legal culture will be important in ensuring informal access to justice 
polices to protect rights, an internally democratic culture and good management 
practice will be essential to ensure those policies provide accessible, informal 
processes that have meaning for those they are meant to benefit. Employees, 
customers and students need to be involved, as individuals and groups, in 
making and implementing the policies if they are to find them useful. Just as the 
involvement of women in developing EEO policies has been demonstrated to be 
a crucial factor in successfully changing the culture of organisations for 
affirmative action (V. Braithwaite 1992:53), so the development of internal 
27 Sigler & Murphy (1988:93) suggest that corporate lawyers "form a natural 
compliance constituency" within companies encouraging them to comply with the 
letter and spirit of the law. 
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justice options must be based on the participation of those they are supposed 
to benefit. 
Thus as Mnookin and Kornhauser (1979:986) conclude from their study of 
lawyers' roles in divorce settlements, the primary function of the legal system 
ought to be to facilitate private ordering and dispute resolution, not to take it 
over. There is evidence that lawyers can encourage the use of negotiation, 
settlement and institutions of informal justice. Mnookin and Kornhauser 
(1979:986) conclude that although "the participation of lawyers in the divorce 
process may ... lead to more disputes and higher costs without improving the 
fairness of outcomes", lawyers may also facilitate negotiation by minimising 
disputes, discovering outcomes preferable to both parties and increasing 
opportunities for resolution outside of court while ensuring that outcomes 
reflect legal norms. McEwen et al (1994:182, 183) also describe a process in 
which lawyers strengthen but do not overcome informal divorce mediation from 
their research in Maine: 
Through joint lawyer-client participation in mediation, lawyers 
believe that they can take a strong role in drafting agreements on 
issues with legal ramifications such as division of pension benefits, 
while clients can with lawyer assistance address non legal issues 
such as setting visitation schedules and dividing personal property 
... As described by Maine lawyers, divorce mediation is a process 
that contrasts markedly with the model assumed by much of the 
commentary. Rather than being an alternative to litigation, 
mediation draws in divorce cases which are among the most heavily 
litigated. Rather than demanding that "legal rights fade into the 
shadow of informality", mediation makes legal rules and rights a 
key reference point through the participation of lawyers . . . And 
rather than leaving parties unassisted in the face of pressures from 
mediators and stronger parties, mediation interposes lawyers as 
advisors. 
The aim is to accomplish a pyramid of access to justice strategies for each 
organisation that looks something like Figure 4.3 in the previous chapter (p 93) 
where formal law goes down the pyramid to facilitate and oversee informal 
justice so that problems of oppression and domination are weeded out. 
Indigenous ordering goes up the pyramid so that people are developing for 
themselves an increasing number of options to resolve their own disputes 
meaningfully. The goal is to encourage and support informal justice without 
allowing legal culture to become impotent. It is better to have robust mutual 
influence of strong legal culture and strong indigenous ordering in preference to 
both being weak, or one being so weak as to be neutralised by the other. Fisse 
and Braithwaite (1993:176) resolve the conflict by suggesting that informal 
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justice should be required to comply with "a set of very basic due process 
rights" under the oversight of law and "a meta-right to participatory process 
for the formulation of other less basic due process safeguards" should be 
provided. Edelman et al (1993:531) concluded from their study of the 
implementation of EEO and AA principles within organisations that basic legal 
norms might infuse and change organisational cultures, but that management 
practices and indigenous orderings will always affect and change their 
implementation: 
Even in its peripheral role, law gradually modifies managerial norms 
and discourse; although organizations do not adopt formal legal 
standards for discerning discrimination, civil rights law has 
solidified managers' attention to fairness and consistency in 
organisational governance. But at the same time the infusion of 
organisation values in internal dispute resolution produces a 
transformation of civil rights in the workplace. As courts review 
and (in some cases) legitimate organizational actions and the results 
of dispute handling, the symbolic structures that employers create to 
demonstrate compliance become the vehicles for the infusion of 
organizational norms and values into law. Thus, once in the 
organizational realm, law cannot contain its own appropriation; 
rather it is shaped and reshaped by management ideology and 
discourse. ( emphasis added) 
Where organisational adoption of legal norms is influenced purely by the 
dominating indigenous orderings of management, justice may not be done. 
Where legal norms also provide a set of due process and participatory norms 
which management must meet, the conditions are set for creating internal 
processes which meet the needs of the citizens who have helped to create them. 
Such mutual interpenetration up and down the pyramid helps to create a 
culture of access to justice in which lawyers, consumer complaints 
professionals, industrial relations professionals, unions, womens' networks and 
consumer groups all contribute relevant voices. Best practice in access to justice 
policies will include strategies for involving law and lawyers in oversight of the 
delivery of informal justice without allowing them to co-opt the process. 
VII. Conclusion 
This chapter has explored one path to modestly improving citizens' access to 
justice by simultaneously (i) moving responsibility for creating and financing a 
large proportion of day-by-day justice options from the state to the 
organisations in which they occur, and (ii) using law to facilitate the doing of 
justice by non-legal institutional orderings. This suggested fifth wave is just one 
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possibility for constituting pyramids of justice options which broaden access 
beyond lawyers' justice and put legal justice, non-legal justice and political 
action into complementary relationship with one another. 
Requiring private and public organisations above a certain size to develop their 
own access to justice policies may seem to divert the justice agenda from the 
more crucial and expensive task of improving the court system, legal aid and 
the accessibility of lawyers' justice. While increasing access to law may appear 
an attractive route to justice, the lesson of Chapter Four was that it is more 
effective to improve the integration of legal justice with other forms of justice, so 
that indigenous orderings become more just. This chapter has suggested that 
focusing such a strategy on large organisations will not only improve citizens' 
prospects for justice in many day-by-day situations, it will also free up state 
resources to focus on improving justice in settings which need priority such as 
the family. 
Together Chapters Three, Four and Five present a vision of an access to justice 
agenda which is broader than traditionally conceived, one in which lawyers' 
justice is crucial but not dominant, facilitative not overwhelming. This chapter 
began with a discussion of the way lawyers' colonisation of access to justice 
pyramids impoverishes efforts to reform justice, and finished by advocating the 
usefulness of a legal culture which shapes and is in turn constrained by 
indigenous orderings. No matter how much we emphasise the role of 
alternatives to law in delivering justice, lawyers and the culture of legalism they 
carry will continue to be crucially important to citizens' ability to access justice. 
It is only within the context of the broad access to justice agenda outlined in 
this Part that we can begin to understand and evaluate the complaints people 
make about lawyers' conduct, and arguments about how they ought to be 
regulated, reformed or organised. In Chapter Two we saw that people complain 
when lawyers do too little justice. This chapter suggested that lawyers can also 
provide too much law. A fifth wave strategy of access to justice reform, such 
as the one suggested here, helps to solve the problem of overpowering legalism 
by nurturing indigenous justice orderings and alternative justice 
professionalisms within powerful institutions. 
A crucial question remains. How can we ensure that lawyers fulfil their role in a 
broad access to justice agenda well, that they continue to carry the values of 
legal culture which facilitate the justice of indigenous ordering and that they 
serve clients and communities conscientiously when informal justice fails and 
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the justice of law is necessary? Having established a context for the reform of 
lawyers' justice in Part One of this thesis, Part Two turns to policy for the 
regulation of the legal profession. 
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CHAPTER6 
The Ethics of Justice 
I. The Justice and the Injustice of Lawyers 
Part One of this thesis argued that when lawyers do wrong in community and 
client eyes, it is because they have hindered the operation of the justice system 
and people's access to it. We saw in Chapter Two that (1) when lawyers 
provide clients (or potential clients) expensive or bad service, they inhibit their 
access to justice; (2) when lawyers help clients manipulate the legal system and 
dominate others, they retard the justice that the legal system offers; and, (3) 
despite official claims about the effectiveness of professional associations in 
shaping a legal profession oriented towards serving the public, lawyers often 
fail to do justice to each other within their own organisations. Examination of 
normative and institutional aspects of access to justice in Chapters Three to Five 
added a fourth item to this list of potential injustices and dominations-( 4) 
that lawyers often fail to recognise or nurture the breadth of ways in which 
citizens can claim justice, and instead over-promote narrow legalism. 
While the community sees the legal profession's pathologies in terms of specific 
complaints of over-charging, differential quality of service, and the distortion of 
justice, the most serious potential pathology of the legal profession is its failure 
to comprehend its role in a broader access to justice agenda. The primary 
significance of the legal profession for access to justice lies not in how well or 
badly they perform the technical task of providing legal services to a range of 
citizens, but in the culture or ideology of justice they carry and support. It may 
be so narrow that it colonises and corrupts non-legal forms of justice, denying 
the breadth of processes by which citizens may gain access to justice. It may be 
so unfocused that lawyers are not sufficiently inspired to do their job of 
providing access for all citizens. 
Chapters Three to Five established the broad contours of an access to justice 
agenda grounded in theory and evidence which puts citizens and justice-not 
lawyers-first. Part Two of this thesis considers how lawyers might be 
regulated and organise themselves to contribute to the practice of justice. 
Lawyers are right if they disclaim full responsibility for access to justice. We 
have seen that lawyering is not and should not be the centre of access to justice 
practices and institutions. But they are wrong if they disclaim responsibility for 
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helping people gain access to the justice of law, which facilitates, complements 
and oversees other means of justice. In fact lawyers will frequently either assist 
or hinder citizens in their attempts to achieve justice. The regulation and 
organisation of the legal profession should be aimed at ensuring lawyerly 
practices and institutions assist in access to justice and do not inhibit it. 
Despite their serious potential for domination and injustice, lawyers do not lack 
aspirations towards assisting in the achievement of access to justice. This 
chapter argues that lawyers do have normative traditions (and ideologies) that 
teach them to play a part in justice and describe what that part is. The ethical 
traditions of the profession can be read as a statement of what the lawyer's role 
in facilitating access to justice ought to be, and as such can provide the basic set 
of norms at which institutions of the profession might be aimed. Section II 
presents lawyers' claims that their ethical self-regulation accomplishes the 
institutionalisation of four main ethical ideals. Sections III to VI discuss and 
reconstruct these ethical ideals, indicating how each can address one of the four 
lawyer dominations or injustices identified in the first part of this thesis. 
Section VII concludes by reconsidering the idea that a self-regulating 
professional community can constitute these ideals, a notion that will be 
examined rigorously in the following chapters. 
II. The Ethics of Lawyers 
The traditional regulation of the legal profession in common law countries has 
been ethical self-regulation. This derives most directly from the practice of 
English barristers who, from at least the end of the 15th century, were self-
regulated by Inns of Court with their strict three-tiered hierarchies consisting of 
students, utter (ie outer) barristers and benchers (who governed the Inns) 
(Pound 1953:82££).1 There were four great Inns of common law and they were 
like societies or guilds with powers of education, discipline and government 
over their members who would live together in the Inn. 2 The courts accepted as 
1 The most senior category were the serjeants. Upon being made a serjeant, a barrister 
would leave his Inn and join the Serjeants' Inn. Judges were appointed from among the 
serjeants and serjeants had the monopoly of practise in the court of common pleas the 
principal common law court which did not go travelling but always sat at 
Westminster (Disney et al 1986:6). The serjeants eventually lost their monopoly and 
disappeared when the court of common pleas was opened to all barristers and the rank 
of Kings Counsel was created. 
2 As Pue (1987a, 1987b, 1990a) shows, the benchers did not exercise disciplinary 
powers from the beginning, but developed such powers through a series of particular 
historical events. However it is true to say that the Inns were self-regulating 
communities, even before disciplinary powers became formalised. 
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qualified those apprentices who made it from student to outer barrister 
according to the government of the Inn. 
The attorneys who practised at law and the solicitors who practised . in 
chancery were the two precursors to modem solicitors.3 While barristers were 
admitted to practice and regulated by the Inns of Court (with the tacit 
acceptance of the judges), attorneys were admitted by the judges directly from 
the beginning of the 15th century and regulated by the judges as "officers of the 
court" (Holdsworth 1937a:504-505).4 The attorneys at law and solicitors in 
chancery were neither self-organised nor self-regulated from the 15th until 
almost the middle of the 19th centuries (Pound 1953:86), and the Inns did not 
allow attorney members from the middle of the 16th century (Holdsworth 
1937b:441ff). According to Holdsworth (1937b:442-443) the courts also found 
it difficult to effectively regulate the attorneys. This gave attorneys and 
solicitors a considerably worse public reputation for good conduct than 
barristers. 
It is for this reason, according to Holdsworth (1937b:443) that the "Society of 
Gentlemen Practitioners in the Courts of Law and Equity" was formed in the 
18th century, and was eventually followed by the Incorporated Law Society 
which was formed in the 19th century in an attempt to emulate the success of 
the Inns of Court at inculcating common standards of professional conduct and 
ethics. The judges' powers over attorneys and solicitors had been limited by the 
fact that there was no mechanism for securing compliance with rules of conduct 
prescribed by the judges or to initiate proceedings for breach, and it was these 
functions that the Society managed to take on in the 1870s, as well as 
3 Disney et al suggest (1986:5) that the first evidence of the emergence of professional 
lawyers in England was in the 13th century when pleaders and attorneys could be 
distinguished. Pleaders correspond very roughly to modem barristers and assisted 
persons in court, perhaps even speaking for them. However their clients were not 
bound by what they said. Attorneys were the precursors of modem solicitors and acted 
as agents for clients in litigation. Later they gave legal advice, drew up legal 
documents and probably managed other affairs for their clients (Disney et al 1986:9). 
4 In 1403 "provision was made for the exclusion of ignorant attorneys. They were to be 
examined by the judges, and those whom the judges admitted were to be enrolled. The 
judges were also to have the power to remove them" (Holdsworth 1937a:504-505). 
During the 17th century the courts began to require that attorneys and solicitors prove 
their qualification before being admitted and "what was done was to require of 
candidates that they should have been engaged for a specified period in some 
occupation in or about the court which would ensure that they had received some 
practical training" (Carr-Saunders & Wilson 1933:43). This was later endorsed in 
legislation which also had the effect of fusing the categories of attorney and solicitor 
(although formally this did not occur until the 1873 Judicature Act reforms fused law 
and equity). Legislation in 1729 required that candidates be articled to an attorney or 
solicitor for five years before being admitted to practice. 
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establishing scales of costs, qualifications for practice and a college for the 
education and examination of articled clerks (Disney et al 1986:19, Carr-
Saunders & Wilson 1933:46). 
As Abel-Smith and Stevens (1967:187) show, the effect if not the motivation for 
the Law Society's activity was the social elevation of solicitors: "It advanced 
the interests of the profession not only by the vigilant pursuit of unqualified 
persons, but by tackling the problem of enrolled solicitors whose shady and 
unethical practices damaged the reputation of all solicitors." By 1888, the 
Solicitors Act gave its disciplinary committee the power to hear disciplinary 
matters and either dismiss them or pursue them in the courts. In 1919 an Act 
was passed giving the Society's disciplinary committee the power to exercise all 
the disciplinary powers over solicitors previously exercised by the court. The 
Solicitors Act of 1933 gave the Law Society power to make rules about keeping 
separate accounts for clients, and also to make rules about any other matter of 
professional practice, conduct and discipline of solicitors. By now the "junior 
branch of the legal profession had obtained by legislation almost the same 
measure of self-government as the senior branch had always had without it" 
and certainly more than any other profession (Abel-Smith & Stevens 
1967:192).5 
In Australia, very similar models of regulation of solicitors and barristers were 
adopted as the professions in each of the colonies became large enough to 
warrant organisation and regulation (Dal Pont 1996:455-496, Disney et al 
1986:37-38, Weisbrot 1990:164-171). Thus until the reforms of the 1990s 
(which will be discussed in Chapter Seven), the law societies promulgated and 
enforced standards of professional conduct, investigated and prosecuted 
complaints, and provided the disciplinary tribunals to hear charges. They also 
5 At the same time the regulation of the bar was (slightly) modernised. After the 
Judicature Act reforms of 1873 younger barristers began to pressure for a more 
democratic bar council covering all the Inns and with more equitable representation 
including QC' s, barristers of more than ten years standing and barristers of less than 
ten years (Abel-Smith & Stevens 1967:212). In 1894 an overall Bar Council was given 
the functions of "the consideration of all matters affecting the profession, including 
the maintenance of the rights and privileges of the Bar, the enforcement of 
professional discipline and custom, the examination of proposed legislation and of the 
rules of practice from time to time in force" (Abel-Smith & Stevens 1967:218; see also 
Comish & Clark 1989:109). This was purely a consultative and lobbying role in 
relation to government. Eventually the Council gained considerable moral and 
advisory authority in matters of professional conduct and etiquette, although the 
responsibility to discipline individual barristers remained within the government of 
the Inns. By making ethical rulings the Bar Council made discipline much more 
consistent across the Inns. But as Abel-Smith and Stevens (1967:219) comment, its 
major importance was in cementing the restrictive practices of the bar. 
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decided on qualifications for admission, issued practising certificates, policed 
compliance with trust account rules and administered fidelity funds and 
insurance schemes (Disney et al 1986:38). As for barristers, in most states the 
Supreme Courts officially exercise regulatory authority over barristers, but in 
practice they have left day-to-day discipline and decisions on qualifications for 
admission to the Bar Associations, so that the intervention of the court is only 
necessary when the Bar Association wants to use the formal sanctions of 
disbarment or suspension from practice. 
In the US, the courts have claimed the inherent power to regulate the legal 
profession because of constitutional provisions about the separation of powers 
(Rhode 1994:42-45). But in exercising these powers the courts have often 
delegated authority to state bar associations. In about two thirds of the states 
lawyers must belong to the state bar association as a condition of practice. In 
some states the bar associations control all the processes of regulation with 
some judicial supervision, and in others court-supervised boards staffed mainly 
by lawyers are responsible for professional regulation. The American Bar 
Association has taken responsibility for drafting codes of professional conduct 
and these are generally adopted with or without modifications by state 
supreme courts, usually on the advice of the state bar associations (see Hazard 
& Rhode 1985). 
An important support for the profession's attempts to elevate its own status 
and to preserve its self-government has been the creation and enforcement of a 
set of ethics that can address public concerns about the role of lawyers in the 
justice system. Thus the self-regulatory tradition has spawned a group of 
ethical ideals which have attempted to articulate (both to the public and to 
themselves) a conception of what it is that lawyers do and how they should do 
it. 
Writers like Abel (1981b) argue that the promulgation of ethical rules do not 
promote ethical conduct but serve the latent function of furthering professional 
market control and the symbolic function of legitimation-they "create a myth 
about what lawyers might be in order to disguise what they are" (Abel 
198lb:668). This need not mean that rhetoric and traditions arising out of the 
struggle to achieve and maintain self-regulation are worthless. Ideals and norms 
developed by the profession to appeal to public sensibilities can be 
appropriated to a theory of the regulation of the legal profession regardless of 
whether they have actually been implemented in practice. (Nevertheless Chapter 
Eight will argue that the ideology and culture of the profession are more 
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ambiguous than Abel recognises.) Indeed such norms can be a more powerful 
tool of persuasion and change than norms imposed from the outside because 
they carry the power of self-critique. 
In contrast to Abel, many commentators from within the profession itself look 
nostalgically back to a past age in which certain ethical ideals were accepted 
and practised. Two recent books by prominent US law professors adopt this 
perspective (Kronman 1993, Glendon 1994), and it can be frequently found in 
the speeches of older judges and professional patriarchs (eg Santow 1994). A 
realistic look at the history of self-regulation suggests that there never was an 
idyllic age in which lawyers held ideals they are now losing. Now and in the 
past ethics have been a matter of struggle, conflict and public rhetoric (Pue 
1995). Ethical norms are likely to be as relevant (and irrelevant) now as they 
ever were. 
What then are the ideals of lawyering that the tradition of self-regulation has 
claimed to nurture and institutionalise? Four basic ethics or conceptions of 
what it is that lawyers ought to do can be discovered in lawyers' ethical debate, 
research, treatises and codes. These four themes are interwoven and often seen 
as complementary, although one or other may be emphasised or de-emphasised 
in particular writings: 
(1) The ideal of devoted service to clients in a legal system where citizens 
need advice and representation to use the legal system (the advocacy ideal). 
(2) The ideal of fidelity to law and justice if the system is not to be 
sabotaged by clients who will pay a lawyer to do anything ( the gatekeeper 
ideal). 
(3) An ideal of willingness to work for people and causes who are usually 
excluded by the legal system (the public service ideal). 
( 4) The ideal of courtesy, collegiality and mutual self-regulation amongst 
members of the profession (the ideal of collegiality). 
These four basic traditions or ideals can be found in most treatments of legal 
ethics. For example, Croft's (1982) description of the English ideology of 
lawyering which he argues was easily transplanted to early republican America 
included: 
an overriding commitment to public service (with compensation as a 
byproduct), a duty, as an "officer of the court," to the judicial 
system and to the institution of law itself, a strong fiduciary and 
agency relationship with clients, and a professional relationship 
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with colleagues marked by fair play, collegiality and candor. 
(1992: 1281-1282) 
Croft's summary covers (in order) the public interest ideal, the gatekeeper ideal, 
the advocacy ideal and the ideal of collegiality. The American Bar 
Association's 1983 Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Morgan & Rotunda 
1993:1-142) include rules to ensure (1) that lawyers zealously serve and 
represent their clients (the advocacy ideal), (2) that they show candor to 
tribunals, fairness to opposing parties and are allowed to reveal information to 
prevent a client committing a criminal act (the gatekeeper ideal), (3) rules 
regulating the way public service is given and encouraging lawyers to do pro 
bono work (the public service ideal) and (4) rules governing relationships 
between lawyers within firms and upholding the integrity of the profession as a 
whole by reporting misconduct (the ideal of collegiality). The code of conduct 
developed by the Comite Consultatif des Barreaux Europeens, a consultative 
body linking all the legal professional associations of the European Community, 
recognises that lawyers have duties (1) to serve clients, (2) to remain 
independent enough to not derogate from standards of professionalism and 
justice to please clients, courts or third parties, and (3) to maintain the 
corporate spirit of the profession (Godfrey 1995:269-295). It does not contain 
an encouragement to voluntary public service. 
Ethics textbooks from North America, Australia and Britain also tend to 
propagate the same sets of traditions, but concentrate on duties to clients (the 
advocacy ideal), with some material on duties to uphold the integrity of the 
legal system (the gatekeeper ideal) and to a lesser extent duties to maintain 
collegiality within the profession and to engage in public interest work (eg 
Bayles 1989, Disney et al 1986, Dal Pont 1996, Drinker 1980, Inns of Court 
School of Law 1989, Rhode 1994, Ross 1995). A number of recent books by 
academics and practitioners on the ethics of the legal profession seek to remedy 
a perceived lack of emphasis in contemporary discourse on the independence of 
lawyers, especially their need to remain independent of clients so that the 
gatekeeper ideal can be fulfilled (Glendon 1994, Gordon 1988, 1990, Kronman 
1993, Luban 1988, Linowitz 1994), and the need of lawyers to do more pro 
bono work and take the public interest ideal more seriously (Galanter & Palay 
1995b, Katzmann 1995a, Lopez 1992, Stover 1989). 
It seems that these four broad categories of ethical ideals command at least 
some agreement among the profession about what it is that lawyers ought to do. 
While each has been criticised, they have enough historical sway and 
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contemporary resonance to be used to anchor debate on the role of the legal 
profession. Sections III to VI outline the meaning of each of these ethics, the 
ways in which they can be criticised as misguided or incomplete, and a 
reconstruction of the ideals for the contemporary role of lawyers in access to 
justice. 
III. Advocacy Ideal 
(i) The Ethic of Zealous Advocacy 
The "Liberal Advocacy Ideal" (Gordon 1988:10) is the predominant conception 
of what lawyers' role and ethics ought to be in most common law countries. It 
emphasises a duty of zealous advocacy to advance client's ends and relies on 
the principle that the lawyer is not morally responsible for the client's cause, but 
must act as his or her agent in aggressively advancing it, regardless of the 
lawyer's own opinion (Luban 1994:xiv). It is most obviously based on the role 
of trial lawyers, especially criminal defence advocates who must vigorously 
assert the rights of the accused against the superior power and resources of the 
state. But it is applied equally to all situations in which a lawyer represents 
and acts for a client in court, negotiations or for any other purpose. 
Lord Brougham's 1820 defence of Queen Caroline before the House of Lords is 
a favourite example of the ideal in action. King George IV was trying to rid 
himself of Caroline by alleging that she had committed adultery, but it was well 
known that the King himself had been unfaithful. Lord Brougham implied that 
although he did not yet need to defend the Queen by attacking her husband, if 
such a defence did become necessary neither he nor, 
even the youngest member in the profession, would hesitate to resort 
to such a course and fearlessly perform his duty ... [A]n advocate, 
in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world, 
and that person is his client. To save that client by all means and 
expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and, 
amongst them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in 
performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the 
destruction which he may bring upon others. Separating the duty of 
a patriot from that of an advocate, he must go on reckless of 
consequences, though it should be his unhappy fate to involve his 
country in confusion. (quoted in Mellinkoff 1973:188-189) 
These words were controversial at the time they were stated (see Mellinkoff 
1973:189££), but are still used as inspiration for the advocacy ideal today 
(Alexander 1984:15, Pannick 1992:105). Numerous less exaggerated versions 
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of this argument can be found in the official and "after dinner" speeches of 
judges and leading members of the profession (eg Mason 1993:3). 
The advocacy ideal teaches that a lawyer has a supreme duty to serve his or her 
client by faithfully achieving the clients' goals. Because the lawyer rather than 
the client tends to become the effective participant in many legal matters (Sarat 
1986:547), it is crucial that lawyers do for their clients whatever the client 
would do for themselves. In the case of barristers it is taken as far as the "cab 
rank" rule which requires that a barrister take on and vigorously defend a brief 
in any area in which he or she practises if he or she is available and the client 
can pay (see Randel v Worsley [1967] 3 WLR 1666; Inns of Court School of Law 
1989:17). While solicitors have not had such an onerous duty to take on clients, 
once they do have a client they, like barristers, owe duties of loyalty, to pursue 
the clients' cases vigorously, to keep them fully informed, and to take 
instructions from the client (see Disney et al 1986:597-827). These duties to 
clients are limited only by the general requirements of the law: A lawyer must 
represent his or her client to the full extent of the law. 
Historically, the advocacy ideal was essentially liberal, motivating lawyers to 
pursue client interests primarily against the power of the state. In Australia, as 
in Britain, it was dependent on a conception of the rule of law which "places 
the courts between citizens and governments" (Neal 1991:67). The rule of law 
required not only courts and judges independent of the parliament and the 
executive (the separation of powers), but also lawyers independent of the state 
and available to help those who want to use the law to challenge or defend 
themselves against the government (Halliday & Karpik forthcoming). 6 The 
argument that the profession must be completely independent of government 
control so that individual lawyers are free to serve their clients' interests is 
raised whenever regulatory reforms to the legal profession are suggested. 7 In 
6 Indeed Halliday & Karpik (forthcoming) show how legal professions in different 
countries have historically been important in constituting the independence of the 
judiciary, the rule of law and hence the conditions of liberal democracy in Western 
countries. 
7 In recent debates in the state of Victoria over the Government's proposal to set up a 
Legal Practice Board to regulate the whole profession (both barristers and solicitors), 
solicitors frequently appealed to the need for the profession to remain "independent": 
Lawyers are not like accountants, plumbers or courts who are regulated by 
the Government. They have a crucial role in maintaining the rights of 
individuals vis a vis the state. If asked, we would all probably vote to 
protect the independence of judges, but as John Phillips, Chief Justice of 
Victoria, recently remarked "it is pointless having an independent 
judiciary without an independent legal profession. Judges are powerless 
to affirm and enforce citizens' rights unless independent lawyers present 
appropriate applications and furnish them with the material to do so ... 
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using this argument, lawyers are saying that structural independence from 
government is necessary to achieve the deeper good--empowerment of clients. 
The ideal is also extended beyond representing client interests against state 
interests to representing client interests against other private interests. For 
example Speiser (1993) sees the class action negligence lawyer as living out the 
American dream of earning a good living while enhancing justice by helping 
individual plaintiffs vindicate their rights against powerful and rich companies. 
(ii) Client Empowerment in the Contemporary Market 
The advocacy ideal encourages lawyers to advance access to justice by 
empowering those who need to use the law to organise their affairs, settle a 
dispute, defend themselves against the powers of the state or establish a right 
against some private interest. This counters the first injustice of which lawyers 
are capable, the fact that lawyers do not take their duty to vigorously pursue 
client interests seriously, but tend to dominate clients yVith expensive and bad 
services. 
It is sometimes suggested that ethics are irrelevant to the contemporary business 
orientation of the legal profession, yet the ethic of zealous advocacy is 
consistent with a market model of legal service delivery.8 According to both the 
advocacy ideal and the market ideal one can make money as a lawyer while 
also helping (paying) clients achieve access to justice by being devoted to their 
causes (Speiser 1993:13). 
Indeed a well functioning market assumes a strong advocacy ideal. Private 
contracts for justice services will be most efficient when the lawyer follows an 
advocacy ideal so that the client gets what he or she bargains and pays for. But 
the market will sometimes fail because clients lack bargaining power or 
knowledge. In those circumstances intervention may be justified to ensure that 
lawyers will still fulfil the advocacy ideal by giving good service. In practice, it 
is in low status and poorly paid areas such as criminal defence and welfare 
work, where people most need lawyers to empower them for access to justice, 
that the advocacy ideal of devoted service to clients is least likely to be 
followed (see pp 21-25 above). It is in these areas that implementation and 
While (the legal profession's) independence complements that of the 
judge, the ultimate beneficiary is the public ... The loss of the 
independence of the legal profession would add yet another nail in the 
coffin of the rule of law in Victoria. (Rayner 1995; see also Coffey 1995:7) 
8 Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine will argue in detail for a model of regulation of the 
legal profession that combines market mechanisms and ethical self-regulation. 
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regulation of the ethical norm of advocacy will be especially helpful 1n 
remedying market failures and improving people's access to justice. 
If the market model assumes a strong advocacy ideal, the advocacy ideal 
assumes a perfectly functioning market. The partisan nature of the advocacy 
ideal means that the market must function in such a way that both sides to any 
dispute can afford legal representation. If one side cannot afford services of the 
same quality as the other then their interests will not be taken into account and 
the "justice" the system gives will be skewed in favour of those who can afford 
it. Consider the fact that lawyers have used the advocacy ideal to justify 
themselves in helping clients evade tax or escape other liabilities (see below), 
even when the other side cannot afford what it takes to counterbalance their 
efforts. Even the state frequently spends less resources on legal services than 
wealthy individuals and companies who want to avoid tax or liability for white 
collar or company offences. The liberal advocacy ideal's assumption that 
everyone will have adequate access to legal services through the market is also 
compromised by the restrictive practices that lawyers have seen as another part 
of their traditions (see the discussion of the collegiality ideal below). When 
lawyers emphasise that they are in business, they also recognise that it is a good 
idea to abolish restrictive practices and find that this is not inconsistent with 
the liberal advocacy ideal. 
(iii) The Incompleteness of the Advocacy Ideal 
While the liberal advocacy ideal is clearly important and relevant for lawyers' 
practice, it is also unsatisfactory as a complete conception of the lawyer's role. 
As Gordon (1988:20) points out, the fact that the liberal advocacy ideal 
prescribes only the barest obligations to the legal framework is a recipe for 
sabotage. While the legal system works on the basis that people will generally 
internalise norms and comply voluntarily, under the advocacy ideal, 
[lawyers] are expected and even encouraged to exploit every 
loophole in the rules, take advantage of every one of their 
opponents' tactical mistakes or oversights, and stretch every legal or 
factual interpretation to favour their clients. The guiding premise of 
the entire system is that maintaining the integrity of rights-guarding 
procedures is more important than obtaining convictions or 
enforcing the substantive law against its violators. (Gordon 
1988:10) 
Some of the most notorious examples of lawyers helping to sabotage the legal 
framework in the interests of client advocacy have occurred in the area of tax 
evasion (see p 27 above). A notorious example was Sir Garfield Barwick's 
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approach as a barrister and as Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia. 
Marr (1980:227-228), Barwick's biographer, describes the Chief Justice's 
method: 
Barwick came to the subject [ of income tax disputes before the High 
Court] with an ideological determination which had not changed in 
the 25 years since he made his name attacking wartime security 
regulation. His approach to tax was much the same, and sprang 
from the same convictions: taxes were penalties imposed by the 
state which stood between citizens and their right to prosper from 
their enterprise. Tax laws could be construed in highly technical 
terms without regard for the purpose they were designed to serve. It 
was not a lawyer's concern if the state was left without wartime 
powers, nor was it a lawyer's worry that the rich might avoid 
contributing to the revenue. 
This approach is related to the fact that the advocacy ideal has assumed an 
essentially liberal world view, in which the state is the centre of coercion and 
domination in society, and it alone requires restraint. The advocacy ideal 
shares "the blindness of classical liberalism toward the domination and 
exploitation exercised by capital, including that which occurs through lawyers" 
(Abel 1981b:670). There has been little room for the idea that the power of the 
state and the law might make legitimate claims on a client, that people might 
have responsibilities as well as rights under the law, that a democratic state 
might "have a role as guarantor of freedom where liberty is most at peril from 
the actions of individuals or private institutions"(Weisbrot 1990:44-45). Its 
compatibility with the market underscores and exaggerates the potential 
problems of the ideal: The business model of the lawyer-client relationship is a 
private contract for services, in which the lawyer does what the client wants 
without regard to public considerations of justice or the public interest, as long 
as the law is not broken. Unfortunately the access to justice movement's 
criticisms of the legal system suggest this is not always a sound assumption. 
The fact the advocacy ideal prescribes devoted service to clients' ends, 
whatever they may be, is problematic where the market functions so that the 
rich can buy up most legal services. It is also problematic when it creates a 
culture in which good advocacy means a culture of excessive adversarialism 
that raises the costs and length of litigation making it more and more 
unaffordable (S. Parker 1996).9 The advocacy ideal needs to be limited in what 
it motivates lawyers to do for well paying clients. This is the role of the second 
ideal, the gatekeeper ideal. 
9 Stephen Parker's research suggests that family lawyers engage in a variety of 
adversarial practices that unnecessarily lengthen and complicate the resolution of 
disputes. 
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IV. Gatekeeper Ideal 
(i) The Gatekeeper Ideal 
Ethics of Justice 
The "regulatory" (Simon 1988) or gatekeeper ideal balances the advocacy ideal. 
While the advocacy ideal emphasises the lawyers' duty to pursue client goals 
and interests vigorously, the gatekeeper ideal emphasises the lawyer's duty to 
maintain the justice and integrity of the legal system even against client 
interests. It comes from the ethical tradition of duty to the court, the law and 
considerations of justice. It sees the lawyer as contributing to the effectiveness 
and enforcement of substantive law and forbids him or her using loopholes and 
procedural rules to frustrate the substance and spirit of the law. It requires 
lawyers to transmit information about the law in such a way that the client 
makes a responsible decision, rather than one that manipulates the law in the 
interests of the clients' goals (Simon 1988:1086). 
It is beyond contention that no matter how much it may be in the interests of his 
or her client, a lawyer must not break the law to further a client's case. If a 
lawyer knowingly assists or advises a client in breaking the law then the lawyer 
will be liable for the breach like any accomplice or co-conspirator. In some 
cases the lawyer may even become a "criminal entrepreneur"-the architect of 
an illegal course of action, such as an illegal scheme to evade tax. In the US 
lawyers and accountants have been convicted of complicity in fraud (Haynes 
1983:48-49, 53) and the courts in Australia have also indicated that they 
would be willing to find a lawyer guilty in such circumstances.10 There are also 
a variety of ethical rules designed to ensure that lawyers do not abuse the court 
process on behalf of their clients-including rules against misleading the court, 
going back on undertakings to the court, bringing vexatious or frivolous cases 
and intimidating or insulting witnesses (Disney et al 1986:831-936). Therefore, 
at the least, it can be said that a lawyer has an over-riding duty to obey the law 
and maintain the court system. However the gatekeeper ethic goes further than 
that-it suggests that lawyers have some sort of duty to justice, to the integrity 
of the law. 
10 Skewes v Veen Huizen (1978) 22 ALR 101 at 114; O'Donovan v Vereher and Or 
(1987) 76 ALR 97; Ahern v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 87. Lawyers have been struck off 
the roll in such circumstances even where the evidence against them does not quite 
amount to criminal complicity: Prothonotary of Sup Ct of NSW v Costello (1984) 3 
NSWLR 201. 
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Lord Brougham's statements extolling the ideology of advocacy were still 
controversial forty-four years later when Brougham restated his belief in what 
he had said. The Law Times reported a speech in which he praised a French 
advocate, M. Berryer and the great English advocate, Erskine. Lord Chief 
Justice Cockburn spoke on the same occasion and at the conclusion of his 
speech he tried to balance Lord Brougham's view of advocacy by reference to 
the duty of lawyers to uphold the integrity of legal justice: 
Much as I admire the great abilities of M. Berryer, to my mind his 
crowning virtue-as it ought to be that of every advocate-is, that 
he has throughout his career conducted his cases with untarnished 
honour. The arms which an advocate wields he ought to use as a 
warrior, not as an assassin. He ought to uphold the interests of his 
clients per fas [through what is lawful], but not per nefas [through 
what is criminal]. He ought to know how to reconcile the interests 
of his client with the eternal interests of truth and justice. (Quoted 
by Mellinkoff 1973:215) 
According to this ideal not only is it desirable for lawyers to be independent of 
the state, but also to show some autonomy from clients and powerful private 
interests (Gordon 1988:13). This conception of independence has been 
discussed in the US more than in Commonwealth countries (Gordon 1980, 
1985, 1988, Linowitz 1994), perhaps because, as writers like Gordon have 
shown, it fits well with America's republican heritage. Thus Gordon (1988:14) 
refers to Louis Brandeis and other lawyers "nourished on the political theory of 
Montesquieu" as exemplars of the idea of a regulatory ideal as a constraint on 
the advocacy ideal: 
Lawyers were to be the guardians, in the face of threats posed by 
transitory political and economic powers, of the long-term values of 
legalism. Performing their positive functions entails the assumption 
of a special responsibility beyond that of ordinary citizens. They 
are to repair defects in the framework of legality, to serve as a 
policy intelligentsia, recommending improvements in the law to 
adapt it to changing conditions, and to use the authority and 
influence deriving from their public prominence and professional 
skill to create and disseminate, both within and without the context 
of advising clients, a culture of respect for and compliance with the 
purposes of the laws. 
So Brandeis invented "public interest" law to complement his commercial 
practice. Similarly, according to Gordon (1985 Lecture One:18), many of the 
founders of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York were railroad 
lawyers disillusioned with the commercial task of exploring loopholes in 
legislation enacted for public purposes. They go together to define their role 
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and "cartelise practice standards" to "reclaim law-making institutions from 
corruption by special interests and to strengthen the capacity of the profession 
to supervise neutral rights-definition and impartial administration" (Gordon 
1985 Lecture Two:l). 
The ideal also exists in Britain and Australia (Dal Pont 1996:384-396, Disney 
et al 1986:918-936, Nosworthy 1995, Pannick 1992:105-106). According to 
this tradition it is not the lawyer's role to help his or her clients carry out 
socially pernicious schemes, but to help them access legal services in a way that 
also upholds justice-to achieve their goals and enforce their rights, as well as 
perform their duties under law as it is written and in its spirit. It has been 
called the "regulatory" ideal because lawyers are given a role in helping (or at 
least not hindering) the state (or more precisely the rule of law) to regulate 
clients. It can also be named the "gatekeeper" ideal because it gives lawyers the 
role of guarding the integrity of the legal system by seeking to ensure that clients 
do not abuse the law. As Nelson (1988:234) argues, such an ideal is necessary 
if the law is to work at all in regulating powerful actors; "If lawyers do not 
moderate their [corporate] clients' tendency to extract the maximum advantage 
from the legal system, we can expect legal outcomes to become increasingly 
skewed in favour of resourceful parties, thus undermining the legitimacy of legal 
institutions.'' 
(ii) The Practical Relevance of the Gatekeeper Ideal 
The gatekeeper ideal clearly addresses the problem of lawyers helping clients to 
escape, manipulate or abuse the legal system. Yet emphasising the gatekeeper 
ideal puts lawyers in danger of simply becoming governments' "yes men and 
women", and not adequately serving clients' goals and interests. Probably for 
this reason there is no strong tradition in Anglo-American legal systems which 
emphasises the gatekeeper ideal of duty to legal justice without also 
emphasising the advocacy ideal of duty to client. This is as is it should be. The 
two ideals are clearly complementary. 
The tradition which sees both ideals as important sees law as a "public 
profession" in which lawyers have a mediating function, between the client and 
the law (Gordon 1988, 1990, Kagan & Rosen 1985, Luban 1987:11, 1988, 
Parsons 1954a). Lawyers represent clients' interests to judges and law-makers, 
and help reform the law to cope with the realities of which clients are aware. 
They communicate the justice of law to clients by counselling clients against 
socially pernicious schemes that subvert the rule of law. At the same time they 
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help clients who wish to take a stand against laws which they view as unjust 
for public-regarding reasons. 11 
While writers like Gordon (1985, 1988, 1990) and Luban (1987, 1988) refer to a 
past age in which American lawyers like Louis Brandeis exemplified the 
practice of law as a public profession, their conception is also relevant to the 
modem corporate lawyer in the current era of increased concern with corporate 
regulation via enforced self-regulation and corporate compliance programs 
(Ayres & Braithwaite 1992, Sigler & Murphy 1988). 12 Particularly as the 
practice of preventive law becomes more significant in constructing corporate 
citizenship, the combination of the regulatory ideal with the advocacy ideal is 
also of significance. 13 Thus in their book on "interactive corporate compliance" 
Sigler and Murphy (1988:95-96) write, 
The tasks of corporate lawyers are changing from those of reacting 
and responding to outside pressures to the construction of plans for 
preventive maintenance. These new tasks involve corporate lawyers 
in weighing whether the firm is under or over-complying with laws 
and regulations. But it also means that corporate lawyers will 
increasingly serve as educators of the corporation, as monitors and 
auditors of corporate activities, and as lines of communication 
between regulators and the firm. The American private enterprise 
system and the American corporation have had social 
responsibilities thrust upon them. The corporate lawyer must serve 
as translator (not merely as advocate) of those public 
responsibilities and also convey to government the point of view of 
his corporation regarding those responsibilities. 
Nelson's sample from four large law firms suggests that, at least in the US, large 
firm corporate lawyers do adhere to a broad conception of their role as 
involving gatekeeper as well as advocacy responsibilities: "More than three-
quarters of the sample (76 percent) responded that it was appropriate to act as 
the conscience of a client when the opportunity presented itself-a consensus 
that did not vary by age, firm, or field of practice", although they were not good 
at putting it into practice (Nelson 1988:255). 14 
11 There is a big difference between this and seeking privately to corrupt just laws for 
self-seeking purposes. 
12 Such an ethic will also be important in the sort of access to justice regime described 
in the previous chapter where lawyers have an important facilitative role in helping 
large organisations develop and improve their own justice systems. 
13 There is a growing literature on the practice of preventive law (Brown 1986, Brown 
& Kandel 1995, Fisse 1989), and on the importance of lawyers and auditors as 
gatekeepers in helping corporations comply with their legal and social 
responsibilities (Halliday & Carruthers 1996, Kraakman 1985, Wilkins 1993). 
14 See Nelson (1988:235) for his defence of why his sample is useful even though it 
only comes from four firms. 
147 
Chapter 6 Ethics of Justice 
Keeping the two ideals together could deal with many of the objections to the 
liberal advocacy ideal, while affirming its general desirability as the first duty of 
lawyers. Perhaps the liberal advocacy ideal should be more emphasised where 
lawyers serve ordinary people in order to combat the problem of lawyer 
domination of clients, but the gatekeeper ideal should be more emphasised to 
those serving powerful private interests. 15 The existence of a gatekeeper ethic is 
also essential in a competitive market for legal services in order to preserve the 
integrity of the legal system against the temptation to "buy" injustice under the 
guise of buying justice. Since the market will always be such that some people 
will be able to buy more than others, there must be some limits to what they can 
buy. An ethical and regulatory system that delivers lawyers who can say no to 
those who are prepared to use their economic power to compromise the 
integrity of the justice system is necessary for access to justice. This need not 
mean lawyers who self-righteously force rigid interpretations of the law on 
unwilling clients. As Gordon (1990:277) argues, it means lawyers who 
creatively combine technical skill, a lively sense of social responsibility and the 
vigorous pursuit of clients' interests; lawyers who do not demand "dumb, literal 
obedience to every rule but creative forms of compliance that, although aiming 
to minimise cost and disruption to the company, effectively still realise the 
regulation's basic purposes"_ 16 
V. Public Interest Ideal 
(i) The Public Interest Ideal 
The public interest ideal has traditionally enriched the basic conceptions of the 
lawyer's work-a-day role provided by the advocacy and gatekeeper ideals. It is 
a tradition of active citizenship by lawyers to solve the problems in access to 
justice that simply doing their duty by clients and the legal system leaves 
15 However the tradition of the gatekeeper ideal must be carefully handled. The 
liberal advocacy ideal and the gatekeeper ideal have often been used together 
negatively to say that lawyers should be absolutely independent from everyone 
( clients, communities and governments), rather than to affirm that they owe positive 
duties to both their clients and the law. This rhetoric has been used by barristers to 
justify their arrogant detachment from clients as well as their independence from 
government. It has also been used by judges to say that they ought not listen to concerns 
about gender and racial bias and other community values (see Wilkins 1992 for a 
general discussion of the way lawyers use independence arguments and their 
validity). 
16 See also Shaffer & Cochran (1994) for a theory of lawyer-client relations that 
might instantiate this ideal. 
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untouched. It encourages lawyers to have their own convictions about what 
would be justice and to seek out ways to act out those convictions as lawyers. 
At an extreme this might mean JI cause lawyering" where lawyers seek out those 
whose interests they wish to represent. The predominant outworking of the 
public interest ideal has been giving up time to do voluntary work for the 
poor .17 The American Bar Association's 1983 Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct states that, JI A lawyer should render public interest legal service" 
(Rule 6.1, Morgan & Rotunda 1993:84). In 1993 this rule was amended to say 
that every lawyer should aspire to devote fifty hours a year to pro bono service 
(Galanter & Palay 1995b:197). The duty can be discharged by, 
providing professional services at no fee or reduced fee to persons 
of limited means or to public service or charitable groups or 
organisations, by service in activities for improving the law, the legal 
system or the legal profession, and by financial support for 
organisations that provide legal services to persons of limited 
means. (Morgan & Rotunda 1993:84) 
Some have seriously hoped that this ideal might support rules setting mandatory 
pro bono requirements (see Luban 1988, Eldred & Schoenherr 1993-1994), and 
several (voluntary) local bar associations in the US have indeed imposed pro 
bono requirements as a condition of membership (Galanter & Palay 1995b:197). 
Doing legal aid work for a reduced fee and becoming involved in the community 
legal centre movement have been more common instances of the public interest 
ideal in action in Australia and Britain. 
It seems likely that many lawyers hold a latent belief in the value of public 
interest work, even if they do not act on it. Studies of law students and their 
-socialisation show that many students as they enter law school have strong 
commitments to using law to achieve goals of justice, social change and public 
interest-ideals which they continue to hold even after their commitment to 
pursue them actively is dissipated by law school socialisation and the allure of 
corporate practice (Goldsmith 1995, Granfield 1992, Stover 1989). 
Eldred and Schoenherr (1993-1994:369) articulate the notion of noblesse oblige 
that lies behind many lawyers' acceptance of the ideal: Jl[L]awyers do possess 
a fundamental duty of public service, which emanates from the monopoly that 
the bar retains over the provision and distribution of legal services" and the 
17 The public interest ideal can also motivate work towards improving the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the law (Halliday 1987) or the perfection of legal 
science (Gordon 1984) through public-regarding law reform. 
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"legitimacy of the system of justice depends upon the legal profession 
recognising that lawyers have a fundamental duty to perform legal services for 
those who are too poor to retain private counsel". Thus large firms in the US 
(where legal aid is weaker than Britain and Australia) have taken pro bono 
obligations upon themselves in the interests of maintaining good public 
relations, and often at the insistence of idealistic younger lawyers (Galanter & 
Palay 1995a, 1995b:198-200). Galanter and Palay's data (1995a) showed that 
pro bono activity increased as an absolute amount and per lawyer between 
1990 and 1993 in large American law firms and that as firms grow they do 
more rather than less pro bono work ( against pessimistic views of the effects of 
large firm practice on pro bono work). 
The public interest tradition has some resonance with the idea of ethical 
discretion in lawyering advocated by Simon (1988), that lawyers should only 
ever act for those whose causes they personally believe in. But such an 
approach neglects the wisdom of the liberal advocacy ideal which ensures 
anyone who can afford it can get representation and the chance to argue their 
case in court rather than first having to persuade a lawyer that their case is 
worthwhile. The ideal of ethical discretion can also run the risk of ignoring the 
gatekeeper ideal by encouraging lawyers to act without any regard to law and 
justice when they do find a client they believe in. 
(ii) Taking the Public Interest Ideal Beyond Noblesse Oblige 
Even though the public interest ideal as traditionally exhorted by professional 
associations and leaders has encouraged little more than noblesse oblige, it has 
been of great significance in increasing people's access to legal services: We are 
dependent on legal service providers who are willing to work for reduced fees or 
voluntarily-ones who will be committed to a cause, who will fight battles no 
one else will fight and who will seek to reform their own profession-in 
achieving access to justice. The public interest ideal goes beyond the advocacy 
ideal which only sees an obligation to give paying clients access to justice. It 
goes beyond the gatekeeper ideal which does not envision lawyers proactively 
finding causes in the public interest in which to act. It also contains the seeds of 
an ideal which encourages lawyers to look beyond legalism and beyond 
noblesse oblige in seeking to help people claim justice. 
In recent times the public interest ideal has motivated some lawyers to find and 
pursue more political agendas for interests which have been excluded from 
participation in the system, whether oppressed groups such as women or 
Australian Aborigines, or diffuse interests such as consumer or environmental 
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interests and to concern themselves with more than purely legal ways of doing 
things. This has meant becoming concerned with political and social, as well as 
legal, dimensions of achieving justice, working with non-lawyer activists and in 
political arenas. The public interest ideal shows potential to bring non-legal 
perspectives and concerns into lawyers' view of themselves-to be an ideal 
which encourages lawyers to learn not to dominate the justice agenda with 
narrow legalism. Thus Luban (1988:238-240) includes not only providing legal 
services to the have-nots in his conception of lawyer public interest obligations, 
but also politicising the representation of poor clients by seeking to reform laws, 
advance the aims of social movements or change the social landscape. He 
concludes that "politicised public interest practice on behalf of have-nots helps 
to perfect the democratic process by overcoming barriers to their political 
mobilisation and participation" (1988:240). 
For some lawyers, their public interest commitment to looking beyond legalism 
to other ways of achieving justice has involved them in setting up and 
encouraging participation in community mediation and alternative approaches 
to securing justice. It has meant becoming more concerned with the whole 
person of the client and his or her community, and becoming interested in 
nurturing alternative means of doing justice that empower clients and 
communities to solve problems for themselves without law and lawyers. 
Their public interest commitment therefore motivates some lawyers' 
involvement in the second and third waves of access to justice reform. It 
encourages lawyers to nurture and facilitate justice beyond the justice of law. 
While nurturing political and cultural means of justice outside the legal 
profession will be the most fruitful way to ensure a diverse and full access to 
justice agenda, it is also important that lawyers themselves have an ethic 
teaching that alternatives are important. The main contemporary importance of 
the public interest ideal is as a lawyers' ethic that encourages lawyers to take 
into account more than just the law when they attempt to ensure justice is done. 
The public interest ideal combats lawyers' domination of the access to justice 
agenda from within. 
VI. The Ideal of Collegiality 
Together the advocacy, gatekeeper and public interest ideals provide broad 
norms which can help orient lawyers towards fulfilling their external 
responsibilities for access to justice. But Chapter Two (pp 35-40) showed that 
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there is also an internal problem of lawyers dominating one another. The fourth 
ethical tradition of duty to the profession, the "ideal of collegiality", appears to 
address this concern. 
According to this ideal, practitioners must show "confidence, mutual respect 
and cooperation" (Dal Pont 1996:427) to one another and seek to uphold the 
integrity and honour of their profession. This means that young lawyers are 
taught rules of courtesy, etiquette and respect for other practitioners including 
not strictly enforcing time limits without first warning the other side, honouring 
oral undertakings even where they are not legally binding, and not allowing 
animosity between clients to affect relations between lawyers. It also means 
that all lawyers have some responsibility to ensure that self-regulation works 
well. For example, the final section of the 1983 American Bar Association 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Rules 8.1-8.5), which are concerned with 
maintaining the integrity of the profession, require lawyers to be honest in their 
statements to bar associations and disciplinary bodies, and to report 
professional misconduct in order to sustain a self-regulating profession (Morgan 
& Rotunda 1993:98). 
The more sinister side of the ideal of collegiality is the traditional "ethical" rules 
which lie behind certain restrictive practices of the profession such as rules 
against advertising, undercharging and other overt forms of competition (Disney 
et al 1986:355-396, Rhode 1994:101-122). Although these rules have been 
justified as necessary to protect clients because of imperfections in the market 
for legal services, 18 they were also seen as necessary to preserve the unified 
image of the professional community and its reputation as being wholly above 
business tactics: 
In order to promote a professional community professions attempt 
to limit potentially divisive economic competition among their 
members by promulgating rules designed both to temper the spirit 
and substance of intraprofessional competition and to establish a 
basic income floor for all its members. (Freidson 1992:221) 
Breach of these rules was a breach of professional unity. As Chapter Two 
showed (p 35), the self-regulatory rule of the profession has also been used to 
exclude those from different racial, ethnic or gender groups (Abel 1981b:654, 
Pue 1995, Rhode 1994:53-63, Ross 1995:97-112). The collegiality of 
18 They have been justified as necessary to protect clients who would supposedly be 
more confused by competition than by silence: These claims will be discussed in 
Chapters Seven and Eight. 
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professional community has in the past been constructed at the expense of 
minorities who are excluded from the profession or experience discrimination 
within it, and low status lawyers who are prevented from competing and 
advertising to gain fee paying clients. 
Since many of the ethical rules that traditionally relied on the ideal of 
collegiality are now discredited, the ideal of collegiality is given little 
prominence in contemporary works on legal ethics. However the ideal of 
collegiality could be rehabilitated to serve a more useful purpose: It might be 
turned inside out so that instead of using the ideal to exclude some and exploit 
others (creating a narrow community of similar people), it would be an inclusive 
ideal calling for all legal service providers to treat each other with respect and 
honour (creating a broad community embracing difference). It would ask 
lawyers to take some responsibility for remedying problems of discrimination 
and exploitation of those already in the profession and also those seeking to 
enter it. 
Professional associations have already begun to see this as important, as 
evidenced by the institution of race relations committees by British professional 
associations (Inns of Court School of Law 1989:34-38) and initiatives to 
understand and remedy gender discrimination in the profession in a variety of 
countries (eg Canadian Bar Association Task Force on Gender Equality in the 
Legal Profession 1993).19 Thus there is some grounds for arguing that the ideal 
of collegiality could be reconstructed to combat the problem of lawyers' 
domination and injustice towards each other. 
VII. Constituting the Ethics of Justice 
If law is a means of claiming justice, and if lawyers are often our means of 
accessing law, then it is logical that the legal profession should claim to have 
some aspiration toward justice. This chapter has argued that lawyers indeed 
do hold themselves out as following a set of ethical ideals which have 
substantial relevance for access to justice. As reconstructed for contemporary 
practice, each of these four traditions of legal ethics can give lawyers a positive 
obligation in advancing access to justice by addressing one of the four main 
injustices or dominations of which lawyers are capable (as outlined in Part One 
of the thesis): The advocacy ideal exhorts lawyers to give devoted and zealous 
l 9 Dal Pont (1996:430 at footnote 25) lists professional rules in Australia that now 
prohibit discrimination. 
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service to clients, combating lawyer domination of clients with expensive and 
bad service. The gatekeeper ideal asks lawyers to moderate client interests with 
the demands of the justice of law, preventing the problem of lawyers helping 
powerful clients manipulate the system and dominate others. The public interest 
ideal encourages lawyers to act out a commitment to justice by looking beyond 
narrow legalism to the facilitation of other means of justice, subverting the 
tendency of lawyers to dominate access to justice agendas with legalism. The 
ideal of collegiality requires lawyers to treat all who join the profession justly and 
to uphold the integrity of professional ideals and standards, not to exclude, 
exploit and discriminate. As Figure 6.1 shows the four potential dominations 
perpetrated by lawyers are thus matched by the four traditional ethical ideals 
advocated here. 
Multiple Dominations Multiple Ethical Ideals 
1. Domination of clients and potential Advocacy ideal 
clients 
2. Dominated by clients to compromise Regulatory ideal 
justice system 
3. Domination of justice agenda Public service ideal 
4. Domination of lawyers by lawyers Collegiality/ community ideal 
Figure 6.1 Multiple Dominations by Lawyers: Multiple Ethical Ideals for 
Lawyers. 
A legal profession that actually acted according to these norms would 
contribute greatly to improving access to justice in the ways set out in the first 
part of this thesis. Yet ethical ideals are impotent without effective regulatory 
methods to bring them to life. 
Traditionally the ideal of collegiality has itself been relied upon to bring legal 
ethics into effect. Collegiality has been thought to support a professional 
community in which professional ideals are discussed, passed on and enforced. 
On this view, legal professional ethics are constituted by the collegiality of legal 
professional community and enforced by institutions of professional self-
regulation. It is true that in order to preserve and transmit ethical traditions 
lawyers need a strong professional community. However, this need not (should 
not) mean a unitary profession which accepts only one perspective on things. It 
could mean a group of people who accept that they have similar goals and 
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aspirations because of their occupation and will accept discussion and debate 
on how those goals and aspirations should be achieved. 
An ethical regime of communal self-regulation on its own is clearly an 
insufficient means of operationalising justice norms. Both this chapter and 
Chapter Two have already foreshadowed the fact that communal self-regulation 
can be criticised for not being good enough at ensuring that lawyers act on the 
advocacy, gatekeeper and public interest ideals, and indeed that it has 
sometimes been aimed at more nefarious purposes such as market control, 
exclusion of minorities and status enhancement. In recent times a variety of 
alternative methods of regulating the profession have been suggested and 
implemented. Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine consider these criticisms of self-
regulation in some detail, evaluate the alternatives, and outline a new theory for 
the regulation of the legal profession. While the set of ethics outlined in this 
chapter may not be self-implementing, they do define access to justice norms by 
which we might judge the effectiveness and outcomes of any proposed 
regulatory scheme for the legal profession. They are existing norms for lawyers 
that refine the normative analysis of access to justice presented so far. The 
attempt to weave the five waves of access to justice reform of Chapters Four and 
Five into the fabric of deliberative democracy would be bound to unravel for 
impracticality if these four ideals had no vitality among lawyers. The following 
chapters consider the techniques by which that vitality might be strengthened. 
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The Dynamics of Regulatory Reform 
I. Introduction 
Chapter Six argued that there are four norms or ethical ideals which ought to guide 
lawyers' behaviour if they are to play their part in improving access to justice. 
Self-regulation was the traditional regulatory policy adopted by the legal 
profession to implement its ethical ideals. In recent years in all common law 
countries, self-regulation has been challenged by policies of increased competition 
and accountability. This chapter examines the early 1990s reform process in 
Australia as a case study of the competing regulatory strategies different groups 
claim can be used to orient lawyers towards the just and effective delivery of legal 
services in practice. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the legal profession both in Australia and other countries has 
already voluntarily adopted many competition and accountability reforms. While 
critiques of the profession often assume that the profession's self-interest will never 
allow it to give up self-regulation, the evidence suggests that lawyers can and will 
respond constructively to reasonable proposals for change in certain circumstances. 
The focus of inquiry in this chapter is therefore not on reviewing substantive 
arguments for and against the application of competition and accountability 
policies to the legal profession (these will be discussed in Chapters Eight and Nine); 
rather it is on understanding the process of reform. The question of when and how 
lawyers will accept the necessity or desirability of change, emerged from the 
empirical research as a more pressing issue than the merits of reforms. 
A diversity of views in the Australian legal profession was pursued in order to 
understand when lawyers might accept reform and when they might resist it. 
Section II describes the methodological tools used to discover this diversity of 
opinion and experience. Section III outlines the policy positions taken in the reform 
debate and the evidence that the legal profession's opinion on regulatory issues 
had indeed moved to a greater acceptance of strategies of competition and 
accountability. Sections IV and V set out the evidence that the strategies and 
processes by which governments and communities introduce the idea of reform are 
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crucial in determining whether the legal profession will collectively debate its 
desirability and accept it, or dispute its wisdom and resist. 
The data reported in sections IV and V suggest that process can be as significant as 
substance in actually achieving change in the legal profession and reforming its 
regulation. But what does this mean for choosing a regulatory strategy for lawyers 
which will orient them towards the sort of access to justice ideals set out in Chapter 
Six? Section VI discusses how these findings about the importance of process 
might affect the substance of regulatory reform to the legal profession, an issue 
developed in greater detail in Chapters Eight and Nine. 
II. Methodology 
( i) Sources of Data 
Forty-one unstructured interviews with lawyers were conducted in the second half 
of 1994, and two more in 1996. The main aim was to understand how lawyers 
perceived the reform process by eliciting as many different opinions as possible. 
Lawyers were interviewed in Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide and Canberra, 
Australian capital cities which have professions of different sizes, structures and 
histories. Names were obtained by using an initial two or three well-networked 
contacts in each place to nominate a range of people with different experiences and 
different opinions. At the end of each interview, respondents were also asked to 
nominate potential interviewees with views different from their own. Lawyers 
with different perspectives were also identified by checking newspaper clippings 
and professional papers for outspoken participants in public debates. The 
respondents included both office holders and bureaucrats in legal professional 
associations, as well as one lay observer, officers of the TPC and of one Attorney 
General's Department, a range of practitioners, a master and a judge. Two lawyers 
refused an interview due to unavailability, and two refused for other reasons. 
Each interviewee has been allocated a code so that the reader can see how often 
different interviewees are quoted without risking anonymity.
1 The interview data 
1 The codes and numbers in each category interviewed are as follows: M-Male; F-
Female; B-Barristers and amalgams who practise only as barristers (5); J-Judge or 
Master (2); G-Members of Trade Practices Commission and Attorney General's 
Department ( 4); L-Lay people involved in legal profession regulation (2); T-Legal 
practice teacher (l); A-Legal professional association bureaucrat (2); S-Solicitor or 
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was supplemented by the collection of newspaper clippings from major Australian 
papers from December 1993 to October 1996, as well as policy documents and 
other written material produced by the profession in each state. 
(ii) Sampling: The Difference Discovery Method 
The data presented in this paper are limited in what they can say about the 
prevalence of different views. The forty-three respondents were not selected 
randomly nor were they stratified to secure representativeness. Rather the sample 
was assembled through a theoretically purposive snowballing technique developed 
for the study, a difference discovery method. While snowballing techniques 
traditionally follow networks of friendship and sameness (McCall & Simmons 
1969:64-65, Minichiello et al 1990:198), the difference discovery method is 
oriented towards the pursuit of diversity in views and experiences, and was 
designed to reveal new and unanticipated perspectives (see generally Burgess 1982, 
Glaser & Strauss 1967:61, Lofland 1971). The assurance sought was that the full 
diversity of perspectives in the profession was revealed, that "saturation" of the 
categories would be reached (Minichiello et al 1990:199). In relation to any topic of 
public discussion there are likely to be "a plethora of at best loosely connected and 
fragmented discourses in which many groups of individuals arrive at partial 
insights into issues" (Bohman 1994:918 discussing Habermas 1996). The different 
discourses that different people articulate will represent a number of different 
considerations corresponding to their interest positions, values and types of 
argument they see as valid. Together these different perspectives represent a 
public pool of reasons that individuals draw on in public deliberation according to 
their own taste and experience. The sampling method used here was designed to 
reveal the full potential of reasons relevant to regulatory reform of the legal 
Australian legal profession by sampling perspectives rather than representatively 
sampling persons. 
Thus initial contacts were asked not to name friends and associates, but to suggest 
those who were different from them. Respondents were asked to do the same, and 
Amalgam Practitioner (27). Solicitors are given a second letter depending on whether 
they are from a very large (multi-state) firm (L), small firm/ solo practitioner (S), 
community legal centre (C), government (G) or another type of firm (M). Because leaders 
of some state professional associations and other prominent lawyers were interviewed, 
further coding to indicate details such as the state from which the lawyers come might 
risk anonymity. 
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the clippings and other policy statements were used to ensure that no obviously 
different perspectives were missed. As the interviews proceeded, fewer and fewer 
of the suggestions for new people to interview were of people who had views 
which had not been aired in earlier interviews. (These suggestions were generally 
not pursued.) After less than thirty interviews, no significantly different views 
about the issues were discovered among interviewees, suggesting that the sampling 
strategy of maximising difference had succeeded in finding most of the different 
views that existed in the profession. By the time the sample had reached forty-one 
it seemed clear that there was no significant way of thinking about the reform 
debate amongst Australian lawyers which had not been captured, although a 
further two interviews were conducted in Victoria in 1996 to ensure that the unique 
characteristics of the Victorian reform process were understood. 
These patterns of op1n1on were independently confirmed by "data source 
triangulation" (Denzin 1970:308) using other research on the legal profession, the 
published positions of certain lawyers and legal associations and by their 
commentary reported in newspaper clippings. Some patterns of professional 
opinion are so robust they are apparent even in a sample of forty-three lawyers, 
and can be confirmed by the interviewees' own reports of these patterns among 
their colleagues, combined with credible data independent of the interviews. 
( iii) Analysis: The Constant Comparative Method 
The difference discovery method of sampling complemented the constant 
comparative method of data analysis (Glaser & Strauss 1967). Copious notes were 
taken during each interview including much verbatim material. They were typed 
immediately afterwards. Interviews and clippings were then analysed by dividing 
them into bites each concerned with one topic. These were placed together in 
categories according to topic, constantly comparing each new piece of information 
with all the previous bites in a category until nothing new was being discovered. 
This "constant comparative method" is the pursuit of difference in data analysis, 
just as the difference discovery method is the pursuit of difference in sampling.
2 
Finally the relationships between the categories were examined and incorporated 
into the analysis presented below. Quotations are examples from each category. 
2 It is odd that so much qualitative research applies a difference-enhancing method of 
analysis on a snowballed sample that is difference-restricting. 
159 
Chapter 7 Dynamics of Reform 
III. Debated Regulatory Policies for Lawyers 
(i) Competition and Accountability Reform 
As we saw in Chapter Two, Australian legal professional associations traditionally 
self-regulated without being required to involve community or government in the 
process (Abel-Smith & Stevens 1967:192, Disney et al 1986:34-43, Weisbrot 
1990:164-171), and without concern as to whether any of their rules restricted 
competition (TPC 1993). Throughout the 1970s and 1980s these traditional 
practices were scrutinised and attacked by reformers seeking to introduce 
competition and accountability reforms (Clarkson Committee 1983, New South 
Wales Law Reform Commission 1982).3 Although many piecemeal reforms were 
implemented during the 1970s and 1980s (Weisbrot 1990:164-222, 1993), public 
debate on the legal profession only reached a peak around 1994 when more far-
reaching competition and accountability reforms were proposed than ever before. 
The TPC (1992, 1993, 1994), state law reform commissions (Law Reform 
Commission of Victoria 1991, 1992a, 1992b, New South Wales Law Reform 
Commission 1993), federal and state governments (Government of South Australia 
1992, Wade 1994) and independent committees of inquiry (Access to Justice 
Advisory Committee 1994, Hilmer et al 1993) all focused attention on anti-
competitive and unaccountable professional practices and sought regulatory 
reform. 
The main impetus for increased attention on the regulation of lawyers was the 
TPC's 1989 decision to review the profession and determine the extent to which it 
complied with anti-trust principles. Towards the end of 1993 a draft report was 
published and in March 1994 the final report was handed down. In the meantime 
the reform of the legal profession had become part of a wider national competition 
policy agenda because of the Hilmer Report which identified the professions, 
especially lawyers, as representing a significant gap in the implementation of 
micro-economic reform (Hilmer et al 1993:133-137). The thrust of both the TPC 
and Hilmer criticisms is illustrated in the following passage from the TPC' s 
(1994:3-4) final report: 
3 The New South Wales Law Reform Commission in particular undertook an extensive 
inquiry into the legal profession between 1977 and 1984 which went largely 
unimplemented until the 1990s (see Disney et al 1986:210-227). 
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The Australian legal profession is heavily over-regulated and in urgent need 
of comprehensive reform. It is highly regulated compared to other sectors of 
the economy and those regulations combine to impose substantial restrictions 
on the commercial conduct of lawyers and on the extent to which lawyers are 
free to compete with each other for business. As a result, the current 
regulatory regime has adverse effects on the cost and efficiency of legal 
services and their prices to business and final consumers . . . Reform of the 
extensive system of regulation applied to the legal profession is an important 
part of the agenda for micro-economic reform and the development of a 
national approach to competition policy ... While the unique role played by 
the legal profession in the judicial and legal systems will need to be given 
due weight, the Commission considers that the principles of competition 
policy and law should be applied to the business and market activities of all 
legal practitioners in the same way as they apply to other business 
activities. 
As a result of these reports, state and federal governments announced their 
intentions to target the profession for reform, and in May 1994 yet another releva'nt 
policy document appeared. The Access to Justice Advisory Committee (AJAC) 
published their Action Plan for reform to the legal system which included a 
significant section on the legal profession (1994:65-221). AJAC were under no 
compulsion to base their views on the demands of micro-economic reform but by 
now competition policy had become the dominant perspective through which to 
view lawyers, and the bulk of their discussion repeated the views of the TPC and 
the Hilmer Committee: 
If the legal profession is regulated in a manner that impedes the freedom of 
lawyers to compete with each other, legal services will not be provided 
efficiently and consumers of legal services will pay the additional costs. 
Similarly, if the structure of the profession is such that consumers are 
required to pay for duplication of legal work or unnecessary services, the cost 
of legal representation will be increased and access to justice diminished. If 
the exclusive right of lawyers to perform legal services is framed too 
broadly, consumers are likely to be denied the chance to purchase services 
from providers (such as conveyancers) who may be prepared to provide them 
at lower prices than lawyers. (AJAC 1994:65) 
Competition policy was the focus of the debate, but it was not the only basis for 
change. Reforms to make the legal profession more accountable to the community, 
most notably by giving independent boards or commissioners responsibility for 
overseeing self-regulatory disciplinary practices were also prominent (AJAC 
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1994:195-212, Mark 1995, Wade 1994, Craven 1995).
4 By the end of 1996 the 
competition principles of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) had been made 
applicable to all Australian lawyers (Corones 1996), and self-regulatory discipline 
and complaints handling in the two largest states, New South Wales and Victoria, 
had been completely restructured (Craven 1995, Dal Pont 1996:11-12, Legal 
Profession Reform Act 1993 (NSW), Legal Practice Bill 1996 (Vic), Mark 1995). 
( ii) Traditional Self-Regulation 
Concerns with competition and accountability cut across the profession's 
traditional view outlined in Chapter Six that professional community and self-
regulation are the most appropriate way to ensure that individual lawyers live up 
to the ideal of helping the community access the justice of law. In the 1990s many 
Australian lawyers reacted angrily and defensively to proposals for reform arguing 
that self-regulation was still the best way to assure the quality of legal services and 
professional independence from government. As a recent President of the Law 
Council of Australia (LCA, the national peak body for Australian legal 
professional associations) wrote, 
... it seems to me that the economists look at those engaged in the practice of 
law not as members of a profession-with everything which the concept of a 
profession connotes-but simply as providers of services in a market-place 
that should conform to the great god of competition . . . It is, I suggest, a 
shallow and simplistic approach. (Phelps 1995:3; see also Kirk 1994) 
Traditionalists argued that protective regulation to ensure clients received quality 
services always trumped concerns with improving competition. As another senior 
Australian lawyer wrote in response to the TPC' s report: 
While in theory, the introduction of a greater number of people providing 
legal services may have an effect on reducing the price of legal services in 
some areas, it will be at the cost of lessening-and probably very 
considerably-the quality of legal services . . . To anyone who truly 
understands and knows the importance of quality in the provision of legal 
services ... the Report of the TPC is hard to take seriously. (Farmer 1994:297) 
4 This had already occurred in Western Australia during the 1980s. Further details of 
accountability reforms to the legal professions in Victoria and New South Wales are 
discussed at pp 178-180. 
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Traditionalists also argue that it is essential to the protection of society that 
lawyers' independence be protected by self-regulation so that the state cannot 
interfere with the representation of clients. As one leading lawyer argued against 
proposals to abolish legal professional self-regulation in the state of Victoria, 
Lawyers help ordinary people protect their life, liberty, reputation and 
property against encroachment by government, commerce, unions and other 
powerful interests . . . The proposed new scheme would require lawyers to be 
licensed by a government appointed board. Such a scheme will destroy the 
independence of the legal profession and the independence of the courts. 
(Rayner 1995) 
Thus lawyers justified their traditional self-regulation by seeing themselves as a 
group with great knowledge and expertise performing a function of great 
significance to society and strictly regulating themselves to make sure they 
performed it well in the interests of clients and the public. The introduction of 
competition policy would undercut their ability to maintain high standards and the 
introduction of accountability would undermine their independence. 
( iii) Changing Legal Professional Opinions 
Surprisingly however, both competition and accountability reforms have been 
voluntarily embraced by much of the legal profession in many countries. For 
example, Paterson et al (1988) found that English and Welsh solicitors' notions of 
professionalism had changed considerably in just five years (since the government 
announced reforms) to come to accept the propriety of advertising and 
competition. Powell (1986) describes the way that US Bar Associations 
voluntarily embraced accountability reforms by ceding responsibility for lawyer 
discipline to independent court-appointed bodies. Similarly the Australian 
interviews reported here show that many lawyers changed their opinions to accept 
reform, although competition reforms seemed to be more widely accepted than 
accountability reforms. It seems that self-regulation is an "historically contingent" 
part of lawyers' notion of professionalism (Powell 1986:54). 
(a) Competition Reform 
While some Australian lawyers held fast to the traditional position that law is not 
a business and that competition policy is therefore irrelevant to it, many 
enthusiastically advocated reform. By and large, Australian legal professional 
associations had officially adopted competition as a goal by the middle of 1994. 
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The LCA (the peak body of Australian legal professional associations) actively 
attempted to get all its members to agree on reform and in July 1994 produced its 
Blueprint for the Structure of the Legal Profession: A National Market for Legal Services 
(LCA 1994a) that set out how it thought competition goals should be achieved. 
The executive committee of the Law Institute of Victoria (LIV, the self-regulating 
legal professional association in Victoria) wrote in a policy paper that it "supports 
the proposition that the legal profession, along with other providers of goods and 
services, should be subject to general competition policy principles" (LIV 1994:1; 
see also Ackland 1994b); and the New South Wales Law Society endorsed the 
introduction of an Act in that state which implemented many of the TPC' s 
proposals even before its final report (Fairlie 1994, Fife-Yeomans et al 1994, Legal 
Profession Reform Act 1993 (NSW)). 
Among the individual lawyers interviewed there was support, indeed demand, for 
competition reform from a variety of sectors of the profession. Even lawyers who 
were cautious about adopting competition policy indiscriminately welcomed its 
application for selected purposes. As one said, competition policy is helpful for 
"getting rid of restrictive trade practices that have no point" (FJl, italics added) . 
The managing partners of some very large national law firms stridently supported 
the application of deregulatory elements of competition policy to their profession. 
They referred to the fact that the legal profession had "constructed a series of 
inhibitions that had a disastrous effect" (MSL12) and favoured radical 
deregulation: "Why should any regulation happen at all? I am yet to see any 
regulation improve standards or personal conduct. Most regulation is ineffective 
against real crooks" (MSL13). Even some suburban practitioners wanted 
competition policy applied to loosen restrictive rules and make it easier for them to 
survive as small businesses: 
I think we are terribly over-regulated. We only need regulation in two 
aspects: Firstly, trust money, and the other is simply within the general 
law, we shouldn't act in a way that is misleading or deceptive conduct. 
Apart from that there shouldn't be any control on us ... The Law Society never 
scraps a rule so you can do more things. It is always squeezing how you can do 
work . . . (MSS16) 
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(b) Accountability Reform 
Opinions on accountability reform were less unified. The newspaper clippings 
revealed more hostility toward plans that would limit or abolish self-regulation 
than to competition reform (Conroy 1995, Mason 1993, Rayner 1995, Woods 
1993), and many interviewees were opponents of accountability reform: 
I am concerned about the government saying, "We should be regulating the 
profession." Are they somehow going to force us to change our rules? What if 
the Board (which is appointed by the government) says that there will be a 
rule that no barrister will appear against the government . . . Our 
independence is cherished. (MB4) 
Yet ambiguities and differences of op1n1on did exist (Tabakoff 1994a). 
Professional associations had already introduced many small reforms increasing 
the accountability of self-regulatory processes by involving lay representatives and 
observers in discipline and having ombudsmen receive or oversee client complaints 
(Mark 1995, Weisbrot 1990:182-222). Some interviewees were completely 
disenchanted with the self-interestedness of self-regulation and preferred 
regulation by government or a third party. A community legal centre lawyer had 
seen many clients who had not been satisfied with the profession's complaints 
handling process: "The clients' ... complaints were exacerbated by the self-
regulatory mechanisms of the profession ... A complacency creeps in and a trust in 
your peers that isn't good" (MSC8). Some lawyers saw self-regulation as purely 
about the "restrictive practices and the rules about locking people out which have 
very rarely been in the public interest" (MSC19), and which focused on looking 
after lawyers, not consumer protection (MSL26). They also thought that lawyers 
ought to be more accountable to the community just like any other business 
(MSL12), as a matter of having a good public image: 
I don't think that discipline should be a concern of the Law Society. It is just 
bad management and bad public relations to handle disciplinary matters 
inhouse. It's the same as the police. If you complain about the police to the 
ombudsman and he refers the matter to an internal disciplinary unit, I've 
never met anyone who isn't unhappy with that. I'm not afraid to be 
disciplined by an independent body. (MSS21) 
Others were dissatisfied with the dual roles of the Law Society: They thought that 
because of their association's role as regulator it did not sufficiently represent their 
165 
Chapter 7 Dynamics of Reform 
own interests.5 It was not self-interested enough: "[I]t is very aggravating to find 
yourself being prosecuted by the Institute. It is quite adversarial ... You feel 
betrayed by your own body" (FSL14). Or as a sole practitioner explained, 
The Law Society is there for the advancement of certain members of the 
profession. They see it as a stepping stone to other things. It should be there 
to advocate for members of the profession ... It says it is there to protect 
society in the public interest, but then it is also there for the profession's own 
benefit to advocate for the profession. There is a fundamental conflict there 
... The sole practitioners have tried to push the Law Society to give up one of 
their roles, perhaps the regulatory role, and to take on the advocate role ... 
We're subject to criticism because the Law Society advocates for the 
profession's interests and then turns around and tries to protect the public 
interest and says it regulates the profession as well. (MSS16) 
The fact that many of these lawyers feel that self-regulation is ineffective and 
unfairly targets or over-burdens them (as Chapter Two showed, pp 37-39) fuels 
their enthusiasm for handing disciplinary functions to a more independent body. 
But the most high profile response of the legal profession to accountability reform 
was the hostility (Callick 1995, Conroy & Wilson 1995, Green 1995, McGuinness 
1995, Wilson 1995) which met Victorian Attorney General Jan Wade's proposals 
(Wade 1994, Craven 1995) to introduce an independent legal practice board to 
issue practising certificates and make rules of professional conduct, and an 
ombudsman to receive and act on complaints about lawyers. Newspapers 
reported that lawyers said her proposals would contravene United Nations human 
rights principles which required lawyers to be a self-governing profession (Conroy 
1995) and the president of the Law Council of Australia wrote that they would 
"severely" erode "the independence that underpins the integrity of the legal 
profession" (Fowler 1995; see also Wilson 1995). 
Thus while some lawyers continued to stridently oppose suggested reforms and 
clung to the tradition of self-regulation, some were initiating significant reforms and 
others demanded even more radical change. While some lawyers would have 
supported reform for their own reasons long before the 1990s debate began, many 
of the lawyers interviewed described a process during which they came to accept the 
desirability of reform as a result of the public debate. How is it that lawyers have 
5 Perhaps this explains why more lawyers are joining unions (Anleu 1992:197-198, Davis 
1994, Tabakoff 1994b). 
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been converted or become resistant to proposals of change and reform? Two 
broad dynamics can be discerned from the diverse experiences of reform that 
lawyers describe; one of persuasion and dialogue resulting in conversion and 
acceptance of reform, and one of imposition and disrespect engendering resistance. 
IV. Dynamics of Conversion 
Many interviewees told their own or other people's stories of conversion to the 
desirability of competition or accountability reforms prompted by public debate 
and the insistence of reformers. Their experiences ranged from (i) spontaneous 
responses to community concerns in order to preserve their profession's legitimacy, 
through (ii) response to persuasive reasons, to (iii) the pragmatic acceptance of fate 
in the face of inevitable reform, and (iv) the persuasive effect of market forces 
which made government reform either irrelevant or within their self-interest. While 
these motivations might vary in moral praise-worthiness, each could result in 
genuine commitment to change and reform in the public interest (even if only 
because lawyers recognised accepting reform was also in their own interest). 
( i) Preservation of Legitimacy 
Some lawyers attributed their support for reform proposals simply to the need to 
be responsive to community concerns. They thought it was vital to listen to and 
accept reasonable community expectations of change in order to preserve or restore 
their profession's legitimacy: 
I think the main challenge to the legal profession is to make itself a credible 
profession. Society is more consumer-oriented. Society demands a greater 
level of accountability and the profession isn't giving it. Lawyers have 
always been smelly but they're getting smellier. (FSG6) 
These lawyers described the way in which their own attitudes to professional 
issues had to change over the years to keep up with changing community attitudes: 
[W]e used to think it was unethical to advertise, but that was changed years 
ago in the ACT [Australian Capital Territory]. We used to think it was 
unethical to take someone else's client, now we openly compete with each 
other. We used to think it was unethical to charge less than the set fee. All 
those things have changed. Ideas about ethics change. The change lags a bit 
behind community attitudes but so do all laws. (MSL18) 
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Others thought that even though they were not convinced there were problems with 
the present regulation of the profession, they ought to be open to change if the 
community perceived a problem: 
11I tend to think if it's not broke you shouldn't fix 
it. But if there is a perception of a problem, then that might be the same as having 
a problem" (FSL22). Even though she did not see a need for increased lay 
representation in disciplinary processes, FSL22 supported such reforms in order to 
avoid negative public debate about accountability. Similarly another senior lawyer 
thought the profession ought to reform its self-regulation so that the public would 
give it the legitimacy it deserved: 
I think the legal profession is an honourable, dignified, caring profession. 
But the public perception is stereotyped in a different direction and one way 
to overcome that is to make the profession transparent and involve the 
community in what it does so that they can see what the profession does ... 
There is no duty to the public at large, but there is a public element in what 
lawyers do and for that reason lay participation is important ... So I think 
there should be self-regulation but in a transparent way with lay input. We 
shouldn't regulate ourselves in a way the public can't see and can't 
understand. (FJl) 
Research in other countries has also shown that the instinct to act to preserve or 
restore legitimacy in the eyes of the public can be a powerful motivation for legal 
professions to reform themselves. Giffen's (1961:121, 130) research on Canadian 
lawyers suggested that the profession's voluntary introduction of legal aid and 
reimbursement funds was prompted by a 
11high level of sensibility" to negative 
public attitudes. Powell (1986:40-41) concluded from his study of the voluntary 
cession of lawyers discipline by the Chicago Bar Association to court bodies that 
they were motivated by a perceived legitimacy crisis to restore their reputation 
rather than feeling any threat of a new system being imposed from outside.6 Thus 
the mere mobilisation of public opinion against a legal profession may be enough to 
encourage it to reform itself in order to restore its reputation. 
6 His study is discussed further at p 196 of Chapter Eight. 
168 
Chapter 7 Dynamics of Reform 
( ii) Persuasive Dialogue 
A more active process of persuasion and dialogue had convinced other lawyers 
and leaders of legal professional associations that they should support reforms. 
One woman changed her mind through the process of dialogue with a friend she 
respected even though she had at first rejected the TPC report: 
When I first heard Alan Fels [Chair of the TPC] talking about regulation of 
the legal profession I felt professionally horrified. Then I was at lunch with 
a good friend from the Industry Commission, who is a lawyer who specialises 
in business deregulation, and I've always respected his opinion, and he asked 
me why? I went away and I thought about it and I realised my professional 
training has lead me to believe that the legal profession is some kind of 
sacred cow. We think that regulation by professional bodies makes us better. 
There is something different and better about lawyers than the customer 
service section at a manufacturing company. I really agonised about this. I 
realised that opinion conflicted with my own personal philosophy of life 
and my approach to being a lawyer ... So I faced those presumptions and 
assumptions and I really just turned around. (FSG6) 
A leading male solicitor also rejected the TPC but was persuaded by what he saw 
as a more credible economic argument: "The document that really hit home for me 
was the Hilmer Report [Hilmer et al 1993]. It was not just lawyer-bashing. It had a 
proper economic basis and talked about every sector of the economy not just the 
professions" (MSL9). 
Officers of the TPC also described the way they saw lawyers change their minds 
through the TPC' s attempts to engage them in dialogue: 
We had a lot of debate and discussion with the legal profession which was 
pretty constructive. Then there were submissions from them, then the draft 
report further discussions and further submissions. There was also debate in 
the press and the governments. During this debate we believe we could see 
the legal profession broadening its perspective. They had to address things 
in our terms ... Increasingly they were thinking about our arguments and their 
public interest arguments They had some very clever justifications reworking 
their arguments within our framework. So we moved the debate. In some 
states the whole profession has changed. (MG3) 
In their final report they noted that while the legal profession had already been 
reforming itself before they started their study, "the pace of reform accelerated 
markedly during the course of the study" (TPC 1994:x). This perspective on how 
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the reform process progressed is supported by newspaper reports at the time of 
the release of the TPC's final report: 
Compared with the fierce opposition from certain quarters of the legal 
profession which greeted the draft report, yesterday's reaction was mainly 
conciliatory. The traditionally staid profession has acknowledged not only 
that most of the reforms are inevitable in an increasingly competitive market 
but also that some, albeit grudgingly, are welcome. (Fife-Yeomans et al 
1994:3) 
Thus active dialogue encouraged some lawyers to examine their beliefs and 
presumptions, in the light of public opinion and reformer's arguments and to give 
up views they found they could no longer rationally defend. 
( iii) Pragmatic Acceptance of Fate 
As lawyers became convinced that significant reform was imminent-whether they 
liked it or not-many decided to voluntarily join the dialogue about what changes 
would take place, and even to pre-empt government reforms: "I think it comes 
down to looking over our shoulder. We could see that people were going to do 
things and the profession decided to do it first and do it better" (MSL9) . One 
commentator on reforms in Victoria noted that the determination of the Attorney 
General's stance "has impressed LIV leaders if not with admiration, at least with 
the recognition that regulation as an issue could not be moved to the backburner. 
The decision was taken to let go what was lost" (Evans 1994:292). A TPC officer 
described how a prominent Bar leader changed his mind about supporting reform 
by a combination of moral suasion and a growing realisation that change would 
occur whether he wanted it or not. Since change was going to occur anyway he 
decided it would be better to enter the dialogue about how it would occur: 
When I first met him he was a complete opponent and now he is the most 
reformist President of the Bar Association. After I spoke at a seminar ... one 
time he berated me for over an hour in the corridor about how I didn' t 
understand anything. Now maybe he's in damage control. He says we have 
to accept that there will be reforms. Let's do them ourselves in the spirit of 
the government's reforms but the way we want them. He turned 180 degrees 
partly because he engaged in dialogue. As long as you have genuine debate 
then you have to move a bit in dialogue, as long as the arguments have 
something to them. But it was also a survival issue. Now the Bar will be 
there to fight another day . . . (MG3, italics added) 
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Similarly in Britain the status quo persisted only until the strength of the 
government's commitment to laissez faire ideology meant that the profession could 
no longer ignore proposed changes, but had to accommodate them (Weisbrot 
1990:186). 
Even though the lawyers in this category originally accepted change only because 
they felt they must, their entry into the dialogue meant that they could later become 
positively committed to the idea that "the arguments have something to them" (see 
MG3 above): 
I think some good will come out of the debate ... It has forced us to look at 
some of our rules and we have made some dramatic changes ... For example 
advertising. We argued with the bodies that said we should change the rule 
against restraints and said why we thought there should be restraints. But 
when we came and looked at the rules we saw we didn't really need them ... 
Our initial reaction was this is ridiculous that you're coming in and telling us 
what to do, but when we sat down and looked at it we realised we could make 
some changes. The changes give more freedom instead of just petty restraints. 
(MB4)7 
In these cases, lawyers came to realise that reform was inevitable before it was too 
late for them to join the debate about how it would occur. They were able to 
voluntarily adapt to reform and even accept its desirability under the shadow of 
the axe of reform before it fell. 
(iv) Surrender to Market Forces 
An important impetus for competition reform was the fact that market forces, 
especially consumer power in the commercial sector, had already forced the legal 
profession to accept the reality of a more competitive legal services market (see 
Clifton-Steele 1994). This was particularly true of lawyers in large commercial 
firms who had been forced to become more cost-efficient by powerful clients before 
the TPC's reports (Ackland 1994c, Stretton 1994): 
7 This change in attitude was confirmed by the comments of a prominent solicitor: 
The Bar cleaned up their act quite markedly. Before that they thought the 
world would never change. But then they accommodated changes ... They 
realised the game was about to be up. But it was not just self-interested: 
When they focused on their service they realised there was a better way to 
do it. (MSL13) 
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Partners were charging a particular bank $300, $315, $350 an hour, and last 
year that bank told them $200 an hour, take it or leave it. (MSL5) 
At the top end it is absolutely cut-throat. They have been tendering for 
business and a while ago I heard that firms were tendering below cost. The 
competition is absolutely intense ... Practitioners are working too hard. 
They're literally killing themselves. Last week one of our leading 
superannuation lawyers died. She was only 37. (MA2) 
Lawyers believe they no longer have any monopoly on "legal" work: "Accountants 
have been giving legal advice in breach of the Act for years especially in the tax 
area. It's a joke to think that the Act gives me competition protection. It is a 
purely theoretical monopoly" (MSM24).8 The market for individual legal services 
in areas like personal injuries and family law has also become much more 
competitive: 
I only know of two firms in the suburbs who have put their prices up in the 
last four years. (FLl) 
All of a sudden solicitors are actually selling their services. We are 
capturing and chasing clientele. Lawyers are having to back their own 
judgments by means of contingency fee arrangements ... Changes are occurring 
not because of the government reforms, but because of competitive forces. 
(MSMll) 
You like to take clients from other solicitors and find superiority in that. 
(MSL23) 
Indeed during the process of the debate some lawyers came to the opinion that the 
application of competition policy to their profession might actually be in their self-
interest. One partner in a large law firm and a leader of his state's professional 
association attributed much of the support for competition reform to the fact that 
lawyers realised their firms must become more competitive to survive in the future: 
Every individual lawyer had a scary financial situation a few years ago. 
There was the 1987 crash and we thought it would never affect us but in three 
years we all had a really hard time. Then when the politicians and others 
8 The TPC (1993:122-123) recognised that Australian lawyers and accountants are 
already in direct competition in areas such as tax law advice. For examples of 
accountants taking over "legal" work see Pengilley (1994) and Tabakoff (1994c) reporting 
on the launch of legal firms by accounting firms KPMG Peat Marwick and Arthur 
Andersen. 
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talked about competition, we thought that maybe there was something in it 
for our benefit. (MSL9) 
Others thought that reforms might help them compete more effectively with 
accountants: "Part of the reason accountants have been taking over our work is 
because they're less regulated than we are" (MSS16). For the large firms, restrictive 
state-based rules stood in the way of creating national firms which could compete 
more efficiently locally and in global markets. 9 
As a result, legal professional associations were already motivated to abolish 
many of the restrictive rules attacked by competition reformers: "I don't know 
what else the TPC will do. The LIV has already gone through all its rules and 
regulations and taken out the anti-competitive ones" (FLl). It seems likely that 
many leaders of the profession were ready to accept the application of competition 
policy to professional regulation by the time the TPC made its final report in 1994. 
Certainly once government determination to reform the profession to make it more 
competitive was combined with credible dialogue calling for further change, 
lawyers who had already felt the pressure of market forces were willing to 
voluntarily join the competition reform process. Similarly many lawyers accepted 
the desirability of accountability reform because of public debate and the perceived 
lack of legitimacy in existing self-regulatory processes. Yet other lawyers resisted 
calls for reform, especially in the early part of the TPC's review of the application 
of competition principles to the profession and during the accountability reform 
debate in Victoria. 
9 For example state rules requiring all partners of a firm to hold practising certificates in 
any state where the firm conducted business were expensive and inconvenient. Brazier et 
al (1993:210) suggest that the desire to compete in global markets was also an important 
factor encouraging British large firm solicitors to adopt competition reforms. 
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V. Dynamics of Resistance 
(i) Stories of Defiance and Resistance 
While some lawyers told of conversion and responsiveness to reform agendas, 
others' stories were of defiance and resistance.1° When lawyers saw reformers as 
uninterested in cooperative dialogue or in listening to legitimate concerns about 
reforms, what will there was for change in the public interest was stifled by the 
desire to defend themselves against critics. Where lawyers perceived they were 
being discredited and disrespected by the views of reformers (see sections (ii) and 
(iii) below), the opportunity for constructive debate and cooperative reform was 
lost, or at least attenuated. 
A female partner in a large Victorian firm summarised the ways in which she felt 
that lawyers had been disaffected by public debate about their reform: 
The legal profession feels very put upon here in Victoria and as if it doesn't 
get any thanks. Victorian solicitors feel disillusioned and dissatisfied with 
the work they've done in comparison with the returns they've got [from] the 
Law Institute, the Attorney General and the community. I don't think the 
legal profession sees itself as supported politically, judicially or by its own 
legal institution. (FSL14) 
A speech from a past president of the Law Council of Australia illustrates the 
potential for lawyers to feel unfairly imposed upon by a disrespectful reform 
process: 
The Cost of Justice inquiry was politically motivated, where some members of 
the committee openly set out to blame all of the ills of the justice system on 
the legal profession and those responsible for administering it. The TPC 
report was, I suggest, very much influenced by the TPC's imperialist ambition 
to have the professions and especially the legal profession brought under the 
umbrella of the Trade Practices Act 1974 and the TPC itself. The Hilmer 
Report was predicated on the sacred cow 
II competition" and the premise that 
a national competition policy would be a good thing ... These reports are 
replete with statements of economic theory ... On the other hand, notions 
such as the maintenance of professional standards in the public interest, 
which are of some moment to the profession, are glossed over and dismissed 
with apparent disdain. (Meadows 1994:85) 
lO The term 
II defiance" has been taken from Sherman (1993) which is discussed at p 181 
below. 
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( ii) Discredit 
When lawyers perceived reformers as unwilling to give them credit for having 
reformed themselves in the past and being prepared to do so in the future, the will 
to cooperate dissipated. Michael Baumann, then President of the Queensland Law 
Society, was quoted criticising the draft TPC report and claiming that the 
Queensland legal profession was already competitive, "A lot of people see the 
legal profession as this type of institution which they want to have the credit for 
reforming without appropriately giving credit to the profession for reforming itself" 
(Woods 1993).11 
A barrister in Adelaide felt that government reformers were not even aware that 
the South Australian profession had governed itself in a more progressive manner 
than lawyers in the Eastern states for many years, let alone given it credit for it: 
A few years ago, Chris Sumner, the old Attorney General, had a white paper 
and a green paper and there was a debate about the organisation of the legal 
profession. He was advised by people from interstate and there was a fuss 
about restrictive practices at the Bar but those rules were not applicable 
here .. . 
Interviewer: You felt as if criticisms were being made of the South 
Australian profession as if it were the same as the profession in the eastern 
states? 
A lot of criticisms were directed at the restrictive practices of the Bar-the 
two counsel rule, the chambers rule, direct access, having conferences only at 
barristers' chambers, even the two thirds rule. None of these things applied 
to Adelaide. (MB2) 
Another barrister was frustrated with hearing the profession attacked when he 
knew that suggested reforms had already been implemented by the profession 
some time before: "I have talked to consumer groups who just don't know the 
facts. They don't recognise that we don't regulate ourselves" (MBS) . Because he 
felt that the reforms the profession had already made were discredited and 
discounted by reformers, he was unwilling to countenance further demands for 
reform. 
11 Perhaps this was a reaction to attitudes like that reported by Fife-Yeomans et al 
(1994) where the TPC was said to have "credited New South Wales with leading the 
way" in competition reforms, but was "critical of lawyers in Queensland, Tasmania and 
targeted barristers in Victoria who continued to resist reforms to competition and 
efficiency." 
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( iii) Disrespect 
Similarly when reformers did not seem to take seriously lawyers' own perspectives 
on how their profession operated and how best to reform it, lawyers found it 
difficult to trust those who had not respected them enough to listen: 
If you look at the section of the TPC Final Report on barriers to entry there 
were a number of questions that the LCA raised from that in the Draft Report 
that they didn't answer. Our comments were ignored. We sent a submission 
with experts in trade practices law making points. They just ignored it ... 
That didn't go down well with the legal profession at all. It's dishonest. It's 
indifferent ... The way they treated us, it doesn't make us want to be subject to 
them. (MA2) 
One leader of the national profession described the reform process as one of 
"governments wanting to be seen to be doing something-bullying." His response 
was defiant, "Now we are in the position of having made all the changes and we 
are going to fight back. We have been suckers, easy hits. We've made enough 
changes and we're not going to just get hit any more" (MBS). Another lawyer felt 
that the TPC had treated the profession so disrespectfully that he would make the 
head of the Commission his personal enemy: 
The TPC is a bunch of turkeys. I have written a letter to Professor Fels [Chair 
of the TPC] saying he is a liar. I asked Fels a few years ago how he was going 
to approach the inquiry into the legal profession. He said they would do it 
diligently and with proper consultation. Well we went along to the 
consultations. They didn't know what they were talking about and then they 
came out with the conveyancing report. It was released to the press before 
the President of the LCA got it and on the same day that the Presidents of 
the Law Societies got it. It contained quite a few factual errors. It was a 
great big political exercise ... Also there was an innuendo that SA [South 
Australian] solicitors are worse at conveyancing than the [land] brokers. I 
haven't forgiven him for that. I'm younger than him so I'm going to outlive 
him. (MSM15) 
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Lawyers were particularly apt to feel disaffected when reformers failed to listen to 
arguments that the profession had already become very competitive (see pp 171-
173 above). Those who continued to suggest competition-type reforms were 
considered "doctrinaire", and not interested in listening to lawyers to find out 
what was already happening in the real world: 
The [Australian Capital Territory] government is threatening to license 
conveyancers. The Law Society's position is that is a doctrinaire reaction. It 
can only have a basis in doctrine not reason. In Canberra, lawyers have been 
allowed to advertise since 1974 so fees are very competitive. So it is not anti-
competitive and the government won't achieve anything because 
conveyancers can't do the work any more cheaply and effectively. The 
government is just doing it because other states are doing it. (MSLS) 
12 
When lawyers feel that their profession has been treated with such discredit and 
disrespect, it is not surprising that they might resist reform and entrench 
themselves in defence of traditional self-regulation. 
(iv) The Significance of Self-Regulation 
The place given to self-regulation is often the crux of the difference between 
strategies of persuasion and dialogue and dynamics of discredit and disrespect. 
Where reformers allow the profession to have a role in reforming and regulating 
themselves, lawyers are more likely to cooperate with reform than where self-
regulation is totally impugned. Attacking the legitimacy of self-regulation is a 
powerful way of communicating discredit and disrespect to the profession, because 
it denies lawyers a continuing role in their own regulation and is critical of their 
historical accomplishments in creating a comparatively ethical profession. The 
idea that as a profession they ought to be able to be trusted to be responsible enough 
to self-regulate is imprinted in many lawyers' minds. It is "part of being a 
profession, being responsible for your own ethics and rules" (FLl), "taking 
responsibility for the standards that are set" (MJ2). If self-regulation is abolished, 
"you lose that key sense of professionalism, your own obligation and it becomes 
12 In an interview a member of the TPC answered this criticism: 
One criticism of our work has been that it isn't quantitative. There is no 
measure of the anti-competitive effect of the regulations. We haven't 
shown the cost difference. We sought opinions and arguments. That's a fair 
comment. But evidence in that area is difficult to find and it would have 
been too expensive for us to commission all the surveys and so on ourselves. 
So we did it from first principles, looking at arguments and evaluating them 
almost subjectively. (MG31) 
177 
Chapter 7 Dyn~mics of Reform 
just rules" (MSL13). These lawyers see a dignity in having a profession which is 
able to exercise the disciplinary tasks of self-government, with the responsibility 
collectively to ensure that the profession as a whole is of a high standard, and 
where standards fail to take responsibility for rectifying the situation: 
There are waves [ of opinion] in different places saying we ought to be a trade 
union but that is not what the profession is about ... Some practitioners say 
the Law Society is a policeman and it is prosecuting me and it should look 
after me. The Dental Association doesn't prosecute dentists. It is the Dental 
Board and the Dental Association gets in and stands up for the dentist. But I 
think the Dental Association is a moribund, hopeless group because it is not 
concerned about the whole man [sic]. (FJl) 
When the idea of competition reform was first introduced, much of the profession 
reacted defiantly because it seemed that competition policy was going to be 
imposed on it by the TPC, which would then become the legal profession's main 
regulator (see Colebatch 1995). As the profession realised that it would be able to 
implement competition reform for itself, it became more compliant with reformers' 
wishes.1 3 Thus the LCA's Blueprint (1994a:2) states both that national 
competition principles should apply to the legal profession and also that "the 
independence of the legal profession is dependant upon the profession's right to 
self-regulation". The profession is happy to accept competition reform, as long as 
it can be introduced within the bounds of self-regulation. 
Accountability reforms are also acceptable to the profession as long as they do not 
completely abrogate self-regulation.14 Having achieved the major objective of self-
regulatory competition reform, the LCA was willing to concede that this self-
regulation could then be "subject to an external and transparent process of 
accountability" (1994:2). President of the New South Wales Law Society, David 
Fairlie (1994:2), could contrast accountability reforms in his own state which did 
not threaten self-regulation with those proposed in other states: 
Although there remain imperfections, I believe we should support the 
introduction of the Act as it is now framed. While there is now non-lawyer 
participation in all aspects of our regulation, the fundamental point is that 
13 This was confirmed by an interview with a Trade Practices Commissioner. 
14 Of course as Section III showed, for some lawyers the total abolition of self-regulation 
is desirable. But by and large the profession is more likely to accept reform if it does not 
completely abolish self-regulation. 
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we remain at the core a profession which is self-regulated. This is in stark 
contrast to the proposals for change to the legal profession released by the 
Victorian and Queensland Governments. 
The New South Wales reforms were made only after extensive consultation with 
the profession, and gave the new Legal Services Commissioner power to receive 
and investigate all client complaints, and to either refer them to the profession's 
own disciplinary bodies under the Commissioner's monitoring and direction, or to 
investigate them him or her self (Legal Profession Reform Act 1993 (NSW), Mark 
1995). 
In contrast, the Victorian Attorney General's initial proposals for reform (Wade 
1994) were made without significant consultation with the profession, and changed 
very little before being enshrined in legislation.15 She proposed that a Legal 
Practice Board be appointed which would oversee the regulation of the legal 
profession, issue practising certificates and administer the solicitors' guarantee 
fund and professional indemnity insurance. It would accredit "Recognised 
Professional Associations" to make rules and perform disciplinary functions. 
Although the Attorney General's working party on the legal profession consulted 
widely and thoroughly before issuing their report on her initial proposals (Craven 
1995), only one significant change was made at the behest of the legal profession as 
a result of this consultation before the Bill was drafted (Legal Practice Bill 1996 
(Vic)).16 By this stage the profession had largely accepted the inevitability of the 
changes, but this was not evidence of a successful reform process. Rather, 
according to one prominent member, the LIV felt that it had little chance of 
influencing the Attorney's reforms which had already been largely decided before 
any consultation occurred: 
We're not unhappy with the changes. But if they had come to us at the 
outset and said, "These are our political objectives, how would you like us to 
achieve our goals?" there is a good chance we could have together come up 
with something less bureaucratic and less costly ... (MLS27) 
15 Interviews in Victoria with MSL27 (a prominent member of the LIV) and MG4 (an 
officer of the Justice Department) showed that the Attorney General put out her initial 
paper (Wade 1994) without consulting with the profession. The Working Party on the 
Legal Profession then consulted widely before issuing their report (Craven 1995), but there 
were no substantive policy changes between the two papers. 
16 That the whole Legal Practice Board would not be appointed by the Government but 
some members be elected by the profession. 
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Indeed the process by which reforms had been introduced made the LIV executive 
feel that their ability to self-regulate had been completely impugned, and that it 
would be better if the government took over their self-regulatory disciplinary 
functions entirely (Meadows 1996):17 
What happened was that the government wanted to reform our regulation ... 
We said why don't you come and look and whatever functions you think we're 
not doing well, you just take them over. We're very tough on our own 
members. It's hard to discipline your own members and they don't like it ... 
We said why doesn't the government take over our disciplinary functions 
entirely ... 
Interviewer: You think that if they're not going to trust you to completely 
self-regulate, then they should take it over with all its expense and trouble? 
Yes, if we're not going to be completely self-regulating, then the government 
should take it on. But they're just doing this half-way house. (MLS27) 
The initial hostility with which the Attorney's reform proposals were met (as 
described above in Section III) may have had as much to do with the process by 
which radical reforms to self-regulation were introduced, as with the actual content 
of the reforms. By the end of 1996 the Victorian profession seemed reconciled to 
the reforms, but, as the quotation above indicates, still felt that the government had 
discredited their previous efforts at self-regulation and not respected them enough 
to involve them in the initial formulation of proposals for change. 
VI. Converting Lawyers 
Traditionally the legal profession has made a strongly principled stance against the 
need to explicitly address competition and accountability in its regulatory 
structures. The current round of debate and reform in Australia shows a 
profession which has moved, especially in its attitude toward competition policy. 
The data reported here suggest that the process of the reform debate was at least 
17 Indeed the LIV had some reason to feel that they had been doing the best they could 
under difficult circumstances. Interviewees described the Government's reforms as coming 
in a context in which members who were disciplined had been vocal in their criticisms of 
the LIV for continuing its involvement in self-regulation, while the Professional 
Standards department of the LIV had implemented an accredited quality assurance 
program to ensure it dealt with client complaints well. 
180 
Chapter 7 Dynamics of Reform 
as important as its content in achieving that result. It fits well the literature on 
theories of responsive regulation, dialogue and reactance described in Chapters 
Three and Four (pp 57-59, 84-86). These works show that the processes and 
strategies by which governments and communities attempt to influence and control 
the behaviour of individuals and groups is crucial in determining whether they 
voluntarily consider the desirability of change and reform themselves, or resist. 
Individual actors are most likely to listen to reasonable calls to change their 
behaviour when they are communicated in a spirit of dialogue, as opposed to being 
coercively imposed, as Braithwaite' s theory of reintegrative shaming argues 
(Braithwaite 1989:10, 69-70; seep 58 above). Offenders will react "defiantly" to 
sanctions and threats, regardless of their substantive merits, where they believe 
they have been applied in an unfair, stigmatising, and disrespectful way (Sherman 
1993). Their proud and self-righteous reaction entrenches them in deviant 
behaviour and makes them more likely to re-offend (Sherman 1993:459). 
Ayres and Braithwaite have found that the same theory applies to the individual 
and collective responses of actors to business regulation, as mentioned in Chapters 
Three and Four. Thus when regulators use strategies of "dialogue, communal 
judgment, reciprocal wooing, and persuasion, which is minimally coerced by power 
relations", constructive regulatory outcomes can be negotiated (Ayres & 
Braithwaite 1992:97). In contrast when regulators use coercive strategies they often 
break down the goodwill and motivation of actors who might otherwise have been 
responsive (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992:21-27):18 
When punishment rather than dialogue is in the foreground of regulatory 
encounters, it is basic to human psychology that people will find this 
humiliating, will resent and resist in ways that include abandoning self-
regulation. (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992:25) 
It is because strict regulatory strategies are based on regulators' image of regulatees 
as "amoral calculators" that such strategies stimulate opposition and destroy 
cooperation, so that the goals of regulation actually become more difficult to 
achieve (Kagan & Scholz 1984:73-74; see also Bardach & Kagan 1982).19 These 
18 This theory is supported by the empirical evidence and testing cited in Chapter Three 
at pp 57-59. 
19 Kagan & Scholz (1984) argue that regulators tend to treat business managers and firms 
according to one of three images; the amoral calculator (motivated entirely by profit-
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principles apply not only to individual regulatory encounters, but also to the 
development and imposition of regulatory schemes for whole industries. Thus 
governments are more successful in achieving their goals of regulatory reform if they 
allow an industry the discretion and responsibility to implement self-regulatory 
reform first rather than moving straight to imposed command regulation. 
Consistent with this theory, engaging the Australian legal profession in dialogue 
has proved effective in converting lawyers through debates where their view was 
heard, but where it was not necessarily the predominant one. Some lawyers were 
responsive to such dialogue simply to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the 
community. Others opened their minds to the ideas of reformers and were 
persuaded by their merits. Yet voluntary change was most common where 
persuasive dialogue was supported by a perception of the inexorability of the 
reform process. For some, inexorability was about the power of commercial 
consumers to force competition. For others it was about the determination of 
reformers who had power in a climate of microeconomic reform to introduce 
change, but demonstrated a willingness to engage in dialogue and allow the 
profession to reform itself before imposing reform. Conversely, attempts to force 
change without dialogue produced unnecessary resistance to reform and 
entrenched conservatism among lawyers. When reformers seemed to assume that 
the profession had not and would not reform itself, or where reformers seemed to 
refuse to listen to lawyers' perspectives on their own profession, lawyers 
experienced reform proposals as illegitimate insult and became proud of fighting 
back (see Sherman 1993:448). The apparent inexorability of reform was a goad to 
defiance and reactance. 
Thus the presence or absence of deliberative process can have a significant effect 
on the ease with which reform is introduced, and the process of reform can have a 
profound effect on its content. Adopting a deliberative process of regulatory 
reform might mean leaving a variety of different substantive regulatory policy 
options open. For example, if reformers want to adopt a posture of dialogue, they 
will probably not begin by proposing the complete abolition of self-regulation 
because to do so would be to communicate distrust towards the profession by 
discrediting its efforts at regulation in the past and disrespecting the value of its 
seeking), the political citizen (ordinarily inclined to comply), and the organisationally 
incompetent entity (that fail to comply because of organisational failures). 
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opinion and experience for the future. In a process -of persuasion and cooperative 
reform, the content of reforms is decided by that process and cannot be set 
beforehand. Thus in relation to competition policy, a mixture of debate, dialogue 
and the realisation that some change was unavoidable meant that the profession 
came to the negotiating table, with the result that the content of reforms varied 
from state to state and was rather different to what the TPC had originally 
envisioned. The availability of an element of self-regulated reform was an 
important contributor to the viability of cooperative change. Accountability reform 
was not so successful particularly in Victoria. Indeed the Australian experience 
shows that proposals of accountability reform are inherently more likely to be 
perceived in a threatening way by lawyers than proposals of competition reform. 
Given the empirical reality of conversion stories based on productive dialogue 
reported here, self-regulation and dialogue must be taken seriously as normative 
ideals for lawyers' regulation. Yet it seems foolish to trust lawyers to self-regulate 
in the public interest, and to reform themselves when necessary simply in response 
to public dialogue. A sophisticated image of the legal profession which sees it as 
capable of effective self-regulation and self-reform (and of unhelpful conservatism 
and self-interest) is necessary in order to develop a useful regulatory strategy. 
Chapter Eight turns to the evidence and theory that lies behind the advocacy of 
different regulatory policies for the legal profession, and shows that the sociology 
of the legal profession also supports a deliberative process of regulatory reform in 
which a mix of strategies are utilised. 
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Competing Images of the Legal Profession: 
Competing Regulatory Strategies 
I. Introduction 
The previous chapter concluded on the basis of Australian evidence that a 
deliberative process might be the most effective means for determining how to 
reform the regulation and organisation of the legal profession. This chapter 
considers the substantive merits of different regulatory policy options, using 
empirical and theoretical evidence on the nature and potential of the profession. 
As Chapter Seven indicated, policy arguments for reform to the regulation and 
organisation of the legal profession often take place within the framework of two 
basic paradigms: Traditionalists prefer the ideal type of an independent, self-
regulating profession, while reformers lean towards a model of forcible deregulation 
to meet requirements for a competitive market. These normative policy arguments 
reflect the underlying and inchoate theories on the empirical nature of the 
profession their proponents hold. Corresponding theories can also be found in the 
scholarly literature on the professions: Functionalism portrays lawyers as a 
learned, independent community of specialists who must be trusted to govern 
themselves (Goode 1957, Parsons 1954a), while the market control approach sees 
the profession as an inherently self-serving monopoly protected by ideology and a 
lack of accountability, which should be distrusted (Abel 1988, 1989a, Larson 
1977). 
These two competing images are artificial, ignoring important ambiguities in the 
profession. The bulk of recent sociological evidence problematises the dichotomy, 
and shows that a more effective interpretation of the legal profession draws on 
both images. This can also ground a more sophisticated understanding of 
normative regulatory issues: The challenge is not to choose between strategies of 
self-regulation and trust, and strategies of forcible reform and distrust, but to 
reconcile them. Such rapprochement requires a process of dialogue and debate 
between the proponents of different policies. Sections II and III clarify and criticise 
the descriptive theories on which prescriptive arguments are based in order to 
establish a sound basis for renegotiation. Sections IV and V propose a deliberative 
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process for regulatory reform which respects and responds to the complexity of the 
legal profession, by contemplating the combination of competing regulatory policies. 
Chapter Three made a case for deliberative democracy on the basis that access to 
justice means access to procedures by which decisions and actions can be contested 
and debated to ensure they live up to accepted social and political ideals. Chapter 
Four was a case for an institutionalisation of deliberative democratic justice based 
on access to informal dispute resolution and access to law in a context where both 
were permeable by collective social and political action. Chapter Seven made a case 
for deliberation in the regulation of the legal profession on the basis of Australian 
evidence of what has worked. The case for deliberation from the present chapter is 
quite different. It is that the legal profession is an ambiguous target of regulation-
segmented, fractured, diffuse. It has a power of special knowledge and trained 
competence in the crucial institutions of the law that warrants trust. It has a power 
from cartelisation that warrants distrust. Only a regulatory strategy that flows 
from the kind of deliberation that enables it to be contextually flexible is likely to 
comprehend this ambiguity. The responsive regulatory pyramid proposed in this 
chapter will not be a pyramid of responses to specific injustices-dialogue, 
warning, ADR, adjudication, state sanctions-as in Chapter Four. It is a pyramid of 
regulatory regimes-the discipline of the market, self-regulation, enforced self-
regulation, regimes of state regulation. This lays the foundations for Chapter Nine to 
attempt a deliberatively democratic design for the regulation of the legal profession 
that incorporates pyramids of types of reactions to specific injustices and 
pyramids of regulatory regimes. 
II. Competing Policies; Competing Theories 
( i) The Legal Profession as Conspiratorial Cartel 
As Chapter Seven suggested, critiques of the legal profession from the perspective of 
competition theory have been the main catalyst for recent regulatory reform. The 
process of reform in Australia in the 1990s was just one manifestation of a 
movement throughout the common law world to seek to apply strategies of 
competition and accountability to the regulation of the legal profession in an 
attempt to achieve the more just and effective delivery of legal services. As Chapter 
Four showed (pp 72-75) the competition wave of access to justice reform 
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frequently resulted in the application of competition policy to legal service delivery, 
and lawyers, along with other professionals, are being made to feel the same 
demands for micro-economic reform which have already been applied to other 
areas of social life. Thus competition and accountability critiques of the legal 
profession have been the catalysts for regulatory reform over the last thirty years in 
Britain (Benson 1979, Brazier et al 1993, Cownie 1990, Hughes Commission 1980, 
Partington 1991, Perkin 1989:472-519, Smith 1989),1 Canada (Arthurs et al 
1988:138, Evans & Trebilcock 1982, Trebilcock et al 1979) and the US (Freidson 
1983, Powell 1985, 1986, Rose 1983).2 
Competition reformers see the legal profession as no different from any other 
industry which must be subject to micro-economic reform. Their image of the legal 
profession is of a cartel which has managed to achieve monopoly rents and 
privileges by self-over-regulation. Lawyers are not free to compete with each other 
or with members of other occupations because of restrictive rules and practices 
which erect barriers to entry, restrict the structure of legal work, prohibit normal 
competitive conduct such as advertising, and institutionalise anti-competitive 
practices such as price-fixing. Governments and regulators such as the ACCC must 
now step in to abolish over-regulation and ensure professional bodies no longer 
prevent competition occurring among lawyers and other legal service providers. 
At its most extreme, the picture of the legal profession as cartel is justified by the 
neo-classical economics of Milton Friedman. In his theory special regulation always 
becomes "a tool in the hands of a special producer group to obtain a monopoly 
1 In the United Kingdom, the Monopolies Commission had already reported on 
professional practices in general and the practices of the legal profession in particular in 
1975 and 1976, when the Thatcher government introduced legislation breaking down 
solicitors' conveyancing monopoly in 1983. In 1988, the Marre Report which was the result 
of an inquiry into the future of the legal profession, recommended that rights of audience 
be extended to individual solicitors with appropriate qualifications. Then in 1989 the 
Lord Chancellor released three green papers on the Work and Organisation of the Legal 
Profession, Conveyancing and Contingency Fees advocating a substantial restructuring of 
the legal practice. These reforms were welcomed by the Law Society but the Bar's 
reaction was more mixed (see Weisbrot 1990:186-187). The Courts and Legal Services Act 
(1990) further broke down the conveyancing monopoly as well as the probate monopoly 
and barristers' previously exclusive audience rights in higher courts. 
2 Reforms to the US legal profession occurred somewhat earlier than in other common law 
countries and often at the instigation of segments of the profession itself rather than 
government reformers (see Powell 1985, 1986). For example competition reforms occurred 
after lawyers brought anti-trust cases against their own professional associations to the 
courts. 
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position at the expense of the rest of the public" (Friedman 1962:148; see also 
Gellhorn 1956).3 Other economists recognise the force of arguments for 
deregulation of the legal services industry but seek to balance the demands of 
competition and protection. They see the profession as a cartel, and argue that 
consumers would benefit from price competition, more advertising, and opening the 
market to non-lawyers, but do not necessarily accept that there should be no 
licensing at all (Albon & Lindsay 1984, Curran 1993, Dorsey 1983, Evans & 
Trebilcock 1982, Slayton & Trebilcock 1978). 
A dominant perspective in the sociology of the professions over the last twenty 
years complements this economic critique.4 Since Johnson, sociologists have seen 
professions as occupational groups organised to maximise their power by claiming 
the status of "profession" and the privileges that go with it (Johnson 1972:45). For 
Larson the "professional project" is to use claims of special knowledge and skills 
to strive both for market control (economic power) through monopolisation, and 
social status (social power) through a collective mobility project (Larson 1977:xvi). 
The most important strategy in the struggle is to control professional education so 
that the profession holds a collective monopoly on knowledge or expertise itself, as 
well as on the supply of producers: 
In a perfect market situation, the sovereignty resides, theoretically, in the 
consumer. The professions ultimately depend on the public's willingness to 
accept and legitimize the superiority of their knowledge and skills. The 
singular characteristic of professional power is, however, that the profession 
has the exclusiv_e privilege of defining both the content of its knowledge and 
the legitimate conditions of access to it, while the unequal distribution of 
knowledge protects and enhances this power. (Larson 1977:48; italics in 
original) 
This theory sees traditional self-regulation and its justifications as no more than 
support for the self-interested professional project aimed at ensuring that 
competition between members is minimised and the profession acts in solidarity to 
3 Adam Smith's statement on the undesirability of allowing members of the same trade to 
meet and associate together is also often quoted against the legal profession: 
People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and 
diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some 
contrivance to raise prices ... (quoted by Curran 1993:47) 
4 See Begun (1986) for a discussion of how sociological and economic views of professions 
fit together. See Macdonald (1995) for a recent example of how the market control 
approach dominates the sociology of the professions. 
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advance its collective goals. Traditional professional claims of disinterested public 
service and of a social bargain mandating self-regulation form part of an ideology 
which justifies and obscures the social structural inequalities caused by 
professionalism. The profession provides a clear path for individual members to 
achieve power and prestige within this tightly regulated structure so that they 
remain committed to an unified profession and contribute, deliberately or not, to its 
collective project (Larson 1977:70-74). 
Considerable empirical evidence supports the application of Larson's theory to the 
legal profession: Abel shows how this theory explains the history and behaviour of 
the legal profession in the United Kingdom (1988) and the US (1989a). Thus he 
writes that the American Bar Association's model code of ethical rules, 
sets forth criteria of "moral character" sufficiently rigorous and, more 
importantly, sufficiently vague that they can be used to restrict the number of 
entrants or to exclude certain categories from the profession. It cautions the 
laity against self-help and discourages lawyers from helping lay persons 
represent themselves. And it devotes an entire Canon, nine Ethical 
Considerations, and three Disciplinary Rules to protecting the professional 
monopoly against the threat of "unauthorised practice". (Abel 198lb:654-
655) 
Weisbrot (1990) and O'Malley (1983) tell the story of the Australian legal 
profession from the same perspective. Each sees the legal profession as an 
autonomous collective organisation aimed and organised to secure its economic and 
social self-interest through the control of entry, competition and internal regulation. 
It is a "conspiracy against the laity" inherently unworthy of trust. 
It is true that institutions of professional community often fail to live up to their 
own rhetoric of effective self-regulation. In addition to the material outlined in 
Chapter Two, there is also compelling evidence that self-regulatory professional 
communities encourage "in-group solidarity of occupational incumbents, who frown 
on revealing to the public any unsavoury activities of an individual worker unless 
they become so blatant as to harm the whole group" (Haug 1980:66):5 Less than 
ten percent of complaints to disciplinary tribunals may come from other lawyers 
5 See also Freidson's (1975) research on the regulatory process in the day to day work life 
of medical practitioners. He shows that practitioners worked on the assumption their 
colleagues were trustworthy, honest and competent, that internal social control worked 
and that it was bad form to criticise them. 
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and judges (Brockman & McEwen 1990:12-13).6 There is also evidence that many 
workers may be capable of providing competent legal services if unauthorised 
practice rules which hedge lawyers' professional monopolies did not prevent them 
from doing so. Thus Zemans (1982) shows that in Canada, England and the US 
there are already many paralegals, operating under the direct control of lawyers 
who could conceivably take more responsibility for themselves and competently 
provide unique contributions to access to justice services if lawyers would let 
them.7 
It is ironic "that much of the criticism of professionalism by radicals seems to 
advance the implicit alternative of the individualistic free market that underlies 
capitalism" (Freidson 1992:219). The policy consequence of accepting the market 
control theory of the profession is to reform lawyers by breaking down professional 
organisation and self-regulation and forcing more competition. As Abel 
(1989b:302) argues at one point, "though more stringent regulation of incompetence 
and discourtesy surely is needed ... the profession consistently opposes the most 
effective cure-free competition, particularly with non-lawyers". Thus, like Milton 
Friedman, many sociological critics of the legal profession seem to imply full and 
free competition, and little more, as the remedy for the evils of professionalism. 
( ii) The Legal Profession as Community of Competence 
As Chapters Six and Seven indicate, lawyers, like other professionals, have 
historically asserted a right to self-regulate without institutionalised accountability 
to anyone else, and to be immune from reforms of either a competition or consumer 
protection perspective enforced from outside. Underlying their arguments is an 
image of the profession as qualitatively different from business in the type of 
services it provides, in its communal organisation and therefore in the type of 
regulation appropriate to it. The traditional image of the legal profession is of a 
group with great knowledge and expertise performing a function of great 
significance to society and strictly regulating themselves to make sure they perform 
it well in the interests of clients and the public. 
6 Most come from clients. 
7 See also Trebilcock & Reiter (1982:95) referring to a study showing that in Vancouver it 
has become an accepted fact of practice that paraprofessionals handle the entire 
conveyancing transaction except for the client interview. 
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This alternative picture of the professions as trusted self-regulatory communities of 
experts was supported by functionalist theory and revived by certain 
contemporary theorists of the legal profession. For Parsons (1954b:381) 
professionals were different from members of other occupations or markets because 
they were "trained in and integrated with, a distinctive part of our cultural 
tradition, having a fiduciary responsibility for its maintenance, development and 
implementation." Since professions are responsible for, and learned in, bodies of 
knowledge and practice of great value to society they must be specially regulated to 
ensure they are suitably trained and certified to interpret, develop, improve and 
practically apply this tradition for the benefit of others (Parsons 1954b:372). As 
Goode (1957:196) argues, unusually restrictive rules are necessary to protect 
individual clients from being dominated by professionals who know so much more 
than them: 
The problems brought to the professional are usually those the client cannot 
solve, and only the professional can solve. The client does not usually choose 
his professional by a measurable criterion of competence, and after the work 
is done, the client is not usually competent to judge if it was properly done. 
Economists have also shown that failure occurs in the market for professional 
services because of "informational asymmetry, in which the seller knows the quality 
of his service or product, but the buyer does not" (Leland 1979:1329). Intervention 
in the market to ensure minimum quality standards is thus necessary (Akerlof 1970, 
Arrow 1963, Horowitz 1980, Leland 1979). The functionalists argued that since 
unqualified persons are not competent to meddle in professional affairs, 
professionals must be trusted to do this special regulation themselves: 
Professionals profess. They profess to know better than others the nature of certain 
matters, and to know better than their clients what ails them or their affairs ... 
Since the professional does profess, he asks that he be trusted" (Hughes 1963:656). 
Self-regulatory communities which socialise lawyers into ethical behaviour and 
discipline undesirable conduct therefore make sense as a way to achieve the 
regulation necessary. This is precisely how professions are organised according to 
Durkheim (1992). Durkheim proposed that the professional genre of ethics be 
extended to the whole of economic life as a solution to the evils of unrestrained 
capitalism. His thesis was that we can trust neither market forces nor state 
regulation to inculcate ethics (1992:12). They must be the concern of sufficiently 
cohered self-regulating occupations which teach each member to look away from 
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their self-interest and towards the whole community, and thus develop the general 
disinterestedness on which moral activity is based (1992:23-24).
8 The more 
protection given these groups the better their ethics will be (1992:13). 
The regulation of the profession can thus be seen as a social bargain characterised 
by trust. The legal professional community takes on the burden of specially 
regulating itself since it alone is competent to do so. In return society at large and 
clients trust them and protect them from interference, supervision and competition, 
as well as giving them higher remuneration and social status.9 But these privileges 
can hypothetically be withdrawn if the profession fails to regulate itself in the 
public interest: 
[T]he larger society has obtained an indirect social control by yielding direct 
social control to the professional community, which thus can make judgments 
according to its own norms . . . Thus it is that the social control of the 
professional community over its members may be seen as a response to the 
threat of the larger lay society to control it. Failure to discipline would 
mean both a loss of prestige in the society, and a loss of community autonomy. 
(Goode 1957:198) 
Of itself this social bargain may not be sufficient to make every individual 
professional altruistic, but it means that the profession as a whole will be 
motivated to organise, regulate and socialise individual lawyers to serve and not 
exploit clients (see also Rueschemeyer 1983:41). This theory of a social bargain 
between the profession and the community has also received contemporary support 
from Barber (1983), Dingwall & Fenn (1987) Halliday (1987) and Paterson (1995) 
(see discussion pp 199-200 below). 
The evidence of social psychological research tends to support the assumptions of 
this theory: When people identify with a group or accept its values then their sense 
of self is linked to acting in compliance with group norms including norms about 
ethical behaviour. The motivation is internal: It is not linked to judgments of risk in 
8 Similarly Goode (1957) argued that as an occupation professionalises, it becomes more 
like a community and it is through its community aspects that social control over 
individual members is exercised. 
9 There are parallels between this sociological view of professions and human capital 
theory in economics which sees individual professionals as receiving the privileges of 
professionalism as a reasonable return on their investment in education, and over-work 
(Becker 1975, Schultz 1961). 
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the environment (Tyler 1996, Tyler & Dawes 1993). Thus where a practitioner 
identifies sufficiently with his or her professional community, he or she is likely to 
naturally follow professional ethical norms. The issue is what type of norms a 
professional community instils in its members, and whether the social bargain is 
sufficient to ensure self-regulation occurs in the public interest rather than the 
profession's interest (an issue that will be discussed further in Chapter Nine). 
III. Comprehending Ambiguity 
Historically the regulation of the legal profession was based on the image of the 
profession as trusted self-regulatory community of competence. The empirical 
work of sociologists and economists based on Larson and Friedman has 
demonstrated that the legal profession has not acted in conformity with that image. 
Does this mean that the image of the profession as cartel oriented towards self-
interest and therefore worthy of distrust should form the basis for any normative 
theory for regulating lawyers? 
The history of regulatory reform to Australian lawyers and their (contingent) 
acceptance of reform, as described in Chapter Seven, suggested that the market 
control approach may not totally explain the nature and behaviour of the 
profession. Critics of the profession often see apparent gains as trivial or 
subverted to the profession's own interests. For example, at one point Abel 
(1989b:292) writes that the opening of the legal services market in Britain to 
licensed conveyancers is too insignificant to pose any real danger to legal 
professional domination. According to this "hermeneutics of suspicion" attempts 
at reform are futile, unless they totally destroy the monopoly power of the 
profession.10 The evidence adduced in Chapter Seven, however, and by proponents 
of the traditional image of the profession (as above) shows that the critical view is 
too simplistic a basis for responding adequately to the complexity of the 
profession. Indeed it is clear from the bulk of research on lawyers that neither 
competing image can satisfactorily describe the legal profession and explain its 
behaviour. At least three ambiguities confound dual approaches to comprehending 
the profession (discussed in (i) to (iii) below); its segmentation, its complex culture 
10 See Hopkins (1978:5-13) for other examples of the way critical legal studies scholars 
apply this hermeneutics of suspicion to reforms. 
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and the ambiguity of its use of claims to special knowledge. Regulatory polices for 
the profession ought to explicitly respond to these ambiguities; policy discourses 
that rely on either self-regulation or enforced competition and accountability reform 
alone are generally too blunt to address such complexity. 
(i) A Segmented Profession 
Both the market control and the professional self-regulation approach assume that 
internal socialisation processes will keep lawyers more or less unified in ethics and 
goals. The market control perspective assumes that the profession will adequately 
control its members so that it can act as an unified whole in its own economic self-
interest. The professional self-regulation approach assumes that the legal 
professional community will effectively discipline and socialise individual lawyers 
into a professional community which serves the interests of the public and clients. 
Yet the profession is unified neither as self-regarding cartel nor other-regarding 
community; it is profoundly segmented.11 Different segments have different 
interests and concerns, some of which may accord more closely with the views of 
reformers than others, and some of which may be more public-regarding than 
others. 
That barristers and solicitors have different interests became clear in England when 
I 
they squabbled over the nature of reforms to the profession allowing solicitors to 
appear as advocates in court (Belloni 1996, Cownie 1990:214-215). Similarly in 
Australia the two branches of the profession have frequently disagreed over the 
desirability of reform to division of the profession (Disney et al 1986:22-36, 92-
122). More recently large firms of solicitors have begun to challenge the Bar's 
monopoly and to complain of unacceptable and inefficient Bar practices (Weisbrot 
1993:4, 11). Urban and rural lawyers or city and suburban solicitors have also 
conflicted, especially over allowing licensed non-lawyer conveyancers (McQueen 
1993:18). In the US differences in ethical and regulatory matters have lead to splits 
between plaintiff's lawyers and lawyers who defend insurance companies and 
corporate clients (Powell 1985:283) and between inhouse corporate counsel and 
other members of the American Bar Association (Schneyer 1992). Many small firm 
11 See Tomasic (1983) for a preliminary analysis of differences in the Australian legal 
profession according to type of work, nature of clientele and ideology of different 
practitioners. Also see Halliday's work (1981) on the fracturing of the Australian legal 
profession and its effects on possibilities for collective action. 
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lawyers feel left out of professional self-governance and would prefer disciplinary 
issues to be dealt with by an independent body rather than professional 
associations which they see as elitist (see pp 37-39, 165-167 below). Women 
lawyers have their own demands for reform in the profession to make it less 
discriminatory and more inclusive, while employee lawyers are beginning to form 
and join unions (see pp 35-37 above). 
Heinz and Laumann's (1982:319) study of Chicago lawyers found that the legal 
profession could be split into two "hemispheres" according to "one fundamental 
distinction-the distinction between lawyers who represent large organisations 
(corporations, labour unions or government) and those who represent individuals". 
This segmentation is likely to have significant effects on acceptance of competition 
reform: Heinz and Laumann (1982:322) infer that organisational clients will 
exercise much more control over their lawyers than individual clients and there is 
much evidence to suggest that in Australia commercial clients have forced their 
lawyers to become much more competitive (see Chapter Seven pp 171-173). There 
is also evidence from Britain that acceptance of competition reform varies greatly 
by geographical locality (Love et al 1992, Paterson et al 1988). 
Powell (1985) shows that developments in the regulation of lawyers in the US were 
initiated or facilitated by segments of the bar seeking to further their own interests. 
For example, legal clinic entrepreneurs allied themselves with consumer activists to 
challenge minimum fee schedules and prohibitions on advertising. In Australia 
activist lawyers have argued and lobbied for reform in what they see as the public 
interest for many years. This was particularly evident in the 1970s when "radical" 
lawyers clashed with professional associations over professional regulatory rules 
which were hindering the development of legal aid and of community legal centres 
(Bell 1985, Chesterman 1996, Tomsen 1992). It has also been true of the recent 
Australian debate (Weisbrot 1993:9). 
Thus, it would be wrong to see reform as imposed from outside on an unwilling 
profession united against change. The profession has a variety of interests and 
concerns, some of which accord more with the traditional professional model and 
some with reformers' view of how things should be done. Forces for change and for 
stagnation can be found among different segments of the profession. At different 
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times different segments gain ascendancy to champion reform or resistance to 
reform. 
( ii) The Ambiguous Culture of Legal Professionalism 
Not only do differences in interest, concerns and ideology occur among different 
segments of the legal profession, the culture of legal professionalism, into which all 
lawyers are socialised to a greater or lesser extent, is itself profoundly ambiguous. 
The market control approach saw the culture or ideology of professionalism purely 
as the tool of economic interest; a false or distorted set of beliefs propagated as 
justification for the self-interest of the profession. The traditional view sees the 
institutions of self-regulation as adequate to sustain a culture of public regard. The 
culture of legal professionalism, however, is neither aimed solely at justifying 
economic self-interest nor inculcating public-regarding ethics. It does contain 
elements of professional arrogance, and self-justificatory ideology but there is also 
a strong tradition of public service and responsibility, even if it is sometimes 
paternalistic or misguided. 
Theories that see the profession as motivated by wider cultural forces and 
institutional concerns explain how legal professional culture can play this more 
ambiguous role. For example, Halliday (1987) argues that the status and power of 
the profession does not depend solely on economic power and an associated 
mobility project, but on the ability of the profession to convince society that it has 
legitimate expert and moral authority in certain areas. So while the project of 
attaining monopolies might be the focus of legal professional ideology as long as its 
concern is self-preservation, once the profession becomes established it moves 
"beyond monopoly" and can afford to concern itself with a broader range of 
functions and actions, including contributing to an "efficient and effective legal 
system" .12 Similarly, Kritzer (1991:539) argues that the professional project can be 
more usefully seen as one of institutionalisation than market control: 
"[!]institutionalisation involves two primary components: (1) establishing 
boundaries between the emerging institution and other organisations, entities, etc; 
and (2) rationalising the internal form and operation of the emerging institution". 
12 Halliday's work was based on extensive study of the historical records of the Chicago 
Bar Association. McQueen (1993) shows how the LIV moved through similar stages 
between 1885 and 1930. 
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According to these conceptions the profession will be perfectly willing to reform 
itself by shedding restrictive practices and becoming concerned with the public 
interest in order to maintain legitimacy. Pue goes further and argues that the culture 
of legal professionalism is part of the larger culture of modernisation and 
rationalisation, not just an artefact of economic forces. The market control 
approach is unable to, 
... accommodate a sophisticated appreciation of professional "ideology". 
Like all variations of economism it tends to reduce ideology to little more 
than a mystification trick deliberately designed to dupe outsiders into 
acquiescence in their own exploitation. Professional ideology is not taken 
seriously on its own terms, and the relationship of professional ideology to 
larger currents of intellectual thought is under-emphasised. (Pue 1990b:406) 
Powell's (1986) study of why and how the Chicago Bar Association gave up its 
disciplinary powers over attorneys in that state to a court controlled commission 
lends some support to Pue' s argument. Powell suggests that the Chicago Bar 
Association faced a crisis of legitimacy at the time and that the reason they 
voluntarily ceded responsibility for disciplinary functions was their concern to 
restore the reputation of the legal profession, and indeed the legal system. Their 
reaction was not simply the pragmatic acceptance of a reform that would otherwise 
have been forced upon them; there was no imminent threat to the Bar Association's 
control of disciplinary functions (Powell 1986:40-41). Rather, Powell suggests that 
the maintenance of self-regulation was not as important in their culture and 
ideology as the maintenance of a good reputation for the profession and the legal 
syst_em, and since it would have been expensive to adequately reform the 
disciplinary system, the Bar Association handed control over to the court which 
now runs a much better system. 
By giving the culture of legal professionalism recognition, we could understand 
actions of the profession and individual professionals as based on the logic of the 
legal ideology which like all ideologies contains public-regarding elements and self-
interested elements. As we have seen, the culture of lawyers may also differ from 
segment to segment emphasising different elements of an ambiguous legal 
professional ideology. Indeed Chapter Nine will argue that the access to justice 
aspirations of the whole profession can be maximised by capitalising on exposure 
to the public-regarding elements in the ideology of specific movements within the 
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profession such as community legal centre lawyers, women lawyers or black 
lawyers (see pp 210-211, 229-230). 
( iii) The Power of Knowledge 
Finally, a normative theory for regulating the profession should take the knowledge 
and expertise of the profession seriously without accepting that it justifies 
professional domination. The conspiratorial cartel image sees the profession's 
claims to special knowledge as ephemeral: They are a fake support for the 
profession's economic self-interest. The traditional view sees the claim to special 
knowledge as unassailable: It justifies the complete unaccountability of the 
profession. A more appropriate view sees their claims to knowledge as defeasible. 
Professional power does come from knowledge-albeit, carefully manipulated 
claims about knowledge-not merely from the ordinary power of vested economic, 
political and bureaucratic interests (see Sterett 1990:366).13 The knowledge the 
legal profession holds is of great importance and value to society. But the 
profession also has great opportunity to exaggerate and exploit its special 
knowledge so as to dominate individual clients and also the community as a whole. 
Freidson (1986) shows how in the Anglo-American world at least, professions are 
the place where formal knowledge is institutionalised. He demonstrates how 
professionals in the US use formal knowledge to gain influence and power in 
various institutions. He concludes that professions and professionals gain power 
"in policy-making and administration, power to define public needs and problems, 
power in resource-allocation, power over clients, and power to control work" 
through claims to knowledge that are accepted as legitimate by society as a whole 
(1986:213). Brint (1994) sees modern professionalism as based solely on applied 
formal knowledge and expertise, unlike traditional professionalism which was 
based on both expert authority and community orientation. Abbott (1988) also 
places claims to knowledge as central in his analysis of "the system of 
professions". He sees professions primarily as competitors for contestable 
jurisdictions, the basic sets of problems that conceptual knowledge is developed to 
deal with. The extent of each profession's jurisdiction will depend on the success 
of its claims to expertise. 
13 See Macdonald (1995:157-186) for an overview of different sociological approaches to 
knowledge and the professions. 
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As long as there are specialist legal workers, they will have the potential to exercise 
at least some power derived from their special knowledge. This may be worked out 
in a variety of ways, including developing restrictive practices, dominating 
individual clients, or taking over areas of policy development. In economic terms 
this implies that the information asymmetry between lawyers and clients should 
not be under-emphasised. A perfect market in legal services will never be possible: 
Some restrictive regulation, even licensing, will be necessary to protect some clients 
from the special power of knowledge. On the other hand, since lawyers do have 
special experience and knowledge of their own area, that others do not have, it 
might be desirable for them to be involved in the regulation of their own profession. 
Professionals hold special knowledge so they must be treated differently, but since 
they can use that special power to dominate others so effectively, they must be held 
accountable for it. 
IV. Regulatory Responses to Complexity and Ambiguity 
( i) Conspiratorial Cartel and Community of Competence; Trust and 
Distrust 
Both the image of legal profession as conspiratorial cartel and as community of 
competence reveal part of the truth; but each also fails to comprehend the 
ambiguity of the profession evident in its segmentations of interest, its ambivalent 
culture, and the defeasibility of its claims to knowledge. Neither image, then, is 
likely to be a good basis for a normative theory for regulating the profession. 
Indeed the evidence shows that regulatory stances based on the assumption the 
profession conforms to either image are unsuccessful in practice. Strategies based 
totally on self-regulation are exploited when lawyers are motivated by self-interest; 
while acting on an image of the profession as self-interested conspiracy might break 
the cartel, but does not encourage lawyers to behave in a public-regarding way, as 
Chapter Seven demonstrated. Taking the regulatory stance of distrust means 
abandoning hope of creating a profession which conforms at all to the Durkheimian 
ideal, and letting self-interest become its dominant feature. 
Reformers will want to capitalise on the public-regarding elements that exist in the 
profession by recognising the validity of aspects of traditional professional claims 
about self-regulation. They will also want to avoid being duped by a profession 
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which has shown itself capable of acting concertedly against the public interest in 
the past, and crush self-interest at the earliest opportunity. As Barber (1983:140) 
argues, "The public must both trust and distrust professionals, as it must trust and 
distrust all wielders of social and political power". The challenge for theorists and 
policy-makers is to reconcile trusting and distrusting strategies in flexible regulatory 
reform, that recognises the commonsense view that the profession is complex and 
ambiguous. 
( ii) A Social Bargain? 
Does this simply mean readjusting the social bargain between profession and state 
for the contemporary context, maintaining the basic structure of regulation 
described by Durkheim (1992) and Goode (1957)? The bargain between the 
profession and the state would authorise self-regulation, but institutionalise 
distrust by contemplating that the state could withdraw the profession's privileges 
where it did not live up to its trust. The terms of the contract might be renegotiated 
to require more competition and more accountability than before, but the profession 
would retain its basic privileges. Thus Paterson (1995:175) argues that reform to 
the British profession successfully followed a model of 
. . . implicit contractualism in terms of which the profession in return for 
delivering competence, access, a service ethic, and public protection expects to 
receive reasonable rewards, status, constraints on competition and autonomy . 
Viewed in this light the events of the last decade can be construed as no more 
than a renegotiation of the tacit contract placing a greater emphasis on the 
consumers' side of the equation, while leaving the essential elements of 
professionalism intact. 
Dingwall and Fenn (1987:61) see professions as "broadly circumscribed by the 
state because they owe their existence to a framework of law which provides the 
protection for their cartel". Models for regulating the profession must recognise 
that the only effectual discipline against a profession is the withdrawal of its 
privileges of self-regulation (1987:62). They advocate reliance on the potential of 
that discipline and the (Durkheimian) group socialisation processes of the 
profession to make lawyers public-regarding most of the time. 
Halliday (1987) offers a more sophisticated rehabilitation of the social bargain 
approach for the legal profession from a US perspective. He argues that legal 
professional associations are now strong in collegial organisation and resources so 
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that they are free to move "beyond a preoccupation with monopoly, occupational 
closure, and the defence of work domains" and to take on more public-regarding 
concerns, especially responsibility in liberal democratic government (1987:347). 
The particular capacity which they can offer is the ability to advocate and help 
shape a legal system that emphasises the integrity of the legal process and the 
primacy of the rule of law (1987:360). Having moved "beyond monopoly", the 
profession can now bargain meaningfully with the state to preserve its monopoly in 
return for working to make the law more effective and efficient: 
[I]n exchange for the state's implicit guarantee that the traditional 
monopoly of the profession will be largely preserved ... the profession will 
commit its monopoly of competence and its organizational resources to state 
service ... Should professions prove disinclined to contribute their technical 
expertise to a general public interest ... and should they choose to honour a 
civic professionalism only in the breach, then moral claims must yield to 
economic constraint and regulatory adjustments. The state can alienate 
occupational territory from a profession if a constituency is too poorly-or too 
expensively-served by it. In short, given the moderate economic monopoly 
and autonomy granted professions by the state, a commitment to civic 
professionalism can be not only expected but enforced. (Halliday 1987:370-
371 ). 
( iii) A More Dynamic Approach 
These approaches are far too static and statist: Because the state acts as surrogate 
for the community in the bargain, and because it is only able to apply sanctions in 
the most drastic circumstances, the profession is not required to take account of 
community access to justice concerns on a day-by-day basis. Giving the 
government a bargaining chip in the genesis and dissolution of regulatory regimes is 
not sufficient. The history of the profession shows that regulatory schemes are born 
in historically contingent circumstances of moral panic or professional politics, and 
then remain in place largely unchanged for decades.14 Thus English solicitors were 
granted a monopoly over conveyancing in 1804 by Pitt to stop them protesting 
increased stamp duties on both their practising licenses and written conveyances 
(Abel-Smith & Stevens 1967:23). They retained it until Thatcher's reforms in the 
1980s. The regulatory regimes that governed Australian lawyers until the 1980s 
and 1990s were shaped both by Pitt's politics and events in the English legal 
profession of the late 19th century (see Chapter Six pp 133-136). Relying on the 
14 Pue (1987a, 1987b, 1990a) shows how the regulation of the British bar was shaped by a 
series of moral panics in the 19th Century. 
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state to overhaul legal professional regulatory systems when they fail has not been 
good enough. The community needs a more dynamic and responsive way of 
institutionalising both its trust and distrust, self-regulation and public 
accountability. 
The approaches of Dingwall and Fenn (1987), Paterson (1995) and even Halliday 
(1987) seem to "trust" in an effective social bargain between profession and state 
on the basis of their empirical analyses of the nature of the profession and recent 
changes to it. Their lack of normative vision for how to improve on this record, 
suggests that they do not take seriously enough the evidence that negative outcomes 
are likely to be pervasive.15 
Chapter Seven showed that Ayres and Braithwaite's theory of "responsive 
regulation" (1992) explained well the results of regulatory reform of the Australian 
legal profession. The theory of responsive regulation is attractive because it is a 
normative as well as an explanatory theory.16 Responsive regulation requires that 
regulatory regimes be developed as part of a deliberative process, as described 
empirically in the evidence of Chapter Seven and as will be outlined in more detail as 
a normative ideal in Chapter Nine. It proposes that regulatory agencies should use a 
pyramid of regulatory strategies in response to the actions of those they are 
regulating. Instead of using their most drastic regulatory strategies first, they 
should avoid defiance by trading on the goodwill of those they are regulating, 
encouraging them to comply voluntarily. More coercive strategies can be used later 
if necessary. The background threat of coercive strategies will maximise the 
effectiveness of trusting, cooperative measures, without having to rely on them 
when distrust is more appropriate. The evidence in Chapter Seven showed that the 
outcomes predicted by the responsive model for different regulatory reform 
approaches occurred in the Australian context. The more abstract evidence 
outlined in this chapter about the nature of the profession suggests that the theory 
will apply more generally to legal professions in different countries and at different 
times: The dynamic, contextual nature of the regulation it advocates is well suited 
to capitalising on the public-regarding elements of a complex and ambiguous 
profession, without sacrificing the ability to deal with its self-interested elements. 
15 Indeed Dingwall & Fenn (1987:62) are explicitly pessimistic about the possibility for 
any more dynamic approach than their social bargain. 
16 As we have already seen in Chapter Four (p 85). 
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The deliberative theory for regulating the profession advocated in this thesis and 
outlined in detail in Chapter Nine, is therefore an empirically grounded normative 
ideal. Social bargain proponents ignore this task of institutional design in their 
descriptive analyses of why the contract between profession and state ought to 
work, not how to make it work. By contrast, the theory presented here does not 
seek to rehabilitate the functionalism of the social bargain approach as an accurate 
description of the profession and its optimal regulation. Rather it comprehends the 
ambiguity of the profession by abandoning both the community of competence and 
conspiratorial cartel images as bases for regulation. It seeks to institutionalise trust 
and distrust of lawyers by placing discussions about policies for regulating the legal 
profession within a more flexible framework. In this approach, competition, self-
regulation and accountability become options on a continuum of regulatory 
strategies, highly contextual choices about which strategies to use at different times 
and in different sub-areas of professional regulation that can be relatively quickly 
adjusted when they fail or circumstances change. The social bargain is recognised 
as an ideal for professional regulation, but a naive one that must be adjusted in 
accordance with the evidence of how the profession actually behaves. 
In practice, the application of the responsive regulation model might mean that a 
government regulator, such as the ACCC, and public interest groups would 
maximise the opportunities for voluntary cooperative reform by examining the legal 
profession, engaging it in dialogue and giving it a chance to reform its own 
regulation before going any further. They might acknowledge reforms that have 
been made before exercising the authority to make further reforms in negotiation 
with the profession, and finally imposing change where the profession is 
recalcitrant. A result of pursuing such a dynamic approach to the whole of legal 
professional regulatory reform might be that self-regulation with minimal 
accountability would be appropriate for trust account regulation since the 
profession as a whole is keen to have a good public image in this area, but a more 
coercive strategy, perhaps giving regulatory powers to third parties such as tax 
office investigators, would be desirable to prevent lawyers assisting outrageous tax 
evasion schemes. Detailed empirical work from sociologists of the legal profession 
will be helpful in making these decisions. 
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Like the social bargain model, this approach recognises that self-regulation is 
desirable where it works and that the threat of withdrawal of professional 
privileges can motivate lawyers to self-regulate in a trustworthy manner. But it is 
also more dynamic than the traditional social bargain approach, by making the 
development of regulation for the legal profession a matter of continual dialogue 
between state, community and profession. It requires the institutionalisation of 
distrust of the profession, by giving government and community an habitual role in 
holding the profession accountable where it does not prove trustworthy. To ensure 
this, a condition of any regulatory regime coming out of the process of dialogue 
might be that wherever they give the profession privileges and responsibilities, they 
also provide a way of making the profession accountable for those privileges and 
responsibilities at the option of consumers, the community or a government 
regulator. 
For example, the profession might be allowed to make rules and arrangements for 
its own regulation and organisation, but governments and community members 
might also be given the standing to challenge any of those rules or arrangements on 
the grounds that they are not in the public interest before a regulator or a body 
made up of government and community interests. In the same way, the profession 
might agree to be responsible for certain disciplinary matters, but to allow any 
party who is unhappy with the outcome appeal to a body consisting of government 
and/ or community representatives. That body might also receive reports on the 
outcome of all cases from which it could judge whether there were any problem 
areas that should be brought to the profession's attention or regulated in some other 
way. A consumer or community group through its representative on the body might 
have access to information about patterns of structural inequality or domination 
that would found campaigns to change lawyers' practices or educate the public. 
Chapter Seven showed that a scheme with some of these elements was adopted in 
the state of New South Wales after a process of negotiation between the profession, 
the government and reform agencies (p 179). 
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V. Regulatory Reform as Deliberative Process 
A regulatory strategy which adequately comprehends the ambiguity of the 
profession will trust the profession to have a role in its own regulation and reform, 
but will also institutionalise distrust by giving state and community a dynamic part 
to play in holding its self-regulation accountable. Where both the market and its 
self-regulation are found to have failed, the community will rightly insist on state 
regulation. The key to reconciling the use of trusting and distrusting strategies is 
dialogue and deliberation among profession, state and community about where 
self-regulation can work, where other methods will do better and what means of 
accountability to put in place. If stereotypical images of the profession cannot be 
sustained in the light of evidence and experience, the best way to break them down 
is to have the different groups listen to each other's perspectives and attempt to 
justify their own views. 
The responsive approach would promote deliberative democratic participation in 
the regulatory institutions surrounding the legal profession, while simultaneously 
affirming a Durkheimian vision of the legal profession's privilege and responsibility 
in playing a part in its own regulation and reform. It would mean nurturing public-
regarding professionalism. Neither of the dominant paradigms of professional 
regulation envisages the profession playing such a role: One treats lawyers as 
incapable of contributing to their own regulation except as economically self-
interested players in a competitive market place. The other sees them as under no 
responsibility to negotiate, deliberate or make themselves accountable to the rest of 
the community for their self-regulation in any but the most general way. The theory 
of access to justice outlined in Chapters Two, Three, Four and Five saw lawyers as 
integral to democracy, yet also capable of great mischief. The conclusion of this 
chapter is similar: The profession is complex and in order to comprehend its 
ambiguity, lawyers must have the privilege and responsibility of deliberation with 
and accountability to government regulators and community groups. Professional 
regulation should not be dominated by lawyers nor controlled by the state (as 
representative of the community). It should be closer to a partnership between 
profession, state and community in which each checks the interests of the others. 
Making the legal profession an active citizen in a dynamic, communicative 
regulatory process (Sunstein 1993:241) gives lawyers a chance to live up to their 
204 
Chapter 8 Competing Images 
conventional ideology of serving the community by a process of deliberation with 
community and state which ensures they really do so, rather than just saying that 
they do. Contrast this vision with Halliday's (1987) leading approach to 
rehabilitating legal professionalism: He puts forward "civic professionalism" as an 
ideal which would guide the legal profession to do part of the work of government 
as a good citizen. In his social bargain between the state and the profession, the 
state calls the profession to fulfil its moral responsibilities as a citizen by 
contributing some resources to state service; it exercises economic leverage over 
them by retaining the power to alter their monopoly if they do not do so. Yet this 
at once gives the profession too much and too little responsibility. It is neither 
dynamic nor deliberative enough. The profession is given the onerous responsibility 
of self-regulation and state service, but without a framework of accountability and 
responsiveness to dialogue with the community. 
Halliday's civic professionalism is certainly a public-regarding professionalism, but 
one devoid of democratic foundations. It flows from a top-down view of the 
sovereignty of the legislature or the executive state. In Halliday' s social bargain the 
state decides, without public deliberation, to delegate state functions to an 
unaccountable profession. A n1ore attractive democratic theory renders 
professional and parliamentary sovereignty more subordinate to the sovereignty of 
the people. It will consist of three crucial elements: (1) A public-regarding 
professionalism, (2) constituted by public deliberation that is not monopolised by 
the lawyers in the state and the profession, and (3) is held accountable to the 
community through dialogue over particular decisions and public reporting of 
performance indicators that profession, state and community agree to be fair. If we 
accept such a democratic theory of public-regarding professionalism, it follows that 
there is no correct blueprint of accountability and deliberative process for lawyers. 
They are matters for deliberation itself, the outcome of which will be different in 
Australia from what it might be in the US or Indonesia. It is more important to 
render the profession subject to the justice of deliberative democratic 
accountability, than to the demands of either competition or traditional 
professionalism.17 
17 As Brazier et al's (1993) research on the British legal profession shows, increasing 
democratic involvement in professional regulation is the most important motivation for 
reforms even though it may be the ascendancy of economic rationalism that makes reform 
possible. 
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The dialogic approach to the regulation and reform of the legal profession breathes 
new life into a Durkheimian professionalism not by rehabilitating it, but by 
incorporating its critique. The critique shows that lawyers do not always live up to 
the vision of service the state and community expect of them. Making profession, 
state and community deliberate together about regulatory issues increases the 
accountability of the profession and forces it to engage with and meet community 
expectations for itself. By requiring accountability and deliberation of the 
profession, we deal with the fact that it can sometimes be anything but a good 
citizen, without devaluing the contribution its expertise, experience and goodwill 
can make to its own regulatory reform. Chapter Nine considers how we might 
design a regulatory strategy for the legal profession which actually embodies these 
principles. 
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Renegotiating the Regulation of the Legal 
Profession 
I. Introduction 
The approach to reforming the regulation of the profession outlined in Chapters Six 
to Eight requires a balance of regulatory strategies and ethics arrived at 
deliberatively. Yet a deliberative procedure will fail to balance different strategies 
with discrepant rationales unless there is some substantive criterion by which the 
different parties can agree to judge the outcomes of their dialogue. It was the 
access to justice agenda set out in the first half of the thesis which made a balance 
of strategies necessary; and it is this notion of access to justice which provides the 
framework of substantive ideals and goals in which to deliberate for the best 
regulatory mix for the legal profession. This chapter puts the procedural ideal of 
deliberation and the substantive ideal of increased access to justice together in a 
consideration of how the regulation of the legal profession might be renegotiated to 
be aimed at access to justice. 
The argument of Chapters Seven and Eight was that multiple regulatory strategies 
are necessary to cover each other's weaknesses in combating the multiple, 
sometimes inconsistent, forms of domination of clients, the community, the justice 
agenda and each other of which lawyers are capable. Four strategies emerge as 
presently existing techniques that ought to be utilised in any new regulatory balance 
for lawyers. These are (1) nurturing professional community, (2) encouraging 
elements of self-regulation, (3) embracing competition reform, and (4) developing 
institutions of state and community accountability. Chapter Seven presented 
Australian evidence that showed that a mix of these strategies arrived at 
deliberatively will be effective at achieving regulatory reform. Chapter Eight argued 
that such an approach is the only one contextually flexible enough to comprehend 
the ambiguity of the profession. This chapter uses the empirical evidence gathered 
in the previous two chapters to explicitly identify what each strategy can and 
should contribute to implementing the substantive access to justice ideals set out in 
Chapter Six: Sections II to V discuss each strategy in turn with Figure 9.1 (p 213) 
summarising the access to justice strengths identified for each. The fourth strategy, 
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improving the accountability of the profession, is found to be fundamental to the 
effectiveness of all the other strategies, and raises again the need for lawyers' and 
their regulation to be subject to the justice of deliberative democracy. Sections VI 
and VII give detailed attention to how we might nurture procedures of deliberative 
accountability of the legal profession informed by a framework of substantive 
access to justice concerns. 
IL Nurturing Professional Community 
The informal social control of professional community is the indigenous ordering 
that forms the bottom layer of a pyramid of methods (see Figure 9.2, p 218) for 
ensuring lawyers act out the access to justice ideals advanced in Chapter Six. 
Traditionally legal professional self-regulation has been organised and justified 
around the notion of professional community because of the effectiveness of 
socialisation in gaining compliance with communal norms (Durkheim 1992, Parsons 
1954b; see pp 189-192 above); "people are socialised to accept norms of 
appropriate behaviour as so much a part of their definition of self that any 
violation of the norms provokes shame and guilt" (Haug 1980:64; see also 
Kavanaugh 1976:966-967). Informal controls of public criticism, gossip, 
embarrassment, and ostracism can equally ensure conformity. 
Failures in the effectiveness of informal social control occur where lawyers are not 
sufficiently integrated into professional community. As Chapter Two showed (pp 
24-25) those that have been excluded from professional community because they 
do not fit its dominant culture are also more likely to breach professional norms. 
Similarly, corporate lawyers breach norms of respect for the justice of law when 
communal bonds with the whole profession are weaker than bonds with corporate 
employers or clients. This may explain why a powerful faction of in-house 
corporate counsel within the American Bar Association stopped new 
whistleblowing rules requiring lawyers to report the illegal activities of clients being 
included in the 1983 model code of conduct (Schneyer 1992). It is in professional 
communities which span different workplaces that lawyers are most likely to learn 
public-regarding pride in lawyers' justice. It is within such communities that they 
develop the self-identity that motivates them to stand up to clients and to 
employers when necessary to preserve the justice of law (gatekeeper ideal), to prize 
serving clients well (advocacy ideal), to do voluntary work as a matter of public 
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service from time to time (public interest ideal) and to respect one another (ideal of 
collegiality). 
Critics argue that professional community is indeed good at informal social control, 
but that this control is aimed at ensuring that the whole profession is effectively 
oriented towards market control and status improvement, not access to justice or 
any other public good (Abel 1988, 1989a, Larson 1977; see pp 185-189 above). In 
principle, however, there is no reason why informal social control cannot be aimed 
at nurturing a legal culture which upholds lawyers' special responsibilities to 
protect and facilitate access to the justice system. Communal control in this sense 
may take unexpected forms: Large city law firms are often decried as symbolising 
the breakdown of traditional professional community (Galanter & Palay 1995b ), 
yet the management structures and socialisation processes of large firms may 
actually "provide ethical obligations, expectations ... , information channels and 
social norms" (Arnold & Kay 1995:339; see also Carlin 1966:96-118) that broader 
professional associations no longer provide, if they ever did. Many firms have 
institutionalised the building up of social capital in recent times through 
increasingly widespread quality assurance programs (Dal Pont 1996:63-68, 
Lockley 1993),1 and the development of ethics committees, mentoring schemes and 
policies that decisions to take certain actions which might be ethically 
inappropriate should always be approved by a senior lawyer (Nelson 1996).2 
The informal communal control of large law firms has been particularly effective at 
ensuring individual lawyers practise the advocacy ideal of high quality service to 
clients. Yet, as Abel (1981b) so forcefully argues, there is no guarantee informal 
socialisation will implement the advocacy ideal in the absence of external pressure 
pushing in that direction, and the most effective pressure seems to be market forces 
(see Section IV below). The bonds of professional community are even better suited 
to strengthening commitment to the other three ideals; the gatekeeper ideal, the 
public interest ideal and the ideal of collegiality. 
Strengthening professional community is the best way to nurture norms of regard 
for the justice of law (the gatekeeper ideal). A lawyer who identifies first with his 
or her professional community and its norms of fidelity to law and justice is less 
1 Australian law firms may now be accredited under ISO 9001 for the legal profession 
(Salter & Friend 1996, Will 1996). 
2 Nelson's research was on how US law firms curb sharp practice among litigators. 
209 
Chapter 9 Renegotiating Regulation 
likely to sway under the pressure of client demands to manipulate the law on their 
behalf. Lawyers who identify more closely with their clients than their profession 
will be more likely to act as tools of corporate or institutional interests. It is 
precisely because of the danger of identification with employer outweighing 
identification with professional norms that other compliance practitioners such as 
equal opportunity officers, consumer complaints workers and ombudsmen have 
found it desirable to group together as professionals, independently of their 
employers, to support and learn from each other, and maintain their commitment to 
certain ideals. When they do so, they are frequently more effective (V. Braithwaite 
1992). 
Subcultures of women, gay, black, or young lawyers may not be what traditionalists 
have in mind when they extol the virtues of professional community, yet 
professional subcultures also serve a crucial function in building up public-regarding 
professional communities. The particular concerns and ideals of each subgroup are 
often a goad to the kind of discussion about the ideals of law and lawyering that is 
necessary for professional community to continue to do its job of debating and 
passing on commitment to and pride in the access to justice ideals of lawyering. A 
feminist lawyer group is a community in which members share a common identity 
as lawyers and women despite their employment in different, competing firms, and 
in which they engage in thinking, discussion and action aimed at improving the law 
(Thornton 1996:213-215). Indeed members of many sub-groups are frequently 
more idealistic about the justice of law and being a lawyer than mainstream 
lawyers. "Public interest subcultures", such as the groups of lawyers that run and 
volunteer at community legal centres, nurture commitment to the ethics of public 
service among diversities of lawyers (the public interest ideal). Black, women and 
young lawyers stimulate discussion within the profession about how they are 
treated, stirring up commitment to a more inclusive ideal of collegiality. 
Recognising and nurturing such groups within the broader profession actively 
includes traditionally marginalised voices at the same time that it foments the 
reconstruction of legal professionalism. Special interest groups also strengthen 
community within the broader profession by building associations between lawyers 
from different workplaces, and encouraging their voices to be heard. Where 
lawyers accomplish both strong identity with the whole profession and with a 
subset of it ( either a firm in which social capital is strong or a special interest group 
that spans many firms), then there is greater scope for face-to-face informal control 
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to work in harness with profession-wide ethics and values. Broadening and 
liberalising professional communities not only includes the traditionally excluded; it 
is also a first step in improving informal social control of lawyers and ensuring that 
the norms of legal culture incorporate comprehensive access to justice ideals (see 
also pp 229-231 below). 
III. Encouraging Elements of Self-Regulation 
When lawyers are not adequately constrained by the bonds of community to 
advance access to justice norms, more formal controls must be brought to bear. 
Traditionally legal professional associations have seen it as consistent with the 
ideals of professional community that they take responsibility for disciplining their 
own members. They have also been responsible for formulating the rules and 
standards that will be applied in professional discipline. These formal aspects of 
communal control-discipline and rule-making-occur on a continuum with more 
informal methods of control such as socialisation, gossip and collegial criticism. 
Giving professional associations formal self-regulatory powers has some 
advantages; the association internalises regulatory costs, and mutual trust and 
greater expertise can make it more efficient for them to formulate, monitor and 
enforce standards (Ogus 1994:107). But the strongest arguments for legal 
professional self-regulation are that it supports the growth of professional 
community. As Wilkins (1992:863) writes, 
[I]t would be a mistake to assume that there is nothing to the 
traditional argument that links independence and the opportunity for 
self-governance. By collectively engaging in the process of enacting 
and enforcing rules of professional conduct, lawyers develop and 
reinforce the disposition for moral decisionmaking. 
A reformed legal profession in which no institutions were left that gave lawyers an 
overarching sense of identity outside of their particular workplace commitments 
would give lawyers little sense of the importance of their role as bearers of the 
culture of legal justice and therefore of the need to serve clients well, to perform 
public interest work and to uphold the justice of law. As Chapter Eight argued and 
Chapter Seven graphically illustrated, abandoning all elements of professional self-
regulation means abandoning hope that lawyers will implement public-regarding 
professionalism; the belief that lawyers will not take responsibility for access to 
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justice becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy when implemented as a normative 
regulatory policy. Allowing, even enforcing, elements of self-regulation encourages 
lawyers to take their public responsibilities seriously. It requires lawyers to create 
the institutions and associations in which professional community can grow and in 
which debate over ethical issues takes place. 
The layering of self-regulatory institutions over informal communal control is the 
beginning of the constitution of a pyramid of lawyer regulation (see Figure 9.2, p 
218). Oversight mechanisms by which lawyers are made accountable to community 
concerns, and their permeation into self-regulation and communal control, 
completes the pyramid, as Section V below will argue. The self-regulation 
advocated here is not license for lawyers to pursue their self-interest; it is 
responsibility to implement public interest under the supervision of and in 
partnership with state and community. Thus the profession might be required to 
develop informal options for resolving disputes with clients and sanctioning 
lawyers that include lay involvement and an appeal to an independent tribunal. 
This could even mean recognising the complaints handling schemes of large firms 
which meet appropriate criteria as the first layer of a pyramid of justice for clients. 
(Indeed there is no reason why law firms of sufficient size should not be required to 
have in place their own access to justice plans, as described in Chapter Five, to 
ensure that they do as much justice as possible to their clients, employees and other 
stakeholders.) 
However self-regulation shares the same weaknesses as professional community as 
a means of implementing access to justice ideals. We have seen in previous 
chapters (pp 17-25, 185-189) that historically it has been weak at enforcing the 
advocacy ideal in the absence of external pressures such as de-regulatory and re-
regulatory competition reform (see section IV below); it also has a bad record on the 
ideal of collegiality, tending to enforce a narrow vision of professional community 
(pp 35-39). The public interest ideal has been left to indigenous ordering and 
voluntary activity and barely enforced at all.3 
3 Although we saw that the American Bar Association has included an unenforceable pro 
bono requirement in its model rules of professional conduct (p 149). 
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Multiple Regulatory Strategies Strengths in Orienting Profession 
Towards Access to Justice Ideals 
1. Nurturing Professional Community Source of professional identity and 
socialisation into all four ethical ideals: 
• advocacy ideal (but only if external 
pressure from market forces or 
competition reform), 
• gatekeeper ideal ( through 
identification with whole 
profession), 
• public interest ideal (through 
identification with professional 
subcultures), 
• ideal of collegiality (but needs to be 
turned inside out). 
2. Encouraging Elements of • Nurtures professional community, 
Self-Regulation and professional responsibility for 
access to justice. 
• Shares strengths and weaknesses of 
professional community. 
3. Embracing Competition Reform Strengthens advocacy ideal through: 
• De-regulation to make traditional 
legal services more consumer-
oriented, and, 
• Re-regulation to ensure competitive 
market by increasing market power 
of consumers. 
Helps prevent lawyer domination of 
justice market through: 
• De-regulation to allow proliferation 
of new forms of legal service 
delivery, and alternatives to law. 
4. Developing Institutions of State and • Ensures regulatory strategies of 
Community Accountability professional community, self-
regulation and competition are 
actually implemented and are 
oriented toward access to justice. 
• Provides forums for deliberative 
processes of regulatory reform in 
which access to justice is the over-
arching goal. 
Figure 9.1 Strengths of Different Regulatory Strategies for the Legal Profession 
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IV. Embracing Competition Reform 
Historically, communal control and self-regulation have built up thick layers of 
unnecessary rules and restrictions that shore up legal professional domination of 
the justice market and are impermeable to client and community concerns. 
Competition reform as a de-regulatory strategy is necessary to break them down, 
and as a re-regulatory movement to ensure a competitive and consumer-oriented 
market. Both aspects of competition reform create external pressure pushing 
lawyers in the direction of regard for clients. As Chapter Six showed, there is a 
particular affinity between regulation by the market and the strengthening of the 
advocacy ideal. Competition reform can also help prevent legal professional 
domination of the justice market. Competition policy is not a regulatory strategy 
that adds a layer to the pyramid represented in Figure 9.2 (p 218). Rather it 
conditions communal practices and self-regulatory rules (abrogating lawyers' 
tendency to be unresponsive to consumer needs), and competition reform of the 
lower levels of the pyramid is a goal of institutions of accountability at the top of 
the pyramid. 
Competition reform creates a more consumer-friendly market by abolishing 
protective rules. Chapter Four showed that making the legal services market more 
efficient by allowing advertising and price competition and abolishing anti-
competitive legal professional rules can make traditional services more affordable, 
and that market reforms may also set the conditions for the proliferation of new 
means of providing legal services which might benefit consumers including non-
lawyer legal service provision, franchising, group legal service plans, legal insurance, 
and contingency fees (pp 72-75). Since many competition reforms have already 
occurred in common law countries like Australia, Britain, and the US, an important 
feature of a competition regime of regulation should now be to preserve the gains 
that have been made, preventing self-regulation from compromising them by 
cartelisa tion. 
Embracing market reform may mean introducing new regulation to increase the 
market power of consumers who would otherwise have little bargaining power with 
their lawyers. Powerful corporate clients have used in-house counsel to increase 
control over lawyers from whom they hire services (Chayes & Chayes 1985:289-
293). But the problems of information asymmetry and status differences still mean 
that lawyers have much greater market power than individual, especially poor, 
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clients. Regulation which requires lawyers to give clients information about prices 
and services helps constitute a more competitive and efficient market. For 
example, 1993 reforms to the legislation governing New South Wales lawyers 
require them to inform clients in writing how their bill will be calculated, an estimate 
of the likely costs and of their rights to have the bill reviewed before the lawyer is 
retained or as soon as possible afterwards. If the lawyer fails to do so, then the 
client has to pay only what an independent assessor decides the bill should be, and 
need not pay anything until that assessment has occurred.4 Improving the market 
power of certain consumers may also mean reforms such as lifting restrictions on 
group legal service plans and profit-sharing between public interest groups and 
lawyers so that diffuse consumers can be subsumed under the umbrella of a larger 
more savvy legal actor. 
Liberalising the market for legal services and for dispute resolution also helps 
decentre the legal profession from access to justice discourse. It can force open the 
market to alternatives to law. It may allow the development of informal 
community-based dispute resolution and the political use of law which were 
restricted while lawyers' justice monopolised access to justice. The philosophy of 
market reform which encourages innovation and choice in the range of products and 
services available and in which lawyers must see themselves as competing among 
many justice service providers fits in well with the idea of a broad range of ways in 
which access to justice can be done. 
Licensing lawyers ( exclusively or jointly with other occupational groups) to perform 
certain services helps achieve the proliferation of other justice service providers if 
the grant of the monopoly or license is limiting as well as capacitive. Lawyers may 
4 Sections 175-183 Legal Profession Act 1987-1994 NSW. Among the lawyers interviewed 
for Chapter Seven the reaction to this reform was mainly favourable although there were 
other. Two conflicting perspectives on the reform were: 
I am not in favour of the New South Wales costs reforms. Is that an 
improvement in communication that every time you see someone you have to 
give them this piece of paper? It can only increase costs if you have to bring 
in a costs agreement. You're simply introducing further steps into the process. 
(MSS21) 
We've had that policy for ten years in litigious matters ... We put it in very 
plain English and told them everything, appended the Supreme Court scales, 
told them what barristers could cost. I pulled the first one out the other day and 
it was almost -exactly what the New South Wales thing says it is supposed to be 
like. It just made good sense. The best way to keep the client onside is to 
communicate and to be very open. It is very good business sense. We always tell 
them up front at the beginning that they might not win. (MSS16) 
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be licensed to provide certain services at which they excel (such as advocacy in the 
superior courts) but at the same time be prohibited from providing other services 
which would hinder the development of non-legalistic means of justice. This might 
involve very specific regulation of lawyers in a variety of fora of formal and 
informal justice so that it is clear how they can and cannot be used. For example 
while superior courts might continue to allow only qualified legal practitioners to 
represent parties before them, other tribunals and dispute resolution fora might 
prohibit or strictly regulate the role lawyers can play. Under the Australian trade 
practices regime, for example, disputed matters will eventually go to the Federal 
Court where lawyers dominate proceedings. But pre-decision conferences for 
authorisations occur before Commissioners of the ACCC. It recognises that parties 
to proceedings might benefit from legal advice but legalism should not dominate its 
proceedings, and therefore allows parties to bring lawyers to authorisation 
conferences, but not to participate in the discussion (Miller 1992:422-423). 
The main difficulty with embracing competition reform is that competition and 
communal professionalism often seem inconsistent. Increased competition is 
blamed for low standards of service and "hired gun" mentality lawyering, while 
communal professionalism is seen as the genesis of cartels and anti-competitive 
practices. Competition among lawyers, however, can provide the external pressure 
which ensures that the internal pressures of informal social control are oriented 
towards giving the client the best product possible. Thus two senior lawyers from 
Phillips Fox, a major national Australian law firm describe how their firm came to 
implement a quality assurance program because certain clients were demanding 
their lawyers have certification and because, "we realised that to remain 
competitive we had to think of new ways to differentiate ourselves from the 
competition, even if only temporarily" (Salter & Friend 1996:36).5 Whenever 
companies compete with each other on the quality of the goods or services they 
provide, they must be competing with each other on the basis of the effectiveness of 
internal self-regulatory mechanisms which ensure high quality goods or services are 
produced (Ogus 1994:110). 
Competition and communal self-regulatory control can also be consistent on a 
broader scale if the ability of professional communities to self-regulate, or to have 
5 In Australia the Queensland and Federal governments have made quality certification 
a condition of, or an important consideration in tendering work out including to legal firms 
(Dal Pont 1996:65). In Britain, the Legal Aid Board buys the services only of law firms 
that are accredited to a certain standard of quality (Lockley 1993). 
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market privileges is made contestable (Ogus 1994:110). Where a professional 
group has a monopolistic right to supply services,, as the legal profession does, 
other groups might claim a share in that right if they can show they will do as good 
a job (or better) of self-regulating to ensure quality. For example,, the English Courts 
and Legal Services Act 1990 allowed real estate agent associations or banks and 
building societies to claim the right to compete with lawyers for conveyancing work 
(Cownie 1990,, Partington 1991). As the research reported in Chapter Four showed 
(Domberger & Sher 1989,, Paterson et al 1988,, p 73), these reforms had a significant 
effect on lawyer advertising and costs even before any conveyancers entered the 
market simply by making the conveyancing market contestable. This type of regime 
introduces many of the advantages of a competitive market without breaking down 
communal bonds between individuals within professional groups which might help 
them behave in an ethical way.6 
Competition can build up the advocacy ideal in the right conditions both by 
ensuring that lawyers give a cheaper more efficient service which increases access,, 
and by stimulating lawyers to improve the quality of service offered. A bonus· 
advantage is that by breaking down unnecessarily restrictive rules,, competition 
reform can also have the effect of opening professional community beyond its 
traditionally exclusive bounds thus helping repair the collegiality ideal. However 
market reform is dangerous when it comes at the expense of overarching 
professional community and effective regulation to implement all four access to 
justice ideals. In a vigorous market,, lawyers may seek to please clients at the 
expense of other ethical commitments; competition can be a threat to the ethics of 
fidelity to law and justice. For this reason the development of institutions of 
accountability to state and community which ensure that strategies of competition 
reform remain conducive to access to justice ideals are necessary. 
V. Developing Institutions of Public Accountability 
Communal control and self-regulation are not sufficiently responsive to the needs of 
clients and the wider community to satisfactorily implement access to justice ideals 
on their own. Competition reform may assist lawyers in responding to client 
6 The reforms introduced in Victoria, Australia mentioned in Chapter Seven (pp 179-180) 
are supposed to work on a similar principle. There lawyers will be able to group 
themselves into whatever self-regulating associations they choose, and if a particular 
group is not self-regulating well then it will no longer be an accredited association. 
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demands and in opening up professional community to a wider group, but it does 
not sufficiently assist clients who lack market power to gain access to quality legal 
services. It provides no check on lawyers who are willing to do anything for 
unscrupulous clients, and it is not self-implementing-left to themselves lawyers 
may not introduce or sustain competition in the legal services market anyway. The 
failures of communal control and self-regulation must be remedied, and the 
pressure of market forces made effective, through institutions in which lawyers are 
made accountable to community access to justice concerns. Sections (i), (ii) and 
(iii) below discuss a variety of specific mechanisms by which individual lawyers 
and individual disciplinary decisions can be brought to account. The argument of 
Chapters Seven and Eight, however, has been that lawyer regulation should be more 
than pyramids of discipline; the most crucial form of lawyer accountability is 
through deliberative democratic processes of oversight of the whole profession's 
culture and practices. Section (iv) below begins the discussion of the institutional 
means by which this might occur, and Section VII gives more detailed consideration 
to how the profession can be brought to account to state and community via a 
deliberative process oriented toward access to justice. 
Figure 9.2 A Pyramid of Lawyer Regulation 
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( i) Pyramids of Disciplinary Controls 
Most obvious is the need to have methods by which individual lawyers and law 
firms can be brought to account for day-to-day conduct which harms clients, third 
parties, the framework of law or other lawyers when communal control and self-
regulation fail. Relying on professional discipline alone risks "in-group solidarity of 
occupational incumbents, who frown on revealing to the public any unsavoury 
activities of an individual worker unless they become so blatant as to harm the 
whole group" (Haug 1980:66). Lawyers are very unwilling to "dob" each other in 
to any type of disciplinary tribunal, even an internal one. Where lawyers do 
discipline each other, disciplinary controls are disproportionately felt by out-
groups (Daniel 1996, Reichstein 1965; see pp 188-189 above). 
Chapter Eight suggested that a condition of any regulatory regime which gives the 
profession privileges and responsibilities might be that it also provide a way of 
making the profession accountable for those privileges and responsibilities at the 
behest of consumers, the community or a government regulator. The independent 
body that considers such appeals might also receive reports on the outcome of all 
cases from which it could judge whether there were any problem areas that should 
be brought to the profession's attention or regulated in some other way. Thus, 
complainants would have a pyramid of options in pursuing their grievances against 
lawyers and law firms, perhaps starting with a complaint to the firm involved, 
moving onto an informal conciliatory process sponsored by the profession's 
professional association to a more formal self-regulatory disciplinary process which 
is supervised by an independent commissioner or board. The necessity for external 
accountability would also go down the pyramid so that self-regulatory institutions 
might include lay or consumer representation. For example, Chapter Seven (pp 178-
179) mentioned the 1994 New South Wales reforms which introduced the Office of 
the Legal Services Commissioner. That office now receives all complaints about 
lawyers, and refers these complaints to mediation or to self-regulatory institutions 
for barristers and solicitors. If a complainant is not happy, the decision can be 
returned to the Legal Services Commissioner for review. Ultimately it can go to an 
independent tribunal for decision, the Legal Services Tribunal. 7 
7 Part 9, Legal Profession Act NSW 1987 (as amended). 
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(ii) Liability in General Law 
The general law often provides adequate means of external accountability for 
lawyers' breaches of the advocacy or gatekeeper ideals if only victims of lawyers' 
conduct were suitably empowered to claim them. Lawyers and law firms can be 
sued in tort, contract or equity for harms caused to clients and to opposing or third 
parties (Evans 1996, Ross 1995:193-222, Weisbrot 1990:210). They can also be 
sued under consumer protection legislation including legislation specifically 
governing lawyers (Weisbrot 1990:215-216), and in egregious circumstances, they 
might be prosecuted for criminal behaviour. Insurance schemes and fidelity funds 
ensure that there are funds available to settle claims in many circumstances, so that 
such a course is sensible when what is required is financial compensation or 
reparation.8 
Such actions are better suited to solving many conduct problems than disciplinary 
controls and also may be suitable where a third party (not the client) has been 
harmed (Wilkins 1992:833). For example in Australia and Britain lawyers have 
been held liable to beneficiaries under wills when they have been negligent in the 
way they have carried out their duties as drafters and holders of the will. In the 
English case of Ross v Caunters9 a solicitors' firm failed to tell their client that a 
beneficiary's spouse could not witness his will (a failure of the advocacy ideal of 
high quality service to clients). After the testator died, the beneficiary was able to 
claim damages from the solicitors for the lost bequest.10 In the US third party suits 
have become more common. Wilkins (1992:834) cites the case of In re Flight 
Transportation Securities Litigation 11 in which a class of investors sued a leading 
New York law firm alleging that it had engaged in a number of false or deceptive 
practices on behalf of its corporate client (a failure of the gatekeeper ideal). In 
these cases parties who had suffered loss because of a lawyer's misconduct are in a 
position to pursue a better remedy (ie compensation) through claims against the 
8 But while professional negligence liability has been generally expanding, barristers in 
Australia and Britain continue to have immunity from negligence liability for their 
appearances in court. In relation to Australia and Britain, see Giannarelli v Wraith 
(1988) 165 CLR 543, and Saif Ali v Sydney Mitchell & Co [1980] AC 198. There is no 
immunity doctrine for work performed in court in the US and Canada (Ross 1995:218). 
9 [1980] Ch 297. 
lO Similarly in the Australian case of Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539 the 
solicitors held a will but made no attempt to contact the executor and beneficiary of the 
estate until six years after the testatrix had died. During that time the house, the main 
asset, had deteriorated substantially. The executor /beneficiary successfully claimed 
damages from the solicitors for loss of value to the estate. 
ll 593 F. Supp. 612 (D. Minn. 1984). 
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lawyer's insurance than disciplinary systems are likely to offer them. In each case 
successful court actions against lawyers also lead to significant discussion and 
awareness within the profession and thus the potential for a change in lawyers' 
conduct. If lawyers' own fear of liability is not enough to change harmful practices, 
their insurers may have the capacity to do so in order to control their own costs. 
More effective utilisation of remedies under the general law means less time and 
resources need to be devoted to specific regulation of lawyers. More support 
should be given to legal consumer movements that will educate people about their 
ability to use these legal remedies to negotiate settlements with lawyers. Indeed one 
conclusion of this chapter will be that the nurture and funding of legal consumer 
groups should be a priority for state spending on lawyer regulation. These groups 
themselves could use the general law to challenge rules and practices of 
professional associations, perhaps on the grounds that they are discriminatory or 
restrict competition.12 
(iii) Non-Victim Enforcement of Lawyers' Ethics 
Pyramids of disciplinary controls and the utilisation of general law discussed 
above rely on the victim of a lawyer's conduct pursuing a complaint or suit. Yet the 
victims of lawyers' conduct are often not suitably empowered to do so. As Steele 
and Nimmer (1976:1000) concluded from their extensive study of client experiences 
of lawyers, 
The primary responsibility for identifying lawyer deviance falls on the 
client, who does not expect to encounter such problems with his 
attorney. In attempting to resolve their problems, the clients 
interviewed in our study felt powerless. They had no conception of 
what response would be effective and as a result they usually did 
nothing ... The result of nonreporting is the insulation of the lawyer 
from disciplinary agency scrutiny even when the lawyer's conduct has 
injured the client. 
Sometimes there is no victim. For example breach of the gatekeeper ideal may often 
benefit the client and harm only some broadly conceived public interest, or a group 
of third parties who have no idea they have been harmed. 
12 It was anti-trust actions brought against US bar associations that led to much of the 
reform of in the American legal profession over the last twenty years (Powell 1985). 
Amendments to the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) in 1995 mean that 
Australian lawyers and professional associations could now also be sued for anti-
competitive practices: Competition Policy Reform Act 1995 (Cth). 
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However other powerful actors often become aware of such breaches and have the 
capacity to remedy them: Judges and courts already have responsibilities to ensure 
that litigation lawyers do not overstep the mark of justice in representing their 
clients, although they do not tend to exercise them very proactively. Corporate 
regulators and administrative officials might also have the capacity and incentives 
to observe and regulate lawyer conduct which harms either the client or a third 
party: 
In the ordinary course of business, SEC officials review formal 
submissions and public documents prepared by lawyers. These 
efforts undoubtedly provide some tentative information about lawyer 
conduct . . . Moreover, as part of their normal duties, SEC officials 
investigate specific market trc:1nsactions to determine whether the 
relevant parties have complied with applicable provisions of the 
securities laws. These investigations also produce a significant 
amount of information about lawyer conduct. Simply as a result of 
their participation in an ongoing process, therefore, trial judges and 
administrative officials are likely to uncover information about lawyer 
misconduct that would escape the attention of disciplinary officials. 
(Wilkins 1992:835-836). 
Giving these actors greater responsibility and greater power to hold lawyers 
accountable deflects some of the regulatory burden from an over-burdened lawyer 
disciplinary system, and complements the efforts of consumer and community 
groups to improve education about lawyer conduct. It helps make lawyer 
regulation more the responsibility of everybody, and less an unreasonable 
expectation of a small bureaucracy of lawyer regulators. In the US from 1989 to 
1993 regulators brought over 90 cases against law firms which had been uncritically 
cooperative with the financial schemes of savings and loan association clients 
which collapsed (Galanter & Palay 1995b:196). Two large firms, Kaye Scholer and 
Jones Day Reavis and Pogue have settled claims at forty-one and fifty-one million 
dollars respectively and in each instance, "the case was resolved by a consent 
decree that set out stiff new rules for the respective firm's banking practice" 
(Galanter & Palay 1995b:196-197; see also Weinstein 1993). Corporate regulators 
charged with administering a particular legal regime will have a much stronger 
incentive to prevent lawyer misconduct that damages the legal framework, than will 
lawyer's clients (Wilkins 1992:836), and as this example shows, they might also 
have the capacity to force lawyers to overhaul their ethics and practice for the 
future. 
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(iv) Oversight of Whole Legal Profession 
The disparate particular mechanisms described above for bringing individual 
lawyers to account when communal control and self-regulatory discipline fail do 
not address the fundamental problem posed in this thesis of how to make the 
culture and self-regulatory rule-making of the profession responsive to the justice of 
deliberative democracy on a regular basis. Individual decisions made by a Legal 
Services Commissioner or a court should filter down to self-regulatory rules and 
communal cultures, and particular practices and self-regulatory rule may also be 
subject to external oversight and challenge by independent bodies. But these are 
only piecemeal solutions to a fundamental problem of a profession too easily 
oriented away from access to justice. The requirement for accountability runs 
deeper than introducing lay-people into disciplinary bodies, putting in place an 
ombudsperson to oversee disciplinary mechanisms or a board to review self-
regulatory rule-making and enforcement.13 
Useful reform, as we have seen, comes from processes of debate and deliberation in 
which the profession listens to community concerns about its practices, and in 
which the community learns from the profession about its ideals and what it is 
possible for it to do. When quasi-governmental bodies such as a Law Reform 
Commission or the ACCC issue discussion papers, consult with public interest 
groups and make recommendations for reform, they make the profession 
accountable, as do governments when they reform the legislation governing the 
regulation of the profession. Yet these one-off efforts at bringing the whole 
profession to public account have not been adequate at holding lawyers to their 
access to justice ideals on an ongoing basis. Chapter Eight argued that access to 
justice regulation requires more than a static social bargain, the terms of which are 
changed in emergencies, more than tinkering with individual regulatory institutions. 
It is an indication of the completeness of legal professional domination of their own 
regulation and organisation that institutions in which lawyers are brought to 
account for, or in which they discuss their practices with, government and 
community are still unusual. The remainder of this chapter will discuss in more 
detail how the culture of the profession might become subject to the texture of 
deliberative democracy. 
13 As James & Seneviratne (1995) point out piecemeal reforms such as introducing a legal 
services ombudsman do little to solve the problem of the whole orientation of the legal 
profession. 
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VI. The Justice of Deliberative Democracy 
(i) The Value of Deliberation 
Renegotiating Regulation 
As Chapter Three showed, the ideal of deliberative democracy is central to a civic 
republican approach to political theory (Sunstein 1988:1548, Madison et al 1987). 
It requires that "public matters are decided by deliberation on the basis of 
considerations that have common appeal" (Pettit 1997:189). A process of 
deliberation requires each participant to engage with and understand the 
viewpoints of the other participants, and it requires each participant to justify their 
views by reference to facts and arguments that have public legitimacy. As Sunstein 
(1993:241-243) describes the vision of the American Federalists, 
a large point of the system is to ensure discussion and debate among 
people who are genuinely different in their perspectives and position, 
in the interests of creating a process through which reflection will 
encourage the emergence of general truths. A distinctive feature of 
American republicanism is its extraordinary hospitality toward 
disagreement and heterogeneity, rather than fear of it. The framers 
believed that a diversity of opinions would be a creative and 
productive force ... The political system was one of deliberation rather 
than aggregation. The framers insisted that existing views might be a 
product of partial perspectives, or limited experience, or of 
incomplete information. People engaged in democratic discussion 
should "meet others from different parts of the Union, and consult." 
People should be "open to the force of argument." They should be 
prepared to give up their initial views when shown "the general 
benefit of the whole community." There is a good deal of empirical 
evidence that deliberation can have a transformative function on 
beliefs. And through this process of discussion, public deliberation 
should produce better public decisions. 
Deliberation about the practices and institutions of legal professionalism will 
certainly bring out the access to justice concerns of governments, clients and 
community groups (discussed in Chapter Two). It would also require the profession 
to justify its practices within the terms of the public good, a process that 
encourages the profession to rediscover traditional shared ethical ideals which have 
access to justice appeal (such as the ideals set out in Chapter Six). 
Sunstein (1993:244) argues "that a well functioning deliberative process will 
increase the likelihood that political outcomes will respond to people's desires and 
aspirations at the same time that it will help shape them for the better". The 
process of reform to the Australian legal profession outlined in Chapter Seven 
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illustrates how this might begin to occur. The TPC and state governments engaged 
professional leaders in debate and dialogue about justifications for and possible 
changes to restrictive rules and practices. Although many lawyers were initially 
opposed to reforms, as the debate progressed, they became more liberal. Officers 
of the TPC described the way lawyers began to justify their practices by reference 
to the public good, rather than simply assuming the worthiness of their traditions. 
As they examined their own rules and practices in these terms, professional 
associations saw that certain restrictions were not necessary and developed their 
own ideas of reforms in the public interest. Thus public debate and deliberation 
about legal professional reform can utilise what Sunstein calls "the civilising force 
of hypocrisy"14 to bring the culture of professionalism more in line with community 
concerns and desires: 
Without making heroic assumptions about the human capacity for 
virtue and the transcendence of self-interest, we might observe that a 
system of public discussion requires people to speak in public-
regarding terms. Policies must always be justified on the basis of 
reasons, or on the ground that they promote the public good. In a 
deliberative politics, even the most venal or self-interested 
participants in politics must invoke public justifications in their 
support. If "hypocrisy is the tribute that vice pays to virtue," at least 
we can say that in a system of public deliberation, everyone must 
speak as if he were virtuous even if he is not in fact. 
The requirement for justification in public-regarding terms-the 
civilising force of hypocrisy-might well contribute to public-regarding 
outcomes. It may "launder" preferences by foreclosing certain 
arguments in the public domain ... It might even bring about a 
transformation in preferences and values, simply by making venal or 
self-regarding justifications seem off-limits. (Sunstein 1993:243-244) 
The Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) theory of responsive regulation outlined in 
previous chapters as a model for the regulation of the legal profession relies on this 
kind of deliberation between industry, state and public interest groups. They place 
their pyramid theory of regulation within a tripartite model of deliberation about 
which layer of the pyramid to use in particular circumstances and how to constitute 
the pyramid in the first place (1992:81-100). In their theory, state regulators, 
public interest groups and businesses should form "regulatory communities": 
Participation of empowered public interest groups in decisions about the 
implementation and enforcement of regulation prevents business interests capturing 
14 He attributes the term to Jon Elster. 
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the regulators, or using their power to get away with a lower standard than that 
required by the law. This kind of participation in regulatory decision-making 
achieves a much more dynamic and effective democracy than either self-regulation 
or simply leaving the implementation of regulation to legislators and government 
agencies. 
The substantial issue, then, in reforming the regulatory structure of a particular 
group or industry such as the legal profession is not to determine in advance a 
detailed prescriptive scheme about what regulatory strategies to use and how to 
balance them: It is to create the conditions in which deliberation can occur. The 
outcome of each process of deliberation will be unique to each time and place in 
which it occurs. But the broad ideal of access to justice will generally be the 
criterion for judging regulatory arrangements for lawyers as a public-regarding ideal 
that fits both with the traditional ideology of the legal profession (as in Chapter Six) 
and public concerns (as in Chapter Two). The question is how to establish and 
preserve such a process of access to justice deliberation. This should be tackled 
from two different angles; from the outside in, by establishing groups external to the 
profession which can draw it into dialogue and developing institutions where that 
will occur, and from the inside out, by nurturing deliberation about access to justice 
values within the profession itself so that lawyers are better equipped to engage in, 
respond to, perhaps even influence, community concerns. 
(ii) From the Outside In 
The success of deliberation as a strategy for improving the legal profession' s 
responsibility for access to justice depends on finding opportunities to engage the 
profession in public dialogue about its goals and practices. Governments and 
quasi-governmental organisations such as the ACCC have had some success in this 
endeavour in recent times. But institutions in which the profession is brought to 
explain, justify and account for its practices and regulation on an ongoing basis are 
not common. Broad-based community groups have had some influence on the legal 
profession through public consultation by law reform commissions, but their 
capacity to participate in an ongoing debate has been limited. It has been 
particularly rare to find groups to represent client and community interests to the 
profession, to help lawyers understand public concerns with the way legal services 
are provided and with the way lawyers uphold the justice of law. From the outside 
of the profession, we must create institutions for wide-ranging and ongoing 
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deliberation about legal professional institutions and we must also find or create 
groups that will represent public and client concerns in this debate. 
Finding people to speak for the community in deliberation about the regulation of 
the legal profession may seem difficult. Consumers of legal services have been too 
diffuse in the past to organise themselves to hold the state and the profession 
accountable for lawyers' regulation. Few consumer groups have consistently 
focused attention on the legal profession, and the lay representatives involved in 
professional regulation have done so as individuals or government nominees (eg 
Weisbrot 1990:209). In recent years the consumer movement has begun to take a 
more concerted interest in lawyers.15 A range of broad-based community groups 
ought to be able to provide and support members who will take part in 
negotiations with the legal profession about its regulation.16 
The most crucial things governments can do to change the regulation of the legal 
profession might be to increase the number of forums for supervising the regulation 
of the profession at the tip of the pyramid in Figure 9.2 (p 218) in which 
representatives of community and consumer groups must be involved, and to spend 
money nurturing groups that will provide representatives. This means introducing 
institutions such as the New South Wales Legal Services Commission to oversee 
professional regulation, as well as boards and tribunals made up of lawyers and 
consumer/ community representatives not only to hear appeals on particular 
disciplinary decisions but monitor the entire regulation of the profession and 
provide forums in which concerned groups can air their worries. Providing such 
opportunities encourages broad-based consumer groups to expand their interest in 
lawyers. Where ordinary consumer groups are not powerful enough to make a 
difference, big business and business peak councils can be strong consumer 
advocates in the legal services market. The business community (as well as 
government departments as consumers of legal services) has already shown that it 
15 For example in Australia the Consumer Justice Charter mentioned in Chapter Two (at p 
16) was developed by a coalition of consumer and community groups initiated by the 
Australian Federation of Consumer Organisations (Consumer Action 1995). 
16 If a representative from one group consistently puts positions that are unacceptable to 
the broader public, there are enough consumer groups with an interest in the issue to move 
to destabilise and delegitimate their place at the negotiating table (Ayres & 
Braithwaite 1992:83-84). Ayres & Braithwaite argue that the key to effective 
involvement by public interest groups in regulation is making sure that public interest 
representatives are democratically chosen from groups with broad-based support, and 
that any one group's place in regulatory negotiations is contestable by another group that 
can show it enjoys more widespread public support. 
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has the power and the will to force lawyers to be cheaper and more efficient. 
Harnessing this energy by including business consumers in regulatory negotiation 
with the state and the legal profession would ensure that at least some aspects of 
community interest in competitive and effective legal services are adequately 
represented. 
It may be necessary for governments to invest resources in more proactively 
encouraging the creation of community groups with an interest in lawyer regulation. 
One useful model of a way to solve the problem of the lack of specific public 
interest groups with an interest in lawyers, is the New South Wales Law Reform 
Commission's (1982) recommendation of the creation of a community council as a 
peak public interest group for lawyers. It was to consist principally of non-lawyers 
and have the functions of investigation, consultation, the expression of views and 
the selection of non-lawyer members for the main self-regulatory institutions of the 
profession. It would take the initiative in considering issues and making public and 
private reports and statements on the profession, and would be suitably resourced 
to play a watchdog role over the whole profession (see also Disney et al 1980:206-
235).17 
However these reforms will not make much difference to the profession if there is 
no overall climate change in the wider community about the extent to which lawyers 
are expected to account for and justify their practices and regulation. The lack of 
community groups with an interest in lawyers is partly an artefact of the paucity of 
general community knowledge about the legal system. Democratic decision-making 
about professional practices should ultimately be a matter of deliberation between 
individual clients and their lawyers, and between law firms and their stakeholders, 
as well as dialogue at the level of professional associations, consumer groups and 
government agencies. Basic things like improving citizenship education about law, 
legal procedures and legal rights and duties in schools, workplaces and government 
institutions will help equip people to demand more of the legal profession. 
In a society where the access to justice pyramids of Chapters Four and Five were 
reality, where civic education included justice education, and where access to 
justice policies were an ordinary part of the cultures of most institutions and 
organisations, the possibility of holding lawyers deliberatively to account on a 
17 This board has not yet been implemented in the way suggested by the New South 
Wales Law Reform Commission. 
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regular basis might not be such a naive hope. Reforming the profession "from the 
outside in" means spending less time on specific regulatory regimes for lawyers and 
more time improving justice without lawyers. The structural transformation of 
justice advocated in Part One of this thesis is the best guarantee that the legal 
profession can be brought to account before the justice of deliberative democracy 
(see Chapter Ten). It is in a society where access to justice has become more than 
lawyers' justice, where alternatives proliferate and many voices in many rooms 
contribute to the practice of justice, that citizens are best equipped to articulate the 
access to justice ideals to which they want lawyers to conform. A society in which 
lawyers' justice dominates justice discourse is a society in which lawyers will also 
dominate their own regulation. 
(iii) From the Inside Out 
A climate of willingness and ability to deliberate about the legal profession, its 
practices and institutions must not only exist outside the profession, but must 
permeate it from the inside and work its way out into public deliberation. The 
socialisation of law students and young lawyers, and especially their growing 
awareness of the significance and content of ethical norms will be crucial in this 
process, as will debate and discussion about the ethics and justifications for 
lawyering among practising lawyers. In this process of debate, subcultures of 
lawyers and their visions of law and lawyering will be key provocateurs, as already 
prefigured in Section II above. 
Powell (1985) shows that many of the reforms in the US legal profession over the 
last thirty years had their genesis in the internal dynamics of the profession, rather 
than the direct application of external social forces. For example, it was not 
consumers of legal services who used litigation to challenge restrictive rules such as 
the bar's prohibitions on advertising, but two lawyer-entrepreneurs of legal services 
clinics, Bates and O'Steen (Powell 1985:286): "[T]he rise of consumerism was 
important not so much for aggregate changes in individual client behaviours as of 
the appearance of consumer advocates within the bar itself" (Powell 1985:284). 
Chapters Seven and Eight showed that legal professional reforms in other countries 
have also been frequently initiated or facilitated by segments within the profession. 
For example, in many countries movements of lawyers concerned with offering legal 
services to the poor have acted as a catalyst for change and reform in their legal 
professions. Abel (1985:6) argues that these "fringe" lawyers are, 
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a vital source of new ideas and experimentation in the delivery of 
legal services. The neighbourhood law office, for instance, which 
became the centrepiece of the Legal Service Corporation and, in 
different guises, the principal form of the American legal collective, the 
English law centre, the Canadian community legal clinic and the 
Australian legal centre, originated in a private initiative in 
Philadelphia in the 1930s. Progressive practitioners also are a 
constant gadfly within the legal profession and an important goad to 
change: advertising by politically motivated private practitioners and 
by English and Australian law centres has been a major stimulus to 
the general relaxation of professional prohibitions.18 
Such groups frequently have a keener sense of traditional professional ideals and 
their importance in contemporary circumstances than many lawyers in ordinary 
business. It has already been argued above (pp 210-211) that groups of feminist, 
indigenous or politically motivated lawyers can have a similar culture and impact; 
segmented professions are more robust self-regulators than unified ones. 
This recognises the fact that lawyers already share values and concerns with 
external community groups before they engage in public dialogue or debate. Issues 
of community concern are frequently also internal issues that professionals should 
be discussing among themselves. The mechanism is one of community interests and 
concerns permeating the profession from the inside, through the dual identification 
of lawyers with legal professionalism and wider community concerns. Thus Powell 
writes that "changes in wider societal values had their impact on the regulatory 
mechanisms of the bar through their penetration of the profession itself" 
(1985:284). Subcultures of lawyers often mirror external social movements which 
motivate their actions and politics within the profession. Chesterman (1996) 
shows how in Australia the new left culture of protest outside the legal profession 
gave birth to the "new left lawyers" who started Fitzroy Legal Service, Australia's 
first non-Aboriginal community legal centre, and worked to remove the mystique of 
law and the power of lawyers. Lawyers' engagement with external social 
movements need not be completely benign: Corporate counsel in the US as "a 
newly organised segment of the bar provide, wittingly or unwittingly, an avenue for 
the representation of the interests of a powerful group of clients within the bar 
itself" (Powell 1985:291; see also Schneyer 1992). Yet on the whole the existence of 
social movements within the profession can provoke internal debate and 
deliberation about quality of and access to lawyers' justice. An important support 
18 In England the Legal Action Group is a notable example of the impact this type of 
group can have (see Downes et al 1981:127). 
230 
Chapter 9 Renegotiating Regulation 
for this process is opening up the legal profession to people from many different 
groups who will bring their interests and perspectives and pre-existing social 
commitments to the legal profession, the "turning inside out" of the ideal of 
collegiality already discussed (p 153 above). 
As community concerns permeate the profession through the medium of legal 
professionals themselves, lawyers are also more likely to reach out to non-lawyer 
citizens, and help them achieve a deeper access to legal justice than they would 
otherwise enjoy. Indeed this action on the part of the profession is necessary if 
certain groups are ever to enjoy access to the justice of law: 
The development of a more competent citizenry and of the 
opportunities to exercise both the skills and rights of citizenship 
depend, in part, on a different kind of professionalism, one that 
stresses "outreach" tactics and a more participatory role for the 
client. This kind can be found in proactive law centres, which seek to 
provide clients with the knowledge and resources they require to 
participate in local policy issues, to criticise existing policies, and to 
propose alternatives. (Stephens 1985:80) 
Groups such as Civil Liberties Councils and human rights groups are often lawyer-
dominated but outreach-oriented. They arise as movements within the profession 
but they take lawyerly concerns and values about human rights, due process and 
even political and cultural empowerment to the wider society and to the state. 
Thus a broad access to justice agenda and vision of what law should achieve is 
propagated from inside the profession outwards. 
A key component of any strategy for increasing access to justice deliberation within 
the legal profession ought to be legal education. Yet legal education seems to 
increase cynicism more than idealism among students (Erlanger et al 1996, 
Granfield 1992, Goldsmith 1995, Stover 1989). Granfield and Stover's studies both 
suggest that while there is considerable idealism among students entering US law 
schools, the process of legal education and socialisation undermines it. About a 
quarter of Granfield' s sample of Harvard students said they entered law school to 
help people, seek social justice or achieve social change (1992:38). Yet during their 
education most students replaced a justice-oriented consciousness with a cynical, 
game-oriented consciousness (Granfield 1992:52).19 Stover (1989:12) found that 
19 Turow's (1977) novelistic account of his first year at Harvard Law School tells the 
same story. 
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the number of students expressing a preference for doing public interest law work 
after law school was halved between the first and final years (originally 
approximately a third of his sample expressed such a preference). 
Both Stover and Granfield concluded that those students who were best able to 
preserve more idealistic conceptions of legal practice were either those who joined 
subcultures with a public interest vision of legal justice while at law schoot such as 
the National Lawyers' Guild or legal services offices (Stover 1989:103-115), or 
those who came to law school later in life with pre-existing commitments and kept 
up their relations with groups outside the law school with the same concerns. 
Perhaps law schools should be doing more to encourage what Stover calls "public 
interest subcultures": 
In sum, contact with a public interest subculture appears to have 
insulated students from the influence of the dominant culture in 
several ways. First, the alternative professional communities 
communicated support for the norm of professional altruism. Second, 
they conveyed an image of public interest practice sharply at odds 
with the prevailing image of public interest ineptitude and marginality. 
Third, they provided altruistically oriented students with the 
assurance that they were not alone in their beliefs but belonged to a 
broader community of like-minded persons. Fourth, they provided 
students with role models. And fifth, in the case of the Lawyers 
Guild, contact with a political point of view that heightened their 
commitment to public interest goals. (Stover 1989:109) 
Erlanger et al's (1996) study of lawyers' first jobs after graduation compared with 
pre-law school interest in public interest work also showed that political 
commitment and involvement with a supportive subculture during law school were 
significant factors in determining whether students who had been interested in non-
traditional practice actually took a job in public interest law. In Australia the 
proliferation of feminist law student groups and clinical legal education units in 
local community legal centres are examples of how contact with public subcultures 
can be increased for students, as are the establishment of research centres and 
groups among academics which focus on public interest issues. 
Much is being written on other ways to encourage students to take ethical 
development and critical reflection upon the role of lawyers in society seriously 
through educational techniques such as the "pervasive method" (Rhode 1994) 
which advocates the discussion of ethical issues in all substantive law classes and 
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teaching law in its social and political context (eg Goldsmith 1996), as well as 
opening up the academy to teachers with different perspectives and experiences 
and giving students the chance to involve themselves in offering legal services to the 
poor as part of their (" clinical") legal education. The aim is to encourage students 
"to critically evaluate the law and professional institutions as they learn about 
them ... to develop and apply their own values and decide for themselves what 
justifications are relevant" (Sampford 1995:20). 
(iv) An Aspirational Tradition 
The goal is to create lawyers who are equipped to become part of what Croft 
(1992) calls "deliberative moral community" in the legal profession. Croft sees a 
moral community as a group of persons who identify themselves as the present 
participants in an aspirational tradition the precise normative content of which is 
constantly open to modification at the option of its current bearers. Creating 
deliberative moral community in the legal profession involves discovering and 
recognising the normative and ideological traditions lawyers already carry, and 
discussing how and to what extent they should be applied and reconceptualised on 
a day-by-day basis. Croft argues that while this dependence on deliberative 
change to ethics seems to raise "the spectre of standardless relativism", 
Adoption of the deliberative moral community model should not be 
understood as tantamount to abandoning the quest for certain 
baseline, aspirational norms, but rather is viewed best as directing 
professional discourse to articulate such norms in recognition of the 
variability of modern practice, and as fostering an attitude that such 
an endeavour is worthy of professional interest. To this end, 
deliberative moral community envisages a foundation of aspirational 
professional norms, supplemented by more context-specific codes of 
conduct where necessary. (Croft 1992:1325) 
The most basic aspirational norm of the legal profession emergent from the process 
of iterative adjustment between facts and norms in this thesis is access to justice. 
The aspiration is brought to life in four traditional ethical principles that most 
lawyers broadly accept. (Croft sets forth his own four candidates which are not 
dissimilar to those set out in Chapter Six; see p 138 above.) While aspirational 
norms like this may be criticised as too indeterminate, it is precisely this openness 
that should make them attractive to large heterogenous moral communities (Croft 
1992:1326; see also Sunstein 1996). "Deliberative moral community" consists in 
sharing debate, discussion and reflection from different perspectives and 
experiences in order to "distil the contours" of a few broadly accepted principles. 
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It does not imply pre-existent agreement on normative details. Organised 
professional associations should be places where a variety of voices in the 
profession can spark debate about the contemporary meaning of traditional ideals. 
The evidence suggests that, despite lawyers' many failures to live up to their 
ideology, from time to time idealism about legal and professional values becomes 
more than rhetoric and reasserts itself in action that is at least partially public-
regarding. Gordon's (1984) classic paper on New York City lawyers between 1870 
and 1910 demonstrates that between 1870 and 1890 their ideal was one of 
perfecting a "legal science" which would define the rights and duties of their clients 
in a socially harmonious way. While such a role was in their material interests, 
Gordon shows that to them it was also an ideal of (republican) public virtue 
contributing to the making just of American society. He also demonstrates how the 
ideal disintegrated with the realities of emerging corporate practice, revealing how 
the market will corrupt the lifeworld of communal lawyering in the absence of 
institutionalised deliberative processes that will bring the profession back to its 
access to justice aspirations.20 As we have seen, in contemporary legal culture, it is 
often the subcultures of legal services lawyers, of feminist or of civil liberties 
lawyers who continue to bear the burden of sparking discussion about the 
traditions of ethical ideals that can further lawyers' part in access to justice. As 
Gordon (1985 Lecture 2:18-19) notes, those historical lawyers' movements that 
made the most impact on the practice of law as a contribution to the practice of 
justice in the US-the Federalist lawyers of the early Republic, the Progressive 
lawyers of the late 19th century and the new deal and black civil rights movements 
of the 1970s and 1980s-were themselves intensely political and controversial 
movements. Gordon's (1985 Lecture 2:20) prescription for improving lawyers' 
justice in the future is similar to that advocated in this section; that groups of 
lawyers should take collective action to form "political conspiracies aimed at 
recapturing their profession's sense of virtue". 
VIL Aspiring to Access to Justice in Lawyer Regulation 
The key to reforming the regulation of the legal profession for access to justice is for 
the justice aspirations of the community to meet the justice aspirations of the legal 
20 Roeber's (1981) study of lawyers in Virginia from 1680 to 1810 tells a similar story of 
commitment to the rule of law and the republican principles of the American Revolution. 
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profession in public deliberation about how the profession should be reformed and 
regulated, and what the public can reasonably expect the legal profession to 
achieve. In building a profession which is better at helping to deliver access to 
justice, four regulatory strategies are available: Professional community is the context 
in which ideals and norms must be learnt, discussed and passed on. Self-regulation 
institutionalises the necessity for the profession to take responsibility itself for 
considering how it does justice to clients, the public and within itself. Competition 
reform helps encourage lawyers to deliver services in an effective, efficient manner to 
consumers, and creates the conditions in which alternatives to legal justice can 
exist. Institutions of accountability help ensure that public-regarding interests are 
institutionalised in lawyer practices and self-regulation, rather than irrelevant, 
irrational or purely selfish ones. These four regulatory strategies do not fit neatly 
into a regulatory scheme for the profession. Rather they need to be interlocked in 
particular circumstances and contexts in order to nurture the four ethical ideals 
which can motivate lawyers towards access to justice, and to conquer the four 
dominations by which lawyers often fail to do justice (see Figure 6.1, p 154). 
The fact that a variety of strategies which are sometimes apparently in tension are 
necessary to ensure that lawyers do justice should not be surprising. We have 
already seen in Chapters Three and Four that a variety of sometimes conflicting 
institutions and strategies can be interlocked into a policy that takes injustice or 
domination seriously. The regulation of lawyers is an application of this general 
theory for increasing the doing of justice. Indeed seeking to control domination by 
lawyers is doubly important for enhancing (republican) citizenship because not only 
is domination by lawyers an injustice in itself, but it also clogs people's access to 
remedies for other injustices. The ability of ordinary persons to do justice among 
themselves is partly predicated upon the ability of lawyers to do justice to them. 
The solutions proposed to the problem of the regulation of lawyers set out in the 
second half of this thesis, then, fit within the framework of the access to justice 
agenda proposed in the first half. The processes by which we can ensure that 
lawyers do justice reprise the processes by which we claim justice in social relations 
in general. Just as a pyramid of options for doing justice in particular situations 
might be necessary in everyday social relations, so might a pyramid of options for 
solving problems with individual lawyers, law firms or indeed the profession as a 
whole, be appropriate. Just as such a pyramid of formal and informal justice 
options must be placed within a context of political action and deliberation for 
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justice to be secured on a day-by-day basis, so must the regulatory structure of the 
legal profession be placed within a context of community action and deliberation 
between profession, state and public if lawyers are to daily contribute to the 
practice of justice in their work. 
In a well functioning democracy citizens will be able to find forums in which they 
can voice their concerns and aspirations about lawyers' part in access to justice in 
ways which will have an effect on the ongoing reform of the legal profession. The 
legal profession would also have its own internal dialogue and debate about its 
aspirational tradition perhaps provoked by groups of lawyers who are themselves 
engaged with external social movements. The existence of (1) groups with 
something to say about what the profession should achieve in terms of justice, (2) a 
profession which considers its own ideals and responsibilities seriously, and -(3) 
regulatory and reform processes where they can deliberate, are the conditions in 
which access to justice aspirations can begin to be institutionalised in not only the 
regulatory practices of the profession, but its communal consciousness. 
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Lawyers in the Republic of Justice 
I. Decentring and Recentring Lawyers 
This thesis has offered reasons for decentring the legal profession from 
conceptions of access to justice. It has presented the professional citizenship of 
lawyers as a crucial part of the checks and balances that underwrite the justice 
that is essential for democracy and good social relations to flourish. Yet it has 
also argued that access to justice is not realisable while lawyers and legalism 
dominate our understanding of what it means. Decentring lawyers from access 
to justice practice makes access to justice more achievable; a legal profession 
recentred on broader access to justice concerns is a legal profession more likely to 
fulfil its responsibility to promote justice without domination. Legal 
professional ethics and regulation find their deepest significance within a 
broader context of democratic justice that is more than lawyers' justice. 
The main principle for regulatory reform that withstands all the normative, 
phenomenological and structural challenges of the iterated adjustment employed 
throughout this thesis is a process of deliberation about how to regulate in which 
the substantive access to justice concerns of the community are brought to bear 
on the profession. It is not a model that privileges either the profession or state 
regulatory institutions. Rather lawyers' regulation would focus on enhancing the 
culture of legal professionalism in a way that is both subject to and constitutive 
of deliberative democratic justice. Section II of this chapter examines how 
understanding lawyers through the prism of a theory of justice can renew the 
theory of legal professionalism, making it relevant to contemporary democracies. 
Section III looks through the prism from the other side: It asks what the practical 
analysis of the world of lawyers and access to justice institutions can contribute 
to the political theories of deliberative democracy of Habermas (1996) and Pettit 
(1997). It concludes that the detailed study of law and lawyers tells us more 
about what law, lawyers and state legal institutions cannot do than leading 
political theories might recognise, and argues that theories of just democracy 
should focus more attention on the practice of justice in many rooms, not just 
central state ones. 
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II. Lawyers Through the Prism of Justice 
(i) Justice Beyond Lawyers 
Why be concerned about lawyers and their professional arrangements when there 
are so many more pressing social crises facing us? In an argument against the 
significance of lawyers in the US, Derek Bok, President of Harvard University, 
quotes approvingly an apocryphal Japanese saying; "Engineers make the pie 
grow larger; lawyers only decide how to carve it up" (Bok 1983:574; emphasis 
added).1 His aphorism encapsulates the widely held view that there are too 
many lawyers in western countries, especially the US, who do not contribute to 
the production of anything useful, but simply waste money on disputation. 
Bok's proverb could also be read as a positive statement of why people are 
concerned with lawyers and what they do. Legal decisions about how to "carve 
up the pie" are a species of decision about how to live together justly, how to 
ensure that everything else is done according to shared ideals of social and 
political relationships. People use lawyers and want to improve their services 
because they expect them to contribute to the practice of justice. As Merry 
found (1990; see p 77 above), citizens turn to law when they fail to solve their 
own problems of family or neighbourhood violence and disputes, or when they 
find they have no other power of their own to bring to bear against the 
domination of a husband or lover. They rely on lawyers being available to help 
them when they use the law ( or when the law is used against them) and will 
complain if they are not served well, if the charges are unaffordable or if they see 
lawyers helping other clients achieve unjust goals (see Chapter Two). Failures of 
lawyers are perceived as failures of access to the justice of law. 
To satisfy community concern, the design of regulatory arrangements for lawyers 
might be based on the insight that lawyers are intermediaries in citizen attempts 
to use law to ensure that shared social and political ideals order their lives 
together. This fits well with traditional functionalist theories which see lawyers 
as the trustees of the cultural tradition of law, the intermediate mechanism 
between the organs of the state and individual citizens (Durkheim 1992, Parsons 
1 Bok refers to a statistic that Japan has 30% more engineers than the US and only a 
fraction of the lawyers. For a rebuttal of this use of statistics see Galanter (1983:59) 
who shows that the Japanese statistics are misleading since many legal jobs in Japan 
are done by people who have not passed the Japanese bar exam, and indeed that the 
number per capita taking the bar exam in Japan after completing the rest of their legal 
training is slightly higher than the US but the pass rate is purposely kept very low 
(1.7% compared with 74% in the US). 
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1954b, cf Brint 1994). But the regulatory practices of legal professional 
associations and disciplinary authorities have tended to disclaim any explicit 
responsibility for justice on the part of lawyers. Instead they have historically 
focused on the high profile problem of trust account fraud (particularly in 
Australia), and on enforcing restrictive advertising and practice rules. They have 
generally ignored problems of bad service and overcharging that most trouble 
clients and community. To this extent, a regulatory theory of the legal profession 
must also be consistent with modern critiques of the profession that see it as 
engaged in a collective project of market control and status attainment, and 
individual projects of domination of clients or blind service to the existing social 
order (Abel 1988, 1989a, Larson 1977). 
If lawyers have normative significance as tools for access to justice, then their 
regulatory reform can only be attempted by looking first beyond lawyers to a 
more general theory about the ways in which citizens should be able to secure 
justice in society. Indeed this has been the main argument of this thesis-that a 
normative theory of justice, and the design of institutions which practically 
implement it, must inform the design of regulatory arrangements for lawyers. 
The rhetoric of "access to justice" emerged early in the iterative analysis of this 
thesis through community concern with lawyers' failures, and remained 
significant in the deliberative democratic theory of justice and the stated (but not 
necessarily practised) ideals of lawyers. The language of access to justice 
signifies a concern with procedures, with arrangements and institutions for 
securing justice or for contesting decisions and actions which seem unjust. 
Therefore justice was defined as, 
those arrangements by which people can (successfully) make claims against 
individuals and institutions in order to advance shared ideals of social and 
political life. 
According to this definition, justice is the collection of institutions, arrangements 
and procedures for securing citizens' status and rights in a sociopolity organised 
according to some accepted social and political ideals. Access to justice is the 
practical project of ensuring that citizens can actually use these institutions 
equally. It is a fundamental ideal imperfectly put into practice in a world where 
it has been inadequately buttressed by resilient institutions (see Dunn 1994). 
This normative ideal of access to justice fits well the republican theory of 
Sunstein (1988, 1993) and particularly Pettit (1993, 1997, Braithwaite & Pettit 
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1990), as Chapter Three showed. The republican ideal of freedom as non-
domination, as set out by Pettit, is an ideal of constitutionalism and deliberative 
democracy in which the procedures that allow citizens to participate in and 
contest decisions (and check the power of public officials and private powers) is 
what assures their freedom. The ideal of freedom as non-domination, an ideal of 
resilient, secure freedom, is one that gives justice procedures the most prominent 
place in the design of the sociopolity.2 The foundational republican ideal of 
resilient freedom and the policy ideal of access to justice motivate a broader 
vision of institutional arrangements for justice than a focus on lawyers alone 
could possibly ground. 
A range of means has been employed over the last thirty years by lawyers and 
reformers of the legal system to improve access to justice, as described in Chapter 
Four. The range of means can be analysed as four main waves: 
1. The wave of legal aid reform that relied on the state to subsidise legal 
services for the poor; 
2. The wave of public interest law that broadened legal services beyond 
legalism towards more political concerns of substantive justice; 
3. The wave of alternative dispute resolution that evinced a concern for 
restoration of relationships between individuals and within local 
communities; 
4. The wave of competition policy that saw the market as the most efficient 
way of allocating justice services and sought to break down lawyers' 
monopolies in order to achieve the more just distribution of services. 
These four waves have achieved some gains in improving access to justice, but 
have failed to achieve the significant improvements their advocates hoped for. 
States will never be able to subsidise enough law to do justice through legal aid. 
The market for legal services will never achieve access to justice for those who 
cannot afford to pay, no matter how competitive it is. The political impact of 
public interest law and the communitarian option of alternative dispute 
resolution have not yet been taken sufficiently seriously as alternatives and 
complements to law to transform access. 
2 As Chapter Three showed, a republican definition of justice would be; that set of 
arrangements that allows people to make claims against other individuals and 
institutions in order to secure their freedom against the possibility of domination. 
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Chapters Four and Five argued that the success of the access to justice movement 
has been constrained by a dominance of legal justice and of lawyers. If justice is 
defined as processes for securing social relationships organised according to 
accepted social and political ideals, then it is about informal and political 
processes as much as legal processes. It means creating a workplace culture in 
which a person who uses a wheelchair feels able to appeal to shared norms of 
respect and equality in asking for a toilet with a curtain rather than a door on 
their floor (Engel & Munger 1996:22); it means access to a process through which 
they can pursue their request higher up if it fails in the first instance; and it might 
mean involvement in a group of disabled workers who proactively advocate and 
educate for their rights within the company and outside it. It will only rarely 
mean using court processes to establish rights either individually or as a group, 
although legal norms might be invoked in advocacy and education and may 
condition informal relationships between those that know of them. 
Improving the culture of justice requires the cumulation of the four waves into a 
pyramid of justice options. The shadow of the law should cover informal justice 
so that norms of law ameliorate dominations inherent in indigenous ordering, 
and informal justice that restores relationships takes precedence in time over 
litigation. Both legal and informal justice should be set in a context of social and 
political action by groups who seek to change community attitudes and 
social/political arrangements in ways that individual citizens cannot do on their 
own. Law is an essential and unique component of a just society, but cannot 
constitute it alone. Miranda-style rules requiring police to inform suspects of 
their rights and to refrain from coercive interrogation have little effect if they are 
only enforced at appeal court level, and do not penetrate the informal police 
cultures or suspects' consciousness of their own rights (McConville & Mirsky 
1995, Rosenberg 1991:324-329).3 
Chapter Five suggested how the practical implementation of such a vision of 
access to justice beyond lawyers might begin in the large institutions where we 
spend much of our lives: Those institutions could be required to build on the 
self-regulated justice processes they already operate to develop comprehensive 
access to justice policies (in all the areas that affect customers, employees and 
stakeholders-health and safety, discrimination, consumer redress, just 
3 Miranda v Arizona 384 US 436 (1966) was the US Supreme Court decision introducing 
the rule that an accused's statements could not be used in evidence against them unless 
they had been warned that they had a right to remain silent, that any statements 
made could be used against them and that they had a right to a lawyer. 
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dismissal etc) that are permeable to the oversight of law and the just demands of 
social and political action. A company that already has a (rudimentary) sexual 
harassment policy and a sophisticated consumer complaint scheme (including 
part funding of an independent industry ombudsman) might discover it needs to 
ensure its access to justice policies for employees meet the same high standards 
its consumer dispute scheme already does. Both might need to become more 
open to the criticisms and consciousness-raising efforts of unions, women's 
networks and consumer groups. 
(ii) Legal Professional Citizenship in the Republic of Justice 
Notions of legal professionalism can be revitalised, not by giving lawyers a 
dominance they do not deserve, but by lending lawyers and what they do the 
significance of the wider framework of justice and democracy to which they 
contribute. This thesis has developed a sociopolitical conception of lawyers' role 
and lawyers' regulation, rather than a primarily individual ethical theory. Most 
normative theories relating to lawyers are concerned more with the ethics of 
individual lawyers and law firms than with the broader way in which the ethics 
and regulation of the whole legal profession can help them do the work of a just 
democracy. Scholarly theories of the profession have tended to concentrate on 
the nature of relationships between individual lawyers and clients (Rosenthal 
1977, Sarat & Felstiner 1995), the communal socialisation of the profession 
(Dingwall & Fenn 1987, Durkheim 1992, Goode 1957) or the monopolistic 
strategy of extracting market privileges and social status (Abel 1988, 1989a), 
rather than on the ways lawyers contribute to the constitution of a just 
community (see Halliday & Karpik forthcoming). These have been odd priorities 
for theorising given the significance of lawyers for justice in the popular 
imagination. As Halliday and Karpik write (forthcoming:53), the circumstances 
in which lawyers will contribute to the constitution of a just sociopolity "must 
count as a problem entirely as critical in its magnitude, and far more 
consequential in its human cost, as when they will struggle to maintain market 
monopolies." 
There is one major exception to the lack of interest in lawyers' contribution to 
building a just sociopolity: It is the vision of lawyers as acting autonomously to 
constitute the separation of powers, especially the independence of the judiciary, 
to defend the rights of citizens against the power of the state, and to safeguard 
the rule of law. This conception features prominently in the ideology of many 
legal professions around the world, and is of great significance in political 
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liberalism, as Halliday and Karpik show (forthcoming) .4 On this view lawyers 
act as leaders of civil society in its efforts to moderate the executive and 
legislative power of the state. Their professional associations are "small 
republics" that control human, symbolic and material resources and which 
exercise the capacity of acting against the state (Halliday & Karpik 
forthcoming:19). So Tocqueville saw lawyers "as the most powerful existing 
security against the excesses of democracy" (1961:321, 328) because of their 
"instinctive love of order and of formalities" (1961:322, 324) demonstrated in 
their defence of the rule of law. Halliday and Karpik examine autonomous 
collective political action by the legal professions (and sometimes the absence of 
it) in Germany, France, Britain and the US, showing how these political projects 
have been pursued in addition to market projects (see also Halliday 1987), 
forming a pillar of modem political liberalism. 
It is crucial to have a legal profession which contributes to justice by a self-
identity which requires it to advocate for individuals against state power, to 
defend separations of powers crucial to liberty (including the independence of 
the judiciary), and to use its expertise to help ensure the state is doing a good 
and fair job of governing (Halliday 1987, Halliday & Karpik forthcoming). Yet 
justice as conceived in this thesis requires more than that: It also requires a legal 
profession grounded and oriented by a notion of justice which gives it a role in 
checking private power, and which gives lawyers' day to day work in solving 
problems and injustices significance in contributing to a just sociopolity. The 
liberal conception of lawyers' role puts too much emphasis on limiting state 
power to ground a regulatory theory for the profession which could govern 
lawyers' whole working lives. Indeed, as we have seen (p 143), the liberal 
tradition taken alone can also justify a Barwick in advocacy against the state for 
wealthy interests who seek to use loopholes and legalism to evade the public-
regarding purpose of just laws. 
The US republican tradition of the practice of law valorised by Luban (1988) 
and particularly Gordon (1985, 1988, 1990) gives lawyers a role in moderating 
not only the influence of the state, but also the power of rapacious private 
actors. The early American Federalists saw lawyers as particularly suited to 
4 As Chapter Eight mentioned, Halliday (1987) also develops a political conception of 
11 civic" legal professionalism which could help the state to govern effectively through 
the use of its expertise to help define state powers and improve the legal system. Brint 
(1994) also suggests that the intelligentsia might retain some ideals of traditional 
11 social trustee" professionalism promoting autonomy and social responsibility which 
can contribute to the maintenance of liberalism. 
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being "impartial arbiters" between private actors as well as checks on the power 
of the state (Madison et al 1987:234-235; see also Gordon 1985). Lawyers are 
important because they carry the rule of law not only in the ideology and rhetoric 
they wheel out when they engage in collective political action ( as Halliday & 
Karpik argue), but also because it is (or ought to be) institutionalised in their day 
to day work practices. Counsel for an insurance company who competently and 
fairly advises on how to settle motor vehicle or occupational health and safety 
claims according to law has not only done his or her job, but has contributed to 
the just functioning of ordinary social relations, and the relief of what would 
otherwise be the injustice of a family who must suffer poverty because of an 
accident caused by someone else. 
Lawyers are significant for justice because of the importance of law in ordering 
social relations justly, and the fact that historically lawyers have had the 
responsibility for passing on and helping citizens use the traditions of legal 
justice. The rhetoric of the Federalist lawyers of the early American republic and 
their Progressive counterparts of the late 19th century might have been 
overblown, yet they had a point: Lawyers are significant as the cultural bearers 
of lawyers' justice, the public values inhering in the law that attempt to bind 
society together justly. That role ought to infuse all one's practice activities as a 
lawyer (Gordon 1985). Lawyers' work partially constitutes the republic of 
justice by daily routines which help clients solve everyday problems, challenge 
private dominations and stand against state power, as well as in collective 
political projects which defend the rule of law and make statements about the 
constitutionality of particular laws and the legality of certain actions. The task 
of regulatory reform of the profession is to design a regulatory strategy which 
will ensure that justice is nurtured by a rule of law culture which works itself out 
in lawyers' daily practices. 
Chapters Six to Nine attempted to develop such a theory. Chapter Six found that 
lawyers already hold a specific set of access to justice ideals that citizens might 
expect them to fulfil to contribute to a wider justice agenda. The advocacy ideal 
sees individual rights and individual empowerment as important. It is limited by 
the gatekeeper ideal that recognises legal service providers must show some 
responsibility for helping people to obey the spirit of the law if the system is to 
maintain any sort of justice. The public interest ideal reminds lawyers they have a 
role not only as servants of clients and of the law, but also of the community, 
especially those who have been excluded from even becoming clients of the legal 
system. The fourth ideal, the ideal of collegiality, says that it is also desirable to 
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foster some communal feeling among legal service providers. Such collegiality is 
desirable not to exclude certain groups, ideas and interests, but to do the 
opposite-to ensure that all legal service providers are treated fairly, and that 
professional ideals are passed on and debated. 
The regulatory theory of the legal profession developed in Chapters Seven, Eight 
and Nine gave them a role as citizens within a wider sociopolity alongside 
government and community groups in deliberating about how they would be 
regulated. Chapter Seven used data from the Australian experience of legal 
professional reform to suggest that a deliberative process which keeps open the 
option of some self-regulation is both possible, and more effective, at achieving 
long-lasting change than the imposition of competition or accountability reform 
without listening to the profession. Chapter Eight argued that adopting such a 
process was also justified on the basis of more general research and theorising 
about the legal profession in a variety of countries that shows the 
meaninglessness of stereotypical images of the profession that motivate forced 
competition and accountability reform on the one hand, or pure self-(over)-
regulation on the other. Instead a more sophisticated image of the profession 
emerges from the literature in which certain segments support particular reforms, 
the ideology of the profession motivates both self-interest and public regard, and 
the knowledge and expertise of the profession is useful but can also be a tool of 
exploitation. 
Chapter Nine advocated a deliberative model of regulation that takes seriously 
the legal profession's citizenship potential and therefore uses strategies of self-
regulation, communal socialisation, competition, state regulation and community 
accountability together to constitute a profession that assists communities to 
govern themselves justly. This way of reforming the regulation of the legal 
profession implements the arguments from the first half of the thesis that long-
lasting change and compliance with norms is more likely to occur where dialogic 
means of social control are used than when coercive and formalistic ones are 
applied. Both in the process of reform (a deliberative process) and in its 
outcome (a regulatory mix in which the profession is brought to account to 
community and government and where government and community hear what 
the profession has to say) there is reliance on informal and indigenous orderings 
in advance of resort to more coercive mechanisms of control. 
This theory for regulating the legal profession turns out to be just one pyramid of 
justice (see Figure 9.2, at p 218) for one particular substantive area. Yet the 
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institutions for regulating the legal profession are more than an example of justice 
in action. The institutions of the legal profession bear a unique relationship to 
justice in that they can help constitute or help destroy other institutions of access 
to justice. Figure 10.1 represents how a pyramid of regulatory strategies for the 
legal profession contributes to building up more general pyramids of access to 
justice, at the same time as access to justice provides the context for deliberating 
about how to regulate the legal profession. Figure 10.1 represents the way the 
regulation and ethics of lawyers must be subordinated to the broader access to 
justice aspirations of the community through community accountability that 
funnels wider access to justice considerations into the profession's own self-
regulation and communal practices. Yet improvement in access to justice 
depends on the regulatory reform of lawyers because in practice lawyers are 
responsible for nurturing the formal legal justice that conditions informal justice 
and indigenous ordering. 
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Figure 10.1 Interplay Between Access to Justice Institutions and Lawyer 
Regulation. 
Indeed the two pyramids pictured in Figure 10.1 are mirror images of each other 
(and they could be pictured either way around). The pyramid of institutions for 
regulating the legal profession have the overall effect of constituting a profession 
capable of carrying the traditions of formal legal justice which form the apex of 
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the other pyramid, the pyramid of access to justice institutions. These norms of 
formal justice (for which lawyers are responsible) ultimately regulate the 
indigenous or communal orderings on which most justice (and injustice) depends. 
The access to justice pyramid, on the other hand, provides the institutions within 
which lawyers must fit and the external norms to which they must be made 
accountable at the apex of their regulatory pyramid. 
In both cases external norms and communal orderings regulate and balance each 
other. External norms of access to justice regulate lawyers but are themselves 
partly constituted by communal orderings in the many "rooms" in which justice 
is done in the wider society ( Galanter 1981). External norms of formal justice 
regulate indigenous justice in many rooms, but are constituted by the communal 
ordering of the legal profession which bears the primary responsibility for 
carrying the traditions of formal justice. It is this funnelling action on which the 
deliberative processes of regulation of the legal profession described in Chapter 
Nine relies. Checking and balancing between profession and community create 
the channels for justice to flow so that the profession is more likely to contribute 
adequately to justice, and communal orderings are more likely to become just. 
Thus when responsiveness to community concerns forced the legal profession to 
become more inclusive of female practitioners, it not only improved the justice of 
legal professional community, but also fed back into community access to justice 
institutions. Feminists within the legal profession have invented new legal 
categories such as sexual harassment (MacKinnon 1979) and used them in their 
advocacy for women clients, making legal justice more responsive to women's 
needs with the ultimate effects that (1) new legal norms percolated down the 
pyramid into informal justice processes (such as human resource management 
policies within companies and universities) and (2) were also promoted by social 
movement advocacy in the wider community where they looped back into 
professional practice (so that law firms themselves became vulnerable to 
complaints of sexual harassment; see Young 1992). 
It is also possible that either the legal profession will dominate communal 
orderings and understandings of justice (as some claim is the case in the 
contemporary US) or that communal orderings will be so strong as to push out 
the possibilities of legal justice (as regularly occurs in communities, families and 
workplaces where certain members are discouraged from asserting their legal 
rights). In a republican democracy in which there are many avenues for 
deliberative justice and in which checks and balances are institutionalised in the 
design of public and private powers, such an imbalance is less likely to occur 
248 
Chapter 10 Republic of Justice 
and is more likely to be remedied. If the legal profession becomes too arrogant in 
its service provision and charges, but there is also a strong market, clients will 
buy services from non-lawyers, forcing lawyers to become more responsive to 
community concerns to compete. Where a workplace or family culture 
discourages women or workers from asserting their rights, a public sphere in 
which social movements are encouraged and nurtured might mean that a 
womens' group or industrial advocacy group will take up in legal and political 
fora the concerns of those who have been silenced in the private sphere of home 
or work. Lawyers may play an important part in these spheres. A state which 
is willing to step in and hold lawyers accountable to the community when they 
become too self-interested, or to provide money for individuals or groups to use 
the courts when they are silenced in their own communities will counteract the 
ability of either lawyers or tyrannous majorities to dominate justice. The wise 
balancing of lawyers' justice and communal ordering thus depends upon ensuring 
that the social and political institutions necessary to constitute a deliberative 
democracy exist and function in such a way that they can check one another. 
Lawyers' contradictory location in relation to state, market and civil society 
makes them part of a system of checks and balances which contribute to a just 
deliberative democracy. Because of their multiple dependencies and 
accountabilities, lawyers are able to assist in checking both the public powers of 
Parliament and executive, and the private power of factions and clients. It need 
not be idealistic to expect lawyers' citizenship to help constitute the republic of 
justice as long as the basic structures and institutions of lawyers' organisation 
and regulation are well designed. The regulatory theory outlined in this thesis 
would allow lawyers to do their jobs and pursue their self-interest in such a way 
that their daily work generally contributes to constituting justice. The linchpin of 
ensuring that lawyers play their part is a deliberative process in which the 
expectations of the community and the knowledge and experience of the legal 
profession are brought to bear on one another so that a suitable set of regulatory 
strategies and organisational structures are developed for the profession. The 
1983 process by which the American Bar Association adopted a new Model Rule 
of Professional Conduct is perhaps an example of how not to do this; a mixture 
of intra-professional politics, deal-making between professional interest groups 
and apparently democratic deliberation among lawyers dominated the 
development of a model set of rules which are gravely ·criticised but set the 
agenda for most lawyer regulation in the US (Schneyer 1992). A better, yet 
equally political (and at times equally divisive), example might be the process of 
reform in the Australian state of New South Wales where the reports of law 
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reform commissions, anti-trust enforcers and community concerns set the 
agenda, forcing the profession into a process of negotiation resulting in a new 
regulatory structure (including significant lay involvement and independent 
oversight of lawyer practices) broadly acceptable to profession, government and 
community (see Chapter Seven). 
III. Contributions to a Deliberative Theory of Law and 
Democracy 
(i) Law and Deliberative Democracy 
Section II summarised how a deliberative theory of justice can contribute to the 
understanding of legal professionalism. What can an understanding of law and 
lawyers, of concrete institutions of access to justice, contribute to a deliberative 
theory of justice? Recent political philosophy already takes increasingly 
seriously the role of law in constituting a just society. As Sunstein (1996:ix) 
writes, "We are ... in the midst of a period of enormous enthusiasm for rule-
bound justice" particularly in the wake of communism. Indeed much recent 
theory on deliberative democracy resonates with the analysis in this thesis on the 
role of law and regulative institutions in achieving justice (Barber 1984, Dworkin 
1986, Habermas 1996, Pettit 1997). 
Chapter Three has already shown how the republicanism of Pettit construes law 
as crucial to constituting a society in which non-domination is the norm. 
Republicans ... hold that the properly constituted law is constitutive 
of liberty . . . According to the earliest republican doctrine, the laws of 
a suitable state, in particular the laws of a republic, create the 
freedom enjoyed by citizens; they do not offend against that 
freedom, even in a measure for which they later compensate ... 
Citizenship is a status that exists, of necessity, only under a suitable 
regime of law ... And so freedom is seen in the republican tradition 
as a status that exists only under a suitable legal regime. As the laws 
create the authority that rulers enjoy, so the laws create the freedom 
that citizens share. (Pettit 1997:35-36) 
The tradition of freedom under law is an important one in democratic theory. 
As Barber comments after quoting Rousseau on this topic, "To obey laws we give 
to ourselves is in fact a very persuasive definition of democracy" (1994:264). 
Yet for republicanism a suitable rule of law is not enough. It must be supported 
by widespread civic virtue, if the law is to be effective. Law must give support 
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to and be supported by the everyday norms of civil society if it is to make more 
than a trivial contribution to justice and freedom: "non-vulnerability can only be 
guaranteed for each under a law that is internalised by others as a legitimate and 
welcome form of constraint, not as a forceful imposition that will be 
systematically resisted and strategically avoided" (Pettit 1997:252-253). For 
republicans, the best way for the state to encourage widespread civility, and 
compliance with the norms enshrined in law is "to establish the republican 
legitimacy of its laws in the public mind, and it can best do this by being an 
effective, contestatory democracy" (1997:280). 
Thus the argument is circular. Law is necessary to advance non-domination, yet 
it is only effective if it becomes ingrained in "[just] habits of people's hearts" 
(Pettit 1997:241). If the law is to live in everyday interactions and to be 
supported by cultural norms, it must be contestable and based on the 
deliberation of the people; it must be open to the social action of groups who can 
show that their interests and ideas have not been adequately regarded and will 
agitate for them to be considered in the laws of the republic. Yet law itself is 
necessary to develop the type of effective, contestatory or deliberative 
democracy in which the interests and ideas of the people help formulate the 
laws, and in which the laws reflect and are supported in norms of civic virtue in 
the habits of their hearts. Law is necessary to ensure that certain public or 
private powers do not dominate in democratic procedures of deliberation, to 
provide means by which citizens can contest decisions and actions, and to 
challenge dominating norms that hold sway in the culture at large. Thus law only 
carries weight in practical affairs if it is supported by a democratic culture of 
civic virtue, but law in turn is necessary to eliminate domination and make such 
a culture possible. 
This circularity or synergy between the law of the state and non-legal norms of 
decentralised civil society is inescapable for those who seek to understand the 
role that law can play in building a just society. Krygier (1996) shows how in 
post-Communist societies the success of the rule of law must depend on the 
extent to which its norms are lived in the culture of a people and in associations 
of civil society which debate the goodness of the law and ensure that it is kept 
by government as well as citizens. Tocqueville (1961:373-378) attributed the 
vibrancy and success of democracy in the US to the fact that even the common 
people knew the laws and participated in law-making so that legal norms had 
become a part of their private as well as their public lives: Democracy had 
penetrated into people's "customs, their opinions, and the forms of social 
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intercourse; it is to be found in all the details of social life equally as in the laws11 
(Tocqueville 1961:382). Law and society scholarship, as Chapter Three showed, 
constantly explores the tension between the norms of law and the norms of 
indigenous ordering and how they either subvert or support one another ( eg 
Galanter 1981). Habermas' Between Facts and Norms (1996) is likely to become 
the most influential and detailed normative explication of this synergy between 
law, deliberation and institutions of civil society in the development of 
deliberative democracy. In Habermas' conception of deliberative democracy, 
law is simultaneously the main output of citizens' deliberation and also what 
makes their dialogue possible. 
For Habermas, the only norms according to which a sociopolity ought to be 
organised are those which could be agreed upon in rational discourse (1996:107). 
In Between Facts and Norms he calls this the "discourse principle11 •5 However two 
empirical facts mean that as a matter of practice face-to-face interaction cannot 
easily be transmitted into deliberation that solves society-wide problems: (1) the 
problem of oppression and domination which destroys the possibility of free 
and equal deliberation, and (2) the fact of social complexity which means that 
we each individually pursue our own "lifeworlds" and each participate in a 
plurality of social groupings without any over-arching worldview (such as 
religion) to bind us together and allow us to share a common language. "The 
limited coordinating power of moral norms in face-to-face interaction cannot be 
transferred to the integrative functions of large-scale institutions, and this fact 
presents a limit on the participatory, democratic organization of complex 
societies" (Bohman 1994:907). In the terms of Habermas' Theory of 
Communicative Action (1987), the lifeworld (which is made up of everyday 
culture, civil society and personality structures) seems to have no effective way 
of influencing the political and economic systems which govern our lives through 
power and money. 
This is where law becomes indispensable. For Habermas law mediates between 
these problematic facts and the norms by which we are governed by mediating 
between the communicative action of the lifeworld and the administrative power 
of the political system. It is the "transmission-belt" between lifeworld and 
systems (Habermas 1996:448), the integrating mechanism that can make 
5 The discourse principle is an application of the idea of the ideal speech situation or 
communicative action in The Theory of Communicative Action (Habermas 1987). 
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deliberative democracy a practical possibility.6 Law can create the conditions in 
which deliberation occurs (1) free of domination, and, (2) in ways that can have 
input into the sphere of public decision-making despite social complexity, 
because it is both coercive and procedural. Only the procedures of law are a 
sufficient coordinating mechanism to allow everyone to participate in rational 
debate in a complex society. Only the coercion of law can make this participation 
possible by ensuring that citizens have certain fundamental human rights 
recognised (,'/private autonomy") as well as the rights that are necessary to allow 
them to deliberate to make law (to exercise their "public autonomy"). 
While Habermas never explicitly defines what he means by law, it seems that in 
order to be law, legal norms must ensure private and public autonomy 
(1996:122-123). Thus as Habermas writes (1996:8), 
Legal norms of this type make possible highly artificial communities, 
associations of free and equal legal persons whose integration is 
based simultaneously on the threat of external sanctions and the 
supposition of a rationally motivated agreement. 
This system of rights must be stable and capable of coercion, and therefore must 
be promulgated by a constitutional state (Habermas 1996:133). But finally and 
most importantly, for law to be legitimate, it must be capable of meeting the 
agreement of all citizens in a discursive law-making process that is itself legally 
constituted. Thus the possibilities of law and deliberation entwine each other in 
a recursive process wherein deliberation is only possible through the mediation of 
law, but law itself must be based in deliberation if it is to achieve the goals of 
making deliberation between free and equal citizens possible: 
The paradoxical achievement of law thus consists in the fact that it 
reduces the conflict potential of unleashed individual liberties 
through norms that can coerce only so long as they are recognized as 
legitimate on the fragile basis of unleashed communicative liberties ... 
Social integration thereby takes on a peculiarly reflexive shape: by 
meeting its need for legitimation with the help of the productive force 
of communication, law takes advantage of the permanent risk of 
dissensus to spur on legally institutionalised public discourses. 
(Habermas 1996:462) 
6 A view akin to that held by Gordon's (1985) Federalist and Progressive lawyers, and 
also by Parsons (1954a, 1954b ). 
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Like Pettit, then, Habermas' conception of the ideal of human freedom 
("autonomy" in Habermas' terms) is one of freedom under a law that makes 
people free. It is an, 
idea of autonomy according to which human beings act as free 
subjects only insofar as they obey just those laws they give 
themselves in accordance with insights they have acquired 
intersubjectively. (Habermas 1996:445-446) 
With Pettit, Habermas recognises the problem which is also the main feature of 
the social science of regulation discussed in Chapter Three, that although law is 
backed by coercion, it cannot achieve even average compliance unless it is 
recognised as legitimate (Bohman 1994:910).7 We have just seen that for Pettit 
(1997:252) this means that the state should ensure that the laws it promulgates 
are "established in common perceptions as legitimate interventions in civil life". 
For Pettit, as for Habermas, this means ensuring that laws themselves are 
promulgated on the basis of the processes demanded by the rule of law, 
constitutionalism and deliberation or contestability, and that substantively they 
increase the freedom of each citizen (which in turn can only be guaranteed by the 
processes of deliberation assured by the rule of law and constitutionalism, and 
on it goes).8 The fact of the state's enforcement of law is intertwined with the 
justificatory force of a law-making process that is rational only to the extent it 
guarantees freedom, and can only be assured to guarantee freedom to the extent 
that it is based upon widespread agreement (Bohman 1994:910). 
Practically, for Habermas this means that the sociopolity ought to be organised 
with a centre and periphery of deliberation (a division of labour necessary 
because of the complexity of society.) The centre is the formal decision-making 
bodies of the constitutional state which ought to be porous to the periphery of 
the informal public sphere in which the institutions of civil society reign. 
Discourse developed by institutions of civil society in autonomous public 
spheres supply legal and administrative discourses with arguments, formulates 
social needs and defines what issues are relevant at a given moment; 
In the proceduralist paradigm, the public sphere is not conceived 
simply as the back room of the parliamentary complex, but as the 
impulse-generating periphery that surrounds the political center: in 
7 In other words, law must have some support from indigenous orderings or the norms of 
civil society, if it is to have any effect. 
8 However for Pettit, the notion of deliberation is made more manageable for a large 
and plural society by saying that decisions and actions need only be contestable, not 
originally based in deliberation. 
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cultivating normative reasons, it affects all parts of the political 
system without intending to conquer it. Passing through the channels 
of general elections and various forms of participation, public 
opinions are converted into a communicative power that authorises 
the legislature and legitimates regulatory agencies, while a publicly 
mobilized critique of judicial decisions imposes more-intense [sic] 
justificatory obligations on a judiciary engaged in further developing 
the law. (Habermas 1996:442) 
This need not require all citizens to participate in public deliberation, only a 
wide enough diversity to ensure that all the rational arguments are considered. 
Habermas does not theorise how the coercion of law in the service of clients who 
pay the biggest fees and states whose violence is legitimated can be rendered 
minimally dominating in practical terms. This is something this thesis has sought 
to do with the idea of a pyramid of justice (see figure 4.3, p 93) in which resort 
to coercion at the peak of the pyramid is restrained by giving the "lifeworld" 
temporal priority in solving injustices. 
(ii) Justice Beyond Pettit and Habermas 
The theories of Pettit and Habermas converge to a considerable extent with the 
theory presented in this thesis of what the role of law, and therefore lawyers, in 
justice ought to be. Like them, this thesis has seen the norms of law as a crucial 
tool for reducing domination and oppression, and as a crucial site of deliberation 
by which citizens can secure their freedom. Like Pettit and Habermas, it has 
also emphasised the importance of cultural norms that support legal norms and 
the necessity for law to be in a dynamic mutually supportive relationship with 
face-to-face social processes and with collective social action by which norms of 
justice are developed. 
The policy for improving the institutionalisation of access to justice developed in 
Chapter Four and illustrated in Chapter Five depended on insights which can also 
be found to a great extent in the democratic theories of Pettit and Habermas. 
Pyramids of justice strategies set in contexts of social and political action is an 
architecture for specific regulatory frameworks that take account of the facts 
that (1) law is not effective unless it penetrates into the customs and habits of 
everyday social intercourse, and is in turn informed and shaped by them, and (2) 
that law alone can never achieve justice unless collective and widespread social 
or political action takes place simultaneously. 
Indeed for these two reasons this thesis has argued that law should be decentred 
from discussions of the design of institutions for access to justice; and that the 
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regulatory reform of lawyers should be informed by an access to justice discourse 
wherein lawyers have been removed from the dominant place. The 
decentralised, non-legalistic institutions which this thesis has advocated for 
improving access to justice and the regulation of lawyers could be normatively 
motivated by considerations found in both the Pettit and Habermas theories of 
the role of law in democracy. Yet a limitation in the writing of both theorists is 
their concentration on centralist, statist or legalistic institutions of justice despite 
their recognition that there must be more to justice than that. 
It is standard for political theorists to focus idealistically on law as an output of 
the central state political system, without a critical focus on law's actual 
application or effect on the practice of justice in private and everyday contexts 
(see Campbell 1993). Law and society scholars who document the legal 
system's domination of the "lifeworld" and of the economic system, indeed even 
mainstream lawyers, are wont to see political theory in the ilk of Pettit and 
Habermas as starry-eyed about the rule of law. As Chapter Four showed, the 
design and reform of practical access to justice policies has also tended to fall 
into the trap of setting too much store on access to central state justice 
facilitated by lawyers. 
This thesis has adjusted the republican theory of Pettit by reference to the social 
science of regulation and of the legal profession, to develop a conception of a 
deliberative democracy in which (a) law and lawyers are significant in achieving 
justice, but the limits of law are recognised, (b) justice is done in many rooms 
and through many means, ( c) citizens can share in the government of their 
communities and in the practice of justice by realistic deliberative participation 
in local and private institutions, not just in public discourses that feed into 
central law-making processes, and (d) the limiting of private power is as 
important as the limiting of public power. Each of these insights about justice in 
a deliberative democracy can be built onto the foundations of democratic theory 
developed by writers such as Pettit and Habermas, and could make their 
insights more realistic and practical. The following sections consider in turn each 
of the four iterated adjustments to democratic theory listed (a) to ( d) above. 
(a) The Limits of Law: Does Anybody Listen? 
While political theorists like Pettit and Habermas focus on law as an output. of 
state processes (albeit processes informed and driven by the deliberation of 
citizens), an emphasis of this thesis has been on empirical work which sees the 
formal "law on the books" as a merely partial explanation of the practice of 
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justice in comparison with the "living law" of norms of communal or indigenous 
orderings. While political theorists concentrate on asking when state-
promulgated law is legitimate, socio-legal research is concerned with the more 
practical question of when it is effective. The issue, as Krygier (1996:17) says, is 
whether anyone listens when law is made. 
Empirical research on regulation, as this thesis explained, shows that while the 
symbolism and coercion of state law may be important, the way law filters 
down to everyday life is partial, may cause reactance-the opposite effect to 
that desired, and can be easily subverted to become a tool of domination. In 
order to address these problems, theorists must have a broader conception of 
justice than that it consists only in state law. Equally important norms are 
developed in schools, workplaces, families and a host of other subnational 
communities and institutions. 
For Habermas, the crucial process is how institutions of civil society funnel 
interests and arguments into a state centre of formal deliberation: 
Civil society is composed of those more or less spontaneously 
emergent associations, organisations, and movements that, attuned 
to how societal problems resonate in the private life spheres, distill 
and transmit such reactions in amplified form to the public sphere. 
The core of civil society composes a network of associations that 
institutionalises problem-solving discourses on questions of general 
interest inside the framework of organised public spheres. 
(Habermas 1996:367) 
Habermas neglects the possibility that the development of indigenous "law" 
within these institutions for their own use, which may never be the topic of 
discussion in his "centre" of public and formal deliberation, is just as important. 
This thesis has argued that central state law should not only facilitate 
deliberation that feeds back into central law-making, but it should also facilitate 
deliberation and communicative decision-making which feeds into the 
development of cultures and norms of justice within private institutions and 
groups, and within the context of particular relationships. In achieving this goal, 
reactance might be avoided by using law persuasively rather than coercively as 
much as possible. For example, coercive enforcement is largely irrelevant to 
protecting children from the terrible injustices that can be inflicted by bullies. Yet 
good schools nurture cultures of deliberation about the regulation of schoolyard 
violence; and the empirical evidence is that such dialogic regulation can cut 
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bullying by as much as half (Farrington 1993:419; see also Olweus 1994, Pepler 
et al 1993). 
This thesis has also argued that in most circumstances cultures of injustice are 
unlikely to be changed unless the symbolic norms of law are supplemented by 
effective collective action to educate people about injustice and to change habits 
and attitudes. Citizens are not born democratic; they must be educated for 
democracy in a way that includes education in respect for just law, resistance to 
unjust law, and participation in debates about the content of law (see Barber 
1994). Finally much of this thesis has been about the dominating potential of 
lawyers, and of formal state-centred law, and the need to keep law's role in 
justice wisely circumscribed. 
Thus in response to the limitations of state law in achieving justice, this thesis 
has advocated (1) a principle of parsimony in the use of law (Chapter Three), (2) 
a theory of the facilitative role of law in nurturing informal and everyday 
practices that increase access to justice (Chapters Three, Four and Five), and (3) 
the need for law to be supplemented by political and social action for doing 
justice (Chapter Four). Recognising the limitations of law in these ways means 
firstly nurturing justice in many rooms and through many means ( discussed in (b) 
below), and secondly encouraging local participation in deliberative fora which 
are more practical than deliberation in central state fora (discussed in (c) below). 
These mechanisms will be more effective at limiting private power than legalistic, 
centralist ones (discussed in (d) below). 
(b) Justice in Many Rooms and Through Many Means 
In order for law to be effective in helping to create a republic of justice, the idea 
in both Habermas' and Pettit's theories of deliberative democracy that law ought 
to be based on deliberation and facilitate deliberation that funnels in and out of 
a centralised law-making process in a formal public sphere, must be treated 
much more broadly. This thesis has advocated a more diffuse notion of 
deliberation which includes face-to-face means of decision-making as well as 
collective social action. 
Neither Habermas nor Pettit have much conception of the justice of law filtering 
down to everyday social relations through communitarian means of justice like 
alternative dispute resolution, or through the way people have learnt to solve 
problems informally among friends, colleagues and within commercial 
relationships. Nor do they have much conception of the possibility that the 
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deliberation which might inform central state law-making might not be through 
participation in groups which have political action as their aim, but by 
participation in face-to-face deliberations in a workplace or consumer dispute 
resolution scheme which forms the lower rung of a pyramid of access to justice 
options which ultimately feeds into court decision-making or centralised policy-
making. This thesis has argued that inter-personal dispute resolution 
mechanisms should be linked with central formal justice in order to make 
informal justice more effective and more just, and so that the law more 
accurately reflects the interests and concerns of real people in real relationships. 
This is not inconsistent with Habermas' and Pettit' s theories, yet both lack an 
emphasis on the significance of justice in many rooms according to (1) norms 
that are like law but written by non-state institutions, (2) norms that have 
evolved spontaneously as part of the culture of an organisation or community, 
and (3) totally contextual non-rule-like judgments that are made in relationships, 
communities and institutions about the just thing to do. 
This also addresses the criticisms of informal justice made by writers such as 
Richard Abel (1981a, 1982a, 1982b) and Laura Nader (1979, 1980) that it 
privatises disputes, thus perpetuating domination, instead of bringing injustice 
out into the light of public debate where it can be used as a catalyst for social 
change. Alternative dispute resolution does privatise disputes, yet in a well 
integrated deliberative democracy informal justice can connect private disputes 
to their public dimension, by involving an advocacy group in their solution, or by 
ensuring that an external monitor is noting patterns of injustice and bringing them 
to public attention. In a deliberative democracy in which pyramids of access to 
justice options are generally available and are set within a vital social movement 
politics, public disputes regularly succumb to private reason and private 
disputes succumb to public reason. The Abel and Nader critiques of informal 
justice's privatising tendencies are one-sided, evidencing the public-centred 
myopia that can also be found in political theorists like Habermas and Pettit. 
Although both Habermas and Pettit have an idea of people's involvement in 
social movement politics being an important way for their concerns to feed into 
law, social movement politics are much more potent and independent than either 
theorist seems to credit. As is the case with informal interpersonal practices of 
justice, law interacts with pre-existing independent norms of social action, 
sometimes in a supporting role (Minow 1990), sometimes in a subverting one 
(Galanter 1974) and sometimes having no effect (Rosenberg 1991). It is not 
simply a case of social action feeding neatly into law and in turn being 
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constituted by law. This is especially true of court-based legal action which, 
with all its symbolism and apparent significance, is mostly impotent in achieving 
social or political change; Martin Luther King in Alabama had more to do with 
achieving school desegregation, than the US Supreme Court in Brown v Board of 
Education (Rosenberg 1991). Thus Sunstein can conclude Legal Reasoning and 
Political Conflict (1996), by pointing out that the role of courts in making 
decisions of justice will always be secondary to more direct methods of citizen 
involvement: 
Legal reasoning-with its elaborate system of analogy, precedent-
following, specification of abstract terms, rule-creation, and 
incompletely theorised agreement-reflects an understanding that 
courts are far from preeminent actors in the system of democratic 
deliberation. As I have emphasised throughout, it is in democratic 
processes, not in courtrooms, that large-scale issues are usually, and 
best, debated and identified ... We may thus conclude our account 
of legal reasoning ... by reflecting on the extraordinary extent to 
which large-scale social transformations, in America and elsewhere, 
have had their foundations in popular rather than judicial 
convictions; and by insisting that in a well-functioning deliberative 
democracy, the most important social commitments emerge not from 
courtrooms, but from the reflective judgments of a nation's citizenry. 
(Sunstein 1996:195-196)9 
What is true of court decisions compared with more direct political action is true 
also of the significance of law in comparison with the virtues of doing justice in 
many rooms and through many means. Law is a deliberative forum with unique 
qualities that make it of special importance in facilitating other deliberative fora 
and ensuring their justice. The republic of justice is about more than law, 
however. The real practice of justice occurs, if at all, as a result of the 
democratic deliberative participation of citizens in the creation and exercise of 
norms of justice, not as a result of a law being passed. When law embodies 
norms of justice, it merely symbolises what has already been deliberated and 
decided. Indeed this is implicit in Habermas (1996:135): "The law receives its 
full normative sense neither through its legal form per se, nor through an a priori 
moral content, but through a procedure of lawmaking that begets legitimacy" . 
What Habermas calls "a procedure of lawmaking that begets legitimacy" should 
be more broadly construed to mean a culture of justice which permeates 
everyday life through communitarian dispute resolution and social action, which 
9 Here Sunstein makes up for an even more court-oriented republicanism than Pettit's in 
Beyond the Rights Revolution (1990). 
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is (imperfectly) symbolised in the law and which the law can occasionally 
enforce, in times of last resort. The five waves of access to justice and the 
analysis of how to weave them together in this thesis shows how to inject 
specificity into Habermas' procedural norm. For example the proposed "fifth 
wave" is a concrete prescription for continuous improvement in justice, a method 
for improving deliberative democracy across all the sites of greatest 
organisational power in a society. Indeed the idea of lawyers initiating a process 
of deliberation within the International Organisation for Standardisation (p 120) 
toward an international standard for access to justice plans is the makings of a 
practical proposal for improving deliberative democracy globally. 
( c) Practically Feasible Deliberative Participation 
This broad construal of what is meant by the procedures of deliberation that 
constitute the republic of justice in turn renders the ideal of citizens' 
participation more practical. Rather than idealising the involvement of every 
citizen in the public sphere, a broader conception of deliberative democracy 
would put forward the more realistic goal that most people will participate in 
decision-making in one or two local institutions in which they are interested, 
while some will also participate in the political sphere of law and policy-making. 
Within local settings, participation need not involve the formal, rule-based 
reasoning of law and the rationality of a political sphere which privileges certain 
voices and excludes others. Thus Iris Young writes that, "It is no secret that in 
actual communication situations in our society, poor, or less educated, or non-
professionals, or privatised people are often intimidated by the discourse rules 
of formal organisations, and their speech is often not taken seriously and 
deemed rational by these organisations" (Young 1993:127). She argues for an 
expanded version of deliberation which she calls "communicative democracy" 
which would include more than "the giving and criticizing of reasons for 
proposals" (1993:128). It would assume "a starting point of distance and 
difference" and include all the communicative acts necessary for reaching first 
understanding of each other and then agreement. It would include everything 
necessary to explain cultural meanin~s, ways of life and points of view to one 
another "through whatever modes of expression they judge will be rhetorically 
effective" through stories, poems, songs, confrontational protests, jokes and 
expressions of passion and emotion which might otherwise be discounted as 
irrational. These forms of participation are more common and more practical in 
non-legalistic fora of justice where discussion need not be curtailed or dominated 
by formal rule-based reasoning. As Young (1990, 1993) comments, a good 
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theory of democracy should be able to encompass these forms of participation. 
Where conceptions of deliberative democracy are broadened, Young's 
communicative democracy in many rooms can percolate into public reason 
through the type of architecture of deliberative democracy shown in the access to 
justice pyramid of Figure 10.1. 
One problem with western justice procedures is that they are based on 
interrogation; asking questions (usually adversarially) and demanding honest 
answers. In many of the world's cultures, for example some Australian 
Aboriginal cultures, it is rude to ask direct questions (Eades 1992, 1995). What 
one should do is tell a relevant story about oneself that is likely to elicit a desired 
account of his or her actions from the respondent. It is quite possible to replace 
formal criminal trials with restorative conferences for Australian aboriginal 
offenders which abandon the usual opening of asking the offender who has 
admitted guilt to "tell us in your own words what happened". Instead, for an 
assault conference, the facilitator might start by telling a story about how he or 
she once got into a fight. When the justice of lawyers recognises such a radically 
different and responsively democratised sense of criminal procedure, it might 
have an influence on other features of the system that oppress. One reason 
Australian Aborigines get arrested for minor crimes so regularly is that they 
refuse to answer questions from the police: The police think they are rude for 
failing to answer, the Aborigines think the police are rude for their interrogation 
in the first place. The hope is that lawyers' justice, through recognising modes of 
conferencing relevant to Aboriginal cultures, might educate police justice. 
(d) Limiting Private as well as Public Power 
A decentralised non-legalistic approach to justice in a deliberative democracy is 
also a more practical basis for the design of access to justice policies that deal 
with everyday injustices. The political theory of Pettit and Habermas is 
preoccupied with the problem of limiting and moderating public power. For 
individual citizens, however, the issue of access to justice is more likely to arise 
in relation to private acts of domination, domination in the family, the 
workplace or a consumer transaction. (This is not to deny that access to justice 
is also of the utmost importance at those times when individuals' freedoms are 
pitted against the authority of the state, most particularly in criminal 
prosecutions, and also when taxation, social security or access to the public 
political sphere are at issue.) Limiting the private power of large corporations 
with tens of thousands of employees and the capacity to influence millions of 
lives ought to be as much the concern of democratic theory as limiting the power 
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of the state. Indeed this thesis has shown how significant the regulation of 
another private power, the legal profession, can be for the development of a just 
deliberative democracy. 
For both Pettit (1997:272-273) and Habermas (1996), a just society is first 
about ensuring that citizens have freedom among themselves and do not 
dominate one another. For both, the state and public political sphere are 
necessary only to stabilise and enforce the rights that institutionalise the social 
ideal of an absence of private domination. Yet, as we have seen, both 
concentrate on the public political sphere.10 This thesis has argued that 
contestability of and deliberation about exercises of private power are just as 
important as deliberation about public power, and that practical strategies like 
access to justice plans are available for building institutions where this can 
happen. Chapter Five set out a proposal of what it might mean to take seriously 
the need to nurture justice and encourage democratic participation in the 
institutional settings in which most citizens spend most of their lives. Like 
Marxist and feminist critics of traditional political theory who have often 
pointed out how little it deals with unjust and undemocratic practices in the 
private spheres of market and family (eg Phillips 1991), this thesis has argued 
that the concept of deliberative democracy ought to be elaborated to encompass 
the nurture and facilitation of the deliberative practice of justice in all the 
settings of life, public or private. In this vision, the republic of justice is 
constituted not just by formal legal justice in the public sphere but by 
deliberative justice (which includes legal institutions) in public and private 
spheres wherever injustice can be done. 
IV. Lawyers in the Republic of Justice: A Task of Institutional 
Design 
This thesis embarked upon a task of institutional design, the development of 
regulatory policies and institutions for the legal profession. For that reason it 
has intertwined the empirical and the normative--explanatory social science, the 
theory of deliberative democracy, and policy studies of regulation and access to 
justice. Like the architectural design of a building which must use principles of 
lO Thus Pettit (1997) moves from a concern with possible republican social policies (in 
his Chapter Five) to a concern with checking the nimperium" of government in Chapter 
Six. 
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aesthetics together with laws of physics and engineering, the design of social 
institutions must marry normative and empirical considerations (Goodin 1996). 
A purely empirical consideration of lawyers' regulation could not have grounded 
a regulatory policy for the profession which envisioned lawyers as much more 
than technical functionaries. The investigation of lawyers' regulation presented 
here was informed by a concern with access to justice which was grounded in the 
data of how people complain about lawyers, how lawyers think about the moral 
guidance of their professional work, and how lawyering is actually structured. 
The analysis was enlivened by a republican theory of justice through deliberation 
and the rule of law. Using this normative basis the thesis has been able to show 
how lawyers can be of great significance in a democratic sociopolity, and how 
they might be encouraged to live up to their own and citizens' aspirations of their 
place in the republic of justice. 
While normative visions of justice might enliven research into particular policy 
areas such as the regulatory reform of lawyers, the translation of normative 
concerns of political theory into concrete contexts can also show how those 
theories need to be adjusted; normative theories for sociologically impossible 
worlds are not very useful. The kind of policy-oriented empirical analysis of 
lawyers and access to justice attempted here can contribute to a more fine-
grained analysis of the role of law in the theory of deliberative democracy, at the 
same time that democratic theory can be used to throw light on the problem of 
lawyers' regulation. Ultimately the institutions which are reshaped as a result of 
such a dialectical process of institutional design can themselves be subject to 
empirical testing against the ideals they are supposed to achieve.11 
The regulatory arrangements for the legal profession advocated here would 
institutionalise this type of intellectual discourse between theory and policy into 
a practical discourse between profession, state and community about how 
lawyers can continually improve their delivery of access to justice goals. Both 
the theory of democracy and the practice of access to justice have tended to give 
law and lawyers too dominating a place in the republic of justice. When the 
11 For example colleagues in the republican justice group at the Australian National 
University have helped implement community justice conferencing in drink driving 
cases in Canberra and are now testing whether dialogic regulation is more effective 
than criminal trials in preventing recidivism and securing procedural justice. The data 
on preventing recidivism and ultimately road deaths is not yet available, but early 
data on citizens' perceptions they are treated fairly, with rights respected and some 
influence over the process, suggest that citizen conferences outperform courts (Barnes 
1996). 
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legalism of lawyers' justice is channelled and constrained by the deliberation of 
citizens, then lawyers can contribute to a community in which the doing of justice 
is an everyday event, concrete and common, not just the rarefied edicts of 
legislatures and appellate courts. 
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